University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
The Montana Constitution Collection
1971

Report Number 14: The Judiciary
Montana. Constitutional Convention Commission

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/montanaconstitution

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Montana. Constitutional Convention Commission, "Report Number 14: The Judiciary" (1971). The
Montana Constitution Collection. 33.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/montanaconstitution/33

This Commission Studies is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It
has been accepted for inclusion in The Montana Constitution Collection by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

ItEI'OHT \l MitEH

14

The Judiciary

Prepared By:

Montana
7nf!Tn^TTunfi

ConrentMn
Coininission

lll'jf

';/342/Rep.

fjn...

ll/CZJ

Constitutxonal

Montana.
Convention Coramissxon
Tl^e Judiciary

S

342
Rep. 14
C72j

Corastitutional Convention

Montana

Commission
The Judiciary

Si

Alt uuuuA'jtr^iS

W^ONTAI^A STATE LIBRARY
930 E-sr Lyncljij Avenue
Helena, Montana 59601'

MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
1971-1972

THE JUDICIARY
By SANDRA R. MUCKELSTON

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION STUDY NO. 14
PREPARED BY

MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMISSION

A

MONTANA
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMISSION
COMMISSION MEMBERS
Chairman
ALEXANDER BLEWETT
Great Falls

Viae Chairman

EUGENE H. MAHONEY
Thompson Falls

CHARLES A. BOVEY
Great Falls

JACK S. BRENNER
Grant

MRS. FIRMAN
Missoula

ARTHUR C. HAGENSTON
Glendive

CHARLES
Butte

L.

H.

BROWN

HARRINGTON

CLYDE L. HAWKS
St. Xavier

EUGENE PHILLIPS
Kaliapell

CLYDE A. RADER
Hardin

C.

R.

H.

"TY" ROBINSON

LEONARD A. SCHULZ
Dillon

Missoula

WILLIAM G. STERNHAGEN

RANDALL SWANBERG
Great Falls

He lena

BRUCE R. TOOLE

DR. ELLIS WALDRON
Missoula

Bil lings

COMMISSION STAFF
DALE A. HARRIS
Exeautive Director

JERRY R. HOLLORON
Assistant Director

ROGER A. BARBER
Counsel

SANDRA R. MUCKELSTON
Counsel

P. RICK APPLEGATE
Research Analyst

KAREN D. BECK
Research Analyst

RICHARD F. BECHTEL
Research Analyst

BRUCE R. SIEVERS
Research Analyst

JAMES T. GRADY
Research Analyst

KAREN C. NYBERG
Convention Arrangements

BARTLEY 0. CARSON
Executive Secretary

BEVERLY HILGER
Secretary

JUANITA FONT AN
Librarian

ALICE BERNER
Secretary

DEE ANN CHRISTIANSEN
Secretary

ROSEMARY S. ACHER
Secretary

JANE B. JONES
Secretary

GAIL M. SMITH
Secretary
11

PREFACE

The delegates to the 19 71-19 72 Montana Constitutional Convention will need historical, legal and comparative information
Recognizing this need, the
about the Montana Constitution.
1971 Legislative Assembly created the Constitutional Convention Commission and directed it to assemble and prepare essential
information for the Convention. This series of reports by the
Commission is in fulfillment of that responsibility.

This study on the judiciary in Montana was written by Sandra
The Commission has authorized
R. Muckelston, research analyst.
approved
by the Research Subpxiblication of the report as
committee on The Judiciary consisting of Commission members
Gene Phillips, Kalispell; Leonard A. Schulz, Dillon; William
Sternhagen, Helena; Randall Swanberg Great Falls, and Bruce
Toole, Billings.
The report analyzes the effects of the
judicial article in the present Montana Constitution. Constitutional provisions and trends from other states are used
for comparative purposes.
,

The Commission extends its appreciation to local and state
officials who cooperated in the preparation of the study.
This report is respectfully submitted to the people of Montana
and their delegates to the 1971-1972 Constitutional Convention.

ALEXANDER BLEWETT
CHAIRMAN
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Men are insisting as
The time is ripe for betterment
perhaps never before^ that the law shall be made true to
its ideal of justice.
.

.

.

Benjamin N. Cardozo
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SUMMARY

CHAPTER

I

PERSPECTIVE
A fundamental problem in societal organization is peaceful
In societies based on law, this
resolution of disputes.
responsibility has been delegated to the judicial branch of
However, the role of the judiciary in American
government.
society has been the subject of a philosophical tug-of-war.
Some advocated that the judicial branch should be free of
dependence on any other branch of government as well as the
public.
The concept of an independent judiciary was challenged early in the nineteenth century when concern with
the extension of judicial activities culminated in moves to
The result was popular control of the
check judicial power.
judiciary, that is, the election of state judges by the
public and limited terms in office. Thus, consideration of
the judicial article of the Montana Constitution must be
weighed in light of two seemingly inconsistent interests:
an independent judiciary and popular control of the judiciary.
Both will be particularly significant in relation
to court administration, judicial selection and in determining which judicial provisions should be self-executing
and which should be left to legislative implementation.

Unfortunately, the judiciary is the least known and least
understood of the three branches of government, particularly
on the state level.
Surrounded by a complex network of procedure, structure and technical terminology, the judicial
system is cloaked in an aura of mystery for most citizens.
Improvement in judicial administration, however, can be
accomplished only by citizen involvement.
Since the effectiveness of a judicial system depends on the framework of
the judicial article, constitutional reform affords Montana
citizens the opportunity to create a modern judicial system
equipped to cope with the demands of change.

CHAPTER II

JUDICIAL SYSTEMS
The general organization of judicial systems in the United
States follows a three- or four-tiered hierarchical pattern,
On the federal level, there is a three-tier court str ucture
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Supreme Court of the United States (court of last resort)
United States courts of appeal (intermediate appellate
courts) and United States district courts (trial courts of
State court systems are similar to
general jurisdiction)
the federal structure except they are usually a four-level
Unlike the federal system, nearly all state court
system.
systems include courts of limited jurisdiction.
,

Montana follows the four-tier system. The five-member
Montana Supreme Court hears appeals from district courts,
exercises limited original jurisdiction through the issuance of extraordinary writs and has supervisory control
over all inferior courts.
The trial courts of general jurisdiction are district courts.
There are twenty-eight district judges serving in eighteen
judicial districts in the state.
Besides exercising general
civil and criminal jurisdiction, except in those jurisdictional areas carved out for courts of limited jurisdiction,
the district courts hear appeals from police and justice of
the peace courts and review actions of various administrative
agencies.
The Montana Constitution directs that two justices of the
Justice of the peace
peace shall serve in each township.
courts exercise civil jurisdiction limited by a maximum
amount of $3 00 and criminal jurisdiction over misdemeanors.
In addition, these courts have jurisdiction over some matters
concurrent with the state district courts.

While the preceding courts are established in the Constitution, police and municipal courts are statutory in origin.
Police courts operate in municipalities with jurisdiction
over violations of municipal ordinances and in other areas
concurrent with justice of the peace courts. Municipal
courts were established by the legislature in 1935 to supplant police courts in municipalities with a population of
20,000 or more; however, this form of court has not been
adopted anywhere in the state.

Most judicial offices in the state are elective. Supreme and
district court judges are elected on a nonpartisan ballot;
election of justices of the peace and police judges is partisan.
Qualifications for judicial office vary, but only
supreme and district court judgeships require a law degree.
The amount of compensation for all judges is set by the legislature except police judges' salaries which are determined
The state finances the salaries
by municipal governments.
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of supreme and district court judges; however, the operating
expenses of district courts are met by the counties within
Expenditures for other courts are
each judicial district.
paid by counties or municipalities.

CHAPTER III
COURT ORGANIZATION
Two areas of critical concern in writing a judicial article
The former reare court organization and court personnel.
court
structure
efficiency
of
the
the
operating
lates to
in providing
regard
to
the
problems
inherent
without
itself
court manpower.

A detailed judicial article in the Montana Constitution,
supplemented by legislation, has produced a fragmented
judicial system composed of 246 courts.
Each court operates
as an autonomous unit, financed by multiple sources without centralized administration of the system as a whole.
Operational statistics on courts are nonexistent. Clearly,
the court structure in Montana does not operate as a coordinated unit.
This type of structural disorganization has been the subject
of judicial reform since the beginning of the twentieth
century.
The impetus of reform in the organization of court
systems usually has been the demand for a more eff i*. lent adjudication of civil and criminal cases. Taxed by a flood
of litigation, the courts have had to look for new procedures
and administrative techniques to cope with modern judicial
business.
Piecemeal reform, however, has not cured the ills,
and steps have been taken by some states to reorganize their
judicial systems entirely.
The primary objective of structural reorganization has been
court unification.
In its most simplified form, a court
structure involves two levels of jurisdiction: a court of
general trial jurisdiction where a case is instituted, the
facts are established and a judgment rendered, and a court
of appellate jurisdiction where errors in the original proceeding can be corrected. Various factors have interrupted
this concept, creating fragmentation.
Demands for local administration of justice produced justices of the peace and
other local courts.
Instances of recurring litigation in
the same area of the law produced specialized courts, such

-3-
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as those for probate, divorce, traffic offenses and juvenile
matters. As more levels of courts were added, functions of
From this functional
the various courts began to overlap.
duplication, a waste of manpower and a proliferation of forms,
inconsistent practices and procedures ensued.

The underlying rationale of a unified court system is to
create a cohesive unit of court operations by consolidating
state courts to produce a simplified judicial structure.
Concomitantly the administration of the state judicial system
can be centralized by vesting the supreme court, the chief
justice, an independent court administrator or a judicial
council with administrative control. Consolidation of courts
and centralized administration can provide, with the aid of
the rule-making power of the supreme court, a vehicle for
more prompt, efficient administration of justice.

There is, however, no final consensus as to what constitutes
unification. According to some authorities, unification can
be approached two ways:
by simplifying court structure through
consolidation of jurisdictions or elimination of court levels,
or by centralizing administrative authority over the operations
of the judicial system.
Most reform advocates consider structural and administrative unification as part and parcel of
a unified judicial system, both necessary to complete the
concept of unification.
In relation to court structure, one
authority on court reform has suggested that the logical result of unification is the establishment of a two-level judiciary
a single statewide court of justice with a unified
trial division and a unified appellate division.
The concept of a two-level court structure, however, poses problems
when various minor courts exist in a state judicial system.

—

Minor Courts
Justice of the peace courts are the only courts
of limited jurisdiction granted constitutional status in
Montana. A major issue is whether this present minor court
level should be maintained.
Reform of minor courts has taken
place in thirty-one other states either by upgrading the qualifications for minor court judges, replacing these courts with
another form of court or deleting reference to these courts
from the state constitution and leaving reform of the minor
court level to the legislature.
The primary objections to the justice of the peace system
appear to be:
1.

Lack of legal training.

-4-
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states with justice of the peace courts do not require
justices to have legal training. Authors of a 1967 study of
Montana's judicial system contended that the overwhelming
majority of justices of the peace and police judges lack
the requisite knowledge to decide many of the cases presented
To compensate for the lack of legal trainin their courts.
ing of these minor court judges, appeals are allowed to the
district court. On appeal the entire case is tried anew;
this not only adds to the caseload burden of district courts
but gives the person charged with a misdemeanor or involved
in a minor civil suit the right to have his case heard twice.
2.
The fee system as the basis of compensation.
Fees
or court costs are the sole basis of compensation for about
85 percent of the justices of the peace in Montana.
The impartiality of judges operating under the fee system has been

questioned

.

Inadequate courtroom facilities. Since many citizens
3.
have their initial contact with the administration of justice
in a J. P. court, public esteem for the entire state judicial
process may be lessened if this court creates a bad impression.
Courtroom facilities are important in providing an
atmosphere for the dispensing of justice; however, in 1966
less than 30 percent of justices of the peace in Montana held
court in a courtroom. Proceedings were conducted in a newspaper office, railroad depot and private homes.
Furthermore, the Montana study revealed that minor courts are
relatively inactive in civil work, criminal work is limited
primarily to collection of fines, and justice of the peace
courts have an irrational geographical distribution.
The alternatives in relation to justice of the peace courts
in Montana seem to be (1) maintain the constitutional status
of J. P. courts, (2) delete constitutional reference to these
courts, delegating responsibility to the legislature for
lower court reform, (3) replace those courts with another
form of court or (4) consolidate the jurisdiction of minor
courts into one general trial court with auxiliary judicial
officers such as magistrates and commissioners, utilized by
federal courts and other state systems, to supplement the
judicial staff of district courts.

Centralized Administration. Since state court systems are
large-scale business operations, application of business

-5-
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management principles is necessary. The primary objective
in centralizing the administration of all courts within the
state is to systematize the operations of the judicial system.
An administrative office in the judiciary could provide compilation of caseload statistics, preparation of a budget for
the entire judicial system, assignment of judges to equalize
workloads, supervision of court personnel and facilities and
assistance in the determination of procedures for channeling
litigation through the various steps in the judicial process.
Since most of these services are not coordinated on a statewide basis in Montana, consideration may be given to granting
administrative supervision to the supreme court or an outSeventeen states have conside agency in the constitution.
stitutional provisions vesting administrative authority in
In addition, thirty-five states
the state's highest court.
provide by constitution or statute for the appointment of
a state court administrator to work with the supreme court.
Nearly all states employ a judicial conference or council to
serve as advisory bodies to the courts; however, the office
of court administrator is gradually taking over the functions
performed by these councils.

An adjunct to administrative authority in a unified court
system is the authority to make rules of court administration,
dealing v/ith the internal operations of the judiciary, and
procedural rules, dealing with the mechanics of litigation.
Since there is no express grant of rule-making authority in
the Montana Constitution, the power has been exercised by
the legislature, which has delegated some authority to the
supreme court to make procedural rules subject to legislative modification. Administrative rules may be made by
each district court and the supreme court in Montana; however, the district court rules cannot conflict with supreme
court rules, which again are subject to legislative modification.
In examination of the practice of other states, the issue
posed is whether rule-making power should be vested exclusively in the supreme court, vested in the court subject to
legislative approval or veto, or vested exclusively in the
legislature. Most authorities advocating modernization of
court administration believe administrative rules should be
made by the supreme court to enable uniformity of court
practices.
In the area of procedural rule-making, there
Some believe that it is
are opposing schools of thought.
a judicial function while others believe it is legislative
since substantive rights may be affected.

-6-
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Court Financing. To some reformists, full state assumption
of court expenses seems to be a logical concomitant of a unified judicial system. One observer noted that efforts to
centralize administration of a court system can fail if
financing depends upon local appropriations.
In Montana, the state finances the salaries of supreme court
and district court judges and the operational expenses of the
supreme court.
Counties bear the costs of district court
operations and justice of the peace courts. Municipalities
finance salaries of police judges. According to a federal
census study, the state assumes only 29 percent of all court
costs.
However, state-local sharing appears to be the norm
in court financing.
Only five states pay virtually all the
costs of courts.
One model article provides for state assumption of all court costs, but permits the legislature to determine a method of reimbursement from political subdivisions
for appropriate portions of the cost.
The treatment of court
financing in the Montana Constitution will depend on whether
minor courts are retained or eliminated.

Other considerations in the area of court organization will
be whether provision should be made for creation of an intermediate appellate court should the need arise; whether the
present composition of the supreme court should be enlarged;
whether the use of retired judges as a source of emergency
manpower should be constitutionally provided; whether the
judge pro tempore provision should be retained; whether the
elaboration of jurisdiction, judicial districts and number
of judgeships in the present Constitution is necessary, and
whether many of the miscellaneous sections of the judicial
article could be omitted.

CHAPTER IV
COURT PERSONNEL
Since competent judges are essential elements of an effective
judicial system, the problems of court personnel are equally
as important as the area of court organization.
How to select
judicial officers and how to remove those who falter in their
duties will be primary considerations.

-7-
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Judicial Selection. Debate has flourished over what method
election or
is best suited to select a competent judiciary;
appointment. For almost seventy-five years following independence, executive appointment of judges subject to legislative
approval prevailed in this country. However, the winds of
change were evident as early as 1793 when Georgia became the
first state to adopt the principle of popular election of
judges

Many factors contributed to the growing demand for popular
control of the judiciary. First, the decision in Marbury v.
Madison a federal Supreme Court case, established that the
court had the power to determine the constitutionality of
Some regarded this extension of judicial power
legislation.
as an infringement on the separation of powers between the
judicial and legislative branches. Second, early American
judges were compelled to make interstitial law when common
law precedents were not applicable to colonial problems.
This was regarded as an usurpation of the legislative funcThird, the debt collection and foreclosure of morttion.
gages which occurred after the American Revolution led to
open revolt against courts and lawyers. The advent of
Jacksonian Democracy advocating control of government by
the common man climaxed the argument for popular control of
the judiciary.
New York's decision in 1846 to adopt the
elective method ushered in the era of elected state judges
throughout the country. Most of the existing states followed
New York's example within a short period and each new state
that entered the Union thereafter followed suit. When the
control over the judiciary by political parties was recognized,
many states instituted nonpartisan elections. For some, however, the elective process in its entirety was an anathema
and the call for a new approach to judicial selection was
issued.
The embryo of merit selection began taking form in
the 1930s and was implemented full-scale in Missouri in 1940.
,

Today there are five main methods of selecting appellate and
major trial court judges used by the states: partisan election, nonpartisan election, appointment by the legislature,
appointment by the executive and the merit plan. The latter
also is known as the Missouri plan, the ABA plan or the
appointive-elective plan.
Popular election of judges has been the basis of judicial
selection in Montana since statehood. The Constitution of
1889 directs that supreme court justices, district court
judges and justices of the peace shall be elected but is
silent on the means by which the elections are to be conducted.
In 1935 nonpartisan election of district and supreme
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It is something of a misnomer,
court judges was instituted.
however, to labia Montana's method of selecting supreme court
and district court judges as "elective." Article VIII, Section 34 of the Montana Constitution provides that vacancies
in these judicial positions are to be filled by gubernatorial
appointment.
Interim appointments in fact have filled more
of the five supreme court
judicial posts than election:
justices presently serving, four were initially appointed to
office; of the twenty-eight district court judges, at least
three-fourths of them were originally appointed to office.
Most of these men have been successfully re-elected, supporting the political adage that it is difficult to unseat
an incumbent; thus, the original selection of most of Montana's
appellate and trial court judges is not by the people but by
the governor

Popular election of judges still prevails in over half of the
states.
Partisan elections are used in seventeen states; nonpartisan elections are employed in fifteen states. Nine states,
Puerto Rico and the federal system allow the executive to
appoint judges. Five states use appointment by the legislature.
The most recent trend is merit selection of judges, which has
been employed in some form or another in fourteen states.

Merit selection combines aspects of both the appointive and
elective systems with a nominating commission. The three
elements embodied in this plan include:
1.
Nomination of slates of judicial candidates by
nonpartisan lay-professional nominating commissions;
2.
Appointment by the chief executive of local and state
government of judges from the slate of candidates submitted by the nominating commission; and
3
Review of appointments by voters in succeeding
elections in which judges run unopposed on the sole question
of whether their records merit retention in office.

The argument most frequently raised against the plan is that
it is "undemocratic" because it deprives the people of the
right to decide for themselves what members of the legal profession should sit as judges.
In rebuttal, proponents of the
plan claim that merit selection gives citizens more voice in
the initial selection of judges, through representation on
the nominating commission, than now exists in those states
where interim gubernatorial appointments fill most judicial
posts.
Furthermore, proponents claim that merit selection
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removes the judiciary from politics more than any other method.

Qualifications of Judges. Once the method of selecting judges
has been determined, the next question is what qualifications
for judicial office should be set in the constitution.
Should
judges of all courts within the state be required to have legal
training? Resolution of this issue will depend on whether or
not the status of minor courts is changed.
The judicial article of the Montana Constitution prescribes
qualifications only for supreme court and district court
judges: minimum age (30 for supreme court and 25 for district
court)
United States citizenship; admission to the practice
of law, and state residence (two years for supreme court and
one year for district court)
More than three-fourths of the
other state constitutions explicitly prescribe federal or
state citizenship as a prerequisite for office. Residence
in the state or district is required in forty states, the
number of years ranging from one year to ten years. Fortyone states require judges of higher courts to be members of
the legal profession, but the growing trend is to stipulate
a certain number of years of legal experience, varying in
length from four to ten years.
;

.

The problem of judicial qualifications is directly related to
If merit selwhich method of judicial selection is chosen.
ection with a nominating commission is utilized, the commission may be best equipped to determine what qualities are
necessary for Montana judges. The constitution may set out
minimum requirements or may merely state that judges "shall
possess such qualifications as may be prescribed by law."
An alternative to leaving the definition of judicial qualifications to the legislature would be to empower the supreme
coiirt to define qualifications through its rule-making power.

Removal and Discipline of Judges.
Impeachment is the sole
method of removing supreme and district court judges provided in the Montana Constitution. All other judicial officers are subject to removal by legislative provisions.
Experience here and in other states indicates that there is
a question whether impeachment alone meets the disciplinary
requisites necessary to maintain a competent, efficient judiciary. Although the judges' pension plan in Montana requires
retirement at the. age of 70 in order to receive benefits,
there may be instances where retirement is necessary before
that age is reached.

Modern innovations in the area of judicial removal and dis-
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cipline procedures are the Court on the Judiciary in New
York, Delaware and Oklahoma, and the commission plan, pioneered
in California and adopted in twenty-one other states.
The
Court on the Judiciary is a specially constituted court where
removal and disciplinary sanctions are imposed by appellate
court judges. The commission plan utilizes judges, attorneys
and lay membership which recommends disciplinary measures to
The advantage offered by the comthe state's highest court.
mission plan is that investigations are conducted in confidence until a recommendation is filed with the court.
If a procedure for removal and discipline is to be incorporated into Montana's Constitution, either in place of impeachment or in addition to it, the following are basic considerations:
Should the constitutional provision create the machinery or
should it merely describe the process required and leave implementation to the legislature? Which governmental body
should have the ultimate responsibility for removal and discipline of the judiciary? Should the sanctions imposed and
grounds for removal be enumerated specifically? Should all
judges in the state be subject to the same removal and disciplinary procedures?

Restrictions on Non-Judicial Conduct. State constitutions
usually contain sections in their judicial articles restricting non- judicial activities.
The objective of such sections
is to remove possible conflicts of interest which would affect a judge's objectivity.
Questions facing the Convention
may be whether restrictions on off-bench conduct should be
placed in the constitution or left to legislation, rules of
the supreme court or regulations of another agency such as
a removal commission.
If restrictions are incorporated into
the constitution, what should they include? Should these
restrictions apply uniformly to all judicial officers?
The judicial article of the Montana Constitution contains
three sections which proscribe off-bench conduct of supreme
and district court judges.
These proscriptions seem to
focus on three areas:
(1) practicing law as an attorney,
(2) holding any other public office, and (3) receiving
money or any other article of value for or on account of a
judicial position. This latter restriction is contained
in a section which also prohibits receipt of allowance or
mileage, yet supreme court and district court judges are
allowed per diem and mileage by state statutes. The restrictions contained in the Montana Constitution are similar
to those provided in other state constitutions; however,
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newer constitutions tend to incorporate prohibited activities
into one blanket provision.
Tenure, Compensation and Retirement. Tenure is the length of
There are two types:
limited
time a judge serves in office.
tenure (service for a specified length of time after which
the judge must be re-elected or reappointed) and, lifetime
tenure. The Montana Constitution fixes the terms of office
of supreme court justices as six years, district judges as
four years and justices of the peace as two years.
The
Convention may wish to consider whether these terms should
remain the same, whether tenure of all judges should be stated
in the constitution or whether tenure of minor court judges
should be left to legislation. Most state constitutions and
the federal constitution enumerate the tenure of appellate
and trial court judges; state constitutions may fix terms of
The question of tenure depends upon
inferior judges as well.
Judges selected under the
the method of judicial selection.
merit plan or elected to office serve limited terms in office.
Appointed appellate judges frequently enjoy lifetime tenure.
The issue of lifetime tenure vs. limited tenure usually revolves around appellate judgeships. The tenure of appellate
judges in other states runs the gamut from one year in Vermont
New
to life appointment in Massachusetts and Rhode Island.
Hampshire and Puerto Rico have terms which last until the
judge reaches 7 years of age.

Compensation is a major factor in attracting capable persons
to the bench and in maintaining the independence and impartiality of judges while in office. The amount of judicial
compensation is a legislative, not a constitutional, problem.
Usually the only reference to judicial salaries in a state
constitution is a clause prohibiting diminution of judicial
salaries during terms of office and a clause which directs
The only
the state to pay all or certain judicial salaries.
the
should
assume
issue presented here is whether the state
salaries,
rather
judicial
responsibility of financing all
than financing only supreme court and district court compensation
.

Retirement provisions, along with tenure and compensation,
determines the attractiveness of judicial positions. The
only constitutional issues involved are whether a mandatory
retirement age should be stipulated and whether post-retirement service of judges should be allowed. Since the judges'
pension plan allows post-retirement service, it may be superfluous to repeat it in the constitution. As for mandatory
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retirement, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations reported that at least twenty-three states by
either statutory or constitutional mandate require retirement
at age 70.
Since retirement by age 70 is required under
Montana's pension program if a judge wishes to receive benefits, the Convention must resolve whether this issue should
receive constitutional mention.

Clerks of Court and County Attorneys.
Two sections of the
judicial article in the Montana Constitution are devoted to
clerks.
The office of clerk of the supreme court is established in one and district clerks of court are defined in
the other.
The purpose of these sections is to establish
the offices as elective and fix the terms of office.
The
questions raised by the provisions are whether the office
should continue to have constitutional status and whether the
office should be elective or appointive. The duties of clerks
on both court levels are administrative in nature:
collecting
fees, filing legal papers, issuing writs and other documents
and maintaining records.
Thus, the office is necessary to
the efficient administration of the judicial system.
However,
centralized administration can be hampered at the lower levels
by an elected clerk.
Election bestows independence upon an
administrative official and allows him to resist cooperation
and coordination.
Four state constitutions provide for election of supreme
court clerks.
In twenty-seven state constitutions, state
supreme court clerks are appointed. The Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations reported that in thirty-three
states, the clerks of trial courts of general jurisdiction
are elected either by statutory or constitutional provisions.
However, in some states, such as Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii and
New Mexico, trial court clerks are appointed.
The judicial article of the Montana Constitution also establishes the office of county attorney. Questions posed are
whether the office should continue to have constitutional
status; if so, should the office be established in the judicial article or in another, such as the local government
article? Should the geographical unit served by these attorneys continue to be counties or might judicial districts be
more realistic subdivisions? Should the office continue to
be elective?

Thirty-seven states give constitutional status to prosecuting
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attorneys; in thirty-six of these constitutions, the office
Under New Jersey's Constitution, the county
is elective.
prosecutor is appointed by the governor with the consent of
Approximately twelve states use district attorthe senate.
neys rather than county attorneys.

Two problems related to the issue of district attorney vs.
county attorney are the sharing arrangements for prosecutor's
salaries and the part-time nature of the office. A recent
report on local prosecutors showed that seven states share
the cost of prosecutors' salaries with local governmental
subdivisions. Twenty-five states require county governments
to pay the entire salary while fourteen states assiome the
In Montana the salary is paid
full cost of his salary.
The amount of
half by the state and half by the county.
schedule
legislative
a
determined
by
annual compensation is
county.
of
the
valuation
taxable
based on population and
However, the low pay scale for these offices in Montana
causes most county attorneys to resort to private practice
The result
in addition to their office responsibilities.
office.
One
of
duties
the
the
is part-time attention to
ofthese
consolidating
obtained
in
advantage which may be
comhigher
is
position
attorney's
fices into a district
pensation since salaries could be pro-rated among the counties
within the district and the state.

-14-

"

CHAPTER

I

PERSPECTIVE
In a society where the individualist ethic is paramount,
Peaceful resolucompetition and conflict are inevitable.
large-scale
prerequisite
to
conflict
becomes
a
of
tion
functions
of every state
organization.-'Fundamental
group
are to protect itself from internal breaches of the peace,
prevent undermining of the social order and keep open the
avenues of social progress. ^ in this process, the judiciThe courts "provide the inary plays a prominent role.
strumentality for the trial of disputes between the individuals and between the state and individuals for the
protection of human beings living in organized society.

ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY

Two concepts underlie any discussion of the judicial branch
in relation to the public and to the other branches of
government: An independent judiciary and popular control
Both control the scope of power the
of the judiciary.
judiciary may exercise.
To preserve separation of powers and insure the impartiality
The
of judges, and independent judiciary seems necessary.
framers of the federal Constitution, reacting to the abuse
of judicial power by English judges who served at the pleasure
of the king, recognized the importance of an independent
judiciary and provided for lifetime tenure and appointment
to the federal bench by the President with the advice and
consent of the senate. According to Alexander Hamilton,
however, complete independence was not attained:

Whoever attentively considers the different
departments of power must perceive that, in
a government in which they are separated from
each other, the judiciary, from the nature of
its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in capacity
to annoy or injure them.
The Executive not only
dispenses honors, but holds the sword of the
community.
The legislature not only commands
the purse, but prescribes the rules by which
the duties and rights of every citizen are to
be regulated.
The judiciary, on the contrary,
has no influence over either the sword or the
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purse; no direction either of the strength or
of the wealth of the society; and can take no
It may truly be
active resolution whatever.
said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the
aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy
^
of its judgment
.

.

.

Early in the nineteenth century, the doctrine of an independent judiciary was weakened by a view that judges should
The extension of judicial
be accountable to the people.
court
resulted in a fear of
unpopular
decisions
activity and
judicial power.
"A belief grew that judicial independence
and lack of responsibility to the people were dangerous and
undemocratic." 5
[T] he new liberalism was most strongly under
way in the new states west of the mountains,
where social and political equality had been
established by the conditions of life, and
where a bold and energetic people were jealous
of their local political powers and impatient
This new political force
of legal restraints.
triumphed completely in 1828 with the election of
Jackson.
He was the living embodiment of the
political creed of the frontier people, who believed that everything should be decided according to the popular will.
.

.

.

[T]he Federal courts [stood] in the way of
Jackson, who conceived a popular mandate to be
.superior to any court's interpretation of the
Constitution, and considered himself to be the
exponent and the instrument of the popular will.
A conspicuous example of that attitude was his
open defiance of three separate decisions of the
Supreme Court upholding the treaty rights of the
Cherokee Indians in Georgia, which he refused
to enforce. ^
In this period a movement to diminish the authority of courts
Lifetime tenure and the method of judicial selection
began.
were attacked. Only the federal courts survived the onslaught.
On the state level, the result was limited terms of office
and popular election of judges.
,

The curtailment of judicial power in the name of popular
In 1832
sovereignty was criticized from its beginning.
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Alexis de Tocqueville wrote:
I am aware that a secret tendency to diminish
the judicial power exists in the United
Some other state constitutions
States
make members of the judiciary elective, and they
I
are even subjected to frequent reelections.
venture to predict that these innovations will
sooner or later bo attended with fatal consequences; and that it will be found out at
some future period that by thus lessening the
independence of the judiciary they have attacked
not only the judicial power but the democratic
republic itself. ^

....

Others have refuted the idea of popular control by defining
the role of the judiciary in relation to the other branches
One commentator noted:
of government.

Popular government is necessarily government
The danger is always present
by a majority.
that a majority of the people at any time may
use its powers in an arbitrary manner to oppress
One of the great problems
the minority.
confronting a people in establishing a popular
government is that of providing means by which
this danger may be avoided.
Experience has
shown that this can be done in but one way;
namely, by entrusting to the courts the duty
of seeing that no branch of the government,
nor all the branches combined, shall take any
action contrary to law or in violation of the
rights guaranteed to individuals.
.

.

.

The result of doing this is to give to the
judicial branch of government a status quite
distinct from that of the other branches.
In the first place, it occupies the anomalous
position of being at once a branch of government and yet standing outside of, or at least
independent of, the government in order that
Secondly,
it may restrain the government.
courts are in the equally anomalous position
of being agents of the people and yet not
representative of the people in the same way
as the other branches, since their duty is not
that of carrying out the will of the people,
as represented by a majority of such people,
but, on the contrary, of protecting the minority.
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no matter how small, whenever their rights are
threatened or interfered with by the majority.

^

When President William Taft vetoed a resolution providing
for the admission of Arizona and New Mexico as states
because their constitutions contained clauses which, in his
opinion, failed to adequately protect the independence of
judges, he stated:

The executive and legislative branches are
representatives of the majority of the people
who elect them in guiding the course of the
government within the limits of the constitution.
They must act for the whole people, of course;
but they may properly follow the views of the
majority which elected them in respect to the
governmental policy best adapted to secure the
welfare of the whole people. But the judicial
branch of the government is not representative
of a majority of the people in any such sense,
even if the mode of selecting judges is by
.They are not popular
popular election.
representatives. ^
.

.

Inherent in the concept of popular control of the judiciary is
judicial decisions should reflect not only substantive law but also the changing economic, social and
political theories of society.
This theory attributes a
policy-making function to the judicial branch. A 1908
presidential address posed the possible conflict between
judicial and legislative functions when the courts are required to reflect community attitudes:

a iDelief that

The chief lawmakers in our country may be,
and often are, the judges, because they are
Every time they
the final seat of authority.
interpret contract, property, vested rights,
due process of law, liberty, they necessarily
enact into law parts of a system of social
philosophy; and as such interpretation is fundamental, they give directions to all law-making.
The decisions of the courts on economic and social
questions depend upon their economic and social
philosophy; and for the peaceful progress of our
people during the twentieth century we shall owe
most to those judges who hold to a twentieth
century economic and social philosophy and not
to a long outgrown philosophy. ... Of course
a judge's views on progressive social philosophy are entirely second in importance to his
-18-

PERSPECTIVE

possession of a high and fine character.
But it is also true that judges, like executives
and legislators, should hold sound views on the
questions of public policy which are of vital
interest to the people.
.

.

.

The legislators and executives are chosen to
represent the people in enacting and administerThe judges are not chosen to
ing the laws.
represent the people in this sense. Their
The legislators
function is to interpret the laws.
are responsible for the laws; the judges for the
spirit in which they interpret and enforce the
[I]nasinuch as judges are chosen
laws.
to serve the interests of the whole people, they
should strive to find out what those interests
are, and, so far as they conscientiously can,
should strive to give effect to popular conviction when deliberately and duly expressed
.But for the courts
by the lawmaking body.
to arrogate to themselves functions which
properly belong to the legislative bodies is
all wrong, and in the end works mischief.
The
people should not be permitted to pardon evil
and slipshod legislation on the theory that the
court will set it right; they should be taught that
the right way to get rid of a bad law is to have
the legislature repeal it, and not to have the
courts by ingenious hair-splitting nullify it. 10
.

.

.

.

.

Thus, consideration of the judicial article of the Montana
Constitution must be weighed in light of two seemingly inconsistent interests. An independent judiciary and popular
control of the judiciary will be significant factors in relation to administration of courts, judicial selections,
qualifications and tenure, and in determining which judicial
provisions should be self-executing and which should be left
to legislative implementation.

ROLE OF THE PUBLIC
The judicial article of a constitution serves as the foundation of a judicial system.
The bones and sinew of the system
are its courts and judges.
These elements are interdependent.
Judges need the court mechanism in order to function, and
courts are ineffective without judicial manpower.
The problems within one area influence the other:
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The judicial task has many facets and the duties
and functions of the judges are far from simple.
Recognition that large discretionary powers
should be vested in the court to control its
procedure and the management of its business
presupposes the selection of able, experienced,
Improvement
conscientious and unbiased judges.
organization
and
court
procedure
of
of judicial
relation
of
the
most
essential
but
the
is
character of the judiciary to these consideraThe best
tions cannot be overestimated.
organization of the courts will be ineffective,
if the judges who man it are lacking in the
necessary qualifications. A court cannot exist
without a judge and proper administrative supervision of the judicial system as a whole by an
able judiciary is of much importance in helping
the judge in his fundamental task of administering justice. 11

Unfortunately, the judiciary is the least known and least understood of the three branches of government, particularly on the
Surrounded by a complex network of procedure,
state level.
structure and technical terminology, the judicial system is
cloaked in an aura of mystery for most citizens. The public
is limitedly aware of the product of judicial operations,
court decisions, but little attention is focused on the
realities of court functions or personnel problems.
Public concern, however, is essential to the effectiveness
The power of courts and judges is
of a judicial system.
They are all-powerful as long
"the power of public opinion.
as the people respect the law; but they would be impotent
against popular neglect or contempt of the law." '-^ In effect,
public attitude toward the entire legal order of society either
enhances or hampers the administration of justice. Citizens
judge the law not only by events observed in a courtroom as
litigants or members of juries but also by attitudes toward
law enforcement officials, toward attorneys who serve as
officers of the court and as a liaison between the public
and the judicial mechanism, and toward rising crime rates,
the spiraling cost of judicial administration and court
congestion and delay.

Improvement in judicial administration can be accomplished
only by citizen involvement:
[C]ourts are agencies of the government, and
fundamental court reform can be achieved only
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courts will
Our
by political action.
never be structured and reinforced to sustain
the burdens of the law explosion until it is
brought home to the public at large that justice
.

.

.

is everybody's business.

The Constitutional Convention affords Montana citizens the opportunity to create a modern judicial system equipped to cope with
problems arising from population expansion, continued technological innovations, increased litigation and shifts in economic
The ability of the judiciary to meet this challenge will
base.
depend on the framework of the judicial article.
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CHAPTER II

JUDICIAL SYSTEMS
The general organization of judicial systems in the United
States follows a three- or four-tiered hierarchical pattern,
Differences arise in the division of jurisdiction among
court levels and in the diversity of court personnel.

FEDERAL SYSTEM^
"The judicial power of
The Federal Constitution provides:
shall
States
be
vested
in
one supreme court,
the United
and such inferior courts as the congress may from time to
time ordain and establish. "^ Thus, Congress may establish
or abolish any federal court except the federal Supreme
Court.

The judicial power or jurisdiction of federal courts is
It extends
briefly enumerated in the Federal Constitution.
under
this
law
and
arising
"all
cases,
in
equity,
to (1)
[federal] constitution, the laws of the United States, and
treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority;"
(2) "all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls;"
(3) "all cases of admiralty and maritime juris"controversies
diction;"
to which the United States shall
(4)
be a party;"
"controversies
between two or more states;
(5)
between a state and citizens of another state; between citizens of different states; between citizens of the same state
claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state or the citizens thereof, and foreign states,
citizens, or subjects. "^
In actual practice, federal court cases are about equally
distributed among three types:
(1) cases in which the
United States is a party;
civil
cases involving a
(2)
federal question, and (3) civil cases involving parties
with diverse citizenship. The first category includes
both civil and criminal cases;
the latter are more
numerous because federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
in enforcing the federal criminal law.
Most of the civil
cases in the federal district courts fall within the last
two categories.
In each of these classes a minimum of
$10,000, exclusive of costs and interest, must be involved
in order for the case to be instituted in the district

courts.
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Supreme Court
The pyramidal structure of the federal judicial system is
illustrated in Table 1. At the apex of the pyramid stands
the Supreme Court of the United States, consisting of nine
justices appointed for life by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate.^ One justice is designated chief
justice and receives a salary of $40,000 a year.^ Other
justices receive an annual compensation of $39,500.6 The
officers appointed by the court include a clerk to keep its
records, a marshal to maintain order and supervise the
administrative affairs of the court, a reporter to publish
Court sessions begin the
its opinions and a librarian.
first Monday of October and continue to the following June.
The Federal Constitution does not define the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; instead, the task is
delegated to Congress.
By law, the court is vested with
discretionary power to decide whether to review a case.
This power was granted by Congress in 1916 and greatly increased in 1925; however, the court does not have complete
Where a federal court holds an act of Congress
discretion.
unconstitutional, or where a United States court of appeals
holds a state statute unconstitutional or invalid, an appeal
Likewise, where
to the Supreme Court is a matter of right.
the highest court of a state holds a federal law invalid or
upholds a state statute which is challenged as unconstitutionIn all other cases, even
al, an appeal is a matter of right.
though federal questions are involved, the Supreme Court may
exercise discretion in taking or rejecting the case. As a
matter of practice, if four of the nine justices vote to take
a case the court will grant certiorari and the case will be
The extent to which the discretion
set down for argument.
ie exercised is disclosed by the fact that from 1962 to
1965 5,967 cases were filed with the court but only 322
Of that number 224,
were disposed of with full opinions.
or 69 percent, were appeals from lower federal courts and
98, or 31 percent, were appeals from state courts.

Court of Appeals
The United States courts of appeals are the intermediate
The
appellate courts in the federal judicial system.
federal
district
from
the
courts of appeals review appeals
courts and the actions of various federal administrative
agencies.
The courts are located in eleven circuits composed of three or more states, the District of Columbia,
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TABLE

I

THE UNITED STATES COURT SYSTEM

SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF

UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS

CLAIMS

US. DISTRICT COURTS
with Federcl and

ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES

Locol Jurisdiction

District of

Federol Trade

Comm.

Columbio

National Lobor Rel.

COURTS

with Federal

87

CUSTOMS
COURT

Districts in

50

Guam
Virgin

US. DISTRICT

Jurisdiction only

Canal Zone

Tax Court

COURT OF CUSTOMS
AND PATENT APPEALS

CIRCUITS

II

Stoies

Puerto Rico
Islands

Appeals from

Board

State Courts

Etc.

in

50

States

Source:
Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr., The United States Courts
88th Congress, 1st Session, House Document No. 180 (Washington;
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 6.
,
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and the torritorios of Guam, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands
and the Canal Zone.
The geographical size of the circuits
vary.
The largest is the Ninth, which embraces the states
of Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
Oregon, Washington and Hawaii.
The smallest is the District
of Columbia.

The number of judges serving each circuit ranges from three
to fifteen depending upon the amount of work in each circuit,
The judge with the longest service, who has not reached 70
years of age, serves as chief judge of the circuit.
The
annual compensation of circuit court judges is $33,000.8

District Courts
The trial courts in the federal system are the U.S. District
Courts.
There are 101 district courts, ninety-six in the
fifty states and one each in the District of Columbia, the
Canal Zone, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
Districts were created to follow state lines as far as
possible; hence approximately half of the states are defined as federal districts with but one district court.
Thus, there is the United States District Court for the
District of Montana which sits in six divisions. 9 other
states are so populous and have such a volume of judicial
business that several districts have been created in them.
For example. New York, Texas and California have four
districts each.

Nationwide, there are 396 district judgeships. 10 The
number of judges serving in each district ranges from
one to twenty-seven. -LI Their annual compensation is
$30,000. -'-2 Other district court officers include clerks,
federal marshals, referees in bankruptcy, probation officers,
court reporters and magistrates.
Special Courts

Three special courts have been created by Congress to deal
with particular types of cases. The United States Court of
Claims consists of seven judges appointed for life and hears
suits on claims against the United States.
It consists of
seven judges who receive $33,000 in salary annually. 13
The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
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hears appeals from the Customs Court, the Tariff CommisFive judges with lifetime
sion and the Patent Office.
Their annual compensation is also
tenure preside.
$33,000.14 Appeals from the decisions of the Court of
Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals may be
heard by the federal Supreme Court.

The Customs Court consists of nine judges appointed for
life;
it determines controversies concerning the classification and valuation of imported merchandise, and consists
of nine judges appointed for life.
Their annual compensation
is $30,000.15

STATE COURT SYSTEMS

Although state judicial systems are similar to the federal
system in hierarchical arrangement, none is as simple as the
federal court system (see Table 2)
Unlike the federal
system, nearly all state court systems include courts of
limited jurisdiction.
.

Court of Last Resort
All state constitutions, except New Hampshire's, provide
for one court of last resort or ultimate review usually
known as the supreme court. 16 As indicated in Table 3,
the number of justices serving on the high courts varies
from three to nine, including a chief or presiding justice
and associate justices.
The court of last resort usually hears appeals from designated state courts, either trial courts or intermediate
appellate courts. Most appeals are entertained at the behest of dissatisfied litigants on a case-by-case basis.
The scope of judicial review is limited; the case is not
retried on the merits.
Rather, the court reviews the
record of the lower court proceedings to determine whether
the lower court committed error in its procedure or in
applying substantive law to the facts of the case.
Rarely
are the facts alone reviewed if there is only a conflict
in evidence, although the court may set aside a verdict if
it is unsupported by evidence.
Another method by which
the action of lower courts is reviewed is through the
issuance of extraordinary writs, such as mandamus, habeas
corpus and prohibition.
These writs are directive in
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STATE COURT ORGANIZATION

Court of Last Resort
(usually called

Supreme Court)

Intermediate Appellate Court
(in less

Trial

than half the States)

Courts of Original and General Jurisdiction

(usually called district, circuit, or superior courts)

Courts of Limited Jurisdiction

("minor" or "lower" courts)

(Rural)

such as

County
Justices of

Peace

(Special)

(Urban)

such as
Family
Small Claims

such as
Municipal

Traffic

Police

Juvenile

Magistrates

County

Probate

Source:
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
State-Local Relations in The Criminal Justice System Report
A-38 .(Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 88
,
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3

NAMES OF COURTS IN THE STATES AND NUMBERS OF JUDGES, 197

TABLE

State

Louisiana

Appellate Couits

No. of
Judges

3

(continued)

Trial Courts of
General Jurisdiction

Judges

Courts of Limited
Criminal Jurisdiction

No. of
Judges

TABLE

Stare

3

(continued)

JUDICIAL SYSTEMS

nature, either requesting or prohibiting certain action by
The highest state court will issue such
a lower court.
writs only upon the petition of an aggrieved party who
makes application directly to it.

Intermediate Appellate Courts

Congestion of appellate dockets led to the creation of
intermediate appellate courts.
Twenty states use these
courts, generally called courts of appeal.
Jurisdiction
varies; some courts exercise limited original jurisdiction
while all exercise appellate jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction
of some intermediate appellate courts may be defined in
terms of the type of cases they hear, such as the Court of
Criminal Appeals and the Courts of Civil Appeals in Texas.
All states having intermediate appellate courts also provide for some means of review by the highest state court,
often as a matter of right without permission of the intermediate appellate court. -^^ The appeal may lie directly
from the trial court or from a decision by the intermediate appellate court. The most common types of cases
in which a direct appeal to the highest court is allowed
are criminal cases involving the death penalty, cases
involving the constitutionality of a state or federal
statute, cases involving the title to land, civil cases
involving an amount in excess of the monetary jurisdiction
of the intermediate court and cases involving taxation
and revenue. 18
Trial Courts of General Jurisdiction
Trial courts of general jurisdiction have authority to try
all types of cases: civil litigation, criminal prosecutions,
equity suits and probate matters. All litigation except
small claims and petty offenses originates in these courts.
In many states the general trial courts also exercise
jurisdiction concurrent with inferior trial courts in
specific instances.

General trial courts are distributed on the basis of geographical units, usually districts or circuits, in order to
provide convenient access to them.
One or more judges may
serve in each unit depending upon the volume of judicial
business.
The constitutions of a few states limit the
number of judges per judicial area; in the majority, however, the legislature is authorized to increase the number
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19

The Florida Constitution
of judges when necessary.
in the number of
an
increase
requires
automatically
^^
The
population
increases.
as
the
judges
circuit
most
common
the
trial
courts
vary;
general
names of
designation is "District Court" or "Circuit Court,"
In New York the
reflecting geographical divisions.
Court," a
"Supreme
the
called
court
is
trial
general
resort.
last
court
of
to
the
reserved
usually
name
In multi- judge districts, the court may be divided fur-

ther into specialized divisions which handle specific
types of litigation, such as probate, juvenile, civil
In some states there are special courts
or criminal.
such as the probate court, criminal court, and in larger
metropolitan areas, a domestic relations court. These
courts also may be termed courts of limited jurisdiction
because their jurisdiction is limited to a particularized
area of the law.
In addition to their original jurisdiction, trial courts
of general jurisdiction may act as appellate courts to
hear appeals from inferior trial courts and to review
actions of certain administrative agencies.

Courts of Limited Jurisdiction
The variation of courts of limited jurisdiction ranges
from justice of the peace courts, county courts, municipal
courts and police courts to magistrates courts and traffic
The jurisdiction of these courts is limited by a
courts.
maximum pecuniary amount in civil cases, and by a maximum
These courts mainly
fine or sentence in criminal cases.
dispose of small claims, conduct preliminary hearings in
felony cases, and try and sentence offenders charged with

misdemeanors
No official transcript is made of the proceedings of most
courts of limited jurisdiction; hence, they are not courts
Accordingly, an appeal is allowed to the genof record.
This appeal, or trial de novo, is a
eral trial court.
completely new trial of the same case. Then, another
appeal is usually allowed from the trial court's judgment
to an intermediate appellate court or the court of last
resort.
In many states the judges that staff these lower courts

are part-time, compensated on a fee basis or salaried.
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and need not have the same qualifications as higher court
judges.

MONTANA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Montana Constitution vests
judicial power in the senate sitting as a court of impeachment, a supreme court, district courts, justices of
the peace and "such other inferior courts as the legislative assembly may establish in any incorporated city or
town."
In accordance with this provision, police and
municipal courts have been established by legislative,
enactment^
The court structure in Montana consists of
a court of last resort, a general trial court, and inferior trial courts.
Supreme Court
The court of last resort in Montana's judicial system is
the Supreme Court of Montana, consisting of four associate
justices and one chief justice.
Section 5 of the judicial
article of the Montana Constitution (see Appendix A)
created a three-member court and empowered the legislature
to increase membership to not more than five.
In 1919 the
legislature added two justices to the court because of an
increase in the appellate caseload, bringing the court to
its present composition of five. 21
By cpnstitutional mandate, a majority of the justices is
necessary to form a quorum or to pronounce a decision. ^2
The chief justice presides at all sessions, and, in his
absence, the associate justice with the shortest term to
serve presides in his stead. 23
To qualify for a seat on the supreme court a person must
be admitted to practice law in the state, be at least 30
years of age, be a citizen of the United States and a
resident of Montana for at least two years immediately
preceding his election. 24 Members of the court are
elected by the "qualified voters of the state at large"
on a non-partisan ballot for six-year terms.
If a
vacancy occurs before the end of the term, the governor
appoints a person to fill the vacancy until a justice
can be elected and qualified.
This election must take place
at the next succeeding general election and the judge so
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elected holds office for the remainder of the unexpired
term of his predecessor 26 Justices of the supreme court
can be removed from office by impeachment 27 aH judicial
officers forfeit office if absent from the state more than
sixty consecutive days. 28
.

;

Compensation of supreme court justices and district court
judges originally was set by Section 29 of the judicial
article
Until otherwise provided by law, the salary of
the justices of the supreme court shall be four
thousand dollars per annum each, and the salary
of the judges of the district courts shall be
three thousand five hundred dollars per annum
each.
The same section also prohibited the salaries to be increased or diminished "during the terms for which they shall
have been respectively elected." A 1964 amendment removed
the original salary figures and allowed judges to receive
salary increases during their terms in office'.
Compensation of supreme court justices has risen from $17,000 in
1967 to $22,500 in 1971.29 The chief justice receives an
additional $1,500 a year. 30

Although the Constitution provides that at least three
terms of court are to be held annually, legislation enacted in 1895 requires the court to hold four terms each
year beginning on the first Tuesdays of March, June,
October and December.-^! All physical facilities, equipment and personnel necessary for the operation of the court
are provided by the state. 32
The jurisdiction exercised by the supreme court (illustrated in Table 4) includes (1) appellate jurisdiction
which extends to all cases in law and equity subject to
such limitations prescribed by law; 33
(2) limited
original jurisdiction which includes the power to issue
extraordinary writs of mandamus certiorari prohibition
injunction quo warranto habeas corpus and all other
remedial writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, 34 ^Lnd (3) supervisory control over inferior courts subject to regulation and limitation by law.^^ The court also has
exclusive jurisdiction to "remove or suspend attorneys
and counselors-at-law. "36
.

,

.

,

The Constitution makes no express grant of authority to
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TABLE

4

SUMMARY OF JURISDICTION EXERCISED BY MONTANA COURTS

• CONSTITUTIONAL WRITS

Supervisory Control

Other Necessary Writs

SUPREME COURT
Chief Justice and

Mandamus

Associate Justices

Certiorari

Prohibition

Injunction

Quo-Warranto
Habeas Corpus

• CIVIL ACTIONS
Enuilable Remedies

Claims Exceeding $300

Claims Less Than $300

But Exceeding $50
Claims Less Than $50

Divorce

Annulment
Bankruptcy
Probate

F(jrcihle

Entry

And

Unlawful Detainer

• CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
Felonies

Misdemeanors

'MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES

Four

.
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the supremo court to make rules of procedure and practice
governing judicial administration, but tlic legislature
has authorized the court to adopt rules governing its
practice and to make rules of civil and criminal proThe authority to make rules of criminal procedure.
cedure, however, expired in 1969.
'

Although there is no centralized administration by the
supreme court over all courts within the state, the court
does act in an administrative capacity as the supervisory
board over the administration of the Montana Trust and
Legacy Fund.^°
District Courts

Montana Constitution established eight judicial districts,
each encompassing one or more counties, but delegated to the
legislature the authority to decrease or increase the number
of districts subject to certain limitations. 39 Through
legislative enactment ^'^ there are presently eighteen judicial
districts in the state served by twenty-eight judges (see
Table 5)
Tlie

,

District court judges are elected by the qualified voters
of their districts on a non-partisan ballot for four-year
terms. '*-^ To be eligible for office, an individual must be
at least 25 years of age, admitted to practice law in the
state, a citizen of the United States and a resident of the
State for at least one year preceding his election.^
Following election, a district judge must reside in a county
seat in the district for the duration of his term in office.'*-^
Interim vacancies in the office are filled by gubernatorial
appointment.'*^
District judges are subject to the same removal and forfeiture provisions as supreme court justices.
Section 30 of the judicial article states:
No justice of the supreme court nor judge of
the district court shall accept or receive
any compensation, fee, allowance, mileage,
perquisite or emolument for or on account
of his office, in any form whatever, except
the salary provided by law.

Despite this provision, these judges are authorized by statute
to receive per diem and mileage when sitting for another district judge or supreme court justice, or when attending a
judicial conference in Helena. ^^ Expenses and salaries of
district court judges are paid by the state. Their compensation
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TABLE

5

JUDICIAL DISTRICTS IN MONTANA

Dist,
1

Counties
Lewis & Clark
Broadwater
DIST. TOTAL

2

Silver Bow

3

Powell
Granite
Deer Lodge
DIST. TOTAL

4

Missoula
Mineral
Lake
Ravalli
Sanders
DIST. TOTAL

5

Beaverhead
Jefferson
Madison
DIST. TOTAL

6

Park
Sweet Grass
DIST. TOTAL

7

Dawson
McCone
Richland
Wibaux
DIST. TOTAL

8

Cascade
Chouteau
DIST. TOTAL

9

Teton
Pondera
Toole
Glacier
DIST. TOTAL

County
Population
33
2

County
Area (Sq. Mi

No. of Judqos
In District

TABLE

Dist.

Counties

10

Fergus
Judith Basin
Petroleum
DIST. TOTAL

11

12

13

14

15

16

5

County
Population
12,611
2,667
675

(continued)

County
Area (Sq. Mi.)
4,242
1,880
1,655

No. of Judges
In Distric t

.

TABLE

Dist
17

Counties
Phillips
Valley

5

(continued)

County
Population

County
Area (Sq. Mi

11,471

4,974

.

)

No. of Judges
In District

1
1

County population and area figures from U.S. Department
Source:
of Commerce
Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population;
Number of Inhabitants: Montana (Washington:
U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1970), p. 12.
,
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has risen from $14,000 in 1967 to $20,000 in 1971.46

Most civil and criminal actions originate in district
courts.
Their civil jurisdiction extends to (1) cases
where the amount in controversy, exclusive of interest,
exceeds $50; (2) cases involving the title or right to
possession of real property; (3) cases involving the
legality of any tax, import, assessment, toll or municipal fine; (4) actions of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer; (5) special proceedings for writs of mandamus
quo warranto, certiorari prohibition injunction and
habeas corpus and (6) proceedings in insolvency, actions
of divorce, annulments of marriage, probate, naturalization
and juvenile matters.'*^ Criminal jurisdiction extends to
all felony cases and to misdemeanors that have not been
delegated to another court by statutory or constitutional
provisions. '^^
.

,

,

;

In exercise of their appellate jurisdiction, district courts
hear appeals from justice of the peace and police courts
within their districts, and review actions of administrative agencies as provided in laws relating to each agency. 49
District courts also have the authority to adopt rules of
court to the extent that the rules do not conflict with
rules of the supreme court or with state statutes. ^*^

The terms of district courts vary.
In each single-county
judicial district, no specific terms are prescribed, but
the court always must be open for the transaction of
business except on legal holidays.-^-*- In multi-county
districts, there must be at least four terms of court in
each county. 52 when a district court is composed of more
than. one judge, there may be as many terms as there are
judges; however, in these multi- judge districts the court
is divided into departments with the business of the court
apportioned equally among the judges.
Expenditures for
physical facilities, equipment and personnel are paid by
the counties within each judicial district. ^4

Justice of the Peace Courts

Article VIII, Section 20 (Appendix A) provides that there
shall be at least two justices of the peace for each organized township of each county.
There are 174 justices of
the peace serving within the state. ^^ They are elected on
partisan ballots by the oloctors of each township for twoyc-ar

terms. 56

Tc)

be clifjiblc Tor
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must be a U.S. citizen and a resident of the county for at least
one year preceding election or appointment ^7 Following election
or appointment, each justice of the peace must reside in the townInterim vacancies are filled
ship in which his court is held.^^
by appointment by county commissioners -"^ Justices of the peace
are expressly exempted from the impeachment provisions of the
Montana Constitution [Art. V, Sec. 17], but they can be removed
If the grounds for complaint are
proceedings in district court.
willful or corrupt misconduct or malfeasance in office, the proceedings may be initiated by a grand jury, the county attorney
for the county in which the justice serves or the attorney general. 60
However, if the grounds for complaint are illegal collection of
fees or refusal or failure to perform official duties, the proceedings may be instituted by a verified written accusation of
any person. "' The trial by jury is conducted in the same manner
as prosecution of a misdemeanor 62
.

.

.

The mode of compensation for justices of the peace depends upon
the population of their township. All justices charge fees determined by fee schedules established by the legislature. 63
Those justices in townships of less than 10,000 population retain
all the fees they charge; retained fees are the only compensation
they receive. 64 p^\\ other justices of the peace receive a salary
paid by the county in which the serve:
in townships having a
population of 10,000 to 15,000, the annual salary is $4,200; in
townships having a population of more than 15,000 but not exceeding 18,000, the annual salary is $4,500; and in townships
having more than 18,000 population, the annual salary is
$5,500.65 In addition, salaried justices of the peace may retain certain designated miscellaneous fees. 66

The original jurisdiction of justice of the peace courts is
limited, and they have no appellate jurisdiction.
Their
civil jurisdiction includes cases where the amount in
controversy does not exceed $300 in (1) actions arising on
contract for the recovery of money; (2) actions for damage
to personal property, or for injury to real property where
no issue is raised by the defendant concerning the title or
possession of the real property; (3) actions for a fine,
penalty or forfeiture given by statute or ordinance where
no issue is raised involving the legality of any tax, impost,
assessment, toll or municipal fine; and (4) actions upon
bonds or undertakings conditioned for the payment of money
(l)enalty may exceed $300). 67
j^ actions of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer, which involve real property,
justices' courts exorcise jurisdiction concurrent with
di.'Urict courts. 68
Anollier
ur sd ct oiia I overlap belwfi-ii
jii.sl
ro <ir
piMcc coinl;; .uid (li;;lri('l court's can be ikmmi
li(>
]
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when the amount of controversy in civil cases is examined.
District court jurisdiction begins at $51 while justice
Cases involving an
of the peace jurisdiction ends at $300.
amount more than $51 but less than $300 may be instituted
in either court (see Table 4)
The criminal jurisdiction of justice courts extends to
offenses of petit larceny, third-degree assault, breaches
of the peace, and misdemeanors punishable by fine not exceeding $500, imprisonment not exceeding six months, or
both.^^ In felony cases, they serve as examining courts. 7
Police Courts

Section 24 of the judicial article empowers the legislature
to "provide for creating such police and municipal courts
and magistrates for cities and towns as may be deemed
necessary from time to time. ..." Acting under this authority, the legislature in 1895 established police courts.
Police judges generally are elected "by qualified electors
of the city" to serve two-year terms in cities of the first,
second and third classes. ^1 In cities with a commission
form of government, police judges are appointed by the city
commission. '2 Eligibility requirements are the same as for
any municipal office:
U.S. citizen, resident in the municipality for at least two years preceding election or appointment and a qualified voter. ^^ Police judges receive annual
salaries fixed by municipal ordinances ^^ in towns the
council may designate a justice of the peace of the township, in which the town is situated to act as police judge
with an annual salary not exceeding $100. ^^ In the latter
situation, the justice of the peace acts as police judge
"in all cases arising out of a violation of ordinances where
the town is a party. "^^ Interim vacancies are filled by
appointment by the city council.''
;

Police courts, like justice courts, have limited jurisdiction.
Their original jurisdiction extends to (1) civil
and criminal proceedings for the violation of any municipal
ordinance; (2) actions to collect taxes or assessments not
exceeding $300, which are levied for municipal purposes;
(3) actions to collect money due to municipalities where
such amount does not exceed $300; (4) cases involving the
breach of any official bond given by any municipal officer;
(5) proceedings for the recovery of personal property belonging to the city or town when the value of such property
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does not exceed $300, and
any municipal license. ^8

(6)

actions for the collection of

Police courts have concurrent jurisdiction with justices of
the peace in offenses of petit larceny, assault and battery,
broaches of the peace, vagrancy, lewd or disorderly conduct,
illoqal possession of beer or liquor and illegal sales of
intoxicating liquors to minors. 79

Municipal Courts
In 1935, legislation was enacted creating municipal courts
for cities with a population of 20,000 or more; 80 however, no municipal courts are known to exist in the state.

Because municipal courts supplant police courts,"! they
exercise the same jurisdiction as police courts and have
jurisdiction "coordinate and coextensive" with justice
courts of the county. 82 Municipal courts also are granted
jurisdiction in forcible entry and unlawful detainer actions
concurrent with the district courts in their respective
counties 83
.

To be eligible for a municipal judgeship, an individual
must have the same qualifications as judges of the district
court, described previously.
In addition, he must be a
resident and voter in the city from which he is elected. 84
Municipal judges are elected on a non-partisan ballot for
two-year terms. 85 They receive an annual compensation of
$3,000 payable from the city treasury. 86 Expenditures for
courtroom facilities, fixtures and supplies are paid by the
county in which the court is located; 87 however, to establish
municipal courts the city council must adopt, by a twothirds majority, the legislative provisions creating these
courts. 88
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NOTES

1.

Major portions of this description are summarized from
Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr., The United States Courts 88th
Congress, 1st Session; House Document No. 180 (Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963) and Milton D. Green,
"The Business of the Trial Courts," The Courts, the Public
and the Law Explosion, ed. Harry W. Jones (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 7-16.
Cited hereafter as Green, "The Business of the Trial Courts,
,

2.

United States Const. Art. Ill, Sec.

3

Ibid

.

,

Sec.

2.

4.

Ibid

.

,

Art.

II,

5.

28
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Ibid

7.

Green,

8.

28 United States Code,

9.

Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory Vol V (Summit, N.J.:
Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 1971), p. 1252. The six federal
divisions in Montana are (1) Billings Division including
the counties of Big Horn, Carbon, Carter, Custer, Dawson,
Fallon, Golden Valley, Musselshell, Powder River, Prairie,
Richland, Rosebud, Stillwater, Sweetgrass, Treasure,
Wheatland, Wibaux and Yellowstone; (2) Butte Division
including the counties of Beaverhead, Deer Lodge, Madison,
Powell and Silver Bow; (3) Great Falls Division including
the counties of Cascade, Chouteau, Fergus, Garfield,
Glacier, Judith Basin, Petroleum, Pondera, Teton and
Toole; (4) Havre-Glasgow Division including the counties
of Blaine, Daniels, Hill, Liberty, McCone Phillips,
Roosevelt, Sheridan and Valley; (5) Helena Division including the counties of Broadwater, Gallatin, Jefferson,
Lewis and Clark, Meagher and Park; and (6) Missoula
Division including the counties of Flathead, Granite,
Lake, Lincoln, Mineral, Missoula, Ravalli and Sanders.
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,
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Sec.
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16.
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Report A-38 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
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p. 88. Cited hereafter as ACIR, State-Local Relations

171,

173
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Ibid

18.
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19.
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20.

"The legislature
Florida Const. Art. V, Sec. 6 (2)
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16.
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21.

Revised Codes of Montana
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COURT ORGANIZATION
The judicial article of the Montana Constitution vests
judicial power in a three-tier hierarchy of courts:
courts of general
court of last resort (supreme court)
and courts of limited
jurisdiction (district court)
jurisdiction (justice of the peace, police and municipal
There are three
courts). (See Table 4, Chapter II.).
lengthy sections in the judicial article defining the
jurisdiction of the supreme court, district courts and
Moreover, three other secjustice of the peace courts.
tions arc devoted to judicial districts and the number of
judges therein.
This judicial article, supplemented by
legislation, has produced a supreme court, twenty-eight
district courts and 217 justice of the peace and police
courts; each court operates as an autonomous unit, financed
No
by multiple sources without centralized supervision.
statewide compilation of statistics on court dockets or
financing is available. Clearly, the court structure in
Montana does not operate as a coordinate, smoothly functioning organization.
,

,

For many years this type of structural disorganization has
drawn criticism from court reformers as producing an inefficient mechanism for the administration of justice. As
early as 1906, Dean Roscoe Pound pointed out in "The Causes
of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice"
(see Appendix B) that federal and state court systems were
archaic in three respects: (1) the multiplicity of courts;
(2) preserving concurrent jurisdiction, and (3) the waste of
judicial manpower.
Pound's primary emphasis was on consolidation of these congeries of courts into a unified
system.
In 1940 Pound re-emphasized the necessity of
judicial reorganization in an essay (see Appendix C) which
became the primer for modernization and simplification of
existing court systems.

According to Pound, the controlling ideas governing the
organization of courts should be unification, flexibility,
Unificonservation of judicial power and responsibility.
cation allows judicial machinery to concentrate on its tasks.
Flexibility enables the judiciary to meet speedily and efficiently the changing demands upon it.
Responsibility is
necessary so that someone is held accountable if the judicial
organization is not functioning as efficiently as the law
and the nature of its tasks permit.
Conservation of judicial
power is vital for efficiency.

-55-

COURT ORGANIZATION
Instead of setting up new courts for each new task. Pound
believed that the judicial structure should be flexible
enough to take care of these tasks as they arise. The
principle should be not specialized courts but specialized
judges.
Concurrent jurisdiction and confusing jurisdictional
lines between various courts, with consequent litigation at
the expense of the merits of the case, could be eliminated.
Judicial power could be concentrated in one "Court of
Justice," as Pound called it, with three branches: a single,
ultimate court of appeal; a superior court of general jurisdiction and a tribunal for small causes "to administer a
much higher grade of justice in small causes than that
formerly dispensed by justices of the peace. ..."
Pound summarized the case for unification as follows:
[U] nif ication would result in a real judicial
department as a department of government.
In the states there are courts but there is no
true judicial department.
Again, unification of
the judicial system would do away with the waste
of judicial power involved in the organization of
separate courts with constitutionally or legislatively defined jurisdictions and fixed personnel.
Moreover, it would make it the business of a responsible official to see to it that such waste
did not recur and that judges were at hand whenever and wherever work was at hand to be done.
It would greatly simplify appeals to the great
saving not only of the time and energy of
appellate courts, but to the saving of time and
money of litigants as well. An appeal could be
merely a motion for trial, or a modification or
vacation of the judgment, before another branch
of the one court, and would call for no greater
formality of procedure than any other motion.
It would obviate conflicts between judges and
courts of coordinate jurisdiction such as unhappily have too often taken place in many
localities under a completely decentralized system which depends upon the good taste and sense
of propriety of individual judges, or appeal
after some final order, when as like as not the
mischief has been done, to prevent such occurrences.
It would allow judges to become
specialists in the disposition of particular
classes of litigation without requiring the setting up for them of special courts.
.

.

.

Applying Pound's formulation to Montana's judicial system, the
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fundamental issue is whether reorganization of the present
court structure is necessary to achieve a simplified, flexible
How many levels of courts should be vested
court system.
with judicial power? Should the legislature be empowered to
create additional courts? How should jurisdiction, judicial
districts and the number of judges to serve in each district
Should rule-making powers and centralized adbe treated?
ministration, now absent from the Montana Constitution, be
added?

UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM
The impetus of reform in the organization of court systems
usually has been the demand for a more efficient adjudicaThe shift and increase
tion of civil and criminal cases.
of population and creation of new causes of action have
produced a torrent of litigation being thrust upon judicial
In order to cope with the flood of
systems centuries old.
cases, new procedures, additional manpower and administrative
techniques were adopted. Piecemeal reform, however, did not
cure all of the ills, and steps have been taken by many
states to reorganize their entire judicial systems.

Court unification has been the primary objective of strucIn its most simplified form, a court
tural reorganization.
a court of
structure involves two levels of jurisdiction:
general trial jurisdiction where a case is instituted, the
facts are established and a judgment rendered, and a court
of appellate jurisdiction where errors in the original
proceeding can be corrected. Various factors have interrupDemands for local
ted this concept, creating fragmentation.
administration of justice produced justices of the peace and
other local courts.
Instances of recurring litigation in the
same area of the law produced specialized courts, such as
those for probate, divorce, traffic offenses and juvenile
matters.
As more levels of courts were added, functions of
the various courts began to overlap.
From this functional
duplication, a waste of manpower and a proliferation of
forms, inconsistent practices and procedures ensued.
The Concept of Unification
The underlying rationale of a unified court system is to
create a cohesive unit of court operations by consolidating
state courts to produce a simplified judicial structure.
Concomitantly the administration of the state judicial
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system can be centralized by vesting the supreme court, the
chief justice, an independent court administrator or a juConsolidation
dicial council with administrative control.
of courts and centralized administration can provide, with
the aid of the rulemaking power of the supreme court, a
vehicle for attaining better utilization of judges, fairer
distribution of judicial workloads, greater uniformity and
promptness in the administration of justice and more effective supervision of judicial competence.!
There is, however, no final consensus as to what constitutes
unification. The Executive Director of the American Judicature
Society, Glenn R. Winters, speaks of structural unification
and operational unification.-^ The former concerns the
structural hierachy of a state judicial system, particularly
the number of levels within the system and the jurisdictional
divisions between the levels. The latter relates to a system
of court administration in which an entity has general supervisory control over the entire judicial system. According
to Winters, the court systems of Puerto Rico and Colorado
typify the three-tier unified model of structural unification, while California, Kansas, Louisiana and Oregon have
achieved operational unification without unifying their
court structures. 3 Therefore, unification can be approached
two ways: by simplifying court structures through consolidation of jurisdictions or elimination of court levels, or
by centralizing administrative authority over the operations
of the judicial system.
Most reform advocates consider structural and administrative
unification as part and parcel of a unified judicial system,
both necessary to complete the concept of unification.
According to one authority, "the purists are probably typified by the authors of the commentary on the National
Municipal League's Model State Constitution, '"^ who included within the concept of a unified court system uniformity of jurisdiction in each court level, a single
administrative head and organization for the entire system,
freedom to assign judges at each level and a single set
of rules governing practice and procedure.
In the National Municipal League's model judicial article
(see Appendix D) , all judicial power is vested in a unified
judicial system, which includes a supreme court, an appellate
court, a general trial court and such inferior courts of
limited jurisdiction "as may from time to time be estab-

lished by law." All courts except the supreme court may be
divided into districts as provided by law and into functional
divisions and subdivisions as provided by law or by supreme
court rule not inconsistent with the law. According to the
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NML model, the supreme court exercises appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising "under this constitution and the
Constitution of the United States," and original jurisdiction in matter of legislative districting and gubernatorial
All other courts have jurisdiction as provided
succession.
by law, but the jurisdiction must be uniform in all districts
The chief justice, as administrative
of the same court.
head of the judicial system, may assign judges within each
court level or from one level to another, and may appoint an
administrative director with the approval of the supremo
The rules adopted by the supreme court to govern
court.
court administration and the practice and procedure in civil
and criminal cases may be changed by a two-thirds vote of
the legislature.
The model judicial article of the American Bar Association
(see Appendix E) differs in its approach to a unified
It vests the judicial power of the state
judicial system.
exclusively in one court of justice which is divided into
one supreme court, one court of appeals, one trial court of
general jurisdiction, known as the district court, and one
trial court of limited jurisdiction known as the magistrate's
Unlike the NML article, the ABA model gives the
court.
supreme court no original jurisdiction. Appeals from a
judgment of the district court imposing a sentence of death,
life imprisonment, or imprisonment for a term of twenty-five
years or more, are taken directly to the supreme court.
The supreme court, not the legislature as the NML model
allows, determines by rule what other appellate jurisdiction it will exercise.
In the ABA model, the supreme court exercises the authority
over other state courts that the NML model grants to the
In the ABA model the divisions and appellate
legislature.
jurisdiction of the court of appeals are determined by
The supreme court also determines the
supreme court rule.
number of divisions of the district court and the number
Each district
of district and magistrate's court judges.
must be a geographical unit fixed by the supreme court and
Every district and magistrate's
have at least one judge.
The
court judge is eligible to sit in any district.
district court has original general jurisdiction in all
cases, except where the supreme court has assigned exclusive
jurisdiction to. the magistrate's court.
The jurisdiction
of the magistrate's court is determined solely by supreme
With respect to centralized administration and
court rule.
rule-making powers, the provisions in the ABA model are
similar to those in the NML model with two exceptions:
under the ABA article, the chief justice's appointment of
an administrative director is not subject to supreme court
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approval, and the rules promulgated by the supreme court
are not subject to change by the legislature.

Unification in Other States
According to the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations,^ if the criteria of uniformity of jurisdiction,
centralized administration, assignment of judges and rulemaking power in the supreme court define a unified court
system, only the judicial systems of Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii
and Oklahoma qualify as unified.
Only one of the criteria is
lacking in certain other states: Michigan does not vest
authority in the highest court to assign judges; Illinois does
not give the highest court power to promulgate rules of practice and procedure; the rule-making power of the supreme court
in North Carolina is subject to legislative repeal, and New
Jersey has not fully consolidated its courts of limited
jurisdiction.
All these states, however, have centralized
administration, which "suggests that this is the key to unification in the minds of many authorities."^
Other states which the ACIR cited as having elements of a
unified system include Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho, New
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Vermont
and Wisconsin.^

Unification and Court Structure

The first section of a judicial article usually declares
where the state's judicial power is vested, and the structural frame-work of a court system is determined by the
enumeration of courts within this section. The following
constitutional provisions illustrate ways the concept of
unification can be stated:

—

Alaska (Art. IV, Sec. 1)
The judicial power of the State
is vested in a supreme court, a superior court, and the
courts established by the legislature.
The jurisdiction of
courts shall be prescribed by law.
The courts shall constitute a unified judicial system for operation and administration.
Judicial districts shall be established by law.

—

Hawaii (Art. V, Sec. 1)
The judicial power of the State
shall be vested in one supreme court, circuit courts, and
in such inferior courts as the legislature may from time to
time establish.
The several courts shall have original and
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appellate jurisdiction as provided by law.

—

The judicial power shall be
Arizona (Art. VI, Sec. 1)
vested in an integrated judicial department consisting of a
Supreme Court, such intermediate appellate courts as may be
provided by law, a superior court, such courts inferior to
the superior court as may be provided by law, and justice
courts

Idaho (Art. V, Sec. 2) -- The judicial power of the state
shall be vested in a court for the trial of impeachments,
a Supreme Court, district courts, and such other inferior courts
The
to the Supreme Court as established by the legislature.
courts shall constitute a unified and integrated judicial
system for administration and supervision by the Supreme
Court.
The jurisdiction of such inferior courts shall be
as prescribed by the legislature.
Until provided by law,
no changes shall be made in the manner of the selection of
judges of existing inferior courts.

—

Proposed Arkansas Constitution of 1968 (Art. 5, Sec. 1)
The judicial power shall be vested in the Judicial Department, which shall consist of the Supreme Court, the Court
on the Judiciary, the Circuit Courts, and the Municipal
Courts

—

The judicial power of
North Carolina (Art. IV, Sec. 1)
the State shall ... be vested in a Court for the Trial
The
of Impeachments and in a General Court of Justice.
General Assembly shall have no power to deprive the
judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which
rightfully pertains to it as a coordinate department of
the government, nor shall it establish or authorize any
courts other than as permitted by this Article.

—

The judicial power of
(Art. V, Sees. 1, 2)
Puerto Rico
Puerto Rico shall be vested in a Supreme Court and in such
other courts as may be established by law.

The courts of Puerto Rico shall constitute a unified judicial system for purposes of jurisdiction, operation and
The Legislative Assembly may create and
administration.
abolish courts, except for the Supreme Court, in a manner
not inconsistent with this Constitution, and shall determine the venue and organization of the courts.

provisions of Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto
Rico (."XiMupl i f y Lhc^ L rend in modernizing judicial arLicles.
In Hawaii and Alaska, only two court levels arc vested wiLli
judicial pov/er while in Puerto Rico's judicial article.

'I'lic

coiist

i

tut i«nal
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only its supreme court is given constitutional status. The
remainder of the court structure in all those states is
defined by the legislature. Furthermore, details such as
jurisdiction and judicial districts is left to legislation
rather than enumerated in the constitution as is done in
Montana's judicial article (see Appendix A).
Most state constitutional provisions create a three or fourThe NML and ABA model articles provide
level court structure.
for a four-level system, although existence of the lowest level
One authorin the NML model is optional with the legislature.
ity on court reform has suggested that the logical result of
unification is the establishment of a two-level judiciary
a single statewide court of justice with a unified trial
division and a unified appellate division, possibly known as
the appellate division of the court of justice:
Under this two-layer court, the appellate
division would be divided into as many threejudge panels as the volume of appellate work
demands, and these would sit at such times
and places as convenience and efficiency dictate.
In like manner, the trial division would be
divided by administrative rule into as many
separate trial units as convenience and efficiency require. All cases filed for trial
would be assigned to the one trial division
and subdivided administratively to the most
appropriate trial units. All appeals would be
filed in the one appellate division and similarly be administratively assigned to the individual
appellate panel which could most advantageously
handle them. Conflicts in decisions among
different panels would be prevented or resolved
In no case would any
by administrative rules.
litigant have a right to a hearing before more
than three judges, nor to a second appeal.^
The concept of a two-level court structure poses a problem
when various minor courts exist in a state judicial .system.
The necessity, if any, of courts of limited jurisdiction
will be a primary consideration in attempting to unify a
court system.

Status of Minor Courts

Justice of the peace courts are the only courts of limited
jurisdiction granted constitutional status in Montana; a
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major issue is whether this present minor court level should
Several alternatives are available:
be maintained.
The constitutional status of J.P. courts could
1.
be maintained.

Reference to these courts could be deleted from the
2.
If the legislature is empowered to create
the constitution.
inferior courts as Section 1 of the Montana judicial article
presently provides, then justice of the peace courts could
be re-established or replaced by statutory law.
If, on the
other hand, the legislature is not empowered to create additional courts, judicial power would be vested only in the
supreme court and the district courts.
The district courts
could be allowed to sit in divisions or branches and hear
matters now heard in J.P. courts.
The minor courts could be replaced, perhaps with
another type of court such as the magistrate courts mentioned in the ABA model article (see Appendix E)
3.

An issue underlying consideration of minor courts is what
authority should be delegated to the legislature in implementing a constitutional judicial article.
Should the structure of the state's judicial system be left to legislative
implementation, frozen into constitutional provisions, or
left to the judiciary itself to implement through rulemaking powers?
"

What is the function of a constitution? Is it
to outline a frame of government, or to provide
all the minutiae of governmental operation?
\<lhY do the framers of constitutions assume
that all wisdom is theirs, and that future
generations are likely to have none? With
respect to the judiciary, do they fear that
the legislature would refuse to provide courts
for the administration of justice; or--providing
courts--would fail to give us judges; or--giving
us courts and judges would fail to provide
clerks? Such a fear seems rather fantastic in
view of the large number of "other" courts which
have been established.
Apparently there is no
concern that too many courts may be created,
since the power to erect new courts is practically
universal.

—

Is there a fear that unless certain courts are
guaranteed by the constitution they may be
abolished or consolidated with others? It seems
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probable that this is the explanation. Independence from the legislature, freedom from
administrative control, impregnability against
abolition or consolidation--these are apparently
the reasons why constitutional status is desired.
And who desires this status for the courts? One
suspects that it is the courts themselves, as it
is difficult to see why the people should be interested in setting up a series of semi-independent
bodies which, because of such status, defy attempts
to procure coordination and administrative control,
result in intolerable conflicts in jurisdiction,
delays in litigation, and duplication of court
facilities and personnel, and render the administration of justice unbusinesslike and inefficient.

When one reads the state constitutions and observes
the number of institutions judicial, administrative,
and political--with the large number of officials
attached to them, that are given constitutional
status, the conclusion is inescapable that in many
respects these documents which we have been taught
to venerate have been the means by which there has
It is
been set up a galaxy of vested interests.
a disturbing thought, but worthy of reflection. 10

—

Justice of the Peace Courts
The office of justice of the peace is a relic of medieval
England, where knights were nominated to preserve the peace
in local areas as early as 1195.
In 1327 King Edward III
assigned prominent citizens in each county to act as
conservators of the peace, their primary duty being to
administer justice in minor matters since the king's assize
judges were not usually available immediately.
In keeping
the peace, these justices were limited to handling minor
criminal offenses; they were not granted civil jurisdiction.
By the sixteenth century justices in England were assisted
by a clerk of the peace, who was generally a lawyer advising the justice on matters of law and court practice.
When
the office of justice of the peace was established in America
by English colonists, justices appointed by the governor still
were not required to have legal training.
They gradually acquired limited civil jurisdiction and finally came to be
elected officers.
Justices of the peace in Montana can be
traced to 1864 when Congress created the Montana territory
and made provision for those courts.
Upon statehood the
Montana Constitution gave justice of the peace courts
constitutional status.
-'-'-
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Widespread disaffection with these inferior courts began
In 1934
in the first part of the nineteenth century.-'-^
one critic observed:
The justice of the peace is a universal and
universally condemned, American institution.
It is doubtful if a more striking example of
cviltural lag can be found in the political
field than the attempt which is made in most
of our 48 States to serve the ends of justice
in the 20th century by a medieval English
instrument.
The system has no defenders
and few apologists.
The only persons actively
desiring its continuation are those who profit
from its operation in some way.
And yet,
though there are sporadic waves of reform, in
most States the system goes along substantially
unchanged. 13

According to an Iowa judge, "justices of
have left the American scene with player
Reform began as early as 1936
shoes. "14
changes throughout the United States did
the 1950s and 1960s.

the peace should
pianos and button
but significant
not occur until

Methods of Reform. Change in the justice of the peace system
has been effectuated either by replacement of the office with
another court structure or by improvement of existing courts.
States have used various means to replace the courts: 15
1.
A constitutional revision or amendment is adopted which
specifies that after a certain date, J. P. courts shall cease to
exist.
The same provisions may indicate methods of replacement;
for example, they may stipulate that there shall be a period of
years between the effective date of the constitutional change
and the date of abolition during which the legislature must
devise a new lower court system.
2.
The constitution is changed to grant the legislature
complete power over J. P. and other minor courts; thereafter,
legislation is enacted repealing the J. P. structure, either
by separate changes over a number of years or by a single
comprehensive reorganization. The constitutional and
legislative changes may be parts of a single reform movemcMit or may be separated by a long period of time, as in the
case where an early constitution of a state gave complete
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power over inferior courts to the legislature but reform of
lower courts did not begin until recent years.
If permitted by the state constitution, minor courts
3.
may be abolished by legislative acts that remove their criminal and civil jurisdiction or reduce it to insignificance.
Displacement of minor courts (by creating new courts that
have jurisdiction concurrent with justice of the peace courts
was a method
in order to draw business away from the J.P.s)
popularly employed until the last decade. This approach has
several disadvantages:
,

First, if the new courts are not substantially
better than the ones they replace, the result
is a greater number of courts with fragmented,
overlapping jurisdiction that must be reformed.
Second, if new courts are each separately created,
as has happened for cities in some states, confusion over jurisdictional limits and procedural
powers is increased and the goal of central
administration becomes more remote. Third,
if the jurisdictional power of the displaced
courts is not repealed, there remains the danger
that some justices, outside effective control,
will use this power for private ends and establish a highly profitable "business" in fines
for traffic violations or the collection of
small debts. 1^

Furthermore, the displacement approach merely adds to the
multiplicity of courts, hindering any attempts towards court
unification.
4.
New constitutional provisions may be adopted which
integrate the jurisdiction of inferior courts into the courts
of general jurisdiction and allow the appointment of matistrates
These comor commissioners to assist judges when necessary.
degrees or
have
law
missioners or magistrates may be required to
assumed.
training in the judicial duties to be

Improvement also can be obtained by reforming weaknesses in
Such reforms might include:
the present system.
1.
Requiring that to be eligible for office a person
cither be a lawyer or undergo specific training in preparation
for judicial duties;
2.
p.ir L LcuJ

Rrplacincj the li'c mclliod of C()mi|ii 'n:;.! ion wilh s.i
In
u
ar ly in criminal ciscs .iiid in nih.iii .uc.ii; wliciiI

(

I

justice serves fulL-Limc;
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Providing for the supervision of J. P. and other
courts of limited jurisdiction by a court administrator or
a higher court, which fixes responsibility on the justice to
keep adequate court records and fiscal accounts and permits
flexible assignment of justices;
3.

Revising J. P. procedures to conform with modern
codes adopted for courts of greater jurisdiction and introducing special, abbreviated procedures for small money claims;
and
4.

Requiring state or local governments to furnish
justices of the peace with adequate courtroom facilities and
personnel.
5.

J. P.

Reform in Other States -*-^

Alaska:
In 1959 a variegated pattern of minor courts was
converted to a system of district courts established by the
legislature, integrated with the rest of the state judiciary
and supervised under the authority of the state supreme court.
The district courts are served by magistrates and deputy magistrates appointed by judges of the superior court. Although
both officers are salaried, magistrates must be legally trained and work full-time while deputy magistrates, who exercise
less jurisdiction, need not be attorneys or devote full-time
to their office.
In 1950 a series of legislative and constitutional
California
changes replaced a system of minor courts including six types
of city courts and two classes of township courts with a uniThe legislature
form system of municipal and justice courts.
court:
a municipal
established districts each having a single
more,
a
or
court in districts with populations of 40,000
40,000.
less
than
population
justice court in districts with a
to
up
$3,000
Municipal courts were granted civil jurisdiction
a
below
crimes
involving
and criminal jurisdiction in cases
up
to
jurisdiction
civil
granted
felony.
Justice courts were
misdemeanors.
low-grade
$500 and criminal jurisdiction in
Municipal judges were required to have five years experience
in the practice of law; justice court judges were required to
be admitted to the practice of law or to pass the qualifying
examination prescribed by the state judicial council.

Colorado
A constitutional amendment approved in 1962
abolished all justice of the peace courts, and legislation
passed in 1964 organized a system of county courts for small
County court judges are required to be lawyers in the
cases.
larger counties, while laymen who have received some training
in their judicial duties are permitted to take office in
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volving $500 or less and to all misdemeanors.

Connecticut
1959 legislation abolished J. P. and other minor
courts and created a system of circuit courts.
Appointed by
the governor for four year terms, all circuit court judges are
salaried, must be admitted to the Connecticut bar and may not
engage in other work.
Circuit court jurisdiction extends to
most misdemeanors, to civil cases up to $500 and to proceedings involving family relations.
Delaware
Legislation enacted from 1964 to 1966 completely
revamped the justice of the peace courts. Fees were replaced
with salaries; justice courts were given statewide jurisdiction.
The courts were placed under the supervision of the chief
justice of the supreme court. A deputy court administrator
supervises the operations of the justice of the peace courts
with authority to assign justices where needed.

Florida
In 1944 the constitution was amended to permit
counties to abolish J. P. courts by referendum and replace them
with other minor courts. More than one-third of the counties
abolished the courts.
In some of the counties where the justice of the peace remains, special acts have been passed which
authorize salaries, replace fee schedules with a single filing
fee or require justices to be attorneys.
Idaho
In 1959 the legislature replaced the fee system for
compensating justices of the peace with provisions for
salaries set by county commissioners.
The election of justices
was superseded by provisions for appointment by county officers
with district court approval.
In 1962 the judicial article
of the constitution was amended to remove all reference to
J. P. courts.
In 1969 the legislature established magistrate
divisions to assist existing district courts, replacing the
municipal, justice and probate courts. Magistrates are appointed on a non-partisan basis by a judicial commission.
Certain
matters may be heard only by magistrates who are attorneys;
however, laymen may serve as magistrates if they have a high
school education and attend a special institute. Magistrates
are salaried officers.

Illinois
In 1962 a revised judicial article was ratified
which consolidated minor court jurisdiction into a statewide system of circuit courts staffed by circuit judges and
magistrates.
Circuit courts replaced a complex network of
courts which included circuit, superior, criminal, justice
of tiic peace, ]3olice magistrate, municipal, city, village
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incorporated town courts.
Each circuit court is under the
supervision of the chief judge of the circuit, who, in turn,
is subject to the supervisory powers of the supreme court.
Jurisdiction of the circuit courts includes all justiciable
Magistrates are appointed by circuit judges, rematters.
quired to be attorneys unless none is available in the circuit,
Jurisdiction of
and servo full-time on a salaried basis.
magistrate courts has been set at a maximum of $5,000 in civil
cases and $1,000 fine or a year's imprisonment in criminal cases,
and

Kansas
From 1965 to 1969, the Kansas Legislature took steps
which in effect abolished justice of the peace courts by
reducing their jurisdiction to $1.00 or less in all areas
where there were city courts, county courts or other minor
courts.
The jurisdiction of city courts was expanded and
magistrate courts were established with jurisdiction of civil
cases not exceeding $3,000 and limited criminal jurisdiction.
In 1956 justices of the peace in wards within
Louisiana
cities of more than 5,000 population were abolished and replaced by city judges who are required to have practiced law
in Louisiana for five years prior to taking office.

Legislation in 1961 replaced justice of the peace
Maine
and municipal courts with a unified statewide system of
district courts. Fourteen full-time district judges, sitting
in eleven districts, replaced fifty part-time municipal court
In addition to matters
judges and twenty-four trial justices.
formerly handled by these minor courts, the district court
was vested with jurisdiction over domestic relations cases
The district court
and civil suits not exceeding $1,200.
system is administered by the chief judge of the district
court and the finances are controlled by the state treasurer.
District court judges must be attorneys and serve on a fulltime, salaried basis.
Maryland: A 197 constitutional amendment abolished justice
of the peace and magistrate courts as of July 5, 1971, and
replaced them with a uniform system of district courts.

Michigan
The judiciary article of a new constitution
adopted in 1963 abolished all justice of the peace courts
and circuit court commissioners and directed the legislature
Thereto create a new minor court system within five years.
after the legislature provided for a uniform system of district
courts supplemented by magistrates appointed by district court
judges.

Minnesota:
In 1956 all constitutional references to justices
of the peace were removed.
Thereafter probate courts were
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given the jurisdiction of municipal courts in sparsely
In
populated counties, thus displacing the J. P. courts.
court
for
Hennepin
County
(Minneapolis)
municipal
a
unified
1963
staffed by fourteen full-time, salaried judges was created to
replace thirty-six part-time justices of the peace and fifteen
municipal court judges. The court's civil jurisdiction extends to cases involving claims of up to $4,000 and appeals
go directly to the supreme court rather than the district
court (trial court of general jurisdiction)

Missouri
In 1945 all justices of the peace were replaced by
salaried, legally trained, full-time magistrates.
The fee
system of judicial compensation was abolished. The magistrate
courts have countywide jurisdiction in civil cases limited
by a maximum pecuniary amount, in juvenile cases, in traffic
cases except in the large cities and in probate cases in
those rural counties where the probate and magistrate courts
are combined.
Nebraska:
In 1970 all references to justices of the peace
were removed from the constitution.

New Hampshire:
In 1957 the civil and criminal jurisdiction
which justices of the peace exercised concurrently with other
state courts was removed, leaving justices with only ministeIn 1963, thirty-seven of the existing municirial functions.
pal courts were changed to district courts; the remaining
municipal courts were abolished. The district courts were
granted criminal jurisdiction in cases involving fines up to
$1,000 or one year imprisonment or both, exclusive civil
jurisdiction up to $500 and concurrent civil jurisdiction with
the superior court (general trial court) up to $1,500. District
court judges are salaried, must be attorneys wherever possible
and, in populous areas, are not permitted to practice law.
New Jersey: Following revision of the judicial article in
1947, the legislature in 1948 abolished all existing minor
courts and replaced them with a system of county-district
and municipal courts which operate under the direct supervision of the state supreme court. Although some municipal
court magistrates are not full-time, all judicial officers
are salaried and must be admitted to practice law.
New Mexico:
In 1961 justices of the peace were placed under
Under 1963 legislation,
the control of a court administrator.
a conference of justices of the peace to discuss means of improving judicial administration in justice courts was established.
Supervision and financial support of justice courts
was transferred from the county commissioners to the state
court administrator. Criminal jurisdiction of justice courts
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was limited to certain potty misdemeanors, and justices were
required to attend authorized training schools.
In 1966 a
constitutional amendment was adopted which abolished justices
of the peace courts and established magistrate courts to
exercise limited jurisdiction. The fee system of compensation also was abolished.

Now York: Although the justice of the poaco remains a constitutional court, several constitutional and legislative
changes have upgraded the office. All justices of the peace
and police judges not admitted to the practice of law must
complete a training program prescribed by an administrative
board.
A constitutional amendment adopted in 1962 permitted
the legislature to determine the judicial authority of
justice courts and, within certain limits, to abolish them.
Thereafter, the legislature enacted provisions whereby local
governments may adopt a Uniform District Court Act to replace
J. P. and other inferior courts.

North Carolina; A revised judicial article, ratified in 1962,
replaced justice of the peace and other minor courts with
district courts.
District court judges are elected for salaried,
full-time service and magistrates may be appointed by superior
court (general trial court) judges to act as part-time salaried
officers of the district court. The chief judge of the district
court is responsible for the administrative supervision of the
courts in his district.
The district court has jurisdiction
over civil cases where the amount in controversy is $5,000 or
less, over criminal cases below the grade of felony, over
domestic relations cases and exclusive jurisdiction over
juveniles.
Magistrates exercise jurisdiction limited to minor
misdemeanors and to small claims assigned by the chief judge.
North Dakota:
By legislation effective in 1961 justices of
the peace were replaced by salaried county justices.
County
commissioners were authorized in their discretion to establish
a system of elected county justices.
Although these justices
are usually part-time, they must be licensed to practice law
in the state.

Ohio
In 1957 the legislature replaced justice of the peace
courts with a system of county courts in all but twenty-six
counties whore the municipal court was given countywide
jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the county courts extends
to all the territory of the county not subject to municipal
court jurisdiction;
they have exclusive civil jurisdiction
up to $100 and concurrent civil jurisdiction with the courts
of common pleas between $100 and $300.
They also have
criminal jurisdiction in motor vehicle violations, misdemeanors and other cases in which the justice of the peace
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County court judges are rcquireei
formerly had j ur isdict Lon.
to be members of the bar who have practiced law for at least
They are compensated by salaries and permitted to
one year.
practice law in cases not involving their courts.

Oklahoma
A judicial article adopted in 1967 abolished
superior, common pleas, county, children's, juvenile and
justice of the peace courts and replaced them with a district
The district courts are staffed by district,
court system.
associate and special judges and exercise unlimited original
jurisdiction over nearly all justiciable matters.
Oregon:
In 1965 justices of the peace in Multnomah County
were abolished and replaced with a district court.

Pennsylvania
Legislation enacted in 1970 established community courts which, if adopted by the voters of a judicial
district, replace municipal, traffic and justice of the peace
courts.
Community court judges are salaried and serve tenyear terms.
Tennessee:
In 1937 the legislature provided for a general
sessions courts for Davidson and Montgomery counties and
reduced the judicial power of the justice of the peace court
in these two counties to preliminary examinations and ministeFor the next twenty years similar legislation
rial functions.
was enacted piecemeal establishing general sessions courts in
In 1959
all but six of Tennessee's ninety-five counties.
legislation created a uniform system for these general sessions
courts served by salaried, full-time, legally trained judges.

Virginia:
In 1936 by special legislative enactment all justices of the peace in certain cities and towns and in all
counties were replaced by salaried trial justices. Most
justices were appointed by judges of circuit courts (the trial
court of general jurisdiction)
but some continued to be
elected.
They exercised exclusive civil jurisdiction up to
$200 and concurrent civil jurisdiction with the circuit courts
between $200 and $1,000. Criminal jurisdiction was limited
to violations of ordinances, county, city and town by-laws
and most misdemeanors.
In 1956 legislation designated all
All trial
trial justices as municipal or county court judges.
justices must be appointed by circuit judges. Civil jurisdiction was raised from $200 to $300 and maximum concurrent
Justices
civil jurisdiction was raised from $1,000 to $2,000.
were required to be licensed to practice law in the state.
Today the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace is limited
to preliminary examinations in criminal proceedings.
,

Washington:

In 1961 legislation replaced the justice of the
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peace and other minor courts in King, Pierce and Spokane
counties with a justice court, which has a municipal
division and over which the supreme court has administrative
authority.
The legislation also abolished the fee method of
judicial compensation.
This plan may be extended to all other
In 1963 new procedural rules were
counties by local option.
adopted for civil and criminal cases in courts of limited
jurisdiction

Legislation enacted from 1959 to 1961 created a
Wisconsin
court reorganization plan establishing the county court as
the principal forum for small cases.
County court jurisdiction,
which formerly had been limited to probate, paternity and
juvenile cases, was expanded to include general civil jurisdiction up to $25,000 and concurrent criminal jurisdiction
with the circuit courts (general trial courts).
Except in
Milwaukee County, where they became divisions of the county
court, the municipal, civil and district courts were eliminated.
Justice of the peace courts were retained but with civil
jurisdiction limited to cases up to $200 and authority to perform marriages.
The system of part-time judicial officers
compensated by fees was eliminated.
In 1966 a constitutional
amendment was adopted removing the judicial power from
justice of the peace courts and, in effect, abolishing them.
Wyoming
In 1966 all references to justice of the peace
courts was removed from the Wyoming constitution.
Reasons for reform.
The primary objections to the justice
of the peace system appear to be (1) lack of legal training,
(2) the fee system as the basis of compensation and (3) inadequate courtroom facilities and staff. 18

Lack of legal training.
Montana and most other states
with justice of the peace courts do not require justices to
have legal training. 19 Professors Mason and Crowley, authors
of a 1967 study of Montana's judicial system, contended
that the overwhelming majority of justices of the peace and
police judges lack legal training and do not have the requisite knowledge to decide many of the cases presented in
their courts. 20 This lack of legal training usually
places the judge at a disadvantage since Montana county
attorneys have law degrees and law enforcement officers
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frequently are knowledgable in the law of their particular
field. 2-'- A conclusion reached by Mason and Crowley was:
[S]ociety is much more complex and the business
of the courts is much more involved and technical than it was even a half century ago, and
this is reflected by the fact that many states
today are overhauling their judicial systems.
Today it is clear that if justice is to be
dispensed expeditiously without the aid of
attorneys, it must be by capable judges who
are well trained in our system of jurisprudence.'^^
The changing nature of the J. P. function in relation to the
existing training and education requirements also was emphasized by a commentary on Nebraska's minor courts:
A justice of the peace had a real function in
His function
1866, in 1875 and even in 1920.
in the earlier years of our state was to resolve
disputes between his neighbors, to bring justice
close to home in those days before paved highIt was not thought
ways and motor vehicles.
necessary then that the justice of the peace
have any legal training, so long as he exercised good common sense in determining who was
But, the job has
right and who was wrong.
changed, even though the qualifications have
not.
Today, the bulk of a justice's workload
He is ruling on violations
is traffic cases.
of the law that did not even exist when the
Yet, he still
justice court was first created.
does not have to have any legal training, or
formal education, does not have to own a law
book, or have read the law, or even be able
to read. ^-^

One example of "common sense justice" administered by lay
judges is the report of an Arkansas justice of the peace
who at eighty years of age tried more than 200 cases annually
on the strength of his seventh-grade education and a single
In an interview, this judge
copy of the Arkansas statutes.
stated:
"I don't ever remember having one who wasn't guilty.
If the sheriff picks up a man for violating the law, he's
guilty or he wouldn't bring him in here. And anyway I don't
get anything out of it if they aren't guilty. "24
To compensate for the lack of legal training, justices of the
peace were limited in their jurisdiction and the aggrieved
party was granted the right to appeal to a higher court where
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the entire case was tried anew (de novo) before a judge with
legal training. ^^ In Montana appeals from justice of the
peace and police courts are made to the district court. 26
Thus, the caseload burden of district courts is increased
unless the complaint is dropped by the county attorney, who
may not have time to prosecute minor criminal offenses or
by a losing party in a civil suit who cannot afford the
appeal

This division of judicial responsibilities between the
district courts and minor courts creates numerous problems:

One is that the right of appeal de novo gives
the person charged with a misdemeanor or involved in a minor civil matter the right to
have his case heard twice, while the person
facing a more serious crime or civil problem
involving large sums of money has the right
If justice is accomplished
to only one trial.
trial for serious matters,
one
allowing
only
by
of public funds to
a
waste
appears
to
be
it
allow two trials for the so-called minor
troubles
The right of appeal de novo allows a defendant
to avoid a sentence or stall its imposition.
If one is not satisfied with his sentence, it's
easy for him to appeal the case and after having
the whole matter re-tried, if convicted against,
to be sentenced by a different judge who will
In a
probably render a different sentence.
the
gives
novo
de
right
of
appeal
sense the
defendant a veto over the sentence rendered by
As a result some judges
a lower court judge.
structure their sentences to meet the approval
of defendants rather than render the sentence
which the crime and situation demands.
By appealing, an accused increases his odds of

avoiding a conviction.
Essential witnesses move
away or die, interest in the case lessens or the
calendar of the higher court is so clogged with
more important matters as to make it difficult
to retry the case.
This often results in the
prosecutor dismissing or reducing the charge
rather than going through a second trial. 2/

Another commentator noted that if qualifications of justices
of the peace could be raised so that a competent lawyer could
serve independent of a fee system, there is no reason why the
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justice of the peace system could not be maintained in a
iiKxiified

form. 28

Fee System.
The fee system is one of the most frequently criticized aspects of justice courts.
Fees or
court costs are the sole basis of compensation for about
85 percent of the justices of the peace in Montana. 29
The constitutionality of the fee system has been the subject
of debate since the U.S. Supreme Court in Tumey v. Ohio 3
declared that a system by which an inferior judge is paid for
his services only when he convicts the defendant cannot be
considered due process of law "unless the costs usually imposed are so small that they may be properly ignored as
within the maxim de minimis non curat lex."jl Although the
Tumey case involved a system where the judge retained a fee
only if he found the defendant guilty, a statement in the
court's dictum could be used to attack the constitutionality
of the fee method of judicial compensation in general:

Every procedure which would offer a possible
temptation to the average man as a judge to
forget the burden of proof required to convict
the defendant, or which might lead him not to
hold the balance nice, clear and true between
the state and the accused denied the latter due
process of law. 32
In Montana, the compensation of a justice is determined, in
most instances, by the number of cases he hears. The number
of cases brought before him rests largely on the discretion
The argument has
of law enforcement officers in the county.
been made that when a justice's compensation is almost completely dependent upon peace officers and prosecuting officials,
it seems highly improbable that the justice of the peace can
"hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the State and
the accused" as the Tumey decision suggests. 33

The control of the purse strings exerted by law enforcement
officers is illustrated by the responses to questionnaires
sent to justices of the peace in 1967 by the Montana Su{:iremc
Court

One justice reported he had no cases whatever
in the calendar year 1966, apparently because
Highway Patrol officers took violators out of
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"[T]he inAnother justice wrote:
his township.
fluence exerted over these Courts by the Montana
Highway Patrol is not in the best interest of
justice and should be stopped." Yet another
opined that justices of the jieacc should be on
"It would make it more
a salary, and wrote:
justices
are elected in one
equal where two
and
stop
these
County
Attorneys and
township
Highway Patrolmen from filing all cases in one
Court, which you will note by the newspaper
clipping enclosed of the State auditing report
of 1967, that the total monies collected in the
[other]
Court, who is also the court house
janitor, far exceed that collected in my Court,
which I consider very unfair." Another justice
wrote:
"[L]aw enforcement at the lower levels has
degenerated to a point where it is a pitfall. "^^
.

.

.

Clearly the fee method of judicial compensation can undermine
the independence of thought and action required of judicial
officers.
That was aptly pointed out by a dissenting opinion
in Application of Borchert, ^^ a 1961 Washington case:
The income of the fee justice of the peace
depends directly upon the volume of cases
filed.
If no cases are filed, he receives
nothing.
Vice inheres in the system. ^6

The fee system, although the amount of fees
be not dependent in terms upon the result,
tends to impair judicial integrity.
Police
and prosecutors can punish a justice of
the peace who discharges defendants whom they
wish to convict, by failing to bring cases
before him.
Judicial independence is
.-^^
as necessary in lower courts as in others.
.

.

.

.

The same dissenting opinion further stated:
The primary evil resulting from the fee system
is the pressure it exerts on each justice who
operates under it to get more business in
order to enlarge his income.
.Most
criminal complaints are made by officers exercising police powers. These officers
naturally seek convictions, and would be
expected to patronize justices who aid them
in their efforts rather than those who insist too rigidly upon protecting the rights
of the defendants.
A sympathetic attitude
toward the views of the police is therefore
.

-77-

.

COURT ORGANIZATION
quite likely to result in more business and an
increase in the justice's income. -^^
We are confronted, then, with a system in which
the income of the unsalaried justice of the peace
is uttery [sic] dependent upon the whim and caprice
of the arresting officers.
.The difficulty lies
not with the integrity or capability of the past,
present or future justices of the peace but with
the system which compels men to choose between their
own financial advantage and justice.
.The
test is whether this enticement inheres in the
system.
It does.
On the one side, the justice of
the peace is tempted to enhance his income by doing
the bidding of arresting officers; on the other, he
must decide impartially in each case. No more is
required to demonstrate a very real likelihood of
bias.
It is the constitutional right of every
person
to be tried by justices of the peace
as impartial as the law can devise. 39
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

The majority of the court in the Borchert case avoided the
argument that fee justice courts are inherently biased and
that such a system should be abolished, stating:
"Such an
argument is properly addressed to the electorate and the
legislature.
The argument presents a legislative problem, not a judicial one."^0
.

.

.

Inadequate facilities. Many citizens have their initial
contact sometimes their only contact with the administration of justice in a J. P. court.
If this court creates
a bad impression, public esteem and respect for the entire
state judicial process may be lessened.
Justices of the
peace often conduct court in makeshift facilities, creating
an inappropriate atmosphere for the dispensing of justice. ^1
The Mason-Crowley report indicated that in 1966, courtroom
facilities were furnished to less than 30 percent of the
justices in Montana. 42 Proceedings were conducted in a
newspaper office, pool hall, railroad depot, store, county
jail, city council chambers and private homes. '^3 one
justice who was a full-time auto mechanic reportedly held
court without ever emerging from beneath an automobile. ^4

—

—

Similar situations are found elsewhere. A report on
Nebraska's courts of limited jurisdiction stated:

There should be a place for these justices in our
system.
But, we should do away with a system that
permits an untrained justice to hold court in a
service station, or his kitchen, or to allow his

-78-

COURT ORGANIZATION

secretary to rubber stamp his name on orders
while he is a patient in a nursing home.
[T]o permit [these things] to continue can
only destroy respect for law and the judicial
The average citizen's contact with
system.
the law comes only in a minor way, most often
If he is not treated
with a traffic ticket.
fairly and with dignity when he has that contact in one of our courts of limited jurisdiction, he is not likely to respect that
court or the higher courts with all of their
robes and judicial dignity. 45
.

.

.

Thwarted Objectives. Although one of the purposes
of minor courts is to provide an accessible forum for
local redress. Table 6 indicates an irrational distribution of justices of the peace throughout the state.
Cascade and Missoula counties, with respective populations
of 81,804 and 58,263, have only two justices each, while
there are five justices in Mineral County, which has a
population of only 2,958. Big Horn and Treasure counties
have two justices each; however Big Horn is five times
larger in area than Treasure County.
The statistics in the Mason-Crowley study revealed that
the "constitutional objective of having a 'poor man's
court' in which litigants in actions involving small
sums could get efficient and substantial justice is
Justice of the
not being ef f ectuated"46 in Montana.
peace courts have become more administrative in nature
and less trial-oriented; they are relatively inactive
in civil work and their criminal work is limited to
"the administrative disposition of misdemeanor offenses
of which the overwhelming majority are traffic offenses. "4'
The decline in trial work is shown by the following summary
based on 77 percent of the total number of justice of the
peace courts in Montana: 48
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Civil Work.
.Of the 141 justices of the
peace reporting [questionnaires were sent to
51 showed no civil cases filed in their
184]
courts during the calendar year of 1966
Eightynine justices (including all of the above mentioned 51) reported no trials of civil cases
during that calendar year.
It appears from these
figures that over 1/3 of the justice courts handle
no civil work at all and 2/3 of them have no trials
in civil cases.
1.

.

.

,

.

The judges reported a total of 4,797 civil case
filings.
They indicated that, of these, 263
were tried.
The total number reported tried is
only a little over 5% of the number filed;
however, even this small figure does not give a
true picture of the situation.
Over 75% of all
civil cases filed (3,665) were filed in just 11
of the 141 courts.
Only 50 cases were tried in
those courts for a trial ratio of only 1.5%.
This might indicate a much higher ratio of trials
in the other 130 courts but the reports leave
substantial doubt of this; the actual number of
trials may be much lower than the over-all total
reported.
A major portion of the total number
of trials reported outside the 11 largest courts
were filed by a few justices who showed that a
trial was had in almost every case.
Their reports indicate that many of the justices consider
a "trial" to be any sort of proceeding beyond the
filing of the original complaint, an appearance
by the defendant, a contested motion, or anything
other than a default judgment.
There is every
indication that the ratio of cases tried to
cases filed is really lower than the statewide
figures indicate.
One other significant factor emerged from a
study of these reports.
The great volume of
filings was concentrated in a few townships
having a large wage-earning labor force -principally in the mining, smelting and logging
industries.
Almost invariably one or more of
the reporting courts in municipalities of this
character showed an extraordinarily large
number of civil cases filed with few or none
ever tried.
In addition, some small communities with a predominantly laboring population
showed 3 mur^h higher rate of civil filings
than that shown by nonindustrial communities
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.Justice courts in
of similar population.
(where
they
function at all)
civil
field
the
appear to be primarily administrative debt
.

.

collection agencies where garnishment actions
are pursued and ended by default judgment.
Certainly the reports indicate that there is
no great civil trial load in the justice courts
of Montana at this time.^^
.Forty-six of the courts
2.
Criminal Work.
reported that they had no criminal trial of any
kind.
Of the 138 courts which reported some
trial work, 27 reported that they tried only
Only a little over half of the
traffic offenses.
courts had both traffic and non-traffic trials
More than twice as many trials were rein 1966.
ported on traffic offenses than on non-traffic
offenses (2,790 traffic trials were reported
Statewide,
against 1,299 nontraffic trials).
the justices reported that they tried less than
10% of the traffic cases filed in their courts.
Even this figure is undoubtedly higher than the
actual number tried due to the manner of reportSeveral judges noted that they included in
ing.
the category of "cases tried" every case which
was not a bond forfeiture - including pleas of
guilty, actual trials, and payment of fines in
person by the defendant.
The figures submitted
by a number of other judges who showed that
trials were had in almost 100% of the cases indicate that these judges used the same standard
There
to judge what was or was not a "trial."
is little doubt that the trial ratio in Montana
justice courts in all criminal cases is considerably less than 15% of all cases filed.
.

.

There is some significant difference in the workloads of justices who have their offices at county
seats and those who do not.
Over half of the judges
reporting who resided outside county seats had no
but at least
trial at all during 1966 (37 of 72)
73 of 84 justices at county seats reported some
The great
trial work of one kind or another.
bulk of reported trials in nontraffic cases was
done in courts at county seats, 1,031 trials were
hold at county seats, and only 268 outside
county scats.
,

r iguros would
seem to indicate further that
the trials in all cases other than traffic offonsos

Th(>st;
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are centered in courts in the county seat where
they can be handled by the county attorney as
county prosecutor.
'^

Police Courts
The same criticisms leveled against justices of the peace
As Table 6 indicates, fiftyare applicable to poli'ce courts.
seven of Montana's police judges serve as justices of the
Therefore, only forty-three police judges are compenpeace.
sated solely on a salary basis. ^1
The qualifications of police judges are as minimal as those
of justice-s of the peace since a J. P. can serve concurrently
as a poLice judge. ^•^ Furthermore, the Mason-Crowley study
revealed that the work of police courts has become increasingly
administrative in nature:

.

As in the case of justices of the peace the
reports showed that the work of the police
courts is not principally trial work and
the manner of handling and disposing of
The 6 4 judges who
cases is much the same.
of
85 police judges
a
total
reported [out of
handled
that
time]
46,026
in the state at
1966.
of
these
cases
1,778
traffic cases in
rate
of
less
than
4%.
trial
were tried--a
The police judges also reported 7,196 criminal
prosecutions for offenses other than traffic
The reports show that 1,457 of
violations.
these cases were tried - a trial ratio of a
These figures appear, like
little over 20%.
the equivalent figures submitted by many
justices of the peace, to be an overstatement because many of the judges reported as
"trials" any proceeding beyond a mere bond
Whether or not the entire disdefault.
crepancy between the 4% trial rate on traffic
offenses and the 20% reported rate on other
offenses is due to this factor is impossible
However, most cities and towns have
to state.
some procedure for disposition of routine

traffic tickets without a personal appearance
This is not generally true
by the defendant.
of the other kinds of misdemeanor violations
handled by traffic courts, such as drunkenness
and vagrancy where the accused is usually taken
into custody and physically held for action by
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Whatever the explanation,
the police judge.
trial
rate for all offenses was
combined
the
The work load of these courts, like
only 6%.
that of the justice courts, is primarily administrative disposition of traffic offenses,
with a somewhat higher load of nontraffic misdemeanors. -'^
Reform Alternatives for Montana's Minor Courts
If the foregoing analysis of Montana's minor court operations
shows a need for reform, the question becomes whether the
reform should be made at the constitutional level or the legisMany states have removed the constitutional
lative level.
status of minor courts, delegating the responsibility for reThe New Mexico constitutional proform to the legislature.
visions abolishing justice of the peace courts stated:

Justices of the peace shall be abolished not
later than five years from the effective date
of this amendment and may, within this period,
be abolished by law, and magistrate courts
vested with appropriate jurisdiction.
Until
so abolished, justices of the peace shall be
continued under existing laws. [New Mexico Const.
Art. VI, Sec.

31]

However, other states have specified in their constitutions
Oklahoma consolidated its
the replacement for minor courts.
minor court system into district courts by the following
constitutional provision:
All Courts in the State of Oklahoma, except
those specifically provided for in this Article,
are hereby abolished at midnight on the day preceding the effective date of this Article and
their jurisdiction, functions, powers and duties
are transferred to the respective District Courts,
and, until otherwise provided by statute, all
non-judicial functions vested in such courts
are transferred to the District Courts and Judges
thereof.
.[Oklahoma Const. Art. VII, Sec. 7]
.

.

Municipal courts in Oklahoma were left to legislative reform:

Municipal Courts in cities or incorporated
towns shall continue in effect and shall be
subject to creation, abolition or alteration
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by the Legislature by general laws, but shall
be limited in jurisdiction to criminal and
traffic proceedings arising out of infractions
of the provisions of ordinances of cities and
towns or of duly adopted regulations authorized
by such ordinances. [Oklahoma Const. Art.
VII, Sec. 1]
To improve the administration of justice on the minor court
level in Montana, several alternatives are available.
1.
Retain justice of the peace and police courts if retained, substantial improvements could be made in the existing
Minor court judges could be compensated by salary
system.
rather than fees; other states such as Delaware and North
Carolina have taken this step.^^ Training in the law or a
qualifying examination could be required. Judicial officers
in Washington's largest counties must be attorneys; in New
York, Mississippi and Iowa, justices are required to complete
Minor courts could be placed under the
training courses.
supervision of the state court system, as Delaware has done.^"
Supervision could result in better record-keeping and more
uniform methods and procedures on this court level.

An overhaul of the existing minor courts may improve the
quality of justice administered; nevertheless, imposing
additional qualifications and restrictions on the courts does
not solve the problems of overlapping jurisdictions or the
uneven distribution of judges.
2.
Replace minor courts with another system of courts.
alternative
would maintain the three-level court structure
This
Montana.
The
ABA model judicial article replaces minor
in
courts with a magistrate court system. (See Appendix E)
Magistrate courts are utilized in Kansas, Missouri, New Mexico
These courts generally are staffed by
and South Carolina.
legally trained officers paid on a salary basis; jurisdiction
is usually broader than that J. P. courts exercise, particularly
Other states have replaced minor
in the small claims area.
courts with a uniform system of county courts or district
Attemptcourts with municipal courts operating in urban areas.
ing to institute a system of county courts in Montana may be
the least feasible alternative, depending upon the facilities
and the staff required to operate them.
3.
Consolidate the jurisdiction of minor courts into
Consolidation of the justice of the
one general trial court.
peace and police courts inLo Montana's district courts would
achieve the ideal two-level court structure, hut would preioiuil
sent problems in the area ()[ fjors(jnncl to hundlc he .idd
I
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cn.st>lc)>ul which would bo Lhrust
upon Lho disLrict courts.
Auxiliary judicial otficers .such as magistrates and commissioners have been utilized by the federal courts and other
state systems to supplement the judicial staff of trial courts.

Magistrates
In 1968 a magistrate system for federal district courts replaced a similar commissioner system. ^8 The magistrates,
appointed and supervised by federal district court judges, ^^
try minor criminal offenses and serve as committing and examining officers. 60

Full-time federal magistrates serve eight-year terms and must
be members of the bar.
If the appointing court finds no
lawyer available in a specific location to serve as magistrate,
the bar requirement is waived and a part-time magistrate may
be appointed to serve a four-year term.^-*- Part-time magistrates may engage in other businesses or occupations including the practice of law.62
Compensation ranges from a maximum of $22,500 a year for full-time magistrates to a maximum
of $11,000 a year for part-time magistrates. ^^
Training
programs arc conducted by the Federal Judicial Center. ^^
On the state level, Illinois has a consolidated trial court
system with magistrates serving full-time. 65 They are appointed by circuit court judges and must be attorneys unless the
circuit has none available. 66 The constitutional provision
which accomplished consolidation states:

The judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court,
an Appellate Court and Circuit Courts. [Illinois
Const. Art. VI, Sec. 1]

The magistrate system is provided by statute in Illinois 67

Other states using a magistrate or commissioner system include Hawaii, Alaska, Idaho, Michigan, Minnesota and Wyoming. 68
A study of Utah courts recommended magistrates 69
:

[T]he J. P. problem is primarily a rural problem. In view of the inadequacies of the JP
system
there is no realistic argument
supporting retention of the JP system in areas
which are primarily urban.
In those areas, there
is a clear need to replace the JP system with a
.

.

.

more adequate "inferior court" system
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a system which constitutes an integral part of
a single unified court system.
Any changes

in the system will, of course, have to provide
for availability of and prompt access to a judicial officer by law enforcement personnel for
warrants and bail determinations. These problems,
however, can readily be solved either by use of
a commissioner system similar to that utilized
by the federal courts or by the development of
a system of magistrates under judicial supervision.

It is the rural context which creates the problem
for changes in the JP system.
Many counties do
not have sufficient legal business or law trained personnel to justify city courts even at the
county seats. Motorists, particularly tourists,
either state residents or non-residents, could
be subjected to considerable inconvenience if
ready access to a method of adjudicating traffic
violations were not available. An equally substantial burden would be imposed upon law enforcement personnel if judicial officials were
not readily available, particularly in view of
the broadened constitutional protections being
developed by the United States Supreme Court.
However, these legitimate concerns should not
prevent modifications of the JP system, if
changes in that system are enacted with a proper
appreciation of the distance problem inherent
in the rural counties.

Tho fundamental fact of modern life often ignored
by those who fear a modification of tho JP system
is that of modern communications.
There is no
reason why search or arrest warrants can not be
obtained by radio and, if the subject of the
warrant doubts its validity, verification could
be accomplished in the same way.
More expensive, but equally possible, would be a system
of magistrates, paid possibly on a scale based
on estimates of work load, appointed by the
courts and answerable to the courts for their
performance in office.

The magistrate system could also fulfill the bail
commissioner function to accommodate rapid and
convenient handling of traffic and fish and game
matters.
However, no pressing need for such office
exists.
Most such matters could be handled by
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means of a summonc and acknowledgment system
which merely requires the defendant to appear
within some reasonable time after the summons
is issued at a convenient session of a court
established on a county-wide basis. Administrative control over the issuance of
summonses by the police or highway patrol
could be obtained by a system using multiple
copies of each summons, with a requirement
that an acknowledgment copy of each summons
issued be placed in the mail immediately after
its issuance by both the officer and the offender.
Administration of these matters could then be
handled at the regularly scheduled sessions of
All of
the county court nearest the defendant.
those who would prefer to forfeit bail could
do so by mail.
And offenders warranting arrest
and detention could be taken to one of several
court facilities in the county. While some
form of after-hours arraignment would be
necessary, this problem could easily be solved
by the designation of a court employee as a
committing magistrate when the judge is unavailable.
.

.

.

The Mason-Crowley study recommended the use of auxiliary
judicial of f icers--commissioners to exercise the jurisdiction of the district courts in criminal cases not amounting to felonies and to act as a committing and examining
court in felony cases. ^^ This approach is patterned after
the federal court system.
However, the necessity for
judicial officers to serve in the area of small civil
claims as well as petty criminal offenses is well-recognized.
The present minor court system in Montana is not being utilized
in the area of small claims, yet there should be a forum for
citizens to litigate such cases without the expense of hiring
an attorney.
Thus, any replacement of minor court officials
in Montana could be directed to both the civil and criminal
areas.

—

Opposition to Minor Court Reform
A Court Study Commission in South Dakota supported the
continuation of a J. P. system by stating:

The faults and shortcomings of the (JP) system
are many.
But, as stated by one of South Dakota's
Circuit Judges, it is a part of our legal system
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which the average citizen feels unconsciously
is part of the "warp and woof" of his life.
Any statistical evaluation cannot measure the
value of this element. Certainly, where
distances are great, and the population is
small, availability, in a geographic sense,
becomes important. And in urban areas a
court of limited jurisdiction can furnish
not only an expeditious means of disposing of
a multitude of minor matters, but it provides
a familiar forum for the settlement of small
claims.
Thus, despite the many criticisms of
this court, the Court Study Commission recognizes the need for a continuance of it in a
more closely supervised form.^-^
This argument has been countered by the contention that accessibility in a consolidated court can be assured by requiring a
consolidated county or magistrates court to travel a circuit,
and that there is no reason why a "common man's court" could
not be operated as a specialized division of the general trial
court. '2

There is a natural resistance to any change in the status quo
One
by those who may lose a position in the new order.
commentator noted:

—

Inferior court officialdom judges, clerks,
constables, and other functionaries naturally
and these
resist abolition of their offices.
particular offices are especially hard to eliminate, for the incumbents are often close to
their legislators 73

—
.

.

.

Another argument generally leveled against the consolidation
of lower courts into the trial courts' jurisdiction is the
expense involved in providing records of the proceedings
and manpower necessary to handle court hearings on such minor
matters as traffic violations, breaches of the peace and fish
and game violations.
The Mason-Crowley study of Montana's
judicial system noted that the total compensation to justices
of the peace and police judges in 1966 was $239,674.72 and
for the same amount of money, at least fifteen legallytrained judges at $15,000 per year could be hired. 74 Another
observer questioned the magnitude of the expense involved in
keeping records of minor hearings when electronic recording
equipment could be used. 75 Furthermore, the elimination of
appeals for trials de novo would save the present expense of
repeating the original trial from scratch. '^

-90-

COURT ORGANIZATION
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations noted
that resistance to a change in lower courts may come from
general trial court judges:
Some general trial court judges may not relish
the prospect of taking on some of the business
handled by the inferior courts, for they prefer
the prestige of occupying a high court insulated
from the myriad problems of petty offenses.''

Reform Attempts in Montana
Since 1945 attempts have been made in Montana either to eliminate the constitutional status of justice of the peace courts
or to improve the quality of justice administered at this
level. ^S

More recently, an amendment to remove mention of justice of
peace courts from the Constitution was rejected by state voters
In 1971, a bill
in 1962, but only by a margin of 1,173 votes.
was defeated in the legislature that would have required new
justices of the peace to have a law degree, or to have completed a two-day training session sponsored by the Montana
Magistrate Association. ^5
Despite the failures in lower court reform, the consensus of
of the Citizen's Conference on the Montana Judicial System
in 1966 was:
The type and quality of justice presently being
provided in these courts could be materially
improved by adoption of a unified court system
which would provide a district court level of
This
judicial quality for all legal proceedings.
unified court system might be materially implemented by incorporating within it a provision
whereby, where needed, district court judges might
select persons to act as deputy judges or magistrates to assist the district court in supplying
continuous court representation in remote areas
of the state. 80
The justices of the peace themselves recognize the need for
improvement in the present system. The president of the
Montana Association of Magistrates pointed out that educating
the judges would solve many problems:
We want more schools

(usually two-day seminars
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conducted by disLricL

judcjc^s) diid wc- need
find the critics .ittitudi' rather
They refuse to provide the schools
amusing.
and then they turn around and say wc don'
know anything, so they'll have to throw us
out. 81

Lhom.

.

.

I

CENTRALIZED ADMINISTRATION
State court systems are large-scale business operations.
National expenditures for judicial activities in fiscal
1968-69 amounted to approximately $900 million. ^2 An enterprise of this magnitude demands the most output for each
dollar.
In terms of fair and speedy administration of justice,
courts must be properly administered to avoid backlogs and
delay.
In a 1970
address to the American Bar Association,
Chief Justice Warren Burger declared:
The management of busy courts calls for careful planning, and definite systems and organization with supervision by trained administratormanagers.
.We need them to serve as "traffic
managers," in a sense as hospitals have used
administrators to relieve doctors and nurses of
managerial duties. We are almost a century behind the medical profession in this respect. ^3
.

.

Another member of the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice William
Brennan, has advocated application of business management
principles to court operations:
No governmental department of any size could
operate efficiently without an administrative
head.
A regiment of officers with no men would
not function. A business office could not be
imagined in which everyone is manager and no
one can tell anyone what to do.
Yet this is
substantially what we have in the courts
situation which grew out of the sanctity of the
so- called autonomous court.

—

Now, obviously judges should be independent
in rendering decisions.
The error crept in
when this independence was carried over to
administration.
In any large institution,
whether it be court, government agency,
or business firm, someone must run the show
on the admin istral ivt.' sidi-.
Someone inusl be
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When a modern court system is established
there should be an administrator at the head of
the entire organization, as there is in the
This should be a permanent
executive branch.
He should
chief justice of the supreme court.
be given specific powers of administration
studying docket conditions, shifting judges
as needed, appointing administrative judges
below, requiring statistical information, and
so on.
In addition he should have general
administration control over the entire structure,
as well as superior authority to the administra.^^
tive judge in the trial court.
boss.

.

,

Even when supervisory control over lower courts is granted to
the supreme court by a state constitution, administrative
responsibility is not always achieved. A 1963 South Dakota
study indicated that no means to implement the supervisory
control granted to South Dakota's supreme court had been
devised, and the result was a lack of administrative responsibility at nearly every court level. ^^ The same situation exists
in Montana.
The Montana Supreme Court is granted "a general
supervisory control over all inferior courts" by the Constitution.
This power, however, has been exercised only to control the
course of litigation in lower courts in specific cases, ^^ to
apportion business among district judges in a multi-judge
district if they fail to do so themselves87 and to compel a
district judge to perform his duties. 88 as the Mason-Crowley
report noted:

Neither the constitution nor statutes of the state
contemplate integral continuous administrative
control or supervision by the supreme court of
lower state courts."^
Scope of Centralized Administration
The primary objective in centralizing the administration of all
courts within a state is to systematize the operations of the
judicial system. An administrative office in the judiciary
would provide the same services available in most large business
organizations: compilation of caseload statistics, preparation
of a budget for the entire judicial system, assignment of judges
to equalize judicial workloads and to prevent court congestion,
supervision of court personnel and facilities, and assistance
in the determination of procedures for channeling litigation
through the various steps in the judicial process in a prompt
and efficient manner. ^^
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Most of these services are not coordinated on a statewide
Fifty-six counties, all municipalities with
basis in Montana.
police courts and the state deal with judicial budgeting.
Judicial assignments are handled on an informal basis; if a
judge is disqualified or otherwise unable to preside in a case,
he contacts another judge to serve in his stead.
It is difficult
to determine the fiscal expenditures made by the entire judicial
system in the state because budgeting operations are decentralized.
Furthermore, the amount of variance in caseloads between
districts or the possibility of congestion in court calendars
cannot be detected without compilation of state statistics.

While crowded dockets and delay in litigation may not be paramount problems in Montana today, these problems can proliferate
A device
from inefficient court management and organization.
which would enable the courts to meet the demands of future
judicial business could be a provision for centralized administration.

Vesting Administrative Authority
An important factor in improving a judicial system is proper
Seventeen states
placement of administrative responsibility.
Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New
Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma and Pennsylvania have constitutional
provisions vesting administrative authority in the state's
highest court. ^'- To aid in the administration of court systems, outside agencies have been employed to work with state
Initially judicial conferences or councils
supreme courts.
were created as advisory bodies; however, these advisory
responsibilities have devolved to state court administrators.

—

State Court Administrators
A definite trend in administration of judicial systems is
In
the employment of professional court administrators.
1970, thirty-five states provided by constitution or statute
for the appointment of full-time, nonjudicial personnel to
assist the supreme court or the chief justice in the discharge of administrative supervisory functions. ^2

Table 7 shows that twenty-one court administrators are
appointed by the highest court of the state, nine by the
chief justice, three by the judicial conference or council
and one each by a judicial study commission and an
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7

STATE COURT ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES, 1970

No. of employees
Title of Officer

State

Appointed by

1970 approp.
Prof.

Alaska

Administrative Director

Chief Justice

Arizona

Administrative Director

Supreme Court

Executive Secretary, Judicial

Chief Justice

Arkansas

.

Department
Administrative Director

Judicial Council

Col oi ado

State Court Administrator

Supreme Court

Connecticut

Executive Secretary, Judicial

Chief Court

Department

Administrator

Supreme Court
Supreme Court

Hawaii

Administrative Director

Idaho

AdministralivB Assistant of

Illinois

Director, Administrative Office

Supreme Court

Indiana

Executive Secretary

Judicial

Iowa

Judicial

the Courts

14

$393,027

1

18
10

13
5

34,725
624,028
291.827

10
3

21

357,400

7

236,691

2

2

7

14

41.000
379,065

1

California

Nonprof.

Study Commission

Kansas

Judicial Administrator

Supreme Court
Supreme Court

Kentucky

Administrative Director

Court of Appeals

6

Louisiana

Judicial Administrator

Supreme Court

3

74.677

Maine
Maryland

Administrative Assistant

Chief Justice

2

31,500

Director, Administrative Office

Chief Justice

.

Department

Statistician

1

1

1

3.5

25.250
Supremt

Part of

Court Budget

.

121,343

of the Courts

Massacfiusetts

Executive Secy, Supreme

Michigan

State Court Administrator

Supreme

Judicial Court

67,970
416,522

Judicial Court
.

Minnesota

Administrative Asst to

Missouri

Executive Secretary, Judicial

New

Administrative Director

Supreme Court
Supreme Court

34,300

Supreme Court

Supreme Court

Conference
Jersey

Chief Justice

of Courts

New Mexico

Director, Administrative

New York

State Administrator for

17

Supreme Court

Office of the Courts

the Courts

North Carolina

Director, Administrative Office

Admin Bd

of Jud.

Conference
Chief Justice

of the Courts

Ohio

Oklahoma

Administrative Director

Supreme Court
Supreme Court

Oregon

Administrative Assistant

Chief Justice

.

.

.

Administrative Director

to Chief Justice

Pennsylvania

Rhode

Island

Tennessee

.

State Court Administrator

Supreme Court

Court Adininistralor

Chief Justice

Executive Secretary to

Supreme Court

Supreme Court
Utah

.

,

Administrator of District

Supreme Court

Courts

Vermont

Court Adininistrator

Virgini.i

Executive Secretary, Supreme

Supreme Court
Supreme Court

Court of Appeals

Washington

Administrator for the Courts

Wisconsin

Administrative Director

Supreme Court
Supreme Court

of Appeals
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lu> p lmsiu'c
All bii L .i fi'w :;cm"vc- .il
administraLive l^oard.
Staff si-zo varies rom two
of the appointing authority.-'-'
members in Arkansas, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon
The appropriation
and Virginia to 139 members in New York.
for the administrators is not always separable from the
appropriation for the supreme court, but where it is separable,
it ranges from $25,250 in Iowa to $624,028 in California, with
a median of approximately $109,000.^4
I

I

1

A recent survey of court administrative offices indicated that
in sixteen states the administrators were required to be
members of the bar, while Alaska, Michigan and New Mexico also
required administrative training or experience. ^^ The annual
compensation of state court administrators ranges from $11,000
in New Mexico to $36,950 in New York; an average salary is
approximately $19,000.96

The duties of administrative officers vary, with more emphasis
Table 8 indicates that the
on appellate court operations.
primary function performed for all courts is the collection
and compilation of data, followed by the examination and design of statistical systems, formulation of recommendations
on court structure, and investigation of complaints about
court operations. On the trial court level, larger administrative offices are involved in collecting and compiling
statistics, obtaining reports from these courts, and making
recommendations to the chief justice or the supreme court
regarding the assignment of trial court judges. Activities
of administrators lessen in the area of minor courts; the
most common activities appear to be requiring reports from
these courts, examining their statistics and recommending
uniform system; collecting and compiling data, and investigating complaints.

Effect of Unification on Administrative Authority. Of thirtyone state court administrative offices responding to a study
by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
and National Conference of Court Administrative Officers,
sixteen were classified as operating in a unified court
system. 97 Table 9 compares these sixteen offices to the
total offices responding and indicates that the administrative offices in a unified system have a greater degree of
Furtherinvolvement, particularly on the lower court level.
more, administrative staffs in unified court systems tend
to have a larger staff available and higher appropriations
than those in nonunified systems, as shown in Table 10.
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ACTIVITIES PERFORMED BY 31 STATE COURT ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES, 19 70

Percentage of States Performing Activities
following Courts:
Activities

performed
General

Supreme
A.
1

.

in

Trial

Limited

Intermed.

Jurisd.

Appellate^

Evaluating Organization. Practices, Procedures

Examine administrative methods and systems used in
make recommen-

offices of clerks, probations officers, etc.,

dations for improvement.

71%

81%

61%

67%

on court operations.
3.
Formulate recommendations on structure of court
system, organization, functions which should be performed
by various courts.
4.
Assist in preparing recommendations to Governor,

68

90

71

73

74

81

64

93

68

74

55

93

77

97

71

orders.

42

NA

NA

Prepare annual report and other reports as directed
by the court.

84

NA

NA

39

81

48

19

19

19

81

68

42

2.

Investigate complaints

Legislature regarding court organization, practices,

procedures.

B.
1

Statistics

and Records

Examine

statistical

system and make recommenda-

tions for uniform systems.

71

2.

Design (or contract for design) of

3.

Collect and compile data on court business transacted.

4.

Require

all

statistical

systems.

necessary reports from the courts on rules,

dockets, business dispatched or pending.

Maintain records of assignment and disposition of
matters submitted to supreme court and of opinions and
5.

6.

C.

Dispatch of Judicial Business

1
Make recommendations to chief justice or supreme
court relating to assignment of judges where courts need
.

assistance and carry out direction of chief justice or

supreme

court as to assignments.

Report to chief justice or supreme court concerning
cases pending which can not be tried because of accumula2.

tion of business.

Assist in preparing assignment calendars of judges,
handle printing, distribution thereof.
3.

4.

Make

reports concerning performance of duties by

special trial judges.

Implement standards and policies on hours of court,
assignment of term parts, judges and justices, publication
5.

of judicial opinions.
D.

Fiscal

Procedures

Prepare and submit courts' budget request.
Maintain accounting and budgetary records for
appropriations
1

2.

3.

Audit

4.

Approve

5.

Disburse nuinies from court appropriation.

bills.

requisitions.

TABLE
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(Continued)

Percentage of States Performing Activities
following Courts:
Activities

performed

Supreme

General
Trial

Procedures (Cont'd)

D.

Fiscal

6.

Collect statistics on expenditures of State, county,

municipal funds for courts and related offices.
8.

Serve as payroll officer.
Exercise other assigned fiscal duties.

E.

Supervision of Non-Judicial Personnel

1.

Responsible for supervising administration of offices

7.

of clerks and other court clerical and administrative

personnel.
Fix compensation of clerks, deputies, stenographers,
2.
other employees whose compensation is not fixed by law,
3.
Exercise other duties with respect to personnel
practices.
4.
5.

in

48

Limited

Intermed.

Jurisd.

Appellate^

\

TABLE

9

PERCENTAGE OF 31 STATE COURT ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES ENGAGED
IN SPECIFIED ACTIVITIES AT VARIOUS COURT LEVELS, 19 70

Supreme

Category of activity

Evaluating organization, practices, and procedures
Statistics

and records

Dispatch of judicial business
Fiscal

procedures

Supervision of nonjudicial personnel

Equipment and accommodations

....

TABLE 10

COMPARISON OF STAFFING AND 19 70 APPROPRIATION FOR STATE COURT
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES OF STATES WITH UNIFIED AND NON-UNIFIED
JUDICIAL SYSTEMS

;
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Federal Court Administration. On the federal level. Congress
established the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts in 1948.^8 it is supervised by a director and deputy
director who are appointed by the federal supreme court and
receive annual compensations of $40,000 and $36,000 respectively. ^^ The director is the administrative officer of the
federal courts and serves under the supervision and direction
His duties,
of the Judicial Conference of the United States. ^00
enumerated in federal legislation, include: 101

Supervise all administrative matters re(1)
lating to the offices of clerks and other
clerical and administrative personnel of the
courts
Examine the state of the dockets of the
(2)
courts; secure information as to the courts'
need of assistance; prepare and transmit
quarterly to the chief judges of the circuits,
statistical data and reports as to the business of the courts;
Submit to the annual meeting of the
(3)
Judicial Conference of the United States, at
least two weeks prior thereto, a report of the
activities of the Administrative Office and
the state of the business of the courts.
.

.

Fix the compensation of clerks of court,
(5)
deputies, librarians, criers, messengers, law
clerks, secretaries, stenographers, clerical
assistants, and other employees of the courts
whose compensation is not otherwise fixed by
law;

Determine and pay necessary office expenses
(6)
of courts, judges, and those court officials
whose expenses are by law allowable, and the
lawful fees of United States magistrates;
Regulate and pay annuities to widows and
(7)
surviving dependent children of judges and
necessary travel and subsistence expenses incurred by judges, court officers and employees.
Disburse, directly or through the several
(8)
United States marshals, moneys appropriated for
the maintenance and operation of the courts;
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Purchase, exchange, transfer, distribute,
(9)
and assign the custody of law books, equipment and
supplies needed for the maintenance and operation
of the courts and the Administrative Office and
the offices of United States magistrates;

Audit vouchers and accounts of the courts
(10)
and their clerical and administrative personnel;
Provide accommodations for the courts and
(11)
their clerical and administrative personnel;

Perform such other duties as may be assigned
(12)
to him by the Supreme Court or the Judicial Conference of the United States.
In addition, the director is required to submit to the Bureau
of the Budget annual estimates of the expenditures and appropriations necessary for maintenance and operation of the
federal judicial system, subject to the approval of the
judicial conference. 102

Judicial Councils and Conferences

Judicial councils and conferences were initiated as advisory
bodies to the courts. Judicial conferences are composed of
judges from all levels within the court system. In 1948, the
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court was empowered by Congress to convene an annual conference of
federal judges. 103 The conference's function is to survey the
condition of court business, make recommendations for the
assignment of judges, and carry on a continuous study of rules
of practice and procedure. 104 Operating within each circuit
of the federal judicial system is a judicial council which
is responsible for making all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the courts within its
circuit subject to the policy decision established by the
judicial conference. 105 However, these councils vary greatly
in the extent to which they use their power and it has been
suggested that many policy recommendations made by the federal
judicial conference remain unimplemented. 1^6
State judicial councils were first adopted in the 1920s. 1^7
Membership usually includes legislators, judges, members
of the bar and other interested citizens.
All but one state.
South Dakota, had a judicial conference or council in operation in 1968.108 Three states now have constitutionally
created judicial councils; 109 in most states, these councils
and conferences are established by statutes. Others are set up
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In Montana the
by court orders or informal agreements HO
power
discretionary
court
has
supreme
of
the
justice
chief
^
judges
of
conference
to call a
.

-'--'-

.

Table 11 shows the membership, powers and duties of judicial
councils and conferences created by statute. Their functions
are similar to the federal judicial conference discussed preIn several cases, these bodies appoint court adminisviously.
In eleven states the court administrator serves as
trators.
the secretariat of the council or conference (see Table 7).
In a few states the judicial council may serve as a judicial
nominating or removal body; for example, Alaska's Constitution
delegates to the judicial council the responsibility to certify
judicial incapacity to the governor or to recommend early
retirement of a judge to the supreme court. H2
However, the need for judicial councils and conferences in
The Advisory Commission
court administration is decreasing.
on Intergovernmental Relations concluded in a recent report:
In general, it seems that the importance of
the judicial council as an institution for
improving court administration has declined
as the office of full-time State court administrator has taken hold.H^

Rule-Making Power
An adjunct to administrative authority in a unified court
system is the authority to make rules of practice and proRules of practice or court administration deal with
cedure.
the internal operations of the judiciary hours of holding
court, length of briefs submitted by attorneys and method
Procedural rules, on the other hand,
of record-keeping.
deal with the mechanics of litigation--how a lawsuit is
started, how the issues are formulated, how the trial is
In determining
conducted and how an appeal is taken.
whether a constitutional grant of rule-making authority
should be made, the area of procedural rules offers the
most controversy.

—

In general, law has two aspects: substance and procedure.
The judiciary and legislature are involved in creating substantive law.
If no statutory provision governs a particular
matter in litigation, the decision of the court forms a body
of law called "case law."
Thus, an appellate court decision
not only provides a solution to a particular case but also
However,
establishes precedent to be used in future cases.
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TYPE OF MEMBERSHIP, POWERS AND DUTIES OE STATUTORILY
ESTABLISHED STATE JUDICIAL COUNCILS AND CONFERENCES, 1968
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c.isi"

law can bo supplanted by legislation.

In the area of procedure, the functions of the court and the
Until the nineteenth
legislature are not as clearly defined.

century, both procedural and administrative rules were made
Soon the procedural
by judges on a caso-by-case basis. 114
rights of
substantive
the
complex
that
so
become
had
system
techniprocedural
of
maze
the
forgotten
in
were
litigant
the
Public dissatisfaction led to procedural reform;
calities.
in 1848 a uniform procedural code was enacted by the New York
Thereafter the New York model, the Field Code,
legislature.
was copied over most of the United States and legislative
enactments became the norm in establishing procedure. H^
These codes, however, became extremely detailed after amendment piled on amendment. It became evident that another
In 1934
method of devising procedural rules was necessary.
Congress granted full rule-making power to the federal supreme
court which led to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 11^ Enactment of the federal rules spurred procedural reform in many states by either enacting an entire new
code or establishing a system for gradual revision on a piecemeal basis. 11^ Thus rule-making by the court subject to
legislative approval became an established method of determining rules of procedure.
As for rules of internal administration, traditionally each
court was free to determine its own operational rules which
resulted in a hodge-podge of court rules throughout a state.
The recent tendency is to restrict local authority to make
such rules and vest the highest state court with the power
to make general rules of administration applicable to all
courts 118
.

Rule-Making in Montana
There is no grant of rule-making authority in the Montana
Traditionally, the power has been exercised
Constitution.
by the Montana legislature, but in 1963 the legislature
granted the supreme court power to make rules of civil
procedure. 119 in 1967 the court's rule-making authority
was extended to criminal procedure 120 this grant of
authority expired in 1969 and has not been renewed. 121
As for rules of court administration, the district courts
and the supremo court are granted power to determine their
own rules.
However, the district court rules cannot conflict
with those of the supreme courtl22 and the legislature has
reserved the right to modify or repeal supreme court rules. 123
;
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Where the Power is Vested
There is little debate over placement of the administrative
rule-making authority. Most authorities advocating modernization of court administration believe this power should be
given to the supreme court to help it systematize the judiIn states like Montana where each district
cial branch.
court is free to determine its own rules, vesting the authority
in the supreme court alone would result in a change to uniform
court practices throughout the state. Administrative rulemaking power could be construed as inherent in any constitutional provision which vests administrative responsibility for
the court system in the supreme court; thus, an additional
grant of administrative rule-making power to the court might
be surplus verbage.
The area of procedural rule-making offers special problems.
There are opposing schools of thought on where procedural
Some argue that this
rule-making authority should be vested.
function is an exclusive power of the judicial branch. On the
other hand, it is argued that such rule-making is essentially
legislative in nature and that without enabling legislation
A view supported by many
the judiciary is powerless to act.
courts is that the judiciary has inherent power to adopt procedural reforms, provided that they do not conflict with
existing legislation.-'-^'* The New Mexico Supreme Court has
held that a constitutional provision granting superintending
control over inferior courts to the supreme court includes
the authority to issue rules of procedure. -"-^^ The judiciary
vs. legislature debate stems from the nature of procedural
In many instances procedure may affect subrules themselves.
stantive rights. According to proponents of legislative rulemaking, substantive enactments by the judiciary are infringeThis is illustrated by
ments on the legislative function.
the limitation placed on the Montana Supreme Court when the
legislature empowered it to establish rules of civil procedure:
"Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify the sub."^'^^
stantive rights of any litigant
.

.

A 1970 American Judicature Society study showed that approximately one-third of the state constitutions delegate procedural
rule-making authority either to the legislature or the supreme
California is an exception; its constitution grants
court. ^^'
such authority to the judicial council. ^^° Through constitutional or statutory provision, the supreme court of eighteen
states make procedural rules according to the AJS study:
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Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky
(civil rules only), Maine, Michiqan, Nevada (civil rules only),
New Jersey, Now Mexico, North Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Wa.shincjIn nearly all these states,
ton. West Virginia and Wyoming.
supreme court rules supersede procedural legislation.
In nine additional states, according to the survey, the supreme
court may initiate rules subject to some kind of legislative
Thus, court-initiated rules are subject to legislative
action.
veto in seven states: Alaska, Connecticut, Iowa, Maryland,
In Georgia these rules must
Minnesota, Missouri and Texas.
be affirmatively approved by the legislature before they are
effective; in North Carolina they are subject to legislative
repeal
In sixteen states, the legislature makes procedural rules:
Alabama, Arkansas, California (prior to 1956), Illinois,
Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts,, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee
and Vermont.
In about half of those states, the supreme
court exercises supervisory authority supplementary to the
statutory rules; in the other half, there is little or no
court supervision.

—

Delaware, Mississippi and Rhode Island
supervisory rule-making power is centralized in neither the
court nor the legislature. And in South Dakota and Wisconsin,
the constitution and status are unclear as to where the
However, Wisconsin rules usually are made
authority rests.
by the Supreme Court subject to legislative modification.
In three states

The ABA model judicial article (Appendix E) vests rule-making
power exclusively in the supreme court; the NML article
(Appendix D) vests it in the supreme court subject to change
by two-thirds vote of the legislature.

An ACIR study indicated that of eighteen unified court systems, nine vest rule-making power exclusively in the supreme
court, four grant it to the court subject to legislative
approval or veto, and five give it to the legislature exclusively 129 Furthermore, eighteen states by constitution
or statute grant the supreme court assistance in rule-making
by judicial councils or conferences; four of the unified
states are among the eighteen. 130
.

Procedural Rule-Making by the Judiciary:

Pro and Con

Arguments supporting procedural rule-making by the judiciary
include 1^1
:
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The judiciary is more aware than legislators of the
1.
deficiencies in procedural system and is better equipped to
Rigidity of procedural statutes can
make needed reform.
result in injustice; courts are bound by statute and cannot
suspend or modify them to meet situations unforseen when the
Judicial rule-making makes use of expert
laws were enacted.
knowledge, results in interpretation of rules by those who
make them, provides a more flexible procedure because of the
speed of amendment and insures more uniformity.
2.
Because the public places the responsibility for the
efficient administration of justice on the courts and not the
legislature, the courts should have authority commensurate
Rule-making power is a necessary
with this responsibility.
instrument for administrative control of the judicial system.

Legislatures generally are removed from the operations
3.
Legislative
of courts and are subject to political pressures.
sessions occur only at yearly intervals or even less frequently
Since procedural reform
and are crowded with other problems.
is not a matter which attracts great public interest, legislators may not be as concerned with this area.
Because of
these conditions, legislative rule-making tends to produce inflexible procedure and subsequent haphazard tinkering resulting
in a detailed, complex, cumbersome machinery.
On the other hand, opponents of judicial rule-making list the
following arguments 132
:

1.
Courts may use judicial rule-making power to affect
substantive interests because substance and procedure are inextricably interwoven.
However, this has not been the experience
in many states because the courts have tended to be quite conservative in determining what constitutes procedure.
2.
Courts fail to respond readily to the public point of
view.
They are unaccustomed to public hearings and other techniques by which a legislative committee enables interested parties
to participate in drafting legislation.

3.
Judges also are not qualified to make policy determinations because of their removal from public involvement.

The Convention has two alternatives.
Procedural and administrative rule-making authority could be expressly delegated
to the supreme court by the constitution.
This would grant
the court independence to establish rules without legislative
action.
Provision could be made to subject these rules to
legislative repeal or approval which would limit the supreme
court's power.
On the other hand, constitutional silence
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could be maintained on this issue, leaving the court to establish
rules piecemeal whenever the legislature grants it authority to
proceed.

Court Financing
Full state assumption of court expenses seems to be a logical
concomitant of a unified judicial system. One commentator
noted that unification of the courts had failed in Now York
primarily because there was no unified judicial budget;
three-fourths of court expenses were met by localities, not
He noted the relationship between efforts to
the state.
centralize administration of the judicial system and the
method of financing:

Those who control the purse can affect administration, and when so many local bodies
are involved in court financing, effective
Since
central administration is not possible.
some localities refuse to appropriate what the
courts request, salaries vary, and it follows
that administrators are denied the tools of
a uniform job classification system and uniform
work standards.
Court staffs are inadequate
.Transferability of judges and other
court personnel to meet unusually heavy burdens
is greatly inhibited because some communities
object to having people whose salaries they
.l^-^
pay serve elsewhere.
.

.

.

.

.

Other observers of judicial systems make the case for state
financing as follows:
A state constitutional provision for a unified court system administered by the chief
justice of the supreme court permits the
judges to control the system of justice.
But when the courts must go hat in hand to
various local departments of government for
the wherewithal to support their needs, the
judgment of the financier may be substituted
Conflicts between
for that of the judge.
courts and branches of local government respecting personnel often arise. ^34
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State-Local Sharing
In Montana, the state finances the salaries of supreme court
and district court judges and the operational expenses of
Counties bear the costs of district court
the supreme court.
operations and justice of the peace courts. Municipalities
According to a federal
finance salaries of police judges.
census study, the state bears only 29 percent of state-local

court expenditures

(see Table 12)

Hawaii, Rhode
Three
Island and Vermont paid virtually all costs of courts.
states Arizona, California and Ohio picked up less than 15
Table 12 indicates that
percent of state-local court costs.
fourteen states shared 20 percent or less of state-local expenditures; nineteen shared between 21 and 4 percent; eleven
shared 41 to 80 percent, and six accounted for more than 80
In addition, Colorado in 1970 assumed
percent of the costs.
100 percent state financing of court expenditures.
In 1968-69, only four states--Connecticut

—

—

,

—

A 1969 survey by the Institute of Judicial Administration
showed the basic characteristics of state-local fiscal responsibility for courts (see Table 13):135

—

All but one of the states financed the entire cost of the
highest court; in Virginia there was some local sharing.

--Seventeen of the twenty states with intermediate appellate
In Kentucky, New
courts also financed their entire cost.
York and Ohio, there was some local contribution.

— State-local

sharing varied among four categories of expenditures in trial courts:
(1) judicial salaries were entirely state
financed in twenty-one of the states; they were state-locally
financed in seventeen, and locally financed in one state. (2)
non-judicial salaries were entirely state-financed in twenty
states; state-locally financed in fourteen, and locally financed in five.
(3) travel expenses were totally state-financed
state-locally financed in thirteen, and
states;
twenty-one
in
completely locally financed in five.
(4) miscellaneous expenses
states; state-locally
nineteen
state-financed
in
entirely
were
financed in twelve, and completely locally financed in eight
states.

—

In the lower courts, state governments supplied total
fiscal support in six and shared expense with local units
In at least twenty-two states, local government proin ten.
vided full financing.
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TABLE 12

STATE-LOCAL SHARING OF COURT EXPENDITURES, 1968-1969^

21-40%

0-20'..

41-60%

Arizona (12)

Alabama

California (13)

Illinois (33)

61-80%
Delaware (68)

Arkansas (47)
Idaho (57)
Maine (56)

(23)

Kentucky

Florida (18)

Iowa (24)
Kansas (29)

Georgia (17)

Louisiana (35)

Nevj Mexico (47)

Colorado

(17)''

New Hampshire

Indiana (19)

Maryl.ind (40)

Oklahoma

(VlassaclKisc^tts (22)

Utah (57)

Nevada (17)
New York (20)
Ohio (13)

Miiiiipsota (21

Virginia (47)

Mississippi (27)

West Virginia (42)

Ppniisylvania

Montana

16)

South Cirohna (18)
Texas (19)
Washington (17)

(/2)

Alaska (93)
Connecticut (99)
Hawaii (99)

North Carolina

(51)

Michiiian (17)

(

81-100%

(91

Rhode Island (99)
Vermont (100)

(44)

Missouri (34)
(29)

Nebraska (40)

New

Jursey (34)

North Dakota (25)
Oregon (27)
South Dakota (25)
Tennessee (26)
Wisconsin (31)

Wyoming
14 States

^Numbers

(36)

19 States
in

9 States

2 States

6 States

parentheses indicate state percent of State-local court expenditures.

"Colorado assumed

full

Slate financing of

its

court system

in

1970.

Source: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
State-Local Relations in The Criminal Justice System Report
A-38 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 108,
,
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TABLE 13
STATE

(S)

AND LOCAL

(L)

SHARING OF COURT EXPENSES, 1969
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With respect to other items of common expenditure, the IJA
survey indicated:

— Judicial

retirement systems were entirely supported by
twenty-five states; by state-local sharing in
in
funds
state
eight states, and by local funds entirely in one.

—

At least twenty-one judicial councils and twenty-six
conferences were wholly state-supported; in Nebraska each
of these bodies was financed by the bar association.

—

Of the thirty-five having state court administrators,
funds in all thirty-two reporting states came entirely from
the state government.

—

Seven states paid the full cost to construct court
buildings; there was state-local sharing in eleven instances,
In New York conand complete local funding in seventeen.
struction was financed entirely by local funds except for
the highest court.

—

Maintenance of court buildings was a state funding
responsibility in twenty-two states and a local responsibility
In New York, maintenance was fiin the remaining fifteen.
nanced entirely from local funds, except for the highest court.
The IJA study also sought data on the authority for determining state court budgets. Of the forty-six states that
answered, thirty-one reported that their executive budget
review agency was authorized to revise judicial budget requests before transmittal to the legislature; fifteen were
not.
In the great majority of cases, the legislature treated
the judicial budget like all other budgets, with full freeThe governor was
dom to raise or lower budget requests.
reported to have an item veto over the judicial budget in
twenty-nine of the forty-six states .136

Overall, the IJA survey indicated that in almost every
responding state, the per capita local judicial expense
exceeded the per capita state judicial expense, and often
was two or three times as much. 137

Since 1961 Illinois has proTrend toward state financing.
vided for state payment of the salary of all judges, a l^J^ge
part of which previously had been borne by counties or cities.
The legislature provided for state assumption of a part of
Of the $8 million
the salaries of other court personnel.
additional cost to the state, $6.5 million represented direct
savings to the counties and municipalities. 138
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In 1966 the Committee on Court Study of the Idaho Legislative Council recommended that all functions of the court system,
with the exception of physical facilities, be funded by the
state. 1^9 In 1962 New York made state aid available to counties
as an incentive to their making certain judgeships full-time
positions. 140 In 1968 a subcommittee for the study of the Nevada
court structure recommended to the Nevada Legislative Commission
"that the administration of justice be recognized as a legitimate state expense and paid entirely from the state treasury ^'^^
A 1970 report by the California Council on Intergovernmental
Relations recommended that the state's fiscal role should be
expanded and more reliance placed on user fees or fines for
violations as a source of court finances. 142
.

The judiciary article of the National Municipal League's
Model State Constitution provides for state financing of its
unified court system. However, it permits the legislature to
provide by law for political subdivisions to reimburse the
state for appropriate portions of such cost (see Appendix D)
The NML explains its position in this way:

For improved management made possible by a unified
judicial system, the state is to pay for the costs,
thus doing away with the widespread practice of
having separate local courts maintained and paid
Since burdens may be greater in some
for locally.
parts of the state than in others, and in view of
the fact that local sharing of costs may be part
of a state's financial structure, the Model allows
the legislature to provide for reimbursement to
the state by political subdivisions of portions
of the cost. 143

The American Bar Association's model state judicial article
makes no provision for overall financing, but provides that
the state legislature is to set salaries of judges and magistrates and provide pensions for them (see Appendix E)

Among eighteen states classified as having a unified judiciary
by the Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations, Alaska,
Connecticut, Hawaii, North Carolina and Vermont have full or
practically full state financing. 144

Arguments For and Against State Assumption of Court Expenditures

Arguments for state assumption of court costs include :1
1.

Even where a fragmented system exists, the state government
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has a fundamental responsibility for seeing to it that all
state and local courts administer justice fairly, consistently
That holds true even for local courts that
and effectively.
may be exclusively concerned with trying violations of local
ordinances, which are, in effect, an extension of state
criminal laws because the state would have to provide for
comparable local regulations if such ordinaces did not exist.
All judicial personnel directly or indirectly are part of a
state system, no matter how disjointed it may be, and this
fact argues strongly for full state financing.

Variations in local levels of financing produce wide disThat makes it nearly
parities in the performance of courts.
for
state
discharge
its
responsibility for
impossible
the
to
assuring statewide consistency of court operations. The only
defensible way for the state to secure a consistent level of
court performance is to assume the total financing for this
function.
2.

3.
The logical result of effective state assumption of overall responsibility for the state-local judiciary is a unified,
simplified system with the supreme court or chief justice
responsible for seeing that the system operates properly.
The powers vested in the highest court or its chief justice
for administration of the state judicial system has little
significance if local governments have to be relied on to
provide the money for the trial courts.

Arguments against state assumption of courts costs include

i-*-

1.
Such action would reduce, if not eliminate, local responsiveness in the general trial and lower courts. A high
degree of responsiveness to local needs, however, is not
justifiable if it means uneven and inequitable application
of the law between jurisdictions.
Furthermore, local responsiveness is assured if judges continue to be selected
locally.
2.
Local governments that derive a "surplus" above and beyond their judiciary costs from fines and fees (mainly traffic
fines) object to surrendering this fiscal advantage.
In
response it may be argued that the operation of any court as
a revenue-raising device should not be condoned.
The violations for which the fines are assessed are, after all,
violations of state law or--when ordinances are involved-of the extension of the state law within the city or county.

In Montana, state assumption of all judicial expenditures
would be a step in unifying its court system.
Fees from
clerks of district courts and salaried justices of the peace
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that offset judicial expenditures in the counties ''*' could be
However, the fiscal effect
directed to the state treasury.
of state financing of the entire judicial system is difficult to determine without a cost analysis of present judicial
expenditures on the county and state level.
If statewide
financing is desired, perhaps the solution proposed by the
National Municipal League would be the best alternative in
Montana (see Appendix D)

Other Court Organization Considerations

Intermediate Appellate Courts

Intermediate appellate courts are established in twenty states
(see Table 3).
Mason and Crowley concluded in their study of
Montana's judicial system that there was no present need for
an intermediate appellate court; ^^^ however, some states have
provided in their constitutions for the creation of these
courts should the need arise.
Oklahoma's judicial article
vests judicial power in "such intermediate appellate courts
as may be provided by statute. "l'^9
In Oregon's Constitution
judicial power is vested in "one supreme court and such other
courts as may from time to time be created by law."1^0
Increase in appellate case loads also can be met by allowing
the supreme court to sit in divisions.
Another solution for
an increase in either trial or appellate work is flexible
constitutional provisions which allow the number of judges to
be increased or the court to be supplemented by outside sources.

Additional Manpower
The present composition of the supreme court in Montana is
fixed by the Constitution at five members.
Court membership
throughout the United States ranges from three to nine (see
Table 3).
The Convention may wish to consider whether the
maximum composition of the supreme court should be raised to
seven or nine, allowing the legislature to add members should
the court's caseload increase to such an extent that it could
not be handled by the present membership.

Another source of appellate manpower is the commissioners
system.
In Minnesota, North Dakota and South Dakota, retired
judges may serve as commissioners to the supreme court. ^^l
In Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri and Ohio,
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prior judicial office is not a pre-requisite to the post.^^^
The duties of commissioners are determined by the supreme
Usually these officers are assigned
court in most states.
and prepare opinions for adoption
oral
argument
hear
cases,
153
in Ohio, where commissioners
by
the
court.
rejection
and
majority of the commission
a
the
decision
of
group,
sit as a
154
Terms of office may be
a
court
decision.
treated
as
is
pleasure of the court.
subject
to
the
law
or
may
be
fixed by
court commissioners
appointed
retired
judges
who
are
Usually
in Indiana,
are paid only the normal retirement allowance. 155
Michigan and Ohio where attorneys may serve as commissioners,
annual compensation ranges from $14,000 to $26,000,156
In 1903 and 1920 commissioners were appointed in Montana to
alleviate an overburdened supreme court calendar. 157 Thus,
it would not be necessary to incorporate this office into
the constitution; legislation or supreme court rule could
provide for the post when necessary.

Judges pro tempore serve as a source of judicial manpower on
Article VII, Section 36 of the Montana
the trial level.
Constitution provides for these offices:

A civil action in the district court may be
tried by a judge pro tempore, who must be a
member of the bar of the state, agreed upon in
writing by the parties litigant, or their attorneys of record, approved by the court, and sworn
to try the cause; and in such case any order,
judgment or decree, made or rendered therein by
such judge pro tempore, shall have the same
force and effect as if made or rendered by the
court with the regular judge presiding.

Whether this provision has been utilized by trial courts in
Montana is unknown. One argument for retention of this
section is to supplement trial courts should a boom of civil
litigation occur in the next century.
One commentator notes
the advantages of pro-tern judges:
A successful "temporary" expedient has been
the appointment of pro-tem judges by the
courts.
Where there is statutory or constitutional authority the appointment of
special judges for the relief of the docket
of a particular court has had beneficial
results, especially where the problem is an
inherited backlog.
It has the advantage
of decreasing the long-range costs of the
operation of the courts where the problem
•

1
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is one that is not necessarily continuing.
It provides a flexible, efficient method of
providing judicial manpower in emergencies.

When coupled with the right of the highest
court to temporarily assign judges from
counties not having a full time workload to counties with a serious backlog
many of the normal problems presented by
1^^
court congestion can be met.
.

.

.

Jurisdiction, Judgeships and Judicial Districts
The Convention may wish to consider whether the elaboration of
jurisdiction should be shortened or omitted from the judicial
article.
The enumeration of jurisdictional powers of the supreme, district and justice of the peace courts constitutes a
great part of the present judicial article; more recent state
constitutions, such as those of Alaska and Hawaii, leave the
jurisdiction of the courts to legislative definition. 159
In Montana most of the jurisdictional language of the
Constitution is repeated verbatim in statutory form. 160

The present judicial article enumerates eight judicial districts
and empowers the legislature to

divide the state, or any part thereof, into
new districts; provided, that each be formed
of compact territory and be bounded by county
lines, but no changes in the number or boundaries of districts shall work a removal of
any judge from the office during the term for
which he has been elected or appointed
[Montana Const. Art. VIII, Sec. 14].
The legislature also may increase or decrease the number of
district judgeships as long as there is at least one judge
per district.
The Mason-Crowley report indicated a wide variance of case
In
loads among the eighteen judicial districts in Montana.
1966 the case load per judge ranged from 1,427 in the eighth
judicial district to 317 in the fourteenth. ^^l Although the
authors noted that case load does not always reflect work load
because the area of some districts requires more travel than
others, they concluded that the present districting system is
inefficient. 162

-118-

.

:

.

COURT ORGANIZATION
The solution, however, is not to rigidify judicial districts
and judgeships by enumerating them in the constitution.
Responsibility for definition of districts and the number of
judges therein could be left to the legislature or it could
be delegated to the supreme court if the court has rulemaking authority. A proponent of the latter alternative
argues

Quick response to changing judicial needs
is again facilitated by the supreme court's
authority to determine the geographic unit
assigned to a particular district court.
Judicial districts need not necessarily
follow county lines or some other political
boundary which may have little or no releThrough judicial revance to caseloads.
districting by the supreme court, the system
can be adopted to keep pace with population
shifts, changing concentrations of industrial
and commercial activity and other factors
which affect judicial workloads.-'-"^
The ABA model judicial article allows the supreme court to
fix the amount of districts and judges to serve in each (see
The NML judicial article, however, grants
Appendix E)
primary authority over these matters to the legislature (see
Appendix D)
.

Miscellaneous Provisions
There are various provisions in the present judicial article
which might readily be left to legislation, primarily sections
These sections deal
15, 25, 26, 27 and 28 (see Appendix A).
with matters of process, uniform laws, forms of actions and
other subjects that could be provided by legislation or court
rules
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CHAPTER IV

COURT PERSONNEL

Paradoxically the true measure of any success that
we may have had in reaching our goal of a government
of law and not of men inescapably rests in largo
part on the personal qualifications of the men whom
we select as judges
Competent judges are essential elements of an effective judicial
Without an able judge, a court will not dispense jussystem.
How to select judicial officers
tice fairly and efficiently.
and keep them on the bench and how to remove those who falter
in their duties will be primary considerations in revising the
Since the beginning of the century, debate
judicial article.
has flourished over what method is best suited to select a
competent judiciary. The primary issue is retention of the
Policv
elective system vs. adoption of an appointive system.
indepenjudicial
control,
considerations such as electorate
dence and political patronage will play a large role in resolving the selection quandary.
With so much emphasis placed on choosing a method of judicial
selection, often too little attention is given to factors inextricably bound up in the selection process. Length of tenure,
adequate compensation and mandatory retirement relate to attracQualifications
ting competent attorneys to judicial positions.
of judges define the type of person sought for judicial office.
Judicial removalaand discipline counterbalance the selection
process by providing means of assuring that competent judicial
adm.inistration will be maintained after judges have been
selected.
Although some of these factors are statutory in
nature, recognition of the interwoven relationship of these
subjects is necessary to place judicial selection in proper
perspective

JUDICIAL SELECTION
Throughout the history of Western civilizations, the keeping of
the peace and the administration of private justice among individuals have been attributes of sovereig..ower
The repositorv
of sovereign power was usually the ruler or king who initially
dispensed judgment himself. ^ But as the affairs of state became
more complex, rulers soon realized that they alone could not
effectively administer justice; it was than that the problem
.
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of judicial selection arose.
Moses chose able men from his
own acquaintance; King Harmhab of Egypt searched throughout
his kingdom for judges "perfect in speech, excellent in
character, skilled in penetrating the innermost thoughts of
men, and acquainted with the procedure of the palace and the
laws of the court. "3 Some judges of the English kings' courts
were chosen not only for their ability and integrity but also
for their willingness to carry out the policy of the Crown.
'^

Unlike countries where the sovereign power was vested in an
individual, judicial selection in America, a society where
sovereignty resides in the people posed more difficult problem.s
Dissatisfaction with colonial judges who were dependent on the king was evident in the Declaration of Independence which stated:
"He [George III] has made judges dependent
on his will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the
amount of paym.ent of their salaries."^ In several of the new
states, after independence, the governor merely succeeded the
king as individual representative of the people and head of
the government and likewise was given the power to appoint
judges.
However, all of the original states indicated a
determination to abolish one-man control of the judiciary by
imJ)osing safeguards on this power of appointment.
One method
was providing that appointment should be subject to approval
of a group of people:
in Pennsylvania and Delaware, it was
the legislature; in Massachusetts, Maryland and New Hampshire
it was the governor's council, and in New York there was a
special "Council of Appointment" consisting of the governor
and certain memiiers of the legislature.^
In Connecticut,
Rhode Island, New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia,
selection of judges by an individual was completely repulsed
and the legislature was empowered to appoint judges.^ The
Federal Constitution, created a few years later, gave the
power to appoint judges to the President with the advice and
consent of the senate. 8 Chief Justice Vanderbilt of the New
Jersey Supremo Court said of this period:
,

.

Thus in the postrevolutionary period in Anic^rica we
find that judges generally were selected by the executive or the legislature to serve in most instances
during good behavior.
Such a system was in accord
with the philosophy prevailing in other civilized
countries that the selection of impartial, honest
judges learned in the law must be entrusted to a
person or group capable of making an intelligent
choice and that because of the professional qualifications demanded for judicial office the electorate
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a wliole cannot bo cxpcctcHl to make such a choice
intelligently any more than it could bo oxpoctod
for in;-,tanco, to select a surcjoon general."

cis

however,
vt' years this system prtiva i led
For >iliiio.st seven L y179
wJicn
Georgia
as
3
as
early
wore
evident
the winds of change
of
popular
principle
the
adopt
state
to
became the first
election of judges. ^
r

1

;

Many factors contributed to the growing demand for popular conFirst, the U.S. Supreme Court announced
trol of the judiciary.
^^ that the Court had power to ad(1803)
Madison
v.
in Marbury
Such unprecedented
judge the constitutionality of legislation.
judicial control over the legislature generated a controversy
about the dire consequences of unchecked judicial power and
led to an attempt by Congress to impeach several justices of the
Court. 12 Thomas Jefferson, who before he was President had advocated appointment of judges to serve during good behavior,
became convinced after the Marbury decision that the growing
power of the judiciary was inconsistent with democratic principles and suggested that popular election of judges might be
desirable. ^^
Second, the early American judges were called upon to play a
more creative role in the law than their British counterparts.
English common-law precedents were not always adaptable to
colonial problems and there was little American common law on
which to rely. New Jersey and Kentucky, in fact, had passed
statutes prohibiting the application of common-law authorities, 14
The courts then were compelled to make interstitial law, which
some regarded as an usurpation of the legislative function.
Third, following the American Revolution, lawyers as a professional group were frequently under attack. Many eminent
attorneys had been loyalist or left the country prior to the
Revolution.
Following the war there was much debt collection
and foreclosing of mortages public distress with the legal
profession often led to open revolt against the courts and
lawyers, such as Sharp's Rebellion in Massachusetts in 1777.15
;

The advent of Jacksonian Democracy advocating control of government by the? common man climaxed the argument for popular control
of tlio judiciary.
In Jackson's rir;;t inaugural address, he
espoused a philosophy based on tlie [^remise that all men were
created equal and then "proceeded to the corollary that they
(judges) were as fungible in public office as potatoes ." -'-°
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New York's decision in 1846 to adopt the elective method ushered
Most of
ih'"the fer^ ciS elected judges throughout the country.
thie dxisting states followed New V'ork s example' within a short
period and each new state that entered the Union thereafter incorporated the eiectlye of judges into its constitution:-^^
'

1848
1850
1851
1852
1855
1857
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1870
1873
1876
1880
1886
1889

-

-

-

1895 189

8

1905
19 7
19 12

-

-

Illinois, Wisconsin
California', Kentucky
Indiana, Ohio, Virginia

Louisiana
Kansas
Iowa, Minnesota, Oregon
West yii-ginia
Arkansas, Maf^yland, Nevada
Missouri
Texas
Alabama, Nebraska
Tennessee
Pennsylvania
North Carolina
Colorado, Connecticut,
•'-'
' '^ ''
New Jdrs^y '
Florida
Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota,
''
Washington, Wyoming
Utah
Georgia
Michigan, Vermont
Oklahoma
Arizona, New Mexico
'

'

Maine, Delaware, Massachuall states joined the movement.
South
and
se-^ts
Rhode Island,
Carolina
New Hampshire did not
iTiethod.^^
Some states which had chosen
adopt the elective
elfectioh of judges returned to the appointive method.
The public becatae aware 6f the judicial favoritism of judges controlled
As one surby pkrty leaders
such as Boss Tweed in New York.
veyor of the judicial scene noted in 1917:
No-^

,

,

Popular elections throw the choice into the hands of
political parties, that is to say, of knots of wirepullers inclined to use every office as a means of
rewarding political services, and garrisoning with
grateful partisans posts which may conceivably become accomplices in election frauds, tools in the
Injunctions granted
hands of Unscrupulous bosses.
by them were moves in the party gamo.l^
In an
iiuiijiy

attempt to remove political control in judicial elections,
For sonic, hovn^vov
states instituted non-partisan elections.
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the elective process in its entirety was an anathema and the
call for a new approach to judicial selection was issued.
The embryo of merit selection began taking form in the 1930s
and was implemented full-scale in Missouri in 1940.

Today there are five main methods of selecting appellate and
partisan elecmajor trial court judges used by the states:
tion, non-partisan election, appointment by the legislature,
appointment by the executive and the merit plan. The latter
also is known as the Missouri plan, the ABA plan or the appointive-elective plan.
Partisan elections are used in seventeen states i^*^ Alabama
(all but trial judges in largest county), Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Indiana, Kansas (all but supreme court judges),
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas and West Virginia.
In Illinois initial selection is by partisan election; subsequent retention is through non-competitive elections.

Non-partisan elections are employed in fourteen states :^-^ Arizona, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio,
Such
Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
court
and
for
California
elections are used for trial judges in
Oklahoma.
judges
in
district
of appeals, district and associate
,

Appointment by the executive is used for the federal judiciary
and in Puerto Rico and nine states: 22 California (appellate
judges), Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New Jersey and Rhode Island (superior, family and district
court judges)
Initial appointments in Maryland are made by
the governor but judges so appointed must stand for election
on a non-partisan ballot in the following year.
.

Five states use appointment by the legislature 23 Rhode Island
(only supreme court justices), Vermont, Virginia, South Carolina
and Connecticut.
:

The merit selection plan has been adopted in nine states: 24
Colorado, Missouri, Alaska, Iowa, Kansas, (supreme court justices
only), Nebraska, Utali Oklahoma (supreme court justices and
court of criminal appeals judges)
and Idaho (supreme court and
district court judges)
,

,

Popular election of judges has been the basis of judicial selection in Montana since statehood.
The Constitution of 1889
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directs that supreme court justices, district court judges
and justices of the peace shall be elected but is silent on
the means by which the elections are to be conducted. 25
Thus the first legislative session was able to provide for
partisan judicial election. 26 ^s early as 1917, attempts
were made to institute non-partisan elections, but this was
not achieved for district and supreme court judges until
1935.^' Justices and police judges still are elected on a
partisan basis. °
It is something of a misnomer, however, to label Montana's
method of selecting supreme court and district court judges
as "elective."
Article VIII, Section 34 provides that
vacancies in these judicial positions are to be filled by
gubernatorial appointment.
Interim appointments in fact
have filled more judicial posts than election:
of the five
supreme court justices presently serving, four were initially
appointed to office; of the twenty -eight district court
judges, at least three-fourths of them were originally
appointed to office. 2" Most of these men have been successfully re-elected, supporting the political adage that it is
difficult to unseat an incumbent; thus, the original selection
of most of Montana's appellate and trial court judges is not
by the people but by the governor.

Elective System

Although the popular election of judges has been described
as one of the most distinctive contributions the United
States has made to world political theory of judicial systems^O
and is utilized by more than half of the states today, it has
also borne the brunt of more criticism than any other method
of judicial selection.
But supporters of the system vociferously point out that no system of judicial selection is
immune from complaints.
Advantages of Partisan Election
Arguments for retention of the election of judges include the
following:
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Under a democratic form of government, the people
1.
must be given a direct voice in selecting all important
Popular
officials, including those of the judicial branch.
elections at periodic intervals prevent the judiciary from
imposing political, social and economic policies which are
contrary to the fundamental aims of the people. ^-'-

Election assures selection of judges representa2.
tive of various ethnic, religious and racial groups of the
community -^^
.

This method has produced a qualified, impartial
and effective judiciary; there is no evidence of the
superiority of judges selected under other systems. Although
the appointive system used by the federal government has
produced an outstanding judiciary, factors other than the
method of selection account for the high quality of the
judges ^^
3.

Politics never can be entirely eliminated from
Under the appointive
selection of any government officer.
system, those who appoint--presidents and governors--are
generally leaders of their own political parties. Nominating commissions and bar associations all are subject to
their own kinds of political pressures -^^
4.

.

It is important to support party government even
5.
in the judicial branch because in the long run, political

parties produce better candidates.
weakens party government -^^

Any appointive system

.

6.
The partisan system is best designed to select
judges who deal most effectively and sympathetically with
everyday problems of ordinary people.^"
7.

The election of judges insures that the judiciary

is an independent branch of our government in that a judge

need not look to the executive or legislative branches for
appointment and confirmation.^^
8.
The partisan-elections method should not be disparaged until related problems that influence the quality
of judicial administration, such as salaries, retirement
benefits and physical facilities, have been improved. ^^
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Disadvantages of Partisan Election
The major criticisiri of the elective system of judicial selection, be it partisan or non-partisan, is that voter
knowledge of candidates and their qualifications is insufficient to form a basis for a rational choice.
Few voters
are aware of the qualifications needed for judicial office
because such qualifications rarely are discussed in camImpartial appraisals of judicial performance
paigns.
generally are not available to the average voter. ^9 The
elective system arose when the population was small enough
that candidates were widely known and the people wore more
likely to be aware of their qualifications.

Furthermore, statistics show that only a small proportion
of voters are responsible for the election of judges.
In
Los Angeles during a 1962 contested judicial election for
three judgeships, only 50 percent of those people who cast
ballots voted for the judgeships. Because not all registered voters voted, it was estimated that only 30 percent
of the electorate participated in the selection of the
judges. ^0 Most who do vote for a judicial candidate do so
on the basis of party affiliation or a popular and wellknown name.
In New York City, a study conducted ten days
after the 1954 general election showed that of those polled,
only 55 percent had voted for any judicial candidate, and,
42 percent of the voters could not remember the name of
the judge for whom they voted, ^'

Other criticisms of the partisan election include:
1.

The elective system involves essentially a choice

of judges by political party officials who are primarily
concerned with political factors such as the candidate's
support within the local political organization, his prior
service for the party and his political charisma, '^2 Thus,
many lawyers who would make competent judges are not considered for office because they have not been members of a
predominant political party or have not devoted years to
political service. ^-^ A recent study showed that of the
eighty Cook County circuit or associate circuit judges
elected in Chicago, seventy-four were members of regular
party organizations.^'^ Most voters merely ratify nominations made in party caucuses so if one party dominates the
state, their candidates are assured election. 45
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There is nothing in the experience with judicial
2.
elections to demonstrate that judges more responsive to
the public have been elected or that the quality of the
If able judges have been elected
bench has been improved.
it is fortuitous and in spite of the system. '^6
jn Montana
and most other states using the elective method of judicial selection, interim gubernatorial appointments rather
than elections have put many judges on the bench.

Election campaigning is time-consuming and expen3.
If a judge seeks re-election, he must take time from
sive.
If a canhis judicial duties at the taxpayers' expense.
didate is a practicing attorney, he must either devote less
time to campaigning or allow his practice to fall behind.'*^
4.
The public is not aware of judicial performance so
the elective method does not insure removal of judges who
are incompetent.
Most judges arc defeated in an election
not because of poor judicial performance but because their
party, as a whole, did badly at the polls. '^^
5.
People should have a direct voice in selecting
legislators and executives who are policy-makers, but not
judges.
A judge should be the antithesis of a policymaker; these men are sworn not to allow influence to affect
them or to give preference to one policy over another. ^^
6.
The elective system engenders a loss of public confidence in the judicial system as a whole.
Campaigns require
funds and it is easy to give the impression that contributions
for a campaign have strings attached.
Even after election a
judge must keep up his political connections in order to be
re-elected and may refrain from taking action that could offend party leaders upon whom his renomination depends. 50 The
Canon of Judicial Ethics prohibits judges from engaging generally in partisan political activites, except in their own
campaigns ^-'- and from accepting any gifts or financial contributions from lawyers practicing before them. 52 This does not
prohibit financial contributions to a committee supporting
the election of a judge; however, to the public this fine
distinction does not remove the suggestion that the judge will
be beholden to those who helped to elect him.

Variations
To avoid some of the undesirable effects of partisan elections,
some states have adopted variations of the elective system.
In
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1962 Illinois adopted a procedure termed "merit retention."
Judges of appellate and trial courts of general jurisdiction, who are initially elected to office on a partisan
ballot, may be retained in office after expiration of their
regular terms by a non-competitive election.
This plan
provides that the name of the incumbent judge is to be
placed on a special ballot, without opponents or party organization, to determine whether ho should bo retained in
office for another term. This method has been urged as
one that would prevent loss of good judges who fail to be
re-nominated or re-elected for reasons not involving the
quality of their performance in office, and it removes the
judiciary from the pressures of politics. However, it
has been criticized, for making it difficult or impossible
to remove judges who are competent or have mediocre records
unless they have clearly engaged in improper conduct. ^-^

As mentioned previously, fourteen states including Montana
have adopted the non-partisan elective system which adherents
proclaim eliminates the evils identified with partisan elections without depriving the public of its right to select
judicial officers. 54 Nevertheless, the system has its share
of criticism.
Opponents claim that it fails to provide any
method of screening applicants before they appear on the
ballot; thus, candidates who would never be nominated by a
party could be elected to political office by such irrelevant
factors as a large campaign fund, a pleasing television image,
or a preferential place on the ballot. ^^ Furthermore, nonpartisan elections deprive a judicial candidate of his party's
financial support; thus, he is required to use his own resources
or depend upon contributions from "friends," which may affect
his impartiality just as much as those judges who receive
financial support from party coffers.

Many of the arguments against the partisan system apply also
to the non-partisan plan.
Time spent away from judicial duties
during a campaign year is not reduced.
It is estimated that
in Montana an incumbent supreme court justice spends nine
months of an election year campaigning for office. ^^ Voters'
apathy toward judicial candidates in partisan elections is
heightened by the non-partisan system.
In Montana this
system appears to explain reduction in the percentage of votes
cast for judges.
Prior to the adoption of the non-partisan
ballot the Chief Justice race in various years polled 91 to
94 percent of the votes cast for the governor; this decreased
to 77 per cent seventeen years after initiation of the plan.
As one analyst concluded:
"Sometimes party labels are better
than no labels at all."^^
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Executive Appointment System
In Delaware, Hawaii, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Puerto Rico
and the federal judiciary, appointment by the executive is
subject to Senate confirmation, while in Maine, Massachusetts

and New Hampshire the appointee must be confirmed by the
Executive Council. ^ California's appellate judges are appointed by the governor with the approval of a commission on
judicial appointments. ^ Thus all jurisdictions using this
system have placed a control upon the executive's appointive
In reality, however, nearly every state gives its
power.
governor full rein to appoint whomever he chooses to the
This occurs through constitutional provisions permitbench.
ting the governor to fill interim vacancies in judicial offices
In ten
by appointment without confirmation by another body.
years between 1948 and 1957, more than 56 percent of the justices of courts of last resort in thirty-six so-called "elective" states went to the bench by appointment °-'- Thus, executive appointment is responsible for more judicial selection
nationwide than any other system. Even in "elective" states
the people have tolerated the appointive system far more than
they realize.
.

Advantages of Executive Appointment
Proponents of this method of judicial selection point out that
it was followed universally in all states for seventy years
after the signing of the Declaration of Independence; that the
abuses of judicial appointment which resulted in election of
judges do not exist today, and that the elective system is
contrary to the professionalism demanded of a modern judiciary. ^2

Most proponents of the appointive system maintain that selection by a major executive office is more conducive to attaining a qualified, capable judiciary than the elective method
whereby candidates are chosen more for political appeal than
merit.
Two principal reasons are given for the claimed superiority of appointed judges:
1.
An individual rather than a group is clearly responsible for the quality of appointed judges. The governor's
success in office and his hopes for re-election may depend, in
part, upon voters' satisfaction with the judges he has appointed;
this responsibility to the public will temper his appointments.
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Provision for a public legislative confirmation hearing at
which opponents to the appointment may be heard acts as a
substantial check since the executive will want to avoid
embarrassment and the legislature will be reluctant to
approve an unsatisfactory choice.
In the elective system,
the responsibility for the quality of the judiciary is diffused among the electorate. "^
2.
The executive can develop the staff and resources
to seek out capable lawyers for judicial office who would
not normally be considered under an elective system if they
lack political experience or support. ^"^ This staff provides
a screening mechanism which the elective system lacks.
The
federal practice, for example, is to have the attorney general
screen likely candidates and make recommendations to the
President. The names of proposed candidates are usually investigated by the FBI and are also subject to scrutiny by
a special committee of the American Bar Association which
rates the candidates and reports this rating to the attorney
general.
In all cases, the appointee must appear and testify before a sub-committee of the Judiciary Committee of
the Senate. 65

Disadvantages of Executive Appointment
Opponents of the appointive system argue that it is inherently undemocratic because it deprives the people of
direct control of the judicial branch; this, of course, is
a repetition of Jacksonian democracy philosophy.
Purportedly this system encourages the executive to expand his
powers by appointing judges who favor his programs and
policies.
This argument is particularly significant when
judges, as in the federal judiciary and Massachusetts, for
example, are appointed for lifetime tenure.
Far from divorcing the judiciary from politics, critics
point out, political considerations may increase under the
appointive method. The appointing official is a political
leader subject to the same political pressures as party
officials, and he may be encouraged to enlarge his political
organization by astute trading of judgeships and judicial
patronage.
Some critics claim that political considerations
may narrow the field from which the judges are chosen if
judgeship is being awarded on the basis of faithful party
service."" Statistics on the federal judiciary indicate
that the President appoints federal judges mainly from his
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between November 1963 and March 1967, 117 of 122
own party:
federal judges appointed were of the same party as the PresiThus, lawyers or judges not active in the executive's
dent.
political party, though qualified for a judicial post, may
Dissatisfaction with the federal
not be considered seriously.
appointment system led Senator Hugh Scott to introduce a bill
creating a Judicial Service Commission to make recommendations
to the President when a vacancy occurs."" The proposal is
similar to the merit selection plan considered later in this
chapter.
'

Despite criticisms of the executive-appointment system the
National Municipal League has taken a firm position in favor
of an appointive judiciary holding office, after an initial
In its
term of seven years, during life or good behavior.
Model State Constitution ^^ the League included the following
provision
The governor shall appoint, with
Sec. 6.04.
(a)
the advice and consent of the legislature, the chief
judges and associate judges of the supreme, appelThe governor shall give
late and general courts.
ten days' public notice before sending a judicial
nomination to the legislature or before making an
interim appointment when the legislature is not in
session (emphasis added)

The legislature shall provide by law for the
appointment of judges of the inferior courts and
for their qualifications, tenure, retirement and
removal
(e)

In the alternative, however, the Model Constitution provides a
plan based on merit selection.

Appointive-Elective System:

Merit Selection

The Merit Plan, commonly called the Missouri plan (see Appendix
F)
the ABA plan (see Appendix E) and the nominating-commission
plan, combines aspects of both the appointive and elective
systems with a nominating commission.
The three elements embodied in this plan include:
,

1.
Nomination of slates of judicial candidates by nonpartisan lay-professional nominating commissions;
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2.
Appointment by the chiot executive or local qovc>rnment of judges from the slatc.^ of candidates submitti>d l^y the
nominating commission; and

Review of appointments by voters in succeeding elec3.
tions in which judges run unopposed on the sole question of
whether their records merit retention in office.
By statutory or constitutional provision, fourteen states
employ some features of the merit selection plan but few use
In Alabama, the nominating
all three elements (see Table 14)
commission and gubernatorial appointment are used to fill
vacancies in one circuit court in Jefferson County;'^ in
California gubernatorial appointment and the retention election is used for appellate court judges;'-'- in Illinois the
retention election is used for all judges except magistrates ,^2
and in Idaho the nominating commission in the form of a Judicial Council and gubernatorial appointment are used for supreme
court and district court judges. '-^ In New York and Pennsylvania
nominating commissions and executive appointment have been
voluntarily established by mayors and governors. 74
.

Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska,
Oklahoma, Utah and Vermont employ all three steps of the merit
plan but only for selection of certain judges.
In Alaska,
the plan applies to supreme court justices and superior court
judges; 75 in Colorado to all courts of Record and judges of
the Denver County Court; 76 in Florida to the judges of the
Metropolitan Court of Dade County; 77 in Iowa to supreme court
and district court judges; 78 in Kansas to supreme court
justices only; 79 in Missouri to state appellate judges, judges
of some city courts in St. Louis and judges of some courts in
Jackson County; °^ in Nebraska to judges of the supreme court,
district courts and workmen's compensation courts ;81 in Oklahoma to judges of the supreme court, criminal court of appeals
and juvenile courts; 82 in Utah to supreme, district and juvenile court judges, 83 and in Vermont to district and superior
court judges. 84

Nomination
The nominating committee is usually composed of judges, attorneys and laymen, serving staggered terms varying from two to
seven years. The number of commission members ranges from
five in some states to as many as thirteen in others.
Alaska,
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for instance, has a scvcn-mcniljer council comp^oscd of the chief
justice, three lawyers appointed by the state bar association
and three non-lawyers appointed ))y the governor and confirmed
by the legislature in joint session. °--' The Kansas Supreme
an attorney
Court Nominating Commission has eleven members:
as chairman elected by the state bar; five attorneys, one
from each congressional district elected by the attorneys in
each district; and five non-lawyers, one appointed by the

governor from each congressional district. °" The membership
of Colorado's supreme court nominating commission is also
based on congressional district representation with the lawyermembers appointed by majority action of the governor, attorney
general and chief justice. °'
Most constitutions incorporating the merit plan require commission membership to be either bipartisan or nonpartisan.
Members are prohibited from holding any political party position or any other public office, particularly a judicial post.
Often these prohibitions extend to a certain number of years
after membership on the commission expires; for example, "no
commissioner shall be eligible for appointment to judicial
office while a commissioner or for five years thereafter ." 88
Additionally, members receive no compensation for their service
other than reimbursement of expenses.

When notified by the governor that a judicial post is vacant,
the commission usually solicits applications from interested
attorneys. The commission sets up its own method for screening
applicants and selecting qualified candidates. Names of
recommended candidates are submitted in slates of two to six
nominees, the number differing in various plans. Most merit
plans require the commission to submit its nominations to the
governor within sixty days after receiving notice of the
vacancy.
Once a slate of candidates is submitted, the commission's decision is publicized. Prior to that time commission deliberations should be confidential to avoid embarrassing applicants considered, but not chosen.
In California the Commission on Judicial Appointments has no
power to nominate candidates; it is a confirmatory body which
acts on interim-vacancy appointments by the governor. °^ No
nomination or appointment by the governor to an interim
vacancy in a trial or appellate court is effective unless
confirmed by a majority of the three-member commission composed of the chief justice of the supreme court, the presiding
judge of the district court of appeals of the affected district
and the attorney general. ^0
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Some states have separate nominating commissions for each court
level; in Colorado, there are separate trial court nominating
commissions for each judicial district as well as one commission for appellate judges. 91 On the other hand, one commission has been employed by some states to serve in areas besides
Idaho's Judicial Council conducts studies
judicial selection.
for the improvement of the administration of justice, acts as
a nominating commission for judicial selection and recommends
the removal, retirement and discipline of judicial officers.^^
In creating a method of judicial selection based on merit
selection, the largest problem posed is how commission members
are chosen.
There are numerous approaches:

Appointment by (a) the governor; (b) governor with confirmation by legislature; (c) legislature; (d) supreme court
(lawyer members only)
or (c) state bar association (lawyer
members only)
,

Election by (a) all voters in the state, or
voters in certain districts.

only

(b)

The last approach is used when geographical representation is
required.
For instance, with two congressional districts in
Montana, membership could be required as follows:
one nonlawyer and one lawyer from each congressional district with
the chairman either a lawyer or non-lawyer elected from the
state at large, or the chief justice of the supreme court.
Geographical representation also can be incorporated into the
appointment method by requiring the appointing authority--the
governor, legislature or supreme court--to select a commissioner
on the basis of residence in a congressional district.

Appointment
The governor is restricted to appointing a judge from the
slate of nominees presented by the commission.
When the merit
plan was first initiated, some governors refused to accept any
names submitted; one solution to this problem was submission
of new names until the governor found one acceptable ^3
.

Another proposal which most states have adopted is to specify
a time period within which the governor must act.
If he fails
to appoint within that period, the appointive power passes to
another individual or group, such as the chief justice, the
chairman of the nominating commission, the supremo court or
the legislature, which appoints a judge from the original
panel of nominees. ^
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Retention Election
The third element of the merit plan eliminates a political
campaign for those judges who wish to retain their offices.
The judges selected under the merit plan may be appointed
for an initial term ranging from one to three years.
During
this short term the voters are afforded the opportunity to
judge the capability of the appointee.
At the end of this
trial period the appointed judge must file a declaration of
candidacy for election to succeed himself. At the next
general election a separate judicial ballot merely asks the
voters
of the
Shall Judge
be retained in office?

Court
No

Yes

The judge runs on his record alone in this non-competitive
election.
Usually if a majority of those voting in the general election vote "no" or if the judge fails to file his
declaration of candidacy, his office is declared vacant and
the process begins anew with nominating and gubernatorial
appointment.
If the judge is retained in office, his tenure
will be for a longer period, as discussed later. At the end
of his second term in office he again faces the retention
election.

Montana
Adoption of a merit selection plan was considered by the
Montana legislature as early as 1945, but was defeated on an
unfavorable committee report. ^^ In 19 57 the Montana Supreme
Court had amassed a three-year backlog of cases caused, in
When
part, by justices' campaigning for re-election in 1956.
the legislature met that year, some representatives felt a
solution to the court's backlog was elimination of the election of judges; merit selection was proposed in House Bill 48.
This Montana version of merit selection, which applied only
to selection of supreme court justices, consisted of a nominating commission, gubernatorial appointment and a retention
election.
The nine-member commission would have included
five district judges, one from each of five areas into which
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the eighteen judicial districts had been incorporated for the
sole purpose of selecting these commissioners; the president
of the Montana Bar Association, and three members appointed
by the governor with confirmation by the senate. ° The latter
three members included a resident taxpayer whose primary
occupation was farming or the livestock business; a state
resident with membership in a generally recognized labor union,
and a resident taxpayer engaged in business. 57 The commission was to nominate a slate of three to five candidates
within forty-five days after notification that a vacancy
existed. ^^ The governor was to appoint within fifteen days
after receiving the commission's nominations.^^ The appointed
judge was to serve an initial term of at least a year before
approval or rejection by the electorate in a retention election. 100

House Bill 48 was defeated by a 46-44 House vote primarily
because the bill became a party issue; it fate illustrates
what could occur if a constitution were to leave the method
Partisan
of judicial selection to legislative dictate
maintain
to
necessary
issues can overshadow the procedures
an efficient, qualified judiciary.
.

-'-°-'-

Arguments For and Against Merit Selection
The plan is "undemocratic." That was the primary argument
Opponents
used in the 1957 Legislature to oppose the plan.
right
to
of
the
charged that the plan deprived the people
profession
legal
decide for themselves what members of the
should sit as judges. 102 Critics failed to explain that
House Bill 48 merely enlarged upon an appointive-elective
Because most
system already operating within the state.
initially
were
district judges and supreme court justices
and subvacancy
interim
appointed by the governor to an
for another
people
sequently as an incumbent elected by the
of the
elements
two
term when the appointive term expired,
merit plan were already in existence: gubernatorial appointment and retention election. The merit selection plan simply
would have added a nominating commission to restrict the
governor's choice to candidates the commission deemed
qualified.
Through citizen representation on the nominating commission the electorate in effect would have had a
voice in the initial choice of a judge--an element nonexistent under Montana's present system.

Other arguments against merit selection include:
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--Nominating commissions tend to accommodate the wishes
of the governor bv placing his "preferred" candidate on the
list of nominees .-'-*^^ One member of a commission set up
voluntarily by the Mayor of New York City pointed out that
if the mayor suggested a lawyer to the commission, it was
almost certain that the mayor would appoint that attorney if
his name was on the panel submitted. 10^
The influence of the appointing authority, be it the
Reply
governor or a mayor, on the members of the commissions depends
on the integrity of the commissioners chosen to do the job.
Bipartisan representation on the commission would prevent a
governor from "railroading" his choice through the commission.
The influence of a mayor over a commission he "voluntarily"
creates is entirely different from a commission created and
empowered by a constitution.
.

--Because nominating commissions usually are composed
of lawyers and judges, their orientation in judicial selection will be to emphasize strictly technical abilities rather
than the needs of the community.
This may lead to nomination
of "silk stocking" candidates--that is lawyers from prestige
law firms. -'-'^^
Reply
Experience in states that use merit selection plans
indicates that individual practitioners and members of small
law firms have been appointed along with members of large law
firms. 106 The question of whether strictly technical legal
abilities or the needs of the community should receive prime
consideration reflects a misconception in the judge's role in
society.
Constitutions and legislation reflect the needs of
the people; judges merely interpret these documents.
Further,
the people under a merit selection plan have the right to
remove those judges from office if they are dissatisfied with
their performance.
.

— This

plan diffuses responsibility for appointing judges
because governors can claim that they were prevented from
making better judicial appointments by the inferior quality
of nominations made by the commission. lO?
Reply
A merit plan could provide that if the governor feels
the candidates nominated on the first panel are inferior, he
has the right to request that another list be submitted.
If
he fails to appoint from the second list, then the appointive
f)ower passes to another individual or group.
Nomination of
inferior candidates may not, in fact, bo caused by poor choice
on the part of the commission; it may reflect a disinterest of
successful practicing attorneys in poorly paid judicial positions
.

.
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--The fact that only one Missouri judge has been defeated
in a retention election since the plan went into effect in
1940 proves that this plan gives judges lifetime tenure,
making it impossible to remove incompetent judges •'-'^S
.

Reply
On the contrary, the defeat of only one judge may
prove that merit selection in fact puts competent judges on
Obviously if the people are dissatisfied and
the bench.
exorcise their right to vote, a judge will be removed. This
contention may reveal public apathy in general towards judges
and refute the argument that the public should have the right
If they do not remove
to choose judges through elections.
incompetent or unqualified judges, how can they choose them
initially?
.

--There is no reason that in the retention election
voters would be better informed about a judge's qualifications after one or two years on the bench than they were
before he was appointed. •'-^°

Reply
The public rarely knows in advance how capable a
judge is, but this trial period before a retention election
allows the public to examine his record and ascertain the
A practice has developed
facts before making a decision.
through secret ballots
the
attorneys
in Missouri whereby
rate the performance of individual judges; this rating is
published prior to the judge's retention election. The
effect of this poll was explained by the former president
of the Missouri Bar Association:
.

Some may fear that because judges are appointed
under the nonpartisan system and do not have to
run for political office in the usual sense, they
are not sensitive to public opinion or criticism
and that they are as independent as federal judiEach
This is not the case.
ciary personnel.
of
its
Bar
conducts
a
poll
year the Missouri
members on the question of whether the judges who
are running for re-election in that year deserve
As to supreme court
to be retained in office.
members, this poll is taken from all the lawyers
in the state; as to appellate court judges,
among the lawyers of the appellate districts;
and in circuit court districts where the judges
are under the nonpartisan system, from the
The results of the
lawyers of the circuit.
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poll are tabulated and widely disseminated in the
Every judge is sensitive to the
news media.
standing which he occupies in the judicial poll.
The fact the judge knows that the manner in which
he is regarded by the lawyers will be made public
influences his conduct on the bench. He would be
less than human if he did not believe the opinion
of his fellow lawyers so published indicated to
some degree the caliber of his work and his fitness for the office which he holds "
.

Adherents of the merit plan contend that it is the most progressive step in gaining a more qualified judiciary. The plan
retains important advantages of the appointive scheme--that
is, participation in the selection process of an authority
(the governor) who is qualified and able to assess judicial
candidates and who is directly answerable to the people, ^-'while assuring that ultimate control of selection is in the
electorate through the retention election. Elimination of
campaigns for re-election frees the judge from political preoccupations and grants him more time to attend to judicial
The security of tenure provided by the plan attracts
duties.
lawyers who would not have submitted themselves to the ordeals
Public confidence in merit selection has
of the old system.
been good in Missouri. Retention of this system by the people
In 1940
of Missouri reflects public confidence in the plan.
Resubmitted
the plan was adopted by a 90,000 vote majority.
in 1942 at the insistence of opponents who argued that the
people had not understood the plan, voters re-endorsed it by
a 180,000 majority. 112

Another advantage in using a nominating commission is that
standards and criteria for rating and selecting judicial
candidates can be developed. Furthermore, commissioners can
develop expertise in evaluating a applicant's qualifications
and offer comparative judgment in choosing candidates. OneCritics, however, point
man judicial selection is eliminated.
out that there is nothing to prevent a nominating commission
from using the same partisan considerations to select a candiComplete elimination of polidate that a governor might use.
tical influences in judicial selection is probably an unrealistic goal, but the merit plan minimizes political considerations far more than the elective and appointive methods through
bipartisan representation on the commission. The thirty-two
years of experience in Missouri shows that the commissions
work well to reduce partisanship; one Democratic governor of
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Missouri appointed eight Democrats and seven Republicans
during his term of office~ although he could have appointed
Democrats in each case.llJ
Comparison of the Elective System With Merit Selection.
In
comparing the operation of merit selection in Missouri over
a twenty-five year interval with the preceding elective
system, a recent study yielded these conclusions concerning
the Missouri Plan:114
1. There is a greater tendency for graduates of night
law schools to ascend to the bench than lawyers from national
"prestige" law schools.
2.
Appointees are essentially "locals", that is, persons
born and educated in the state, rather than "cosmopolitans."
3.
Despite the claims that merit selection results in
nonpartisan judicial selection, the authors of the study
claimed that more appointees were affiliated with the state's
majority party than when judges ran in partisan contests.
4. Older lawyers have been appointed to the bench.
The average age has risen from the 40s to the 50s.
5. Appellate judges appointed under the plan have had
more service on lower level courts than was the case under
the elective system in Missouri.

6. There is a growing trend for appointees to have had
prior experience in a law enforcement position, particularly
as a prosecutor .
7.
Contrary to criticisms of the plan, merit appointees
are not more conservative than those elected in partisan
contests.
8.
Members of the Missouri Bar generally agree that the
plan has resulted in putting "better" judges on the bench
than those chosen by election.
9•

tenure.

In effect, merit selection judges enjoy lifetime
In this regard, the authors noted:

great number of [attorneys] argue that this
independence is desirable because it permits a
judge to make decisions based on the merits of

A
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the case, rather than subjecting him to the pressures that e lective judges must often face under
threat of being voted out of office. However,
some of them view this judicial indepe ndenc e as
not entirely salutary, since it "fede ralizes"
some judges, that is, tends to make them arbitrary in the treatment of lawyers and laymen with
business before the courts.
(Attorneys who are
active in trial courts are most likely to suggest
this tendency; a number of them oppose the Plan
for this reason.)
Presumably, elective judges
are more sensitive to the feelings of the Bar and
public on such matters, because these groups are
in a position to make their influence felt at the
time of the next election.115
10. Cleavages have developed in Missouri's legal profession whereby rival groups nominate candidates and conduct campaigns to get their nominees elected. These bar elections
have taken on many features of the general party system.
The issue of judicial selection poses considerable conflicts,
primarily of a philosophical nature. Here the opposing doctrines of judicial independence and popular control of the
judiciary, described in Chapter I, will be most significant.
Inherent in the resolution of this philosophical dispute is
the question of which method of judicial selection facilitates
the best administration of justice. Subsequent considerations
may be whether the method should be applicable to all judges;
to what detail it should be enumerated in the constitution,
and should it be self-executing or dependent upon legislative
implementation.
Thus- far, systems employed throughout the United States have
been considered; however, methods of judicial selection in
other nations provide an interesting point of comparison.
Judicial Selection in Other Countriesll6
The highest judicial officer in England is the Lord Chancellor.
He is followed in the judicial hierarchy by the Lord Chief
Justice, the Master of the Rolls, the President of the Probate,
Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court. Then there
are seven Law Lords and five Lord Justices of Appeal. The
Prime Minister of England fills vacancies in these positions.
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The Lord Chancellor is the presiding judge of the House of
Lords, England's highest tribunal.
He is appointed by the
Queen upon recommendation of the Prime Minister. The office
is political in that a new Lord Chancellor usually is appointed when there is a change of government. The Lord
Chancellor recommends appointments to the High Court of
England, fifty-six county courts and certain courts in London.
In total, he can appoint almost 18,000 persons to the bench. 117
Although judicial selection would seem to be dominated by
political influence, British tradition commands that the Lord
Chancellor's appointments be non-political with primary emphasis on judicial ability and judicial independence.
English judges usually are selected from barristers, particularly from those serving as Queen's Counsel. The Lord
Chancellor's office maintains a permanent staff which continually compiles information on leading barristers and prior
to appointment, the Lord Chancellor consults with the head of
that division of the court to which an appointment will be
made. Although information is sought about candidates, any
attempt to influence judicial selection, such as a letter of
recommendation from an influential person, is not tolerated.
In evaluating the English system, one writer concludes:
[W]e find that the British system of judicial selection places reliance upon appointment of judges in
part by the principal judicial officer in the hierarchy and in part by the principal executive official. These men exercise their uncontrolled discretion, but notwithstanding our general belief that
discretionary authority in governmental affairs is
an evil to be avoided so far as possible, we must
concede that the influence of the high British traditions of public service has resulted in guiding
the discretionary authority of the Lord Chancellor
and the Prime Minister to the end that throughout
the centuries the ability of the British bench has
been of the highest order.
Moreover, once appointed, the judges have justifiably deemed themselves quite independent of outside influences.
They have reached their decision upon the law and
the facts as they saw them. Their judicial
ability has been such that we in this country never
cease to wonder over the craftsmanship, skill, and
learning displayed by them in rendering their opinions, which are almost invariably delivered immediately after the close of the trial and quite
extemporaneously.118
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Following the Revolution in 1790, French judges were elected
by popular vote.
As qualifications for judicial office were
lowered to allow anyone except domestic servants and apprentices to be candidates, dissatisfaction with judicial
quality led to incorporation of the appointive system into
the French Constitution.
The legal system of France bears little similarity to the
Anglo-American legal process. There is public prosecution
whereby judges pass freely from the bench to act as government attorneys and back again to the bench; a complete absence of civil juries; less emphasis on advocacy; a decentralized court system, and a system of administrative courts
separate from ordinary courts of law. Correspondingly, the
French method of judicial selection is unlike its English
counterpart, but has been copied by most European countries.
The core of the "Continental system" is professional training
of judges.
Upon finishing law school, the student chooses
to enter either active law practice or the "magistrature
the judiciary.
To enter the magistrature one must pass
rigid examinations; thereafter, as vacancies arise, one
enters the lower ranks of the judicial hierarchy, usually at
the age of 25.
Elevation to higher court positions depends
oil ability and promotions with a seat on the Court of Cassation, the French Court of Last Resort, the ultimate goal.
Initially the Minister of Justice was responsible for
appointments and promotions; however, in 1934 these tasks
were assigned to a five-member judiciary commission composed
of the president of the Court of Cassation; two associate
judges of that court selected by the court; a president of
a court of appeals selected by all the presidents of courts
of appeal, and one other judge selected by the trial courts.
This commission, along with a non-voting representative of
the Department of Ministry, submits a list of three nominees
for each vacancy from which the Minister of Justice must
make his selection. The list is comprehensive, including all
judges in service and those students who have passed the
magistrature examinations.
,

The Continental method of judicial selection combines a professional training and apprenticeship of persons solely for
judicial service with a method of appointment and promotion
by a judicial administrator who is restricted in his choice
to a slate of candidates determined by high-ranking, experienced judges. The system, however, has been criticized for
the jealousy bred by competition for promotions and for lack
of practical experience in law practice among French judges.
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It also is noteworthy that except in the very lowest courts

French judge never presides over a case alone; most French
trial courts consist of three judges.

a

In Latin America practically all judges are appointed.
Judges
of the supreme court are appointed in some countries by the
president and in others by the legislature.
Lower court judges
In Peru, Chile, Bolivia,
are appointed by the supreme court.
and Brazil appointments are made from a list of names submitted by the supreme court, a method similar to the French

procedure
In India supreme court justices are appointed for life by the
president usually after consultation with higher court judges.
Trial court judges are appointed by the president with the
advice of the Chief Justice of India, the governor of the state
in which the appointment is made and the chief justice of the
particular high court.
In Thailand there is only one class of judges, who are civil
officers appointed by the Ministry of Justice.
Selection is
based on competitive examinations after which four years is
spent in the practice of law.
Promotion from lower courts to
higher courts is by discretion of the Minister of Justice, who
has complete political control over the entire system.

In Japan candidates who pass judicial examinations prepared
by the Supreme Court are appointed as judicial apprentices for
two years.
Following the apprenticeship another examination
must be passed in order for the candidate to be eligible for an
assistant judgeship, which is attained on appointment by the
Cabinet from a list of nominees submitted by the Supreme Court.
After ten years of service as an assistant judge, appointment
to higher courts is likely if the judge is competent.
These
appointments are made in the same manner as assistant judges,
with the exception of the justices of the Supreme Court. The
Chief Justice is appointed by Emperor as designated by the
Cabinet and Associate Justices are appointed by the Cabinet
directly. Appointments to the Supreme Court are reviewed by
the people at the first general election following appointment and every ten years thereafter. These justices run
against their record in non-competitive retention elections.
The Japanese system, therefore, combines appointment of
judges with tenure dependent on voters' satisfaction with the
quality of judicial service.

In Canada-'--'-^ there are two courts with national jurisdiction:
the Supreme court of Canada, the tribunal of last resort, and
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the Exchequer Court, which handles suits against the Crown
including appeals from the Income Tax Appeal Board. The
court structure of each province includes a Court of Appeal,
a supreme court which divides trial jurisdiction with district
or county courts based on the size of the claim, and minor
courts similar to American municipal courts.

The British North America Act of 1867 provides that provincial judges of the superior, district and county courts
shall be appointed by the Governor General.
Through legislation implementing this act, the Governor General is authorized to appoint judges to the two national courts.
In practice,
however, the Canadian Cabinet selects members of the supreme
and exchequer courts from candidates recommended by the Minister
of Justice.
An order is drafted, signed as a matter of course
by the Governor General, and published in the official Canada
Gazette to give legal effect to the Cabinet's choice.
In
absence of express authorization for Dominion control, selection of remaining provincial courts seems vested in the provifices.

As in the United States, most of the Canadian selections rest
on political patronage considerations rather than merit.
Reform in judicial selection, although advocated in many quarters,
has not succeeded. 1^0
In Norway, Sweden and Denmark judges are appointed by the
national administration for life, subject only to a mandatory
retirement age or removal for cause. It is noteworthy that
these countries which have instituted some of the most democratic practices reject popular election of judges.

As in France, Scandinavian countries have no juries in civil
cases and only a limited use of juries in criminal cases.
In
Sweden only cases involving freedom of the press have jury
trials.
A common practice in these countries is to have laymen
sit as judges.
In Norway one judge sits with two laymen in
some trial courts; laymen also are required to sit on an appeal
if the trial court contained lay assistants.
In Sweden trial
courts may contain one judge and from throe to twelve laymen
elected from the area in which the court is situated. Their
vote can overrule that of the judge. The lack of juries in
modt instances is thus offset by the use of laymen in judicial
dedi si on-making.

Although the 1936 Constitution of the U.S.S.R. states that
"the judges shall be independent and subject only to the law,"121
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the court actually is regarded as a mere agency of governmental administration, carrying out Soviet state policy.
Lower court judges or "peoples' judges" are elected by popJudges of higher courts are elected by Soviet
ular vote.
representative assemblies. In 1947 64 percent of the Soviet
judges lacked any legal training whatsoever; only 14.6 percent had any legal training on the university level. 122
The Soviet judiciary is controlled by the federal Minister
of Justice, the Minister of Justice of the Republic and the
heads of Regional Bureaus of the Ministry of Justice, all
of whom are authorized to inspect the courts to determine
if correct law is applied in civil and criminal cases, to
sanction those judges who violate "labor discipline" or to
recommend removal of judges. Thus, according to one critic,
"the judge becomes more or less a pawn in the hands of a
political administration ." '-23

This brief analysis illustrates that in most major countries,
judicial ability and independence is sought through the appointive method of judicial selection rather than through
popular election of judges as is employed in the United States
and the U.S.S.R.
Many nations, in fact, tend to stress a
civil service approach requiring competitive examinations
and apprenticeship.
However, without analyses of the performance of individual foreign judges, it is difficult to
conclude whether in practice these approaches to judicial
selection result in judges of a superior quality.

QUALIFICATIONS OF JUDGES
A judge's decisions are in large part the product
of, first, what man and lawyer he is when he ascends the bench and, secondly, what he absorbs
once there. 12 4

Once the method of selecting judges has been determined, the
next question is what qualifications for judicial office should
While there may be a tendency
be set in the constitution.
merely to retain existing qualifications, the issue gains
greater consequence in relation to retaining or eliminating
justice of the peace officers a question discussed previously.
In other words, should officers on all court levels have law
degrees?

—

The pros and cons of requiring legal training for all members
of the judiciary was summarized in a recent report by the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations:
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Information on State prescription of qualifications
V\?hat is
for lower court judges is fragmentary.
that
training
and exindicates
available, however,
prevalent
in
these
are
less
perience qualifications
general
trial
triappellate
and
the
than
in
courts
that
still
the
37
States
of
in
1965,
Thus,
bunals.
had JP courts, 28 had no requirement for legal
In general.
training for the office
the minor courts in rural areas have less stringent
qualifications for their judges than those in the
urban jurisdictions. A 1964 survey of the minor
courts in the 100 largest metropolitan areas in the
United States showed very few in which judges were
not required to be lawyers.

....

.

.

Considering the lower courts' share of the overall
criminal justice burden and their pivotal position
within the existing system, a strong case can be
made for establishment of minimum training and experience qualifications for judges of these courts.
Nonurban areas, however, have a problem with establishing qualifications that urban areas do not have.
Stringent residence requirements, if coupled with a
requirement that all judges be lawyers, may well
leave some courts in these areas without judges.
In at least two States, legislatures have recognized
this problem by providing that in the absence of
qualified personnel a judge may be chosen from nonlawyers or from lawyers in another part of the
State.
Thus, the issue of qualifications is related to the
It may be necessary,
structure of the court system.
as suggested above, to structure the lower courts
in the nonurban and rural areas in such a way as to
assure the availability of a pool of potential candidates for the judicial office for which qualifications are to be established.

Legal training and experience seem an obvious prorequisite for judicial office. Yet this proposition has not and does not meet with complete acSome contend that character, integrity,
ceptance.
and independence are the prime traits of a good
judge and these are not the inevitable byproducts
Some argue that a formal
of a career in law.
requirement only enhances the aloof, status-quo and
unresponsive propensities of the judiciary, since,
so the argument runs, legal training tends to be
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narrow, quasi-mechanistic, and tradition-bound.
Some also raise the question: What kind of legal
experience is best? And by way of an answer, they
point out that many of our best judges have never
had prior judicial experience, that some have
never even practiced law or pled a case; and that
some with a solid background in the law have proven
These critics conclude that nonto be mediocre.
lawyers as well as lawyers should be on the bench,
particularly at the high appellate level where final
decisions on controversial matters of social, economic, and constitutional importance are made.
On the other hand, supporters of the requirements
of legal experience point out that the nonlegal,
political aspects of judicial decision-making are
inescapable in a human institution. The significant thing, they maintain, is that judges have
legal training to recognize precedent and know the
restrictions established over the years by the collective judgment of the bench.
Only within these
constraints of precedent and tradition can the judge
effectively exercise his "freedom" of choice. Only
within these limits can a judge effectively curb
the natural tendency to apply his own social and
economic predilections to a case. Also, the legal
training requirement does not preclude judges from
being broadvisioned and sensitive to current social
and economic conditions. Witness such giants as
Hand, Harlan, Holmes, Brandeis and Cardozo.
Finally,
the bulk of the questions that State and local judges
rule on are not susceptible of being treated as
political, but mainly require the applications of
rules of conduct about which there is little disLegal
pute to a range of factual situations.
training is essential in these cases to insure that
the right rule of conduct is applied. 125

Montana's 1889 Constitution states four qualifications for supreme and district court judges that are commonly provided by
most state constitutions 1^6
:

— Minimum
court)

age

(30

for supreme court and

2 5

for district

;

— United States citizenship;
— Admission to the practice of law, and
— State residence (two years for supreme
for district court.
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District judges need not reside in the district to be eligible
for election to its judgeship but upon election, the judge
must take up residence within the district he is to serve. 127
Qualifications for all other judicial officers was left to
legislation.
There are only two statutory requirements for
U.S. citizenship and residence in the
justices of the peace:
county in which he is to serve for at least one year preceding
his election. 128 Statutory eligibility requirements for police
or municipal court judges are as minimal.
The most common qualifications required of appellate and trial
court judges are summarized in Table 15.
More than three-fourths
of the state constitutions explicitly prescribe federal or state
citizenship as a prerequisite for office. Residence in the state
or district is required in forty states, the number of years
ranging from one year to ten years.

Forty-one states require judges to be members of the legal
profession, but the growing trend is to stipulate a certain
number of years of legal experience, varying length from four
to ten years.
Hawaii's Constitution states:
No person shall be eligible for the office of justice or judge unless he shall have been admitted to
practice law before the supreme court of this State
for at least ten years.
[Art. V, Sec. 3]

The National Municipal League's Model State Constitution includes
a minimum period of admission to practice law as its sole eligibility requirementl29 while the American Bar Association's
Model Judicial Article omits this requirement and suggests only
federal citizenship, state residence and a license to practice
law within the state (see Appendix 3)
A recent survey of lawyers and judges in Utah and Nevada indicated that at least ten years of extensive law practice was
the highest rated attribute of a judicial candidate while
legal training at a law school and at least ten years of trial
experience as a lawyer rated second and third respectively 130
Requiring a certain period of law practice is an alternative
to prescribing a minimum ago because a period of practice
.

usually guarantees that

a

certain age has been attained.

Another age-based, requirement is to provide a maximum age
limit (see Table 15)
In Idaho and Michigan, judges must be
less than 70 at the time of election or appointment; in Iowa,
judges must be of an age to serve an initial term and one
regular term of office before reaching 72. A fixed rule of
the American Bar Association's Senate Judiciary Committee is
.
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TABLE 15
QUALIFICATIONS OF JUDGES OF STATE APPELLATE COURTS
AND TRIAL COURTS OF GENERAL JURISDICTION

State
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I
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t ....

Years of ; 1n i'1lum '.'.es idence
l:ini"lum /\r,e
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,. • i~
: -,':
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...

X

X

s

X

X

3

X

X

10b
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X

X

2
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X
X

X

Connecticut
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Florida
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Ida:,o

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
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X
X

X
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5
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30
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T.*

X

X

X
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X
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X
X
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3
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X
5
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2
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5
5
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5

X

X
X
X
X

X
X
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X
X

X
X

X

X

21
26

X
X

X

2
2

X
2
2
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35

X

X
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30
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8
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3
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5

5
5
6
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5

X

X
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7

7
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4
8
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X

4
8
5

X

5
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X

X
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X
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5

X
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X
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I
I-'
O'I
Vl

I

•EXplanatian of eymbole :
A. Judges of CQurta of lut resort ' and inteniecliete ap~llate coarte .
T. Judges of trial courta of ceneral juriediction.
x
lndicatee require1!1ellt exists.
a} :'8lllber of, or admit tad to, bu. ID nevade, liceneed and adaitted to practice le, in all couru in State.
In Connecticut, shall not engage in private practice.
b} For court of appeal.a, 5 yeara.
c) For court of appeals.
d) Good chnractcr; in ::.rylanJ, integrity, wisdom.
e} s~ate citi&enahip.
f) Qualified voter; in Hevada, qualified elector in State for supreme court juaticea; in State and dutrict
for trial court judges.
g) In Idaho and !·'.ichi3an, judgea muat be under 70 at time of election or aproin~t. io 1011a, 111U11t ba of
euch age aa to be able to eerva en initial end one regular term of office before necbiDg 72.
h) In Louisiana, supreme court, 10; court of appeals, 6.
1) Sobriety of aanner.
j} !'..equind number of years a.a qualified voters .
It) Ile lief in Cod.
1) Associate district judges required to be licensed to practice in the State. number of yeara of practica
and age not specJ.fied. Footnote (1'1} not' applicable to them.
m) Shall continue to be licensed attorney while hol.dinc office.
n) Thirty yoars for judgea of ·eourt of al)peals end court of criminal appeals.
o) Five out of lO years preceding appointw!at or election.
.
p) Shall haw practiced l • in the State et lea.st one year immediately preceding election or appointment.

The Council of State Governments, State Court ~ystems, Report
Source:
RM -446 (Lexington, Ky., Revised 1970), pp. 16-18.
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that no one who has reached 64 will be approved for a federal
judicial post or if already on the bench, for advancement to
If a lawyer has reached 60, the ADA will
a higher court. -'-^l
disqualify him from approval unless he is found to be both
well qualified and in excellent health. 132

The Convention may wish to consider a practice prevalent in
many foreign countries whereby judges are promoted from one
level of courts to another on the basis of ability and years
Should supreme court justices in Montana be reof service.
quired to have experience on a lower-court bench? While highranking positions in most occupations and businesses are acquired by experience or apprenticeship, a Montana supreme
court or district court judgeship can be acquired with a law
Justices of the peace or police judges need neither
license.
If inferior court
experience nor a high school education.
judges in Montana should be required to have law degrees,
these positions could become the training ground for future
district court or supreme court positions. Even maintaining
existing requirements, district judgeships could be the
training and experience required of supreme court justices.

Most writers in the area of judicial qualifications conclude
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint the
criteria which adequately describe the ideal judge. Judicial
characteristics are both definite and capable of measurement
such as age, experience, citizenship--and intangible, incapable
of specific measurement, such as integrity, honesty and
courtesy. One analyst polled trial judges whose judicial
service ranged from one year to many decades and discovered
that qualities they rated highest in a judicial candidate
were intrinsic, personality traits, not external achievements 1^3
High on their lists were moral courage, decisiveness, reputation for fairness and uprightness, patience, good physical
Suprisingly,
and mental health and consideration for others.
law
nor
are they
uniquely
to
these qualities do not relate
are subthey
Furthermore,
peculiar to lawyers and judges.
which
rated
qualities
Those
jective and hard to measure.
lowest among the judges polled were activity in professional
associations, above-average law school records and past
activity in civil or political affairs.
.

The criteria used by the New York City judicial nominating
commission between 1962 and 1964 included the following 134
:

-166-

COURT PERSONNEL

1.

2.

Personal qualities and characteristics:
character: moral vigor or ethical firmness and
a.
imperviousness to corruption or venal influences
b.

patience (judicial temperament): capacity to
exercise forbearance under provocation (to suffer fools gladly)

c.

humility and tolerance: capacity to listen with
a mind intent on understanding the
ideas or arguments being advanced
and with an appreciation that certainties of today may become the
superstitions of tomorrow

d.

key to judge's effizeal and capacity for work:
cient and proper administration of
judicial functions

e.

common sense:
important to have ability to make
practical and reasonable judgments

f.

tact:

sensitivity to feelings of others and
capacity to deal with others without
giving offense

Prepatory education and training:
a.
education and early years at the bar, to learn how
well he performed in college and law school and
what early associations he formed
b.

any teaching, lecturing, or writing

c.

trial and courtroom experience (not necessary for
appointment but a plus factor in selection and a
guide meriting consideration)

3.

Professional attainments and special experience:
a.
cultural interests and affiliations
b.
community activities
c.
participation in bar association work
participation in civic and political activities
d.
e.
specialized knowledge and experience

4.

should be
Political, ethnic and other affiliations:
used as negative criteria in providing a well-balanced
slate of nominees.
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The qualities stressed by the American Bar Association's Senate
Judiciary Committee, which rates contenders for federal judicial
positions, include character, judgment, industry, experience,
judicial temperament and professional ability. 1^5

Another issue concerning judicial qualifications is what should
This problem is directly rebe constitutionally prescribed.
If
lated to which method of judicial selection is chosen.
merit selection with a nominating commission is utilized, the
commission may be best equipped to determine what qualities
The constitution may set
are necessary for Montana judges.
out minimum requirements or may merely state that judges "shall
In
possess such qualifications as may be prescribed by law."
Montana, legislation states the same requirements for supreme
court and district court judges as provided in the 1889 Constitution 136 however, leaving qualifications to legislation
also means they are open to the possibility of repeated changes.
An alternative to leaving the definition of judicial qualifications to the legislature would be to empower the supreme
court to define qualifications through its rule-making authority.
;

Qualification of judges provides the framework for gaining a
more qualified judiciary. The Convention must resolve what
qualifications should be included in the judicial article and
whether these qualifications should be uniformly applied
within the state.
REMOVAL AND DISCIPLINE

Impeachment is the sole method the Montana Constitution provides for removing supreme court and district court judges.
The Constitution states:
The sole power of impeachment shall vest in the
house of representatives; the concurrence of a
majority of all the members being necessary to
Impeachment shall be tried
the exercise thereof.
by the senate sitting for that purpose, and the
senators shall be upon oath or affirmation to do
justice according to law and evidence. When the
governor or lieutenant-governor is on trial, the
chief justice of the supreme court shall preside.
No person shall be convicted without a concurrence
of two-thirds of the senators elected.
The governor, and other state and judicial officers, except justices of the peace, shall be
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liable to impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors, or malfeasance in office, but judgment in
such cases shall only extend to removal from office
and disqualification to hold any office of honor,
trust, or profit under the laws of the state.
The
party, whether convicted or acquitted, shall nevertheless, be liable to prosecution, trial, judgment
and punishment according to law.

All officer? not liable to impeachment shall be subject to removal for misconduct or malfeasance in
office, in such manner as may be provided by law.
[Art. V, Sees. 16-18]
All other judicial officers are subject to removal by legisla-tive
tive provisions.-'--^' Experience here and in other states indicates that there is a question whether impeachment alone meets
the disciplinary requisites necessary to maintain a competent,
efficient judiciary. Although the judges' pension plan in
Montana requires retirement at the age of 70 in order to receive
benefits, 1^8 there may be instances where retirement is necessary
The Convention, then, may wish to
before that age is reached.
consider other procedures. Experimentation in this area by other
states, discussed below, should point out pitfalls to be avoided
as well as adaptable techniques.
A procedure for the discipline and removal of judges is designed
"to provide a workable system for taking remedial action when a
judge, through fault or disability, fails to execute properly a
the duties of his office. "139 Such a procedure works hand in
hand with a method of judicial selection toward the goal of improving the quality of judges. But the tendency among advocates
of judicial reform has been to stress judicial selection as if
to imply that once the most qualified personnel are on the bench,
the instances necessitating removal or discipline will be lessened.
While this may be the ideal to strive for, it is doubtful that
cases of the senile judge, or the corrupt judge, or the drinking
judge will ever be eliminated completely.
"Judges are human
beings.
Perfection is unattainable. The difficult problem,
therefore, is where to draw the line short of perfection. " -'-^0

Choice of removal and disciplinary procedures and standards
usually are motivated by two seemingly inconsistent attitudes.
On the one hand, the public needs to be assured that judges,
as administrators and creators of the law, are fulfilling their
positions of public trust with the utmost impartiality, integrity, and ability.
On the other hand, judicial supervision
should be restrained because judges need freedom to perform
their duties without fear of reprisals.
According to one writer:
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judiciary tor purposes ot discipiiuc oi romoval i:;
Althouyh
the need to preserve judicial independence,
"judicial independence" has two meanings, in this
context it does not refer to the independence of the
judiciary as an institution from control by other
branches of government, but to the right of the individual judge to exercise his office within his view
of the law, without fear of repercussions merely because of those views. The premise underlying this
position is that if judges need fear reprisals for
being deemed wrong, the judiciary will become so
docile that new ideas and approaches will never come
to light.
Moreover, certain cases might be decided
by the removal and disciplinary authority rather than
Although, absent close supervision
by the judiciary.
of the judiciary, litigants will suffer and gain justice only after costly appeals from wrong decisions,
these evils must be tolerated to some extent as the
price we pay for the law's growth. ^'^1
Some are opposed to any supervision of judicial conduct. They
argue that:
(1) maintaining ethical standards should be left
to the conscience of the judge; (2) unless a judge's acts amount
to criminal conduct, judicial derelictions should not be the
subject of sanctions; (3) disciplinary machinery harms innocent
people by giving unscrupulous individuals and newspapers an excuse for unwarranted attacks on judges and a club with which to
gain personal advantage and (4) standards of conduct are maintained by surveillance of bar associations, public and press,
and the influence of judicial colleagues -'-^^ Unfortunately,
the general public has scant knowledge of judicial performance.
Those most cognizant of judicial incompetence, it is argued,
are members of the legal profession who have regular contact
with judges. Yet attorneys are reluctant to actively campaign
for stricter supervision of judicial behavior for fear of reprisal by members of the judiciary. Self-regulation easily
fails from self-interestAs one expert in the area of judicial
removal and discipline remarks;
.

To maintain that a judge should be restrained only
by his conscience is to restate the divine rights
of kings in a different guise.
The concept of an
independent judiciary does not necessarily entail
the inmiunity of judges from the rule of the
law

.

.

.

.143

It is apparent that the method chosen must satisfy the public
that a check does exist to curb judicial incompetence, but that
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some protection must be afforded the judiciary to prevent unfounded charges and accusations from damaging a well-qualified
judge or seriously undermining the judicial function.

Systems Presently Employed

Traditional Methods
Traditionally, most states have used impeachment, address and
recall, singly or in combination, to remove judges.
Growing
dissatisfaction with these means has led to innovations directed
not only at removal of judges for flagrant abuse of office but
to disciplinary measures for less notorious misconduct.
Impeachment, the oldest of the removal procedures, is incorporated
into the constitution of every state except four: Delaware,
Indiana, Hawaii and Oregon-'-'*'* It is a legislative procedure
whereby the House of Representatives prefers charges by a
majority of all its members, and the Senate, sitting as a court
of impeachment, tries the accused.
Half the states, including
Montana, require concurrence of two-thirds of the members elected
to the Senate for conviction;-'-'*^ the federal Constitution requires only two-thirds of those present ^^^ If a judge is impeached in Montana, he may be suspended or removed from office
and disqualified from holding future state office.
The conviction is final; no appeal or pardon is available.
Furthermore,
the accused is subject to criminal prosecution whether he is
convicted or acquitted in the impeachment proceeding.
,

.

One complaint with impeachment as a disciplinary procedure is
that it rarely is used:

Parliament has not impeached and removed a Government officer since Viscount Melville was tried for
misappropriating Royal Navy funds in 1806.
In the
United States the House of Representatives has impeached only 8 federal judges since 1789; the
Senate has convicted only 4. The last impeachment
and conviction of a federal judge was in 1936 Halstead L. Ritter, District Judge for the Southern
District of Florida.
Replies to a 1960 bar survey
indicated that state legislatures have attempted
impeachments in only 17 states on 52 separate occasions, resulting in 19 removals and 3 resignations.
These statistics illustrate what critics have said
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since the Constitutional Convention in 1789:
impeachment is a totally inadequate procedure to
remove or discipline a judge and to protect the
bench and public from judicial misconduct or incapacity. 1^7
Only one judge has been impeached in Montana.
In 1918 Charles
L. Crum, judge of the Fifteenth Judicial District (then comprised of Rosebud and Musselshell counties) was found guilty
of charges ranging from aiding his son to avoid the draft
(although his son was not of draft age) to making statements
critical of United States participation in World War I.^'^^
Crum was tried in absentia and no evidence was presented in
his defense.
The Senate judgment removed him from office
despite the fact that he had resigned before the impeachment
proceedings began.

The Crum affair illustrates other criticisms made of impeachment as a device for removal and discipline:
1.
Political partisanship. The legislature is a partisan body and political considerations often dominate the disciplinary trial of a judge. The constitutional requirement
that senators sitting in impeachment proceedings be upon oath
or affirmation is aimed at reducing partisanship but has little
effect.-'-'*^
For example, in the previously mentioned Ritter
trial of 1936 there were fifty-six votes for conviction: fiftyone of them were from the opposite political party of the
judge being tried. -'-^'^

2.
Grounds for impeachment. Usually the grounds are
limited to the more serious and flagrant offenses, such as
Montana's "high crimes and misdemeanors, or malfeasance in
office," and are not directed at more common types of judicial
inadequacy, such as physical or mental disability or simple
neglect. 151 New York is an example of the opposite extreme;
its Constitution does not specify any grounds for removal by
impeachment so the grounds apparently are determined on a
case-by-case basis. 1^2
3.
Time-consuming and expensive. Modern legislatures
lack time to depart from the complexity of their business for
an impeachment trial. 1^3 Although Montana's 1918 trial ran
only three days, 154 the trials usually are lengthy; trials of
federal judges average sixteen to seventeen days and one trial
ran for six weeks. 1^5 in one Oklahoma impeachment trial the
cost was estimated at $50,000; in Florida the average cost is

$250,000,156
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Rights of the accused are inadequately protected.
4.
The size of the legislature makes it poorly suited for adjudicative functions 157 in addition, members of the jury, the
senators, are not required to be present each day of the
trial. '-5° As a result, the average attendance during federal
impeachment trials has been fifteen senators a day; in one
It
trial only three senators were seen present one day.-*-^"
that
the
accused
could
receive
a
fair
is difficult to believe
heard
of
have
not
the
entire
trial when so many
the jurors
evidence presented.
;

Harmful publicity. The rarity and notoriety of an
5.
impeachment trial produces an outpouring of publicity which
jeopardizes the fairness of the trial and reflects adversely
upon the entire judicial system. 1^"^
Removal proceedings must
6.
Lack of confidentiality.
have some method of confidential disclosure of facts concerning the judge which impeachment does not provide; thus,
investigators have difficulty in gathering information to
remove a judge. 161

Arguments made in support of impeachment as a removal procedure include:
1.
It is a vital safeguard against abuse of judicial
power.
Although rarely used, its existence serves to deter
flagrant misuse of judicial authority 162
.

2.
It is a valuable supplement to the judiciary's power
If the judiciary is unable to
to remove its own members.
discipline its own members, the responsibility is left to the
legislature to perform this function. 16 3
3.
Historically the legislature has not abused the power.
Some assert that history has demonstrated that the legislature
has not abused its disciplinary powers over the judiciary by
initiating politically motivated removal proceedings. Other
critics, however, point out that there have been politically
motivated impeachments such as the attempt to impeach Justice
Samuel Chase of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1804.1°'*

Another removal procedure provided for in the state constitutions is address, whereby the legislature, either by one or
both houses, initiates the proceedings by sending a request
for removal of a judicial officer to the governor, who is the
removing authority 165 An address usually requires a vote of
two-thirds of the members elected to the. legislature 166 if
.

.
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not constitutionally required, the accused is entitled to
notice and hearing by tradition because, like impeachment,
address is a quasi- judicial proceeding. ^-^^ Address is
available in twenty-eight states: Arkansas, Connecticut,
Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin. ^^8

All the arguments made for and against impeachment as a procedure for removing judges are applicable to address, except
one:
the grounds for removal by address are usually broader
than those for impeachment, ^^^ Although some state constitutions specify no grounds for removal, others either define it
generally as "for reasonable cause" ^'^ or have limited it to
specific acts, including mental and physical disability 1^1
.

Recall is another method of removal.
It relies solely on the
electorate; a certain percentage of voters sign a petition
requesting the judge to submit to a special recall election. 1^2
Some states provide that a judge who faces a recall election
must run alone and receive a majority vote to retain office;
other states allow opposition candidates to run,-^'-^ In the
latter situation, the judge need receive only a plurality to
retain his office. Recall of judges is available in Arizona,
California, Colorado, Kansas, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon
and Wisconsin. 1^^

Recall was adopted around 1910 by a number of Midwestern and
far Western states when the Progressive and reform movements
swept that part of the country. -^^^ This method was supposed
to grant power to the people to remove corrupt and incompetent judges; in practice, however, it has seldom been used. 176
In California, the last recall election was in 1932. 1'77
Reasons
for its disuse include (1) it is difficult and expensive to
obtain the required percentage of signatures for recall elections; -'-'° (2) it depends upon voter dissatisfaction, which in
turn depends on public information about judicial conduct which
often is nonexistent -'-7° (3) the persons most informed, lawyers,
usually do not wish to campaign openly against a judge before
whom they may later be forced to try cases ;180 (4) recall involves elections dominated by partisan political considerations
rather than judicial qualifications and forces a judge to campaign for office rather than tend to judicial duties '-^-'- and
(5) many individuals who may be good judges are not necessarily
adept politicians. 1^2
;

,
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Courts
Courts are used in many states to determine measures of disIn certain states the
cipline or removal (see Table 15)
comprised of selecconstituted
tribunal
court is a specially
levels.
In
and
trial
court
appellate
ted judges from the
existing
court
such
before
an
are
heard
others, the charges
trial.
Usually
manner
of
a
bench
as the supreme court in the
The
only certain specified individuals may file complaints.
court may either dismiss the complaint or impose sanctions.
.

Special Courts

.

In 1948 by constitutional amendment. New York created the
Court on the Judiciary -'^^ The court is composed of six
judges, two from the highest appellate court and one member
from each of the four divisions of the intermediate appellate
courts.
It can remove judges "for cause" and retire them
"for mental or physical disability preventing proper performance of judicial duties ." -'-^'^ The court's jurisdiction extends from members of the highest appellate court to courts
of limited jurisdiction but does not include all judges
within the state. -'-^^ The court can be convened only by the
chief judge of the Court of Appeals upon his own motion or
by written request of the governor, a presiding justice of
an appellate division or the executive committee of the state
bar association.-'-^^
.

The respondent judge is entitled to notice of the alleged
Concurrence of four
charges and an opportunity to be heard.
of the six members of the court is necessary for removal or
retirement.
After it has convened, but prior to holding the
hearing, the court must notify the governor, temporary presIf
dent of the senate, and speaker of the assembly (house)
within thirty days after this notification the legislature
commences removal proceedings against the judge, the court
loses jurisdiction of the case. 187
.

One weakness in the New York court is that it has no continuous existence; it can be convened only upon application by
certain individuals or groups. Since its creation in 1948,
the court has convened only three times. 188 However, proponents of the plan insist that many complaints are handled on
an informal basis and are not recorded. -^"^
Lack of continuous existence, critics charge, prevents maintenance of a permanent staff to investigate complaints of
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judicial conduct with any regularity. Also the rarity of
hearings brings public attention when the court does meet.
This prevents hearings on a confidential basis which would
protect judges from adverse publicity if the charges are unfounded. 190
Further, critics complain, the court does not observe rules
of fair procedure because it acts as both prosecutor and
judge; in addition, membership on the court could include the
judge who initially preferred the charges.
Like impeachment,
there is no route of appeal from the judgement of the court. l^^
Proponents of the court reply that a disciplinary proceeding
is different from an ordinary criminal proceeding and to require separate prosecution, adjudication and appellate bodies
would reduce the role of senior appellate judges, those best
qualified to determine suitability for judicial office. ^^^
A basic advantage of the New York plan is economy.
Use of
an existing court rather than creation of a new agency reduces cost, l"-^ Furthermore, an impermanent existence costs
less than a continuing body such as the California Commission,
described below. Another advantage imputed to the plan is
that senior appellate judges are best suited by training and
experience to rule upon the conduct of fellow judges. 194 unlike the California plan which employs individuals outside of
judicial office, the Court on the Judiciary involves judges
disciplining judges.

Despite criticisms, Delaware and Oklahoma have adopted variations of the New York court. 195 Oklahoma eliminated many of
the drawbacks by creating two divisions--trial and appellate. 196
The appellate division reviews cases appealed from the trial
division. 19
Judges from either division can be disqualified
because of prejudice, interest or partiality 198 in addition,
membership of the court is not exclusively judges; a member of
the state bar association is on each division. 199 The court
is convened by petition filed by the supreme court, governor,
attorney general, state bar association, or either house of
the legislature 200 The grounds for removal are stated specifically in Oklahoma's Constitution and include gross neglect
of duty, corruption in office, habitual drunkenness, and gross
partiality or oppression in office. ^^l cause for compulsory
retirement is "mental or physical disability preventing proper
performance of official duty or incompetence to perform duties
of the office. "202
'

.

.
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Many states use their state supreme courts (or
Other courts
court) to act as a removal and disciplinary
appellate
highest
suspend or retire without petition from
remove,
which
can
body
The
1947 New Jersey Constitution authorized
outside
source.
an
its supreme court to remove lower court judges "for such causes
and in such manner as shall be provided by law. "20 3 However,
until 1970, the New Jersey legislature failed to pass legislation to implement this section; the 1970 law still falls short
in the interim, the court
of providing adequate procedures 20 4
discovered a method by which it could remove or discipline a
judge indirectly.
Since the court had authority to discipline
attorneys licensed in the state, it held that judges might be
disbarred or disciplined as members of the bar for judicial
misconduct ;^^ thus, if a judge is disbarred, he is no longer
qualified to hold judicial office. Theoretically, this disciplinary power exists in Montana also. As in New Jersey, the
Montana Supreme Court has disciplinary power over members of
the bar^Oo g,^,^ supervisory control over inferior courts. 207
Combining these powers and using New Jersey as precedent, the
court should have authority to disbar judges.
One reason this
approach has not been used here may be that it depends heavily
on centralized administration of the court system, which does
not exist in Montana.
The New Jersey court puts its court
administrator in charge of investigations of complaints and
when the;y are substantiated, the court then meets with the offending judge in an informal hearing. 208 jf ^^le evidence warrants removal, the court may request the judge to resign or
issue an order to show cause why disbarment proceedings should
not be initiated. 209 Another reason for the success of the
New Jersey plan is strong, effective leadership by the state
supreme court and its chief justice in the area of judicial
behavior. 210 Wisconsin, which has a similar system, has failed
to make headway because of a lack of leadership. 211
.

.

Commissions
The commission plan, pioneered in California, is becoming the
most accepted innovation in the area of judicial removal and
discipline procedures. Twenty- two states--Alaska Arizona,
California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Vermont and
Virginia and Puerto Rico have adopted this plan in some form, 212
The system has fulfilled the most glaring deficiencies observed
in all other methods previously discussed:
it provides an effective means for a private citizen to seek relief against
,

—
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judicial incompetency, insures confidentiality necessary to
protect the judicial function as a whole and creates an agency
which is continually in operation.

Basically the commission plan requires an independent body,
usually with a majority of its members being judges, to serve
as a continuing investigatory agency with the authority to
hold hearings on matters involving judicial fitness. This
commission serves only as a recommending body; it cannot impose sanctions.
It merely reports its decision to the state's
highest appellate court which can follow the commission's recommendation, make its own determination, or dismiss the case.
The California plan consists of a Commission on Judicial Qualifications with jurisdiction over all state judges. ^13 The
commission is composed of nine members serving four-year terms
five judges appointed by the Supreme Court, two lawyers appointed by the state bar association and two citizens, who are
not judges, retired judges or attorneys, appointed by the governor and approved by the senate. 2-'The commission members
choose an executive secretary who maintains a permanent staff
headquartered in San Francisco 215
"^

.

Upon receipt of a complaint, the commission usually investigates informally to determine if the complaint is justified.
Frivolous charges and those alleging matters outside of the
commission's power are weeded out by the executive secretary.
If the investigation substantiates the complaint, the commission
considers the matter and may order further investigation, which
usually is done by a letter to the judge, stating the allegations and requesting an explanation.
If the explanation is
satisfactory, the matter ends there; if the conduct complained
of cannot be corrected by calling it to the judge's attention
and .the judge does not retire voluntarily in the meantime, then
a formal hearing may be held.
At the hearing the charges are
presented and the judge has an opportunity to defend himself.
Based on the findings at this hearing, the commission may
recommend certain action to the supreme court or dismiss the
charges. 216 The California Constitution authorizes the commission to recommend the following:
retire a judge for disability that seriously
(1)
interferes with the performance of his duties and
is or is likely to become permanent, and (2) censure or remove a judge for action occurring not
more than six years prior to the commencement of
his office, wilful and persistent failure to perform his duties, habitual intemperance, or conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice that
brings the judicial office into disrepute.''-^'
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If a recommendation is made, the supreme court reviews the case
Until a recommendation is
and makes final disposition of it.
filed with the court, the commission's proceedings are by law
kept in strict confidence. 218
In its first four years of existence the Commission received
344 complaints and directly caused the resignation or retirement of twenty-six judges. ^-'-^ Justice Bray, chairman of the
commission during its first years of operation, stated four

needs which the commission plan serves:
The Commission recommends the removal or
(1)
forced retirement of judges, who, for any reason, are
no longer able to properly perform their official
duties or have been guilty of misconduct.

The very existence of the Commission with
(2)
the powers given it acts as a deterrent to the occasional recalcitrant judge and minimizes absence from
judicial duties for extended periods.
The Commission provides a medium through
(3)
which the disgruntled litigant, and even the crank,
may air his grievances against the courts or judges
without publicity affecting the particular judge
singled out.
In most instances the complaints are
so groundless that we do not even notify the judge
charged that a complaint against him has been made.
In a sense, the Commission offers an apparently
sympathetic shoulder upon which these complainants
may cry. While they are never satisfied with our
actions, nevertheless, you would be surprised to
find how much more content they are than they would
have been had there not been a public agency to
give them consideration ....
In quite a number of instances, these
(4)
complaints disclose situations, which, while not
serious enough to warrant the removal of the judge
designated, nevertheless disclose practices [such
as] continued failure to start court on time, taking
unlimited recesses, constant wisecracking in court,
short court hours, etc.
In these instances, we notify the judge of the charge and tactfully suggest
that if the practice complained of exists, it be
discontinued. ^^^

Variations of the plan range from having less than a nine-member
commission to reporting the commission's decisions to the legislature, which, rather than the state supreme court, has the
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power to remove or discipline judges. 221 Some states use
boards or councils to perform the commission's duties.
Idaho's
Judicial Council nominates candidates for judicial office under
the merit selection plan and recommends disciplinary sanctions 222
In Illinois a Courts Commission composed entirely of judges
hears complaints referred by the Judicial Inquiry Board composed of judges, laymen and lawyers. 22 3 The Illinois procedure combines aspects of both the commission plan the Court on
the Judiciary plan.
.

Critics of the commission plan fear that an independent agency
with its own staff authorized to hold confidential investigations may result in secretive Star Chamber proceedings 224
Although this is a possibility, defenders of the plan maintain
that until charges are substantiated, the investigations should
be kept in confidence and that safeguards exist to prevent
abuse of the commission's authority through diversity of membership of the commission and the fact that the group merely
recommends action to the court. ^^^
.

Critics point out that the California commission regularly
publishes the number of judges it has induced to resign or
retire as if it were primarily concerned with that end and
may use pressure to reach it. ^26 There also is fear that the
commission may grow into another government bureaucracy with
complex, expensive operations 227 However, in the first six
years of operations in California, the annual budget of the
commission including the salary of the executive secretary
averaged only $35,000,228 Members of the commission serve
without salary, receiving only compensation for expenses. 229
.

Proponents of the commission plan emphasize that an independent
agency, relatively free of outside political pressure, insures
the best procedure for handling the delicate task of supervising judicial conduct.
Such an agency pinpoints responsibility, which is difficult in systems with divided responsibility
such as New York's Court on the Judiciary 230 ^he continuous
existence of the commission, through the availability of its
staff at all times, allows development of uniform, statewide
procedures and standards, which is a saving in both time and
money over developing procedure and standards on a case-bycase basis. ^^-'- Moreover, the commission plan is the only procedure which, through attorney and citizen members, actively
involves individuals outside of judicial office.
That satisfies critics who insist that if the judiciary alone is permitted to clean its own house, it will not clean at all.
However, creating outside membership on the disciplinary group
opens up a new and perhaps baseless argument: because the
members are all afjpointcHl, Lhcrt- may l)c< control f) lli<- jiuli
ci.iry l)y .'-.ixminlcrc;;!
n )ii|
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Basic Considerations
If a procedure of removal and discipline is to be incorporated
into Montana's Constitution, either in place of impeachment or
in addition to it, the following are basic considerations:
1.
Should the constitutional provision create the machinor
should
it merely describe the process required and leave
ery
implementation to the legislature? In Alaska the constitutional
provision merely states:

The legislature may provide by law for a commission
on judicial qualifications and establish procedures
for the censure, suspension, disqualification or
[Art.
removal of a justice or judge of any court.
IV, Sec.

10]

In California, two sections of Article VI, created the commission plan:
in the first, the commission is established; in
the second, the grounds for removal are enumerated and implementation as far as procedural rules is left to the state's

judicial council.

Section 8: The Commission on Judicial Qualifications consists of two judges of courts of appeal,
two judges of superior courts, and one judge of a
municipal court, each appointed by the Supreme
Court; two members of the State Bar who have practiced law in this State for 10 years, appointed by
its governing body; and two citizens who are not
judges, retired judges, or members of the State
Bar, appointed by the Governor and approved by the
Senate, a majority of the membership concurring.
All terms are four years.

Commission membership terminates
ceases to hold the position that
appointment. A vacancy shall be
pointing power for the remainder

if a member
qualified him for
filled by the ap-

of the term.

Section 18.
(a) A judge is disqualified from
acting as a judge, without loss of salary, while
there is pending (1) an indictment or an information charging him in the United States with a crime
punishable as a felony under California or federal
law, or (2) a recommendation to the Supreme Court
by the Commission on Judicial Qualifications for
his removal or retirement.
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(b) On recommendation of the Commission on Judicial
Qualifications or on its own motion, the Supreme
Court may suspend a judge from office without salary
when in the United States he pleads guilty or no
contest or is found guilty of a crime punishable as
a felony under California or federal law or of any
other crime that involves moral turpitude under that
law.
If his conviction is reversed suspension terminates, and he shall be paid his salary for the period
of suspension.
If he is suspended and his conviction
becomes final the Supreme Court shall remove him from
office.
(c) On recommendation of the Commission on Judicial
Qualifications the Supreme Court may (1) retire a
judge for disability that seriously interferes with
the performance of his duties and is or is likely to
become permanent, and (2) censure or remove a judge
for action occurring not more than 6 years prior to
the commencement of his current term that constitutes
willful misconduct in office, willful and persistent
failure to perform his duties, habitual intemperance,
or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.
(d) A judge retired by the Supreme Courts shall be
considered to have retired voluntarily. A judge removed by the Supreme Court is ineligible for judicial
office and pending further order of the court he is
suspended from practicing law in this State.
(e) The Judicial Council shall make rules implementing
this section and providing for confidentiality of pro·ceedi ngs.
Colorado uses two sections to create the commission plan with almost inordinate detail. Not only are the terms of office for the
first commission members specifically listed by date, similar to
the provisions in Article VIII, Section 8 of the Montana Constitution (see Appendix A), but how members may be disqualified and
how vacancies are filled are repetitively set forth.
By contrast in Utah and Hawaii the commission plan is created by
legislation alone. The constitutional provision in Puerto Rico
states:
Justices of the Supreme Court may be removed for
causes and pursuant to the procedure established
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in Section 21 of Article III of this
[the impeachment provision]. Judges
courts may be removed by the Supreme
causes and pursuant to the procedure
law.
[l\rt. V, Sec. 11]

Constitution
of the other
Court for the
provided by

Shorter provisions are exceptions rather than the rule.
In
order to prevent legislative tinkering with a system that the
authors of the constitution feel should be adopted, most constitutions specify the machinery for removal and discipline,
membership, terms of office for members, power of the disciplinary body and grounds for removal or discipline. Another
rationale for the inclusion of these provisions is to prevent New Jersey's fate where the legislature failed to inplement the constitution's removal provisions for 23 years.
States that have opted for the court-on-the-judiciary system
have constitutional provisions of some length which create the
court, its membership, powers, and procedural detail on jurisdiction of the court.
Delaware, compared to New York and Oklahoma, has the most concise provision:
A Court on the Judiciary is hereby created consisting of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court, the Chancellor, and the President Judge of the Superior Court.
Any judicial officer appointed by the Governor may
be censured or removed or retired by the Court on
the Judiciary as herein provided.
A judicial officer may be censured or removed by
virtue of this section for willful misconduct in
office, willful and persistent failure to perform
his duties, the commission after appointment of an
offense involving moral turpitude, or other persistent misconduct in violation of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics as adopted by the Delaware Supreme
Court from time to time.
A judicial officer may be retired by virtue of
this section for permanent mental or physical
disability interfering with the proper performance
of the duties of his office.
No judicial officer shall be censured or removed
or retired under this section unless he has been
served with a written statement of the charges
against him, or of the grounds of his retirement,
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and shall have had an opportunity to be heard in
accordance with due process of law. The affirmative concurrence of not less than two-thirds of
the members of the Court on the Judiciary shall be
necessary for the censure or removal or retirement
of a judicial officer. The Court on the Judiciary
shall be convened for appropriate action upon the
order of the Chief Justice, or upon the order of
any other three members of the Court on the Judiciary. All hearings and other proceedings of the
Court on the Judiciary shall be private, and all
records except a final order of removal or retirement shall be confidential, unless the judicial
officer involved shall otherwise request.
Upon an order of removal, the judicial officer
shall thereby be removed from office, all of his
authority, rights and privileges as a judicial
officer shall cease from the date of the order,
and a vacancy shall be deemed to exist as of that
date.
Upon an order of retirement, the judicial
officer shall thereby be retired with such rights
and privileges as may be provided by law for the
disability retirement of a judicial officer, and
a vacancy shall be deemed to exist as of the date
of retirement.
In the absence or disqualification of a member of
the Court on the Judiciary, the Chief Justice, or
in his absence or disqualification the Senior
Associa iate Justice, shall appoint a substitute
member pro tempore.

The Court on the Judiciary shall have:
(a) the power to summon witnesses to appear and
testify under oath and to compel the production
of books, papers and documents, and
(b) the power to adopt rules establishing procedures for the investigation and trial of a judicial officer hereunder [Art. IV, Sec. 37].
2. Which governmental body should have the ultimate responsibility for removal and discipline? Traditional forn1s
of removal have placed responsibility in the legislature.
The trend in modern systems of removal and discipline is to
put responsibility in the state's highest appellate court,
or a court on the judiciary or in a commission. Where the
-184-

responsibility should be placed, who is best qualified to
supervise judicial conduct and how responsibility should
be centralized are questions directly related to centralized administration of the courts under a unified judicial
system.
3.
Should the grounds for removal and the sanctions
to be imposed be enumerated? This problem related to the
arguments under question "l" but warrants separate consideration.
If the grounds for removal are restrictive, the
removal and disciplinary process will be frustrated before
it begins.
For instance, if the grounds for removal are
stated as "willful misconduct in office," a literal interpretation would prevent removing a judge who committed an
act months before taking office which would have been
grounds for removal if he had been in office at the time.
The trend in constitutional revision is to expand the
grounds for discipline and removal.
Most states have incorporated "mental or physical disability" as a basis for
retirement or removal from office.
However, adequate pension benefits are essential if this criterion is used.
Usually formal involuntary retirement is unnecessary since
preliminary investigation often is gently but sufficient
persuasion to cause disabled judges to retire.
"Excessive
use of alcohol" is another consideration for disciplinary
action especially when intoxication affects judicial performance in office, but may be extended to instances where
excessive drinking public, although not directly affecting
court work, may bring disrepute upon the judiciary and
reduce public confidence.
Other bases for removal or discipline may include (1) dishonorable personal conduct:
mishandling funds, tax evasion,
improper political activities; (2) misbehavior in performance
of duties:
partiality, unfairness, discourtesy and unrcasonJble delay in obtaining decisions, prolonged personal absences from duties, or refusal to accept certain cases; (4)
taking court time for business pursuits.232
In regard to sanctions, it was necessary to amend the California constitution in 1966 to provide the power to censure
after its supreme court was confronted with a case which it
felt did not warrant removal from office.233 Lacking the
power to censure, the court dismissed the case even though
there had been seven days of testimony by forty-eight witnesses and a commission finding of misconduct in thirteen
separate legal proceedings.234 California's dilemma illustrates that there will be instances where forfeiture of
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judicial office would be too harsh and a public reprimand would
suffice.
Censure or suspension for a period of time without
pay are two remedies that would fill the void.
If the sanctions and grounds for removal are not mentioned
specifically in the constitution, who should be empowered to
create them? Alternatives would be the legislature, the supreme
court through its rule-making power, or the disciplinary body
itself, such as the court on the judiciary or the commission.

Should all judges in the state be subject to the same
4.
removal and disciplinary procedures?

Most states provide separate removal procedures, one for
supreme court personnel and another for other judicial officers.
The Model Judicial Article proposed by the American Bar Association recommends the following section:
Justices of the Supreme Court shall be subject to
removal by the impeachment process. All other
judges and magistrates shall be subject to retirement for incapacity and to removal for cause by the
Supreme Court after appropriate hearing. ^^5

Obviously this method is employed when the Supreme Court is
the disciplinary body; it prevents the Court from disciplining
its own members.
However, if a special court on the judiciary
or an outside agency such as a commission is employed, it would
not be necessary to have two removal procedures.
Some states
employing the commission plan California, Illinois, Nebraska,
New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon and Pennsylvania extend the commission's jurisdiction to all judges in the state judicial sys-

—

tem.

2

—

36

RESTRICTIONS ON NON-JUDICIAL CONDUCT
State constitutions usually contain sections in their judicial
articles restricting non- judicial activities. The objective
of such sections is to remove possible conflicts of interest,
which would affect a judge's objectivity. Unlike other public
officials, judges are expected to approach sainthood in their
lifestyles.
Plutarch spoke of Philip of Macedon who removed
a judge for dying his hair and board, saying, "I could not
think that one that was faithless in his hair could be trusty
in his deeds. "237
Certainly restrictions on off-bench conduct
have become less stringent since Plutarch's observations;
however, the comportment of judges in their social, business
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and political activities is still carefully scrutinized by
the public.
The Carswell, Haynesworth and Fortas affairs
illustrate public reactions when a judge's impartiality is
questioned.

Restrictions on the conduct of judges in their private
affairs arc relevant to disciplinary and removal standards
for conduct in the performance of judicial duties; however,
disciplinary and removal provisions are more concerned with
judicial competency while restrictions on judicial conduct
are aimed at maintaining impartiality.

Questions facing the Convention may be whether restrictions
on off-bench conduct should be placed in the constitution or
left to legislation, rules of court, or regulations of another
agency such as a removal commission? If restrictions are incorporated into the constitution, what should they include?
Should these restrictions apply uniformly to all judicial
officers? How will enforcement of these provisions be effectuated?

Article VIII of the Montana Constitution contains the following sections relevant to this discussion:
Section 30. No justice of the supreme court nor
judge of the district court shall accept or receive
any compensation, fee, allowance, mileage, prerequisite or emolument for or on account of his office,
in any form whatever, except the salary provided by
law.

Section 31. No justice or clerk of the supreme court,
nor judge or clerk of any district court shall act
or practice as an attorney or counsellor at law in
any court of this state during his continuance in
office.
Section 35. No justice of the supreme court or district judge shall hold any other public office while
he remains in the office to which he has been elected or appointed.
Section 37. Any judicial officer who shall absent
himself from the state for more than sixty consecutive days shall be deemed to have forfeited his
office.
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The purpose of section 37 seems to be prevention of undue absenteeism which would hamper prompt administration of a judge's
caseload.
Yet indirectly, this forfeiture clause also may
allay entanglements in non-judicial activities that would
require extensive out-of-state participation. Except for the
forfeiture provision, the aforementioned restrictions in the
Montana Constitution do not apply to all judicial officers,
only to supreme court and district court judges.
Justices
of the peace are exempted; they are prohibited by statute
from practicing law in their own court or any other justice
of the peace court in their township or county.^"
In Montana, constitutionally proscribed conduct of higher
court judges seems to focus on three areas:
practicing
(1)
law as an attorney, (2) holding any other public office, and
(3) receiving money or any other article of value for or on
account of a judicial position. This latter restriction is
contained in Section 30 which also prohibits receipt of
allowance or mileage, yet supreme court and district court
judges are allowed per diem and mileage by state statutes. 239
Other legislation in Montana prohibits any higher court judge
to have a partner practicing law, and prohibits a former
judge to act as an attorney in any case over which he presided while in office. 240 j^ addition, state statutes allow
litigants to disqualify any supreme court justice, district
judge or justice of the peace from acting in any proceeding
because of interest in the litigation, relation by consanguinity or affinity within the sixth degree to either party,
previous judgment in the litigation from which the appeal
is being taken, previous involvement as an attorney for
either party, and bias or prejudice which may prevent a fair
and impartial hearing. ^41

The Canons of Judicial Ethics, created by the American Bar
Association, have been adopted by courts in many states as
standards which serve as precept guides for the judiciary.
Off-bench activities which the Canons disallow include
partisan politics, business promotions and solicitations for
charity; acceptance of gifts, favors and duties inconsistent
with the judicial function; and abstention from private law
practice and any judicial act in which personal interests
are involved. 242 rpj^g judicial obligation is summarized in
the Canons
In every particular his conduct should be above
reproach.
He should be conscientious, studious,
thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just.
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impartial, fearless of public clamor, regardless
of public praise, and indifferent to private political or partisan influences; he should administer justice according to law, and deal with
his appointments as a public trust; he should
not allow other affairs or his private interests
to interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his judicial duties, nor should he administer the office for the purpose of advancing
his personal ambitions or increasi n g his popularity
[emphasis added] ^^•^
.

Recently created constitutional provisions in this area tend
to incorporate prohibited activities in a blanket provision. ^44
Supreme court justices and superior court judges
while holding office may not practice law, hold
office in a political party, or hold any other
office or position of profit under the United
States, the State, or its political subdivisions.
Any supreme court justice or superior court judge
filing for another elective public office forfeits
his judicial position.
[Alaska Const. Art. IV,
Sec.

14].

(a) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of conduct for Judges and Associate Judges.
(b) Judges and Associate Judges shall devote full
time to judicial duties.
They shall not practice
law, hold a position of profit, hold office under
the United States or this State, or unit of local
government or school district or in a political
party.
Service in the State militia or armed
forces of the United States for periods of time
permitted by rule of the Supreme Court shall not
disqualify a person from serving as a Judge or
Associate Judge.
[Illinois Const. Art. VI, Sec.

13].

No justice or judge of a court of record shall,
during his continuance in office, engage in the
practice of law within or without the Commonwealth,
or seek or accept any nonjudicial elective office,
or hold any other office of public trust, or engage
in any other incompatible activity.
[Virginia
Const. Art. VI, Sec. 11].
The disqualification statutes seem to be the most effective procedure existing in Montana to reduce judicial bias and prejudice,
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Unless voluntarily complied with, the present constitutional
restrictions have little effect because there is no procedure
now available by which to ascertain possible conflicts of interest.
Judges are not required to disclose their off-bench
activities. The Convention, then, may wish to follow the
examples of Connecticut and Rhode Island where no constitutional mention is made of restrictions on non-judicial
activity. ^^^
TENURE, COMPENSATION AND RETIREMENT

Tenure

Tenure is the length of time a judge serves in office. There
are two types:
limited tenure (service for a specified length
of time after which the judge must be re-elected or reappointed)
and lifetime tenure. According to advocates of judicial reform
lifetime tenure for appellate court judges is desirable. The
issue of tenure, however, cannot be resolved by arbitrarily
selecting a period of time; attention should be given to collateral issues directly related to determining a length of
judicial service.
There is no ideal duration for judicial tenure. As
a general principle, tenure should be long enough
to safeguard the independence of the judiciary and
to provide the stability of employment necessary to
attract highly qualified personnel.
Only when a
judge is confident of his position for a reasonable
long period of time can the people expect a successful lawyer to give up a lucrative practice to assume
the bench
On the other hand, it may be unwise to establish an indefinite period of judicial
tenure.
Judges, like other humans, sometimes fail
to recognize their own limitations, desiring to
continue serving the public long after their capacities have declined.
More important, judicial tenure
must be limited to give voice to the will of the
electorate.
Persons who do not perform their
functions adequately must periodically be judged
by the electorate. 2 46

....

The Montana Constitution fixes the terms of office of supreme
court justices as six years, district judges as four years and
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two-yoar terms. 248 <l<]^^. ConV(>ntion nuiy wish lo
whether
these terms should remain tlie same, wluMheiconsidor
should be stated in the constitution or
all
judges
of
tenure
whether tenure of minor court judges should be left to legisMost state constitutions and the federal constitulation.
tion enumerate the tenure of appellate and trial court
judges; state constitutions may fix terms of inferior court
judges as well.
judyi>s sorvt.'

The question of tenure depends upon the method of judicial
Judges selected under the merit plan or elected
selection.
Appointed appellate
to office serve limited terms in office.
The issue of lifejudges frequently enjoy lifetime tenure.
time tenure vs. limited tenure usually revolves around appelAs Table 16 indicates, the tenure of
late judgeships.
appellate judges in other states runs the gamut from one year
in Vermont to life appointment in Massachusetts and Rhode
Island. The federal judiciary also has lifetime tenure. New
Hampshire and Puerto Rico have terms which last until the judge
reaches 70 years of age.

Lifetime Tenure
The principal contention supporting lifetime tenure is that
the mere possibility of a threat of interruption to a judge's
career is sufficient to deter an ordinarily prudent man from
being independent from the passions of the masses and whims
of the majority. 249 Proponents of lifetime tenure argue that:
[The federal supreme court] is probably history's
most outstanding example of viability of a tribunal with the broadest powers of judicial review
over the decrees of the legislative and executive
branches.
Yet, in all probability, the Court could
not have attained the stature and prestige which it
now enjoys if its members had been given only an
.250
appointment for a period of years
.

.

.

Lifetime tenure therefore affords more impartiality on controversial questions and makes judicial service a more attractive
career by offering greater job security.
It also allows
judges to attain greater judicial skills through experience
and enables a judge to perform at greater levels of his
capacity using the experience he has acquired. 252 The primary
disadvantage of such tenure is that unless a state has an
-'-
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The Counci l of State Governme nts, State Co ur t ~ystems, Report
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RM - 446 (Lex i ngton , Ky . , Revised 197 0 ), pp. 20-23.
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create a judiciary too firmly entrenched. The latter situation presents less of a problem on the federal levc^l since
those posts attract unusually capable men due to the status
There is also a substantial possibility
of the positions.
that judges vested with life tenure may fail to respond to
new and compelling needs of an ongoing, dynamic society. 25
1

,

Limited Tenure
Limited tenure has the opposite effect of lifetime tenure.
It makes possible the removal of judges who have not performed
their duties well and prevents judges from remaining on the
bench when advanced age may curtail their efficiency. 254 Thus,
the election of judges can serve as a method of removing incompetent judges. Conversely, limited tenure may interfere with
judicial independence and impartiality. Elected judges are
forced to forego judicial duties to campaign for re-election.
Limited tenure also makes it difficult to attract qualified
attorneys from successful private practice for a few years of
security followed by the rigors and hazards of an election
campaign .255

Most states require a judge to be reappointed or re-elected
at the end of his terra, depending on the method of judicial
A modification in this practice is to use a short
selection.
If the merit selection is used, the judge
probationary term.
serves a probationary term of one to three years and is
subject to electorate approval in a retention election in
The length of the second
order to serve a longer second term.
term and each succeeding term can be a fixed period of time,
In New Jersey a judge serves
six or ten years, or for life.
an initial seven-year term and upon reappointment serves for
This approach has been endorsed by the National
life. 256
Municipal League in its Model State Constitution 257 Under the
probationary-term system, the judge's record can be appraised
and tlie electorate can decide whether ho should continue in
office.
In Illinois, a yes-no retention election occurs every
ten years for appellate judges and every six years for circuit
court judges. 258 -p}^^ ^3^ Model Judicial Article provides for
retention elections every ten years for all judges after
serving a three-year-probationary term. 259 a Michigan proposal
provided for only one retention vote held three years after
appointment and if a judge is retained, he holds office for
life, subject to mandatory retirement at age 70 or disciplinary
removal 260
.

.
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Compensation

Compensation is a major factor in attracting capable persons to
the bench and in maintaining the independence and impartiality
Since the amount of judicial salaof judges while in office.
ries is set by the legislature in federal and state systems, precautions were taken early in our history to prevent reprisals
against unpopular judicial decisions by decreasing judicial compensation. The federal Constitution states:
The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts,
shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office. 261
.

.

.

Unfortunately, some states provided, in addition to the diminution clause, that judicial compensation could not be increased
during a judicial term. Article VII, Section 29 of the Montana
Constitution originally stated:
The justice of the supreme court and the judges of the
district courts shall each be paid Quarterly by the
state, a salary, which shall not be increased or diminished during the terms for which they shall have been
respectively elected. Until otherwise provided by law
the salary of the justices of the supreme court shall
be four thousand dollars per annum each, and the salary
of the judges of the district courts shall be three
thousand five hundred dollars per annum each (emphasis
,

added)

Because of the staggered terms of judges on the supreme and district court levels, this prohibition against an increase of judicial salary while in office resulted in some judges receiving
higher compensation than their colleagues 262 The situation v/as
remedied when an amendment adopted in 196 4 deleted the underlined
portion of the section cited above. 263
.

Since it is not generally recommended that a constitution incorporate specific judicial salaries, the only questions regarding
the compensation provision seem to be whether the prohibition
against diminution of salary while in office should be retained
A
and VN^hether all judicial salaries should be paid by the state.
provision allowing judicial salaries to be set by the legislature with the proviso tHat such compensation shall not be diminished during continuance in office seems adequate. If the
legislature were directed to pay all judicial salaries, this
would be a step toward state assumption of judicial expenditures discussed in Chapter III.
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Although salaries of the supromc court cind district court
judges have been increased by each legislative session since
1967, Tables 17 and 18 indicate that Montana's salaries are
relatively low when compared to the rest of the nation.
Presently higher court salaries in Montana stand at $22,500
for supreme court justices and $20,500 for district court
judges. "^ On the lower court levels, 85 percent of the
justices of the peace are compensated solely by fees. 265
Salaried justices of the peace receive a maximum of $5,500
annually. 266 Annual salaries of police judges range from
$100 to $10,800,267
Since the state already pays the compensation of supreme court
and district court judges, whether it assumes the cost of compensating lower court judges depends on whether the present
courts of limited jurisdiction are retained and whether the
The question of
fee system of compensation is maintained.
whether the state should assume financing of all judicial salaries in Montana involves not only justices of the peace but
police judges whose present compensation is set not by the
legislature but by municipalities. Thus, the state would be
entering an area which has been left to individual community
dictates, allowing salaries of police judges to depend upon
how much each community wishes to pay. This variance in salaries of police judges may result in a more efficient administration of justice in communities with higher paid judges than
The issues involved
in communities with minimum compensation.
in this question were summarized in a report by the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations:
Two intergovernmental issues are involved in the establishment of adequate salaries. The first is the
question of whether the State should mandate minimum
salaries for those lower courts for which it does not
now establish salaries. The second involves the matter of how much the States should aid localities in
financing judicial salaries.
Regarding the former,
while no comprehensive data are available on the
identity of these courts, they would usually include
courts established at local governmental discretion,
such as municipal, police, city or mayor's courts.
The argument for State mandating is that it represents
an exercise of State responsibility for seeing that
the office is attractive enough to qualified persons
and that a minimum standard of judicial performance is
achieved statewide. The major argument against it is
that the State should not mandate a requirement on
local government unless it is prepared to help localities meet the concomitant cost.
State mandating of
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court ju-lpes receive 2 r;t-ite sal. try of v2/,bOO, suop U-i eiite.' liy $7,500 liv lie cmmty In Cook County (i:nic.i o)
.-.suocKnte luu-es of tue circuit court recoiv.2 n s-^l-ry of S25,OOT, .supplcmente.l by J'/, 50') in Couk County
^1C,5J0, suppleiienteu oy iiA,500 In Cook County nor-l.T'ver Tin;-st--^t*3 s-..l.iry of
lai-yer n.i- istr^-ites receive
In Indiana, the ft.-'te n.nys i fixed amount
supplements are l,a.-ieJ
irtrates r-^cclve 515,00) from the JtaLe.
on a po-,julation slidln; scale In a.'ditlon, county cormlsslorers ray incre.ise a jut!-'e*-j salary not to exceed
>4.'0OO.
In Louisiana, local cupplenentation, up to vl3,53C, is mandatory in some Instances, pernlsslvc in
In Mssouri,
others.
population of 20T,C1.j or more.
In llnnesota, the supnlenent is SI.OjO In counties vith
in other Inst.ances option-nl su'nlenents ran -e from$l,800
a ^3,000 supplement is compulsory in t-jo counties
to $3,000.
In ileLrasl-.^, Lancaster (Lincoln) and Jou:las (Omaha) Counties are rcnuireri to yiay a supnlenent of
$1,503.
la Texas, iiumerous special le-islatlve acts provida for local suppler ent itlon. u-;. to $^,000 -- in
not necessarily keyed to re; ion or population.
sorie Instances optional, in others rranditory
In ''est Vir inia,
the fltate pays 317,500 to ;1\303. county supplements may not exceed ^25,000 in the a'- re ate.
These jarisdictions pay additional amounts to the chief justices of the courts of last resort. The additional
sums are;
5500 In Colorado, uela"ar3, lorth Dakota, ?enns"lvania, Puerto "Ico, South Carolina ar-' Utph $1,000
ississiool, .:€'? iarrpsiiire, north Cnrolina, ^hode Island, Tennessee, and Uisin ur.nsns,
aryland,
innesoLa,
assachusetts $1,210 in .!ai;atl. $1,500 in ;'?ine, Montana, Vermont ant Virginia $2,000 in
co.isin
$1.2v}0 in
Alaska and Ohio $2,500 in Arkansas --nd He; Jersey $2,545 in California $2, CSC in .lei' Yorl: $4,000 in
Connecticut (also for Chief Court iidminlstrator)
Half uai<i 'ly State half by county.
In addition, expense allo>-ance of $2,40-^ In Ark.-nsas and Indiana
$4,300 in reor"ia .and $5,0'''0 in .lorth
Carolina.
In Arkansas, jud'^es may elect Instead to receive actual exnenses Incurred.
Lffective September 1, 1?70, salaries shall be increased every year hy the percenta^.e by vhich the California
consumer nrlce Index, cornllid ';y the California Deoarcment of Industrial '"elations, increased in the previous
calendar year.
Salaries paid partially ly "tate, aartially Ly county, based on statutory population formula "liere.y rh.;] State
pavs a larger portion in t- e lass populated counties.
"re-idln jud- es of these courts receive an additional $5''0 in Tela are, "issis.siiinl ijei- .l.npshi -o Tcnnsvlvanfa
aid Vermont
$1.3'') In
$538 In Ic YovV. 51,00) in arylan.l, .'ortii Carolln.a,
.-i.ssa
..od
Tslantl and Teimossop
chusetts.
erl:iiin.il courts. In Tfuni-.n.-i,- .ilr.o
.ivi e<n.i ly
<ourLs.
Uiif'ular circuit judves are ex officio special (:oiimilsBl,)nnrs of the court nl aplif.ih; nul In tlnit i-.-ip/u-tlv
receive an additional $2,400.
Supromv Ucncli of lialtitiiorc City.
Svcovdcr's Court of Detroit.
In addition, judi-us n-ceivs full reimbursement for .ill tr.ivnl expenses .)n official business.
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e)
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'
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l)
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k)
1)
n)
'V
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p)
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r)

s)
t)

I

Assifnment jud",es, $4<),0'IO.
County courts.
In aJcitlon, judges of the court of appeals receive $6,000 for expenses, those of the appellate division
(3rd and 4th departments) ?8,000 (S9,000 for presldlnr; jud;;e), and those of the supreme court (3rd and 4th
lapartpents) 53,000.
ranges are due to loi.-er salaries paid to judpes in 3rd .and 4lh departmenls.
$10,500
of salaries of judges in the latter and $16,000 in 1st and 2nd departments paid from local sources.
Supreme court.
Courts of coomon pleas. Vaviations in salary based on population.
In Ohio, State pavs 511,000, county an
addltl.mal per capita salarv -- minimum 53,500- maximum $15,000.
In Pennsylvania, judges in districts I'ith
a population of more than 150,000 receive $30,000, those ulierc the population is between 100.000 and 150,000
receive $27,500, and vhere the population is belou 100,000, $26,500; judges of tlie commonuealth court (Dauphin
County) receive $32,500.
$17,500 for district judfes.
.\s30ciato district Jud'-es in counties of less than 10,000 population receive
51?, 500. in counties of 10,000 to 300,000 population, $14,500, in counties of 300,000 or more, 516.500. Special
judfres, "ho may be appointed by district juJpes, receive $12,500 if tliev are lai'ycrs.
$0,500 If they arc nonlawyers.
Constitution provides that county supplements may be .authorized by statute, no such authorization has
i,een :;lven. above salaries are paid by State.
S35,50U for .Indies of superior court $34,500 for judj-es of commonuealth court.
fills $.',00 a year for office expenses, .and
$25 a day for subsistence vhile court Is slttins in Columbia
(average 40 tiays .1 year)
Plus $2,000 travel expense in lieu of per diem.
Salaries sho-m are lho:;e paid by State m.ly i.e siipplemontcd by localities.
Corp.aation, hustinrs, and la" and equity court...
.

u)
v)
/)

**In Montana 1971 salaries are $24,000 for chief justice of
the supreme court, $22,500 for associate justices of the
supreme court and $20,500 for district court judges.
The Council of State Governments, State Court Systems
Source;
Revised 1970), pp. 24-27.
Report RM-446 (Lexington, Ky
.

,
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COMPENSATION OF JUDGES OF COURTS OF LIMITED JURISDICTION

Alr.b:una

County

l^robate

State

Municipal

r^es or !;alary

Tees or salary

Alaska
Arizona
$1,800-3,000

Arkansas

CdUfornlT
520,030

Color.ido

1,600-17,500,J

$2,400- 15,001)
2'', 270"

Jusllte, llapistrate
or Police
F^es
S600-12,000'o
Up to 14,300''
Up to 23,230^^
Fees^
OOO 21,0C0'

$19,000*^

100-9008
20,000

(k)

20,onoi 21 ,5on" 22,500"
9,500-2 ,00r'^ 17.5/) 21,000''

Feus

Connect lent
Ivl.n; iru

•lorld

9,s')o-2;;,'ij(i

12,000Up to

2 s, '^00"

iij.'.oo

v-j,

1

0,000
1 ,-T
r 'DC n.ci

J

r,f.ci-2i,(.oo''

i.ornl

l\

Vt v'j

ft

s.-'I

irv

I'M Mil
lil.\l.o

19,500'

12,000-23,500

(x)

Icnjr

Uinsas

5,000-15,000

Up to 12,500

i.ontucky

Up to 28,000^

i:.".ine
3,200-5,000
!-ryland
8-19.5^ a day^"
:iassichusctts9,40>26,300

4,0 30-25, :^00^''

Snl.-iry

'

3,0'JO-4,iV/2

(pn.rt-tlirc)

6 , 500"
12,'Ji?-23,500l

Tecs a salary"
I-ecs

salary

L

Michigan

6,5.^:)-29.00j''^

5, 000-16, o:o

'Inncsot.i

7,5:'-22,C,T''«

i:,e'~"-24,:

20, 000-33, 500^'P

300-6,500
30, Cr/"" 22,0.0-26,300^

25,0DO^''

24^-23,?-^'^e
5,4~i1-2), 100"*

Mississippi

r,2cs

15,000=

"^

"''on tan a

.'"^Ol

Ip to 9,600

Loulslann

:iiGS0uri

Pecs, IT f.00-23,

3,0011 ;'H,500'-1'), 01)0-28,500"'
f\->:l"
2 J. 1100"
5, 124-2 1.670'

300-11 .SOd*^'"

l.iOO-U.llOO'

Illinois
InJl.-sm

Other

7, 600-25, 000<=
25,0C0e 13, ;03-27,50j'^

Teas
18,5'iOP

Salary^^
Varies
3,?0T
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Up to 3,600 4 fees"
L'p to 4,200 £. feus''

TABLE 18

(Continued)
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$4,000-19,500^

iJ..I»raska

MiA-ada
iJei-

ilarapshlre

i:.-.-

Jersey

^g.ooo'p

Mill Cl|>l]

Up to $19,000^"
ITom $300 pluF $5.00.
-r case lip to $15,000"
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x)
y)
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ah)

ac)
cd)
ao)
af)
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.all)

.al)

ai)
ik)

al)
an)

an)
ao)
jp)
ao)
ar)
as)
at)

au)
av)

ao)
ax)
ay)
at)

ua)
bb)
be)

bd)
be)
"

8

(Con

I

i

iiikhI)

In IJolio, tliosi- pf Iu.Ihu-n ..f |iiKtli-..\>Klr.rB ftxo.l bv orillnnncc of r'."vcri>lnc Vo.ird.
courts fixed by board of couiitv ccwiralsslonoT-s, Itli ipprov.il of SLiiior district Judpc.
In .Icii Yorl:, plus $6,000 expense allo«nnce ($9,000 for pri'sldlnp Judr>;)Courtj of clilns.
Prosldln- judf.c receives $21,000.
S.ilnrv Is 80 ncrccnt of district Judpc's salary,
lu loiM, If mayor holds mayor's court, i-enerally receives. In nt^dlllon to Ills salary,
Justices of ,iollcc courts.
the same fees as a Justice of the peace.
City court (udpea In ttoi Orleans rr:cclvc $28,500; nunlclp.il and well are court ludpcs In Nei- Orleans receive
$18,000.
Several rountlen and Ualtlmore City no>i pay nnnu il .alTlen r mi- inc. from $600 to $l''i,000. The <hlel Judj-.e of
the Orphan's Court of Ualtlmore City receives an additional $!iOQ (total $14,500).
Chief JuUi-.is of municipal and people's courts of Ualtlmore City and people's courts of .'onti'omery County receive
chief Judr.e of people's court of Prince Ceori.e's County receives additional
an additional $500 (total $25,500)
clilcf JudRcs of t\io other people's courts riceive iddlttonal $500 (total $A,500-$19 ,500)
Si, 000 (tetal $22,000).
Chief judRe receives an additional $1,000.
Chief Justice receives additional $1,300.
.lunlclpal Court of Boston.
Land Court of Ilass.icliusetts.
Salary set by Lep.lslature paid half by State, half by county county may supplement.
Extra $1,000 to $2,000 for probate
Fixed by Legislature for various counties In accordance with population.
Judges in counties without municipal court* amount based on number of cases handled durln« year,
Salaries (loi-'er end of range part time), as fixed by State, vary by class of county .accordinp, to assessed valuation
Certain class 1 counties may supplement by up to $4,000.
.and population.
Salaries of police court Justices fixed by municipal authorities; In Isalsclppl, usually vary accordinp, to
size of city,
Other probate Judges receive up to $23,000.
S2'i,000 paid In St. Louis City, St. Louis and Jackaon Counties.
ilaplstrates.
In counties of 30,000 nnJ less, probate Judi-.e Is ex officio raoRlstrate and salary of nianlstrnte
compensates for both offices,
St. Louis Court of Crlrnlnal Correction.
$9,000 paid by State. $12,000 by city,
Based on population.
In Uorth Dakota, the salary Is $11,000 In counties Siavine a population not exceedlnc 15,000
In Ohio, part-time Judpes receive a
$13,500 If population Is 15,000-22,000 $15, COO If population Is over 22,000.
mlnltium of $6,000.
In '.'aslilnpton, top salary paid in Seattle.
Sl^JjOOO in metropolitan and primary class cities; In first-class cities, salaries set by city councils.
Fees for Justices of the peace, salaries of police naplstrates set by city councils.
.\ddltlonal compensation for special sessions,
County district courts.
Presidlnp Judge there receives an additional $2,500.
Top of raniji- applicable to .4ei;ark.
:;anges due to local determination or optional local supplements.
Statutory minimum of $25,000 may be supplemented by localities.
Surropates' courts.

S.^liuli's of immlclp.il

u)

!

1

f)

,

'

village courts.
County courts which function as probate courts, $5,600 In counties having a population not exceeding 8,000.
S5,800 If population exceeds 3,000 (additional $100 for each additional 1,000 population, but not to exceed
$7,000), $8,500 If population in excess of 30,000.
An additional $2,^00 may
Inlmun $3,000, plus 6c per capita of population of district, not exceedln'- $6,000.
be authorized by legislative lody of county,
unlclpal court and traffic court of rhlladelphla. Lauyer Judges receive $2u,000, non-lr-yer Judges, $16,500.
Justices of the peace nlnlnum $3,000, plus 40C per resident vithln district, up to $14,000.
Salarv deoends upon length of sarvlce, with $300 Increment for each two years of service for Justices of the

ToiTi and

'

peace.
Courts of general sessions,
Domestic relations courts.
In Dallas and Harris Counties (Houston) - population between 900,000 and 1.2 million - $13,000 olus $3,000 as
member of oountv Juvenile board. County courts at lav and county criminal court.-, up to $17,500.
Including supplements to state salary which may be paid to municipal court Judges.
"unlclpal or police court tries misdemeanors in city terms Interchan.-^eable, If Judge, salary if r.ayor, no
extra money.
Common picas, domestic relations. Intermediate, Juvenile and criminal courts.

The Council of State Governments, S tate Court Systems
Report RM-446 (Lexington Ky., Revised 1970), pp. 28-32.
Source:
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LocaJ cxjicMid Lures wiLliouL SLaLc
iiumciaJ u:;.'; s vUici'
long has been one of the sorest points in State- local
i

I

i

I

relations
This leads to the second intergovernmental issue: To
what extent should the State legislature assist the
localities in meeting the salary costs of local judges?
The Institute for Judicial Administration found that in
at least 23 States, lower courts were financed entirely
by local funds.
In at least nine more States, the cost
was shared by State and local governments.

The State of New York provides one example of State
financial assistance to local units of government in
meeting the costs of a mandatory requirement on the
courts.
A 1961 constitutional amendment mandated fulltime service by judges of a court for the City of New
York, of the family court, the surrogate's court and
county court, as well as of the higher courts, elected
A 1962 statute
or appointed after September 1, 1962.
provided minimum salaries for judges of the surrogate's,
county, and family courts if they were full-time judges
The same
by virtue of the constitutional provision.
counties
with such
made
State
aid
available
statute
to
full-time judges and to the City of New York to be administered by the Administrative Board of the Judicial
Conference.
The statute offers State aid to counties of 300,000 or
more population and the City of New York at the rate of
$10,000 per year for each full-time judge of the county
court, surrogate's court, family court and civil and
In counties of less
.criminal court of New York City.
than 40,000 population, the maximum State aid is $10,000
per year, in counties of 40,000 to 100,000 population
the maximum is $20,000 per year, and in counties of
100,000 to 300,000 population the ceiling is $30,000 per
In no case can State aid exceed $10,000 per year
annum.
for each full-time judge of the county court, surrogate's
court and family court.
For fiscal year 1967-68, a total of $3,421,779 was paid,
of which $2,099,287 went to New York City, $98,027 to
Nassau County, and lesser amounts down to a minimum of
$10,000 to other counties. 268

The Executive Director of the American Judicature Society has stated that "the greatest current weakness in judicial compensation
picture is the deplorable neglect of the courts of limited and
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special jurisdiction ." 269 one judge complainted to the
Society that all attention and efforts of judicial reform
in his state were centered on higher court judges, and
county level courts were ignored as if they were not a part
in 1968 the Society recommended
of the judicial system. 270
of $17,000 and noted that
level
salary
minimum
trial
that a
and noted that apsalary
of
$17,000
minimum
level
trial
a
limited jurisdiction
of
fifty-six
courts
proximately half of
did
not meet this minin
1968
surveyed
forty-three
states
in
imum for any of their judges. 2 '1
The problem of adequate compensation is legislative, not constitutional. Thus far, California offers the most progressive
solution; state statutes there allow judicial salaries to be
increased annually by the percentage by which the state's consumer price index increased in the previous calendar year. 2 '2
However, the question of how judicial salaries are financed
may depend upon the compensation provision of the judicial
State-local sharing of costs seems to be the trend.
article.
New York already has taken this step. The National Municipal
League suggests the following language in its model judicial
article
The chief judge shall submit an annual consolidated
budget for the entire unified judicial system and
the total cost of the system shall be paid by the
The legislature may provide by law for the
state.
reimbursement to the state of appropriate portions
of such cost by political subdivisions 273
.

Illinois' new judicial article contains a similar approach:

Judges shall receive salaries provided by law which
shall not be diminished to take effect during their
terms of office.
All salaries and such expenses as
may be provided by law shall be paid by the State,
except that Appellate, Circuit and Associate Judges
shall receive such additional compensation from
counties within their district or circuit as may be
provided by law. There shall be no fee officers in
the judicial system.
[Art. VI, Sec. 14]
The ABA model judicial article concentrates more on the quesIt
tion of adequate salaries than the method of financing.
states
The salaries of justices, judges, and magistrates
shall bo fixed by statute, but the salaries of the
justices and judges shall not be less than the
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highest salary paid to an officer of the executive
branch of the State government other than the governor. 274

Thus, the Convention will be faced with various issues in readequacy of salaries, the diminution
gard to compensation:
clause and method of financing judicial compensation.

Retirement

Along with tenure and compensation, retirement pension plans
are considered by potential candidates to the bench in deterIn Montana pension
mining the attractiveness of the position.
provisions for supreme court and district court judges were
enacted by the legislature in 1967.2 '5 rpj^^ judge's program
is administered in the same fashion as the public employees'
retirement system to which lower court judges may belong.
Under the judges retirement system, each member is required
is
to contribute 6 percent of his monthly salary; this
matched by the state in an equal amount. 2 76 These appropriations and contributions are paid into the public employees'
retirement system but earmarked as the judges' retirement fund. 277
In addition, one-fourth of certain fees collected by the county
treasurers and the supreme court clerk, as designated by the
legislature, are credited to the judges' retirement fund. 278
The right to receive the retirement allowance vests when a
member reaches 65 years of age and has completed at least
five years of service. 279 The member may retire at age 65
but must retire at age 70 in order to receive pensions benefits 2yu The usual retirement allowance consists of the state
annuity plus the member's annuity. The member's annuity is
the actuarial equivalent of his aggregate contributions at
the time of retirement; the state annuity is an amount which,
when added to the member's annuity, provides a total retirement allowance of 3 1/3 percent per year of his final salary
for the first fifteen years' of service and 1 percent for each
year's service thereafter 281 i^ addition, there are specific
allowances for disability, involuntary retirement, penalty
retirement and optional retirement. 2 82 since an adequate
pension program is already in existence in Montana through
legislation, it may be superfluous to constitutionally require
The
the legislature to maintain a pension program for judges.
retirement of judges, however, has constitutional import because of its relation to the removal and discipline of the
judiciary previously discussed in this chapter.
.

.
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Most modern removal provisions in state constitutions include
involuntary retirement of judges who are physically or menState constitutally incapacitated because of advanced age.
tions employing a court on the judiciary, such as New York,
Delaware and Oklahoma, usually empower the court to retire
a judge "for permanent mental or physical disability interfering with the proper performance of the duties of his
office. "283 Those states which use an independent commission
for removal and discipline have constitutional or statutory
provisions allowing the commission to recommend retirement
of a judge to the supreme court for "disability that seriously
interferes with the performance of his duties and is or is
likely to become permanent ." 284 j^ other states the supreme
court or some other body may initiate retirement procedures
by certifying apparent incapacity to the governor who appoints
In Oregon the
a special commission to conduct an inquiry.
bar association can initiate such proceedings; Minnesota by
statute authorizes twenty-five or more freeholders to petition the governor for removal of a judge incapacitated for
more than six months, and in New Jersey the supreme court
certifies incapacity to the governor. 285 The model judicial
article proposed by the American Bar Association follows the
commission approach:
A justice of the Supreme Court may be retired after
appropriate hearing, upon certification to the governor, by the Judicial Nominating Commission for the
Supreme Court that such justice is so incapacitated
as to be unable to carry on his duties. 286
The ABA committee's comment which accompanied this section stated:

This provision follows the Alaska plan to have an
independent body make the determination whether a
high court judge has become incapacitated while in
office.
The nominating commission seems to be a
logical agency to charge with this responsibility.
The difficulties which seem to arise when this
power is put in the hands of fellow judges are
avoided by this approach.
In addition to the involuntary retirement provisions incorporated into removal and disciplinary procedures, some state constitutions liavo separate sections dealing with a mandatory
rcLiromont aqc and post-retirement service for judges.

M.ii ul^i

I
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More than a decade ago, the National Conference on Judicial
Selection and Court Administration recommended automatic
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retirement at 70.287 The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice endorsed the principle of retiring judges at a predetermined age. 288
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations reported that at least twenty-three states by either statutory
or constitutional mandate require retirement usually at age
70.289 The constitutions of Alaska, New York, Maryland and
Florida require retirement at age 70,290 while in Colorado's
judicial article the mandatory age of retirement is 72.291
Iowa leaves the problem of mandatory retirement age to the
legislature by a constitutional provision which states:
The General Assembly shall prescribe mandatory retirement for Judges of the Supreme Court and District Court as a specified age and shall provide
for adequate retirement compensation
[Art.

....

V, Sec.

18]

Determination of whether a mandatory retirement age should
be incorporated into the judicial article must be resolved
If a judge wishes to receive pension
by the Convention.
benefits in Montana, legislation establishing the judges'
retirement system requires the judge to retire at age 70
Any judge or justice who becomes eligible for retirement hereunder, but fails to make application
therefor, prior to his attaining the age of 70
years, shall automatically waive all retirement
benefits, and shall receive a return of only such
moneys equal to the accumulated deduction contributed by him; save and except that any judge or
justice, who is over the ago of 70 years, at the
time of the effective date of this act, or who
shall attain such ago before the expiration of
At
his term, without forfeiting said rotiremont.
the termination of the said existing term, if such
member has failed to make application for retirement under this act, he shall automatically waive
all retirement benefits hereunder, and shall receive a return of only such moneys equal to the
accumulated deduction contributed by him. 292
This provision, however, applies only to supreme and district
court judges.

Arguments for mandatory retirement
The problem is balancing
the need for removing judges who may become incompetent be.
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cause of age with the need to retain the services of judges
who remain productive. Proponents of a mandatory retirement
age argue that it eliminates the unpleasantness of removing
aging judges on an individual basis, which is more personal
than the objectivity of mandatory retirement 293 They argue
that the increase in the volume of judicial business, the
growing complexity of most judicial positions and the marked
change in the law require retirement at a fixed date.294
Furthermore, the emotional blow of mandatory retirement is
offset by provisions allowing part-time post-retirement service, which also substantially increases judicial manpower. 295
.

Arguments against mandatory retirement
Opponents of a fixed
retirement age for judges contend that age is biological, not
chronological, and that all men do not lose their mental and
physical capabilities at the same ago. 296 Thus, it is difficult to determine a suitable retirement age.
Requiring
all judges to retire at the same age may remove many competent judges; opponents of mandatory retirement point out that
Justice Holmes of the U.S. Supreme Court remained on the bench
well past the age of 70.297 Some critics call attention to
the fact that some states with mandatory retirement age circumvent the purpose of the provisions by allowing certain
judges to serve on a part-time basis,•298 if the judge is
able enough to serve part-time, why should he be retired at
all? Many opponents feel that removal commissions are the
proper vehicle for handling question of judicial incapacity
and that specific references to mandatory retirement ages
are unnecessary 299
.

.

Post-retirement Service
The harshness of mandatory retirement may be offset by provisions allowing the chief justice of the supreme court to call
upon retired judges for part-time service.
This also provides
a source of judicial manpower on both the appellate and trial
court level to alleviate heavy case loads.

Legislation in Montana allows retired judges to be called
back into active service:
Every judge or justice receiving retir.ement pay
under the provisions of this act [judges' retirement plan applying only to supreme court and district court judges], shall, if physically and
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mentally able, be subject to call by the supreme
court or the chief justice thereof to aid and assist the supreme court or any district court under
such directions as the supreme court may give, including the examination of the facts and cases before the court, the examination of authorities
cited and the preparation of opinions, when and if
and to the extent approved by the court, may by the
court be ordered to constitute the opinion of such
court and such retired judge or justice may, subject to any rule which the supreme court may
adopt, perform any and all duties preliminary to
the final disposition of cases in so far as not
inconsistent with the constitution of the state.
Such retired judge or justice when called to service as herein provided shall be reimbursed for his
actual expenses,
if any, in responding to such
"^
call. 300

This legislation allows retired judges to serve in commissionertype functions described in Chapter III.
The Convention may consider whether provision for post-retirement service should be incorporated into the judicial article.
Some states, such as New York, Iowa and Alaska, have done so.-^Ol
The model provisions of the National Municipal League and the
retirement service within the same provision. The NML article
states

They [judges of the supreme court, appellate court and
general court] shall be retired upon attaining the age
of seventy years and may be pensioned as may be provided by law.
The chief judge of the supreme court may
from time to time appoint retired judges to such special
assignments as may be provided by the rules of the supreme court. 302
The ABA model provision is similar except a retirement age is
left to legislation:

Every justice and judge shall retire at the age specified by statute at the time of his appointment, but
that age shall not be fixed at less than sixty-five
years.
The Chief Justice is empowered to authorize
retired judges to perform temporary judicial duties in
any court of the State. 303
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CLERKS OF COURT AND COUNTY ATTORNEYS
Two sect ic:)ns oT Article^ VIII of the Montana Constitution arc
devoted to clerks. Tho office of clerk of the supreme court
is

i^stablishod in one:

There shall be a clerk of the supreme court, who
shall hold his office for the term of six years, except that the clerk first elected shall hold his office only until the general election in the year one
thousand eight hundred ninety-two (1892)
and until
his successor is elected and qualified.
He shall be
elected by the electors at large of the state, and
his compensation shall be fixed by law, and his
duties prescribed by law, and by the rules of the
supreme court.
[Art. VIII, Sec. 9]
,

District clerks of court are defined in the other:
There shall be a clerk of the district court in each
county, who shall be elected by the electors of his
county.
The clerk shall be elected at the same time
and for the same term as the district judge.
The
duties and compensation of the said clerk shall be
as provided by law.
[Art. VIII, Sec. 18]
The purpose of these sections is to establish the offices as
elective and fix the terms of office. The questions raised
by the provisions is whether the office should continue to
have constitutional status and whether the office should be
elective or appointive.
The duties of clerks on both court levels is administrative in
nature:
collecting fees, filing legal papers, issuing writs
and other documents and maintaining records. 304 Thus, the
office is necessary to the efficient administration of the
judicial system. However, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations noted in a recent study:

Even in those states which have a statutorily established court administrator with broad powers and the
backing of the highest court, the exercise of controls over the administration of courts at the lower
levels may be hampered by an elected clerk of the
eourl
lie traditional title for tiie court adminislatoi).
Ilxpei ene<^ has shown thai election bc.'•.lows
iKii'piMulence upon an admini:; tra t ve official
and inclines him to resist cooperation and coordination. 305
(

•

I

i

i

i
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Four state constitutions Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi and
Montana provide for election of supremo court clerks. 306
in
twenty-six state constitutions, state supreme court clerks
are appointed: 307 Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Idalio,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming.

—

The ACIR reported that in thirty-three states, the clerks of
trial courts of general jurisdiction are elected either by
statutory or constitutional provisions 308 in fifteen of these
states, there is a state court administrator ^^9 j^ some
states, such as Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii and New Mexico, trial
court clerks are appointed. ^10
;

.

Neither the ABA
of the National
(see appendices
office of clerk

model judicial article nor the judicial article
Municipal League s Model State Constitution
E and D respectively) explicitly mention the
of court.
Instead the ABA article states:
'

The Chief Justice of the State shall be the executive
head of the judicial system and shall appoint an administrator of the courts and such assistants as he
deems necessary to aid the administration of the
courts of the State. 311
The National Municipal League's article grants similar power to
the chief justice. 312 jn a comment, the authors of the NML
Model stated:

A court system consists of a great deal more than
highly qualified judges.
It is a large organization
that employs many, sometimes thousands of persons-clerks bailiffs, stenographers, guards, probation
officers, etc.
and maintains numerous court buildings and law libraries.
It must keep huge permanent
files, systems of accounts for the collection of
fines and fees, and it must provide a vast administrative machinery to keep court papers flowing in
the proper channels.
All this requires administrative oversight and, in an integrated court system,
it also requires unified administrative planning at
,

—

the top. 313

Although the present constitutional provisions in Montana require the office to be elective, the office of supreme court
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clerk is more or less put under the administrative control of
the supremo court by the phrase "his duties prescribed by law,
and by the rules of the supreme court." However, if centralized administration of the judicial system is created in
Montana, appointed clerks of court on all levels would seem
a logical concomitance of such centralized administration.

County Attorneys
The judicial article of the Montana Constitution also establishes the office of county attorney:
There shall be elected at the general election in
each county of the state one county attorney, whose
qualifications shall be the same as are required
for a judge of the district count, except that he
must be over twenty-one years of age, and whose
term of office shall be four years, and until their
successors are elected and qualified. He shall
have a salary to be fixed by law, one-half of which
shall be paid by the state, and the other half by
the county for which he is elected, and he shall
perform such duties as may be required by law.
[Art. VIII, Sec. 19]
The major issue related to this provision is whether the office should continue to have constitutional status; if so, should
the office be established in the judicial article or in another,
such as the local government article? Should the geographical
unit served by these attorneys continue to be counties or might
judicial districts be more realistic subdivisions? Should
the office continue to be elective?

Although the county attorney in Montana handles some civil
matters, he is primarily a public prosecutor 314 The role of
the prosecutor was aptly defined by the ACIR:
.

The prosecutor acts in behalf of the State in conducting the proceedings against persons suspected
He has authority to determine whether
of crimes.
an alleged offender should be charged and what the
charge should be, and to obtain convictions through
(juilty plea negotiations.
He influences and often
tirt <M'ni n(^s the disposition of all
easels brought to
him by t h(^ pcHici- [or shoriffl and oftt^n works
His
closely with tliem on important investigations.
decisions significantly affect the arrest practices
i
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of the polico, tlu> volume of cases
Llio number of offenders referred to

the court:;, .iiul
he cor i-cl oUli
is iiotentially a

in
I

t

i

1

The prosecutor, therefore,
system.
key figure in coordinating the various enforcement and
correctional agencies in the criminal justice system.
The historical traditions of the demand for decentralized administration of criminal justice have led to
the almost universal practice of electing local prosecutors, largely independent of the attorney general
who may, in some instances, have only circumscribed
responsibilities in the criminal justice process. -^l^

Local Prosecutors in Other States
In a recent study the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations reported that prosecutions systems vary among the fifty
states, ranging from centralized appointive ones in Alaska,
Delaware and Rhode Island where the attorney general has charge
of all local prosecutions, to the multi-tiered systems of Florida,
Mississippi and Utah where local prosecutors are elected by
county and judicial district. 316

The local prosecutor is elected in forty-five states, and appointed in f ive--Alaska Connecticut, Delaware, New Jersey and
Rhode Island either on the state or local level (see Table 19)
Thirty-seven states give constitutional status to prosecuting
attorneys: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana., Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin. ^1' Thirty-six of
these constitutions establish the office as elective; under
New Jersey's Constitution, the county prosecutor is appointed
by the governor with the consent of the senate. 318

—

,

The ACIR classified state prosecutorial systems into nine categories, which illustrate the use of judicial districts or
counties for the geographical representation of the office as
well as the type of responsibilities placed on local prosecutors: 319
1.
State prosecutor systems:
and Rhode Island.
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Allny*
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t:ivil
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•

appeals
criminal and

County Attny.

Aii^ond

civil

County'

Arkanscis

criminal only

Judic. Dis.

California

District Attny.

criminal and

County

Colorado
Conn.

District Attny.

criminal only

States Attny.

felonies

County

Chief Pros,

misdemeanors

Circuit'

Dist. Pros.

.

Attny

Delaware
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Flor:da

State Attny.

Goergid

District Attny.

civil

Judic. Dis.

I

Judic. Ct.
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criminal, St.
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Judic. Dis.

Iowa

County Attny.

criminal and

County

Kansas

County Attny.
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Hawaii

Idaho

.

Comm.

Attny.

Louisiana

.

District Attny.

Maine
Maryland

.

States Attny.

County Attny.

.

Massachusetts

District Attny.

Michigan

Prosecuting Attny.

.

County Attny.

Minnesota

Attny.*

Mississippi

District

Missouri

Prosecuting Attny.;

County Attny.
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Nebraska

County Attny.
County Attny.

.

.

Nevada
New Hampshire
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.

District Attny.

District Attny.
District Attny.
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Solicitors'

North Dakota

Stale's
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.

.

.
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Oregon

District Attny.
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.
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District Attny.
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District
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civil
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2.
State-appointed local prosecutors:
ticut and New Jersey

Connec-

Local (judicial district) prosecutors with
3.
criminal and appeals responsibilities: Georgia and
Massachusetts
(judicial district) prosecutors with
responsibilities: Arkansas, ColoraIndiana, New M(<xico, North Carolina and Tennessee
Iiocal

4.

r.olcly criiiiiiia]

do,

5.
Local (judicial district) prosecutors with
civil and criminal justice responsibilities, but no
appeals duties: Alabama, Louisiana, Oklahoma and
South Carolina

Local (county) prosecutor with criminal
6.
and appellate responsibilities: Hawaii, Illinois,
Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Washington.
7.
Local (county) prosecutors with solely criminal responsibilities: Missouri and Texas

8.
Local (county) prosecutors with criminal
and civil, but not appellate responsibilities:
Arizona, California, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Maryland,
Montana, Nevada, Nebraska, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming

Overlapping county- judicial district proseFlorida, Kentucky, Mississippi and Utah

9.

cutors:

Should the Office be Elective or Appointive ?
As in selection of judges, controversy surrounds the method by
which local prosecutors should be selected. The alternatives
in the selection process were examined in the ACIR report:

Opinions conflict on whether the prosecutor should
be an elective or appointive official.
Earlier
studies of the prosecutor's office, such as that
of the Wickersham Commission, have indicated that
clc^ct^ion was a key factor in its weakness due to
the inciMil
(v<'n fii oi
I

noLiru)

i

vc

c-i 'iiK

the par

il
11
t
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i
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I

im(>.s orfortnl
for lax or unhe Idw.
M(ir(> rc^cont studies,
and low salary traits of the
I
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oltict', niiytiL also be intorprcjLod as an indication
that Lilt' profoss i«iialisni of tlu^ oFfici^ lias bt-cn diluted by its involvement in politics.

Against these views, however, some have noted that
the election of the prosecutor assures his "independence" his freedom from outside influence in
the exercise of his responsibilities.
Hence, we
have the description that the "... office of prosecuting attorney has been carved out of that of
attorney-general and virtually made an independent
office."
This feature has been pointed to as indicative of the popular desire for decentralization
of the office.
Moreover, the constitutionally
elective status of the prosecutor in 36 States is
said to attest to the popular desire to keep the
office under direct public control.
From still
another vantage point, some have stressed the fact
that a niomber of local prosecutors in large urban
areas have succeeded in placing themselves above
politics and in developing professional offices
which have exemplary records in prosecuting local
crime.
It has been said that these
examples show that the elective system can provide
competent, professional prosecutors if those who
control the process of selection strive for these
qualities
,

"...

.

Theoretically, either election or appointment
could strengthen the effectiveness of the prosecutor.
Election, while involving the prosecutor
in partisan or factional politics, can assure
that he will possess
a degree of political independence that is desirable in an officer
charged with the investigation and prosecution of
charges of bribery and corruption."
It may also
assure that he will "... come to the office
without a comfortable acceptance of the status
."
quo
Moreover since he is a highly
"visible" official, public apathy is not likely to
occur in the selection of a prosecutor.
Public
concern, especially at this point in time, will
force local political parties to recruit able candidates for the office.

"...

.

.

.

On the other hand, appointment to the office can
bring about strict accountability for a comprehensive and rigorous prosecutions policy.
State and
local chief executives will be held responsible
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\ai the oJK'ct. ivc adnii n s L rjl on ol a broad(>r [proportion of the criminal justice process, so the aryunicnt
runs, and hence in a better position to coordinate
prosecution policies with other components of the system.
In addition, some contend that appointment enqondcrs greater professionalism in the office, especially if the length of appointment is sufficiently
long to attract qualified personnel.
Appointment also
might reduce public antipathy to paying the prosecutor
an adequate salary.
i

i

Another controversy centers on whether the prosecutor
should be appointed by local or State officials. Local appointment is favored on the basis that many localities have administrative responsibilities for
lower courts as well as almost exclusive responsibility
for the police function.
To coordinate police, prosecution, and court policies then, some argue that local appointment of the prosecutor is needed.
City
attorneys, many of whom already have minor criminal
justice responsibilities, are almost invariably appointed.

Others feel that the local prosecutor should be appointed by a state of f icial--either the governor or attorney
general.
Such a method of selection is held to have a
number of benefits.
State appointment of local prosecutors could result in more effective enforcement of
laws due to greater prosecutorial involvement in the
drafting of the criminal code. Appointment by the governor or attorney general also would permit greater
statewide coordination of prosecutorial policy and prevent the local prosecutor from independently setting
law enforcement priorities.
Moreover, appointment at
the State level could result in more effective utilization of prosecutorial personnel since it would more
easily permit transfer of prosecutors from low to
high crime areas.

Treading the middle way in the election-appointment
controversy are the National Association of Attorneys
General and the ABA. The former group feels there is
no single best method since what is appropriate for
one state is not necessarily appropriate for another.
The ABA, however, believes that the prosecutor should
be elected on a non-partisan basis, using the "merit"
plan similar to the Missouri plan for selection of
judges.
Those who advocate this method of selection

-219-

COURT PERSONNEL

see it as a means of removing the office from poliSuch advocates feel that nonpartisan "merit"
tics.
selection would have the benefits of increasing
public confidence in the office's enforcement policies, of reducing the amount of time a prosecutor
has to spend in partisan political matters, and of
attracting more qualified candidates to the office.
These changes so the case runs would raise markedly
the professional status of the office.
,

,

Critics of the "merit" selection plan note that the
prosecutor if he is to be an elective official, needs
the organizational and financial support of an estabThe "merit" plan of selection provides
lished party.
no necessary incentive for selection of candidates of
a higher caliber, and the nonpartisan election tends
to reduce voter interest in the prosecutor's election.
Both of these factors, some feel, cause the prosecutor to devote disproportionate time to building an
independent base of public support as well as to prevent less established lawyers from campaigning for
the office.
In summary, the prosecutor has long been an elected
His office was created as a result
local official.
more decentralized administration
need
for
a
of the
of justice, and over time the local prosecutor was
delegated criminal justice powers that formerly had
been within the province of the Attorney General.
Accompanying this delegation of power was the growing popularity of direct election of the prosecutor;
this was in keeping with Jacksonian and later Progressive principles regarding popular control of
public officials, strict accountability on their
part to the electorate, and keeping the system honest.

Of late, election of the prosecutor has been criticized on the basis that it lowers the professionalism of the office. Critics contend that this
method of selection is responsible for the parttime and underpaid character of the office in many
Only by the process of appointment or at
areas.
least nonpartisan election will more qualified personnel be attracted to the profession and prosecutorial policies be better coordinated with other
Appointment
parts of the criminal justice system.
advocates underscore the need to strengthen the
position of chief executives in the system, noting
that real coordination is rarely produced by a number of elected officials with separate constituencies
and separately assigned responsibilities.
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On the other hand, defenders of local election of the
prosecutor point out that it is instrumental in keeping the office "independent" and responsive to popuThey contend that election generates
lar demands.
greater public interest in the function and allows the
public a sense of participation in the criminal justice system.
Moreover, some maintain the existence
of an "independent" prosecutor may be necessary for
effective implementation of prosecutorial policy
without which the whole system suffers. His independence, after all, means he will be less subject to
conflicting political pressures in the administration
of prosecution policy than would be the case with a
State or local chief executive.
Proponents of local
election almost always contend that appointment by a
State official would involve the local prosecutor in
more not less politics, and, in any event, excessive
bureaucratization of the prosecution function necessarily would result.

Finally, the present system in the 45 States relying
basically on local election is defended by some on
the very practical grounds that the bulk of the local
district attorneys would oppose a major change in the
mode of selection and too much political currency
would be expended on an effort that in no way necessarily assures a more effective prosecutorial component of the criminal justice system.

The controversy over the method of selection, then,
centers on whether election or appointment will ultimately inject greater professionalism into what is
now an undermanned and underpaid function in too many
areas.
Both methods of selection can result in the
selection of able prosecutors.
Both methods of
selection can result in better coordination of prosecution policies with other parts of the criminal
justice system.
Conclusive proof, then, is still
lacking as to whether the method of selection will
make a wholesale difference in the quality of prosecution in many areas. Quite possibly an improved
prosecution function will come about as a result of
other reforms ^2'-'
.

Other Considerations
As indicated in Table 19, fifteen states utilize judicial districts as a basis for distributing public prosecutors.
If the
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office of county attorney in Montana were re-established as
a district attorney, conforming with judicial districts, the
number of offices would be reduced from fifty-six to eighteen;
however, reduction of offices would not necessarily indicate
More deputy officers may be necessary
a reduction of staff.
in order to handle the enlarged geographical jurisdiction of
the office.
Two problems related to the issue of district attorney vs.
county attorney are the sharing arrangements for prosecutor's
salaries and the part-time nature of the office.
The ACIR report showed that seven states share the cost of
local prosecutors salaries with local governmental subdiviColorado, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana,
sions
Oklahoma and Virginia. ^21 Twenty-five states require county
governments to pay the entire salary, while fourteen states
assume the full cost of his salary :j22 Alabama, Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah and VerAlabama, Georgia, Oregon and Tennessee allow county
mont.
supplements to this aid.^23 jj-j Montana the salary is paid
half by the state and half by the county. The amount of
annual compensation is determined by a legislative schedule
based on population and taxable valuation of the county. ^^4
The number of deputies hired and their salary is determined
by the board of county commissioners in each county. -^25 jf
the offices of county attorney were consolidated into district
offices one advantage might be higher compensation. The
salaries involved could be pro-rated among the counties withHigher compensation would
in the district and the state.
enable full-time devotion to the duties of the office.
'

:

Most county attorneys in Montana supplement their salaries
with income from the private practice of law. The reason for
such supplementation is low pay; the result is part-time attention to the duties of the office. The report of The Courts
Task Force of the President's Crime Commission, as summarized
in the ACIR report, discussed the problem of part-time prosecutors
:

The Courts Task Force of the President's Crime Comthe attorneys he (local
mission stated that
prosecutor) deals with as a public officer are the
same ones with whom he is expected to maintain a
less formal and more accommodating relationship as
Similar problems may
counsel to private clients.
arise in the prosecutor's dealing with his private
clients whose activities may come to his official

"...
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attention."
In addition to this conflict of interest,
the part-time prosecutor may give insufficient time
"Since his salary
and energy to his official duties.
is a fixed amount, and his total earnings depend on
what he can derive from his private practice, there
is a continuing temptation to give priority to private clients."
The Courts Task Force concluded that part-time employment is related to low pay and the workload of
the office.
Regarding low pay, the Task Force observed that high quality attorneys will not seek prosecutorial offices unless the economic rewards are
high enough.
"Full-time devotion to duty cannot be
demanded unless the pay is raised and salary scales
are based on the assumption that the prosecutor will
not have a second income from outside law practice."
The Task Force contended most cities cannot justify
continuation of part-time prosecutors. They have
heavy workloads that demand the fullest attention
without distractions by other obligations and interests.
Yet the National District Attorneys Association found that in 1969 a number of prosecutors'
offices in urban areas permitted their attorneys to
pursue the private practice of law.
Included were
Harris County (Houston)
Texas; Cuyahoga County
(Cleveland), Ohio; Baltimore, Maryland; Hartford
County, Connecticut; Passaic County, New Jersey;
Pulaski County (Little Rock)
Arkansas; Lancaster
County (Lincoln)
Nebraska; and Covington, Kentucky.
Of 37 prosecutorial districts with a population of
100,000 or more, 15 permitted such outside employment.
,

,

,

The problem of a small workload as a cause of parttime employment is found mainly in lightly-populated
jurisdictions. As the ABA s Advisory Committee on
the Prosecution and Defense Functions noted:
'

"Prosecutory officers in Pennsylvania face the same
problems as those found in all other States.
Scarce
resources make the full-time adequately staffed district attorneys office a rarity.
Only in the very
largest cities where salaries are relatively adequate
do we have full-time staffs.
The vast majority of
Pennsylvania's counties must settle for part-time
law enforcement."
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The Courts Task Force noted that some States have
moved in the direction of creating district attorneys' offices covering judicial districts larger
In Oklahoma, for example, the
than one county.
county system was revised in 1965 in favor of a
system of prosecutorial districts corresponding to
The inadequate fisthe State's judicial districts.
cal resources of counties had prevented payment of
fair compensation to the attorneys, a situation
which reached crisis proportions in 1964 when no
attorneys sought election as a county attorney in
55 of the State's 77 counties.
In 1967, Minnesota was given Federal grant support
by the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance to test
the effectiveness of full-time prosecutors in rural
areas then served only by part-time prosecutors.
Under joint sponsorship of the State Judicial Council and the attorney general, two districts were established, one encompassing 15 counties and the other
The counties would not accept abolition
17 counties.
of the county prosecutor's office, so the full-time
district prosecutors were imposed on the existing
part-time county prosecutor system, providing assistance in some cases and relief from trial burdens in
According to two LEAA officials, the "halfothers.
demonstrated sufficient value to
arrangement
way"
help secure continuation of the program with local
support after the Federal grant was terminated.

The ABA Advisory Committee recommended that "Wherever possible, a unit of prosecution should be designed on the basis of population, caseload and other
relevant factors sufficient to warrant at least one
full-time prosecutor and the supporting staff necesThe National Assosary to effective prosecution."
ciation of Attorneys General and the Board of Directors of the National District Attorneys Association
favor similar action.
A major concern in expanding the territory of prosecutorial districts is the fear of losing responsiveThe prosecutor's familarity
ness to local conditions.
with the community helps him in gathering evidence,
allocating resources to the various activities of
his office, and appraising the disposition appropriate
The same fears,
to particular offenses and offenders.
of course, niay be expressed in opposition to any move
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toward statewide coordination of the prosecution
function aimed at promoting reasonable uniformity
As the Courts Task
of policies and practices.
Force pointed out, sensitivity to local conditions
may be retained by following the Oklahoma pattern
whereby the district attorney serving a multicounty district is required to select one assistant
The
from each of the counties in his district.
difficulty with that solution is that a county's
workload may not warrant the full-time attention of
one attorney. 326

Another consideration in relation to the county attorney's post
Thirteen
is whether it should remain a constitutional office.
state constitutions--Alaska Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island and Wyoming--contain no provisions establishing
the office of local prosecutor.
Furthermore, among the states
where it is constitutionally provided, the office appears in
the judicial article of twenty constitutions, including Montana,
in an article relating to local government in ten constituThe Contions and in a "public officers" article in three.
vention, if it retains the office in the constitution, may wish
to place it in the local government article.
,
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APPENDIX A

MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ON THE JUDICIARY

ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENTS
The judicial power of the state shall be vested
Section 1.
in the senate sitting as a court of impeachment, in a
supreme court, district courts, justices of the peace, and
such other inferior courts as the legislative assembly may
establish in any incorporated city or town.

SUPREME COURT
The supreme court, except as otherwise provided
Section 2.
constitution,
shall have appellate jurisdiction only,
in this
shall
co-extensive
with the state, and shall have
which
be
general
supervisory
control
over all inferior courts,
a
under such regulations and limitations as may be prescribed
by law.

Section 3. The appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court
shall extend to all cases at law and in equity, subject,
however, to such limitations and regulations as may be preSaid court shall have power in its discretion
scribed by law.
to issue and to hear and determine writs of habeas corpus,
mandamus, quo-warranto certiorari, prohibition and injunction,
and such other original and remedial writs as may be necessary
or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
When a jury is required in the supreme court to
determine an issue of fact, said court shall have power to
summon such jury in such manner as may be provided by law.
Each of the justices of the supreme court shall have power
to issue writs of habeas corpus to any part of the state,
upon petition by or on behalf of any person held in actual
custody, and may make such writs returnable before himself,
or the supreme court, or before any district court of the
state, or any judge thereof; and such writs may be heard
and determined by the justice or court, or judge, before
whom they are made returnable. Each of the justices of the
supreme court may also issue and hear and determine writs
of certiorari in proceedings for contempt in the district
court, and such other writs as he may be authorized by
law to issue.
,
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Section 4. At least three terms of the supremo court shall
be held each year at the seat of government.
The supreme court shall consist of three justices,
Section 5.
majority of whom shall be necessary to form a quorum or
pronounce a decision, but one or more of said justices may
adjourn the court from day to day, or to a day certain and
the legislative assembly shall have the power to increase
the number of said justices to not less nor more than five.
In case any justice or justices of the supreme court shall
be in any way disqualified to sit in a cause brought before
such court, the remaining justice or justices shall have power
to call on one or more of the district judges of this state
as in the particular case may be necessary to constitute the
full number of justices of which the said court shall then
be composed, to sit with them in the hearing of said cause.
In all cases where a district judge is invited to sit and
does sit as by this section provided, the decision and opinion
of such district judge shall have the same force and effect
in any cause heard before the court as if regularly participated in by a justice of the supreme court.
a

Section 6. The justices of the supreme court shall be
elected by the electors of the state at large, as hereinafter provided.
The term of office of the justices of the supreme
Section 7.
court, except as in this constitution otherwise provided,
shall be six years.

Section 8.
There shall be elected at the first general election/
provided for by this constitution, one chief justice and two
associate justices of the supreme court. At said first
election the chief justice shall be elected to hold his
office until the general election in the year one thousand
eight hundred ninety-two (1892), and one of tlio associate
justices to hold his office until the general election in
the year one thousand eight hundred ninety-four (1894),
and the other associate justice to hold his office until
the general election in the year one thousand eight hundred ninety-six (1896)
and each shall hold until his
successor is elected and qualified. The terms of 6ffice of
said justices, and which one shall be chief justice, shall
at the first and all subsequent elections be designated by
ballot.
After said first election one chief justice or one
associate justice shall be elected at the general election
every two years, commencing in the year one thousand eight
hundred ninety-two (1892)
and if the legislative assembly
,

,
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shall increase the number of justices to five, the first
terms of office of such additional justices shall be fixed
by law in such manner that at least one of the five justices
The chief justice shall
shall be elected every two years.
preside at all sessions of the supreme court, and in case
of his absence, the associate justice having the shortest
term to servo shall preside in his stead.

There shall be a clerk of the supreme court, who
Section 9.
shall hold his office for the term of six years, except that
the clerk first elected shall hold his office only until the
general election in the year one thousand eight hundred ninetyand until his successor is elected and qualified.
two (1892)
He shall be elected by the electors at large of the state,
and his compensation shall be fixed by law, and his duties
prescribed by law, and by the rules of the supreme court.
,

No person shall be eligible to the office of
Section 10.
justice of the supreme court, unless he shall have been
admitted to practice law in the supreme court of the territory
or state of Montana, be at least thirty years of age, and a
citizen of the United States, nor unless he shall have resided
in said territory or state at least two years next preceding
his election.

DISTRICT COURTS
The district courts shall have original jurisSection 11.
diction in all cases at law and in equity, including all
cases which involve the title or right of possession of
real property, or the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, toll or municipal fine, and in all cases in which the
debt, damage, claim or demand, exclusive of interest, or
the value of the property in controversy exceeds fifty
dollars; and in all criminal cases amounting to felony, and
in all cases of misdemeanor not otherwise provided for; of
actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer; of proceedings in insolvency; of actions to prevent or abate a
nuisance; of all matters of probate; of actions of divorce
and for annulment of marriage, and for all such special
actions and proceedings as are not otherwise provided for.
And said courts shall have the power of naturalization,
and to issue papers therefor, in all cases where they are
authorized so to do by the laws of the United States.
They shall have appellate jurisdiction in such cases arising
in justices and other inferior courts in their respective
districts as may be prescribed by law and consistent with
Their process shall extend to all parts
this constitution.
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of the state, provided that all actions for the recovery of,
the possession of, quieting the title to, or for the enforcement of liens upon real property, shall be commenced in the
county in which the real property, or any part thereof,
Said courts
affected by such action or actions, is situated.
issue,
hear
power
also
to
shall
have
thereof
judges
the
and
and determine writs of mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari,
prohibition, injunction and other original and remedial writs,
and also all writs of habeas corpus on petition by, or on
behalf of, any person held in actual custody in their reInjunctions, writs of prohibition and
spective districts.
habeas corpus, may be issued and served on legal holidays
and non-judicial days.

Section 12.

The state shall be divided into judicial dis-

in each of which there shall be elected by the electors thereof one judge of the district court, whose term of
office shall be four years, except that the district judges
tricts"^!

first elected shall hold their offices only until the
general election in the year one thousand eight hundred
and until their successors are elected
and ninety-two (1892)
and qualified. Any judge of the district court may hold
court for any other district judge, and shall do so when
required by law.
,

Until otherwise provided by law judicial
Section 13.
districts of the state shall be constituted as follows:
First district, Lewis and Clark county; second district.
Silver Bow county; third district. Deer Lodge county;
fourth district, Missoula county; fifth district, Beaverhead, Jefferson and Madison counties; sixth district,
Gallatin, Park and Meagher counties; seventh district,
Yellowstone, Custer and Dawson counties; eighth district,
Choteau, Cascade and Fergus counties.

Section 14. The legislative assembly may increase or
decrease the number of judges in any judicial district;
provided, that there shall be at least one judge in any
district established by law; and may divide the state, or
any part thereof, into new districts; provided, that each
be formed of compact territory and be bounded by county
lines, but no changes in the number or boundaries of
districts shall work a removal of any judge from office
during the term for which he has been elected or appointed.
Section 15. Writs of error and appeals shall be allowed
from the decisions of said district courts to the supreme
court under such regulations as may be prescribed by law
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No person shall be eligible to the office of
Section 16.
judge of the district court unless he be at least twentyfive years of age and a citizen of the United States, and
shall have been admitted to practice law in the supreme
court of the territory or state of Montana, nor unless ho
shall have resided in this state or territory at least one
year next preceding his election.
Ho need not be a resident of the district for which he is elected at the time
of his election, but after his election he shall reside in
the district for which he is elected during his term of
office.

Section 17.
The district court in each county which is a
judicial district by itself shall be always open for the
transaction of business, except on legal holidays and nonjudicial days.
In each district where two or more counties
are united, until otherwise provided by law, the judges
of such district shall fix the term of court, provided that
there shall be at least four terms a year held in each
county.

Section 18.
There shall be a clerk of the district court
in each county, who shall be elected by the electors of
his county.
The clerk shall be elected at the same time
and for the same term as the district judge.
The duties
and compensation of the said clerk shall be as provided by
law.

Section 19.
There shall be elected at the general election
in each county of the state one county attorney, whose
qualifications shall be the same as are required for a
judge of the district court, except that he must be over
twenty-one years of age, but need not be twenty-five years
of age, and whose term of office shall be four years, and
until their successors are elected and qualified.
He shall
have a salary to be fixed by law, one-half of which shall
be paid by the state, and the other half by the county for
which he is elected, and he shall perform such duties as
may be required by law.

JUSTICES OF THE PEACE
Section 20.
There shall be elected in each organized
township of each county by the electors of such township
at least two justices of the peace, who shall hold their
offices, except as otherv/ise provided in this constitution,
for the term of two years.
Justices' courts shall have such
original jurisdiction within their respective counties as
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may be prescribed by law, except as in this constitution
otherwise provided; provided, that they shall not have
jurisdiction in any case where the debt, damage, claim or
value of the property involved exceeds the sum of three
hundred dollars.
Justices' courts shall not have jurisdiction
Section 21.
in any case involving the title or right of possession of
real property, nor in cases of divorce, nor for annulment
nor shall they have
of marriage, nor of cases in equity;
power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari,
quo warranto, injunction, or prohibition, nor the power of
naturalization; nor shall they have jurisdiction in cases of
felony, except as examining courts; nor shall criminal cases
in said courts be prosecuted by indictment; but said courts
shall have such jurisdiction in criminal matters, not of
the grade of felony, as may be provided by law; and shall
also have concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts
in cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer.

Justices' courts shall always be open for the
Section 22.
transaction of business, except on legal holidays and nonjudicial days.

Section 23. Appeal shall be allowed from justices' courts,
in all cases, to the district courts, in such manner and
under such regulations as may be prescribed by law.
POLICE AND MUNICIPAL COURTS

Section 24. The legislative assembly shall have power to
provide for creating such police and municipal courts and
magistrates for cities and towns as may be deemed necessary
from time to time, who shall have jurisdiction in all
cases arising under the ordinances of such cities and towns,
respectively; such police magistrates may also be constituted
ex-officio justices of the peace for their respective counties.

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Section 25.
of record.

The supreme and district courts shall be courts

Section 26. All laws relating to courts shall be general
and of uniform operation throughout the state; and the
organization, jurisdiction, powc^r.s, proceedings and
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practice of all courts of the same class or grade, so far
as regulated by law, shall be uniform.
The style of all process shall be "The State
Section 27.
of Montana," and all prosecutions shall be conducted in
the name and by the authority of the same.

There shall be but one form of civil action,
Section 28.
and law and equity may be administered in the same action.
The justices of the supreme court and the
Section 29.
judges of the district courts shall each be paid quarterly
by the state, a salary, which shall not be diminished
during the terms for which they shall have been respectively
elected.

Section 30. No justice of the supreme court nor judge of
the district court shall accept or receive any compensation,
fee, allowance, mileage, perquisite or emolument for or on
account of his office, in any form whatever, except the
salary provided by law.
No justice or clerk of the supreme court, nor
Section 31.
judge or clerk of any district court shall act or practice
as an attorney or counsellor at law in any court of this
state during his continuance in office.

The legislative assembly may provide for the
Section 32.
publication of decisions and opinions of the supreme court.

Section 33. All officers provided for in this article,
excepting justices of the supreme court, who shall reside
within the state, shall respectively reside during their
term of office in the district, county, township, precinct,
city or town for which they may be elected or appointed.

Section 34. Vacancies in the office of justice of the
supreme court, or judge of the district court, or clerk of
the supremo court, shall be filled by appointment, by the
governor of the state, and vacancies in the offices of county
attorney, clerk of the district court, and justices of the
peace, shall be filled by appointment, by the board of
county commissioners of the county where such vacancy occurs.
A person appointed to fill any such vacancy shall hold his
office until the next general election and until his successor is elected and qualified.
A person elected to fill a
vacancy shall hold office until the expiration of the term
for which the person he succeeds was elected.
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Section 35.
No justice of the supreme court or district
judge shall hold any other public office while he remains
in the office to which he has been elected or appointed.

Section 36. A civil action in the district court may be
tried by a judge pro tempore, who must be a member of the
bar of the state, agreed upon in writing by the parties
litigant, or their attorneys of record, approved by the
court, and sworn to try the cause; and in such case any
order, judgment or decree, made or rendered therein by
such judge pro tempore, shall have the same force and effect
as if made or rendered by the court with the regular judge
presiding.
Section 37. Any judicial officer who shall absent himself
from the state for more than sixty consecutive days shall be
deemed to have forfeited his office.
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APPENDIX B

THE CAUSES OF POPULAR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE
ADMINISTFIATION OF JUSTICE*
By Roscoe Pound

Dissatisfaction with the administration of justice is
Not to go outside of our own legal system,
as old as law.
discontent has an ancient and unbroken pedigree. The
Anglo-Saxon laws continually direct that justice is to be
done equally to rich and to poor 1 and the king exhorts
that the peace be kept better than has been wont, 2 and that
"men of every order readily submit
each to the law
which is appropriate to him."-^ The author of the apocryphal Mirror of Justice gives a list of one hundred and
fifty-five abuses in legal administration, and names it as
one of the chief abuses of the degenerate times in which he
,

.

.

.

lived that executions of judges for corrupt or illegal
decisions had ceased.^ Wyclif complains that "lawyers make
process by subtlety and cavilations of law, civil, that is
much heathen men's law, and do not accept the form of the
gospel, as if the gospel were not so good as pagan's law."^
Starkey, in the reign of Henry VIII, says: "Everyone that
can color reason maketh a stop to the best law that is
beforetime devised. "6 James I reminded his judges that
"the law was founded upon reason, and that he and others
had reason as well as the judges."^ In the eighteenth
century, it was complained that the bench was occupied by
"legal monks, utterly ignorant of human nature and of the
affairs of men."^ In the nineteenth century the vehement
criticism of the period of the reform movement needs only
In other words, as long as there have
to be mentioned.
been laws and lawyers, conscientious and well-meaning men
have believed that laws were mere arbitrary technicalities,
and that the attempt to regulate the relations of mankind
in accordance with them resulted largely in injustice.
But we must not be deceived by this innocuous and inevitable discontent with all law into overlooking or underrating the real and serious dissatisfaction with courts
and lack of respects for law which exists in the United
States today.
In spite of the violent opposition which the doctrine of
judicial power over unconstitutional legislation at first

*Address delivered at annual convention of American
Bar Association in 1906.
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encountered, the tendency to give the fullest scope to
the common law doctrine of supremacy of law and to tie
down administration by common law liabilities and judiToday,
cial review, was, until recently, very marked.
Courts are
the contrary tendency is no less marked.
distrusted, and the executive boards and commissions with
summary and plenary powers, freed, so far as constitutions
will permit, from judicial review, have become the fashion.
It will be assumed, then, that there is more than the normal amount of dissatisfaction with the present day administration of justice in America.
Assuming this, the first
step must be diagnosis, and diagnosis will be the sole
It will attempt only to discover
purpose of this paper.
and to point out the causes of current popular dissatisThe inquiry will be limited, moreover, to civil
faction.
justice.
For while the criminal law attracts more notice,
the punishment seems to have greater interest for the lay
mind than the civil remedies of prevention and compensation,
the true interest of the modern community is in the civil
administration of justice.
Revenge and its modern outgrowth, punishment, belong to the past of legal history.
The rules which define those invisible boundaries, within
which each may act without conflict with the activities
of his fellows in a busy and crowded world, upon which
investor, promoter, buyer, seller, employer and employee
must rely consciously or subconsciously in their everyday transactions, are conditions precedent of modern social
and industrial organization.

With the scope of inquiry so limited, the causes of dissatisfaction with the administration of justice may be
grouped under four main heads: (1) Causes for dissatisfaction with any legal system, (2) causes lying in the
peculiarities of our Anglo-American legal system, (3)
causes lying in our American judicial organization and
procedure, and (4) causes lying in the environment of
our judicial administration.
It needs but a superficial acquaintance with literature to
show that all legal systems among all peoples have given
rise to the same complaints.
Even the wonderful mechanism of modern German judicial administration is said to
be distrusted by the people on the time-worn ground that
there is one law for the rich and another for the poor.9
It is obvious, therefore, that there must be some cause
or causes inherent in all law and in all legal systems in
order to produce this universal and invariable effect.
These causes of dissatisfaction with any system of law I
believe to be the following: (1) The necessarily mechanical
operation of rules, and hence of laws, (2) the inevitable
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difference in rate of progress between law and public
opinion, (3) the general popular assumption that the
administration of justice is an easy task, to which anyone is competent, and (4) popular impatience of restraint.
The most important and most constant cause of dissatisfaction
with all law at all times is to be found in the necessarily
mechanical operation of legal rules. This is one of the
Legal history shows an oscillapenalties of uniformity.
judicial
discretion on the one hand and
tion between wide
of
magistrate
confinement
the
by minute and detailed
strict
hand.
From
time to time more or less
rules upon the other
necessary in order
justice
without
law
becomes
reversion to
into touch
public
administration
of
justice
the
to bring
or
conditions.
But
changed
moral,
social
political
with
such periods of reversion result only in new rules or changed
In time the modes of exercising discretion become
rules.
fixed, the course of judicial action becomes stable and
uniform, and the new element, whether custom or equity or
natural law becomes as rigid and mechanical as the old.
This mechanical action of the law may be minimized, but
Laws are general rules; and the
it cannot be obviated.
process of making them general involves elimination of the
If all
immaterial elements of particular controversies.
actual
which
were
alike
degree
in
controversies
or if the
controversies approximate to the recognized types could be
The
calculated with precision, this would not matter.
to
these
approximate
difficulty is that in practice they
immaterial
eliminate
When we
types in infinite graduations.
factors to reach a general rule, we can never entirely
avoid eliminating factors which will be more or less
material in some particular controversy.
If to meet this
inherent difficulty in administering justice according to
law we introduce a judicial dispensing power, the result
is uncertainty and an intolerable scope for the personal
equation of the magistrate.
If we turn to the other extreme and pile up exceptions and qualifications and provisos, the legal system becomes cumbrous and unworkable.
Hence the law has always ended in a compromise, in a
middle course between wide discretion and over-minute
legislation.
In reaching this middle ground, some sacrifice
of flexibility of application to particular cases is inevitable.
In consequence, the adjustment of the relations
of man and man according to these rules will of necessity
appear more or less arbitrary and more or less in conflict
with the ethical notions of individuals.
In periods of absolute or generally received moral systems,
the contrast between legal results and strict ethical requirements will appeal only to individuals.
In periods
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of free individual thought in morals and ethics, and
especially in an age of social and industrial transition,
this contrast is greatly intensified and appeals to large
Justice, which is the end of law, is
classes of society.
the ideal compromise between the activities of each and
The law seeks
the activities of all in a crowded world.
to harmonize these activities and to adjust the relations
of every man with his fellow so as to accord with the
moral sense of the community. When the community is at
When the
one in its ideas of justice, this is possible.
community is divided and diversified, and groups and classes
and interests, understanding each other none too well, have
conflicting ideas of justice, the task is extremely diffiIt is impossible that legal and ethical ideas should
cult.
The individual looks
be in entire accord in such a society.
at cases one by one and measures them by his individual
The lawyer must look at cases
sense of right and wrong.
in gross, and must measure them largely by an artificial
standard.
He must apply the ethics of the community, not
If discretion is given him, his view will be
his own.
If his hands are
that of the class from which he comes.
tied by law, he must apply the ethics of the past as forIn either event,
mulated in common law and legislation.
judicial and individual ethical standards will diverge.
And this divergence between the ethical and the legal, as
each individual sees it, makes him say with Luther, "Good
jurist, bad Christian."-'-^
A closely related cause of dissatisfaction with the administration of justice according to law is to be found
in the inevitable difference in rate of progress between
In order to preclude corruption,
law and public opinion.
to exclude the personal prejudices of magistrates, and to
minimize individual incompetency, law formulates the moral
sentiments of the community in rules to which the judgments
These rules, being formulations
of tribunals must conform.
of public opinion, cannot exist until public opinion has
become fixed and settled, and cannot change until a change
It follows that
of public opinion has become complete.
this difficulty in the judicial administration of justice,
like the preceding, may be minimized, but not obviated.
In a rude age the Teutonic moots in which every free man
But these tribunals broke
took a hand might be possible.
down under pressure of business and became ordinary courts
with permanent judges. The Athenians conceived that the
But the Athenian
people themselves should decide each case.
dikastery, in which controversies were submitted to blocks
of several hundred citizens by way of reaching the will of
the democracy, proved to register its caprice for the
moment rather than its permanent will. Modern experience with
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juries, especially in commercial causes, does not warrant
us in hoping much from any form of judicial referendum.
Public opinion must affect the administration of justice
through the rules by which justice is administered rather

All interference
than through the direct administration.
with the uniform and automatic application of these rules,
when actual controversies arise, introduces an anti-legal
But, as public opinion
element which becomes intolerable.
affects tribunals through the rules by which they decide
and these rules once made, stand till abrogated or altered, any system of law will be made up of successive
strata of rules and doctrines representing successive and
often widely divergent periods of public opinion.
In this
sense, law is often in very truth a government of the
living by the dead.H The unconscious change of judicial
law making and the direct alterations of legislation and
codification operate to make this government by the dead
But here again we must pay a price
reasonably tolerable.
for certainty and uniformity.
The law does not respond
quickly to new conditions.
It does not change until ill
effects are felt, often not until they are felt acutely.
The moral or intellectual or economic change must come
While it is coming, and until it is so complete
first.
as to affect the law and formulate itself therein, friction
In an age of rapid moral, intellectual and
must ensue.
economic changes, often crossing one another and producing
numerous minor resultants, this friction cannot fail to be
in excess.

A third perennial source of popular dissatisfaction with
the administration of justice according to law may be
found in the popular assumption that the administration of
justice is an easy task to which anyone is competent.
Laws
may be compared to the formulas of engineers.
They sum up
the experience of many courts with many cases enable the
magistrate to apply that experience subconsciously.
So,
the formula enables the engineer to make use of the accumulated experience of past builders, even though he could
not work out a step in its evolution by himself.
A layman is no more competent to construct or to apply the one
formula than the other.
Each requires special knowledge
and special preparation.
None the less, the notion that
anyone is competent to adjudicate the intricate controversies of a modern community contributes to the unsatisfactory
administration of justice in many parts of the United States.
The older states have generally outgrown it.
But it is
felt in extravagant powers of juries, lay judges of probate
and legislativel2 or judicial law making against stare
in most of the commonwealths of the South and West.
decisis
The public seldom realizes how much it is interested in
,
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maintaining the highest scientific standard in the administration of justice. There is no more certain protection against corruption, prejudice, class feeling or
Publicity will avail something. But the
incompetence.
daily criticism of trained minds, the knowledge that
nothing which does not conform to the principles and
received doctrines of scientific jurisprudence will escape notice, does more than any other agency for the everyday purity and efficiency of courts of justice.
Another necessary source of dissatisfaction with judicial
administration of justice is to be found in popular imLaw involves restraint and regupatience of restraint.
lation with the sheriff and his posse in the background to
But, however necessary and salutary this
enforce it.
restraint, men have never been reconciled to it entirely.
The very fact that it is a compromise between the individual
and his fellows makes the individual, who must abate some
part of his activities in the interest of his fellows, more
In an age of absolute theories, monarchial
or less restive.
A conspicuous
or democratic, this restiveness is acute.
example is to be seen in the contest between the king and
An
the common law courts in the seventeenth century.
equally conspicuous example is to be seen in the attitude
"The
of the frontiersman toward state-imposed justice.
unthinking sons of the sage brush," says Owen Wister, "ill
tolerate anything which stands for discipline, good order
and obedience; and the man who lets another command him
I can think of no threat more evil for our
they despise.
democracy, for it is a fine thing diseased and perverted,
namely, the spirit of independence gone drunk. "13 This
But in a lesser degree the feeling
is an extreme case.
that each individual, as an organ of the sovereign democracy, is above the law he helps to make, fosters everywhere a disrespect for legal methods and institutions and
It is "the reason of this
a spirit of resistance to them.
our artificial man the commonwealth," says Hobbes "and
his command that maketh law."!^ This man, however is
The concrete man in the street or the concrete
abstract.
mob is much more obvious and it is no wonder that individuals and even classes of individuals fail to draw
the distinction.
,

:

A considerable portion of current dissatisfaction with the
administration of justice must be attributed to the universal causes just considered. Conceding this, we have
next to recognize that there are potent causes in operation
of a character entirely different.

Under the second main head, causes lying in our peculiar
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I should enumerate five:
(1) The individualist
legal system.
ill
with a collectilaw,
which agrees
spirit of our common
contentious
of
procommon
law
doctrine
vist age; (2) the
political
litigation
game;
into a
(3)
cedure, which turns
jealousy, due to the strain put upon our legal system by
the doctrine of supremacy of law; (4) the lack of general
ideas or legal philosophy, so characteristic of AngoAmerican law, which gives us pretty tinkering where comprehensive reform is needed, and (5) defects of form due
to the circumstance that the bulk of our legal system is
still case law.

The first of these, conflict between the individualist
spirit of the common law and the collectivist spirit of
15
the present age, has been treated of on another occasion,
Suffice it to
What was said then need not be repeated.
point out two examples. From the beginning, the main reliance of our common law system has been individual iniThe main security for the peace at common law is
tiative.
The chief security for
private prosecution of offenders.
the efficiency and honesty of public officers in mandamus
or injunction by a taxpayer to prevent waste of the proThe reliance for keeping public service
ceeds of taxation.
companies to their duty in treating all alike at reasonable
price is an action to recover damages. Moreover, the
individual is supposed at common law to be able to look out
If
for himself and to need no administrative protection.
he is injured through contributory negligence, no theory
of comparative negligence comes to his relief; if he hires
as an employee; he assumes the risk of the employment; if
In our modern
the rule is caveat emptor
he buys goods
industrial society, this whole scheme of individual iniPrivate prosecution has become
tiative is breaking down.
Mandamus and injunction have failed to prevent
obsolete.
Private
rings and bosses from plundering public funds.
suits against carriers for damages have proved no preventive of discrimination and extortionate rates. The
doctrine of assumption of risk becomes brutal under
modern conditions of employment. An action for damages is
no comfort to us when we are sold diseased beef or poisonAt all these points, and they are points
ous canned goods.
of every-day contact with the most vital public interests,
common law methods of relief have failed. The courts have
not been able to do the work which the common law doctrine
of supremacy of law imposed on them.
A widespread feeling
that the courts are inefficient has been a necessary result,
But, along with this, another phase of the individualism
of the common law has served to increase public irritation.
At the very time the courts have appeared powerless themselves to give relief, they have seemed to obstruct public
.

,
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efforts to get relief by legislation. The chief concern
of the common law is to secure and protect individual
rights. "The public good," says Blacks tone, "is in nothing
more essentially interested than in the protection of every
individual's private rights. "16 Such, it goes without sayToday we look to society
ing, is not the popular view today.
for protection against individuals, natural or artificial,
and we resent doctrines that protect these individuals aBut the
gainst society for fear society will oppress us.
common law guarantees of individual rights are established
So that, while
in our constitutions, state and federal.
in England these common law dogmas have had to give way to
modern legislation, in America they stand continually between the people, or large classes of the people; and the
legislation they desire.
In consequence, the courts have
been put in a false position of doing nothing and obstructing everything, which it is impossible for the layman to interpret aright.

A no less potent source of irritation lies in our American
exaggerations of the common law contentious procedure.
The sporting theory of justice, the "instinct of giving the
game fair play," as Professor Wigmore has put it, is so
rooted in the profession in America that most of us take
it for a fundamental legal tenet. -'-^ But it is probably only
a survival of the days when a lawsuit was a fight between
two clans in which change of venue had been taken to the
forum.
So far from being a fundamental fact of jurisprudence, it is peculiar to Anglo-American law; and it has
been strongly curbed in modern English practice. With us,
it is not merely in full acceptance, it has been developed
and its collateral possibilities have been cultivated to
Hence in America we take it as a
the furthest extent.
of
course
that
matter
a judge should be a mere umpire, to
pass upon objections and hold counsel to the rules of the
game, and that the parties should fight out their own game
We resent
in their own way without judicial interference.
such interference as unfair, even when in the interest of
justice.
The idea that procedure must of necessity be
wholly contentious disfigures our judicial administration
at every point.
It leads the most conscientious judge to
feel that he is merely to decide the contest, as counsel
present it, according to the rules of the game, not to
It leads counsearch independently for truth and justice.
sel to forget that they are officers of the court and to
deal with the rules of law and procedure exactly as the
professional football coach with the rules of the sport.
It leads to exertion to "get error into the record" rather
than to dispose of the controversy finally and upon its
merits.
It turns witnesses, and especially expert witnesses
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It leads to sensational
into partisans pure and simple.
cross-examinations "to affect credit," which have made the
witness stand "the slaughter house of reputations. " ^^
It prevents the trial court from restraining the bullying
of witnesses and creates a general dislike, if not fear,
of the witness function which impairs the administration
It keeps alive the unfortunate exchequer
of justice.
rule, dead in the country of its origin, according to which
errors in the admission or rejection of evidence are preIt
sumed to be prejudicial and hence demand a new trial.
grants new trials because by inability to procure a bill
of exceptions a party has lost the chance to play another
inning in the game of justice. 19 it creates vested rights
in errors of procedure, of the benefit whereof parties are
not to be deprived. 20 The inquiry is not. What do substanInstead, the inquiry is. Have
tive law and justice require?
If any
the rules of the game been carried out strictly?
material infraction is discovered, just as the football rules
put back the offending team five or ten or fifteen yards, as
the case may be, our sporting theory of justice awards new
trials, or reverses judgments, or sustains demurrers in the
interest of regular play.

The effect of our exaggerated contentious procedure is not
only to irritate parties, witnesses and jurors in particular
cases, but to give to the whole community a false notion of
the purpose and end of law.
Hence comes, in large measure,
If the law is a
the modern American race to beat the law.
mere game, neither the players who take part in it nor the
public who witness it can be expected to yield to its spirit
when their interests are served by evading it. And this is
doubly true in a time which requires all institutions to be
economically efficient and socially useful. We need not
wonder that one part of the community strain their oaths in
the jury box and find verdicts against unpopular litigants
in the teeth of law and evidence, while another part retain lawyers by the year to advise how to evade what to
them are unintelligent and unreasonable restrictions upon
necessary modes of doing business.
Thus the courts, instituted to administer justice according to law, are made
agents or abettors of lawlessness.

Another source of irritation at our American courts is
political jealousy due to the strain put upon our legal
system by the doctrine of the supremacy of law.
By virtue
of this doctrine, which has become fundamental in our polity,
the law restrains, not individuals alone, but a whole people.
The people so restrained would be likely in any event to be
jealous of the visible agents of restraint.
Even more is
this true in that the subjects which our constitutional
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polity commits to the courts are largely matters of economics, politics and sociology upon which a democracy is
peculiary sensitive. Not only are these matters made into
legal questions, but they are tried as incidents of private
This phase of the common law doctrine was
litigation.
"I tell
felt as a grievance in the seventeenth century.
you plainly," said Bacon, as attorney general, in arguing
a question of prerogative to the judges, "I tell you
plainly it is little better than a by-let or crooked creek
to try whether the king hath power to erect this office in
an assize between Brownlow and Mitchell. "21 King Demos
must feel much the same at seeing the constitutionality of
the Missouri Compromise tried in an action of trespass, at
seeing the validity of the legal tender laws tried on pleas
of payment in private litigation, at seeing the power of
the federal government to carry on the Civil War tried
judicially in admirality, at seeing income tax overthrown
in a stockholders bill to enjoin waste of corporate assets
and at seeing the important political questions in the
Insular Cases disposed of in forfeiture proceedings against
Nor is this the only phase of the
a few trifling imports.
common law doctrine of supremacy of law which produced
Even more must the laypolitical jealousy of the courts.
man be struck with the spectacle of law paralyzing administration which our polity so frequently presents. The
difficulties with writs of habeas corpus which the federal
government encountered during the Civil War and the recent
In my
case of the income tax will occur to you at once.
own state, in a few years we have seen a freight rate law
suspended by decree of a court and have seen the collection
of taxes from railroad companies, needed for the every-day
conduct of public business, tied up by an injunction. The
strain put upon judicial institutions by such litigation is
obviously very great.
Lack of general ideas and absence of any philosophy of law,
which has been characteristic of our law from the beginning
and has been a point of pride at least since the time of
Coke,
contributes its mite also toward the cause of
dissatisfaction with courts. For one tiling, it keeps us
in the thrall of a fiction.
There is a strong aversion to
straightforward change of any important legal doctrine.
The cry is interpret it
But such interpretation is spurious.
It is legislation.
And to interpret an obnoxious
rule out of existence rather than to meet it fairly and
squarely by legislation is a fruitful source of confusion.
Yet the Bar are trained to it as an ancient common law
Hence,
doctrine, and it has a great hold upon the public.
if the law does not work well, says Bentham, with fine
sarcasm, "it is never the law itself that is in the wrong;
.
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it is always some wicked interpreter of the law that has
corrupted and abused it. "23 Thus another unnecessary strain
is imposed upon our judicial system and courts are held for
what should be the work of the legislature.

The defects of form inherent in our system of case law have
been the subject of discussion and controversy too often
Suffice it to say that
to require extended consideration.
the want of certainty, confusion and incompleteness inherent
in all case law, and the waste of labor entailed by the prodigious bulk to which ours has attained, appeal strongly to
the layman.
The compensating advantages of this system, as
seen by the lawyer and by the scientific investigator, are
not apparent to him.
What he sees is another phase of the
great game; a citation match between counsel, with a certainty that diligence can rake up a decision somewhere in
support of any conceivable proposition.

Passing to the third head, causes lying in our judicial
organization and procedure, we come upon the most efficient
causes of dissatisfaction with the present administration
of justice in America.
For I venture to say that our
system of courts is archaic and our procedure behind the
times.
Uncertainty, delay and expense, and above all, the
injustice of deciding cases upon points of practice, which
are the mere etiquette of justice, direct results of the
organization of our courts and the backwardness of our procedure, have created a deep-seated desire to keep out of
court, right or wrong, on the part of every sensible
business man in the community.
(l)in
Our system of courts is archaic in three respects:
its multiplicity of courts, (2) in preserving concurrent
jurisdiction, (3) in the waste of judicial power which it
involves.
The judicial organizations of the several states
exhibit many differences of detail.
But they agree in
these three respects.

Multiplicity of courts is characteristic of archaic law.
In Anglo-Saxon law, one might apply to the Hundred, the
Shire, the Witan, or the king in person.
Until Edward I
broke up private jurisdictions, there were the king's
superior courts of law, the itinerant justices, the
county courts, the local or communal courts and the private courts of lordships; besides which one might always
apply to the king or to the Great Council for extraordinary relief. When later the royal courts had superseded all others, there were the concurrent jurisdictions
of King's Bench, Common Pleas and Exchecquer all doing
the same work, while appellate jurisdiction was divided
,
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In the
by King's Bench, Eschequer Chamber and Parliament.
Fourth Institute, Coke enumerates seventy-four courts. Of
these, seventeen did the work that is now done by three, the
County Courts, the Supremo Court of Judicature and the House
At the time of the reorganization by the Judicature
of Lords.
Act of 1873, five appellate courts and eight courts of first
instance were consolidated into the one Supreme Court of
It was the intention of those who devised the
Judicature.
plan of the Judicature Act to extend the principle of unity
of jurisdiction by cutting off the appellate jurisdiction
of the House of Lords and by incorporating the County Courts
in the newly formed Supreme Court as branches thereof. ^^
The recommendations as to the County Courts was not adopted,
and the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords was
In this way the unity and simplicity of
restored in 1875.
But the plan, although
the original design were impaired.
adopted in part only, deserves the careful study of American
Its chief
lawyers as a model modern judicial organization.
features were (1) to set up a single court of final appeal.
In the one branch, the court of first instance, all original jurisdiction at law, in equity, in admiralty, in bankruptcy, in probate and in divorce was to be consolidated;
in the other branch, the court of appeal, the whole reviewThis idea of
ing jurisdiction was to be established.
unification, although not carried out completely, has
Indeed, its advantages are selfproved most effective.
Where the appellate tribunal and the court of
evident.
first instance are branches of one court, all expense of
transfer of record, or transcripts, bills of exceptions,
The records
writs of error and citations is wiped out.
are the records of the court, of which each tribunal is
The court and each branch thereof knows its
but a branch.
own records, and no duplication and certification is required.
Again, all appellate practice, with its attendant pitfalls,
and all waste of judicial time in ascertaining how or whether
a case has been brought into the court of review is done
away with.
One may search the recent English reports in
vain for a case where an appeal has miscarried on a point
of practice.
Cases on appellate procedure are wanting.
The whole attention of
In effect there is no such thing.
the court and of counsel is concentrated upon the cause.
On the other hand, our American reports bristle with fine
More than four percent of
points of appellate procedure.
the digest paragraphs of the last ten volumes of the
In ten
American Digest have to do with Appeal and Error.
volumes of the Federal Reporter, namely volumes 129 to
139, covering decisions of the Circuit Court of Appeals from
1903 until the present, there is an average of ten decisions
Two cases
upon points of appellate practice to the volume.
to the volume, on the average, turn wholly upon appellate
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In the ten volumes there are six civil cases
procedure.
turning upon the question whether error or appeal was the
proper mode of review, and in two civil cases the question
was whether the Circuit Court of Appeals was the proper
tribunal.
I have referred to these reports because they
represent courts in which only causes of importance may
be brought. The state reports exhibit the same condition.
In ten volumes of the Southwestern Reporter, the decisions
of the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals of Missouri show
that nearly twenty percent involves points of appellate
procedure.
In volume 87, of fifty-three decisions of the
Supreme Court and ninety-seven of the Court of Appeals,
twenty-eight are taken up in whole or in part with the
more technics of obtaining a review.
All of this is sheer
waste, which a modern judicial organization would obviate.

Even more archaic is our system of concurrent jurisdiction
of state and federal courts in causes involving diversity
of citizenship; a system by virtue of which causes continually hang in the air between two courts, or, if they do
stick in one court or the other, are liable to an ultimate
overturning because they stuck in the wrong court. A few
statistics on this point may be worth while.
In the ten
volumes of the Federal Reporter referred to, the decisions
of the Circuit Court of Appeals in civil cases average
seventy-six to the volume. Of these, on the average, between four and five in a volume are decided on points of
federal jurisdiction.
In a little more than one to each
volume, judgments of Circuit Courts are reversed on points
of jurisdiction.
The same volumes contain on the average
seventy-three decisions of Circuit Courts in civil cases
to each volume.
Of these, six, on the average, are upon
motions to remand to the state courts, and between eight
and nine are upon other points of federal jurisdiction.
Moreover, twelve cases in the ten volumes were remanded
on the form of the petition for removal.
In other words,
in nineteen and three-tenths percent of the reported
decisions of the Circuit Courts the question was whether
those courts had jurisdiction at all; and in seven percent of these that question depended on the form of the
pleadings.
A system that permits this and reverses four
judgments a year because the cause was brought in or removed to the wrong tribunal is out of place in a modern
business community.
All original jurisdiction should be
concentrated.
It ought to be impossible for a cause to
fail because brought in the wrong place.
A simple order
of transfer from one docket to another in the same court
ought to be enough.
There should be no need of new papers,
no transcripts, no bandying of cases from one court to
another on orders of removal and of demand, no beginnings
again with new process.
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Judicial power may be wasted in three ways: (l)By rigid
districts or courts or jurisdictions, so that business
may be congested in one court while judges in another
are idle, (2) by consuming the time of courts with points
of pure practice, when they ought to be investigating substantial controversies, and (3) by nullifying the results
American
of judicial action by unnecessary retrials.
respects.
The
judicial systems are defective in all three
Appeals
are
Courts
of
Federal Circuit Courts and Circuit
conspicuous exceptions in the first respect, affording a
But in nearly all
model of flexible judicial organization.
hard
and
fast lines bestates,
rigid
districts
and
of the
tween courts operate to delay business in one court while
In the second respect,
judges in another have ample leisure.
waste of judicial time upon points of practice, the intricacies of federal jurisdiction and the survival of the obsolete Chinese Wall between law and equity in procedure
In
make our federal courts no less conspicuous sinners.
an
examined,
or
volumes
of
the
Federal
Reporter
ten
the
average of seventy-six decisions of the Circuit Courts of
Appeals in each volume, two turn upon the distinction between law and equity in procedure and not quite one judgIn
ment to each volume is reversed on this distinction.
an average of seventy-three decisions a volume by the Circuit
Courts, more than three in each volume involve this same
distinction, and not quite two in each volume turn upon it.
But many states that are supposed to have reformed procedure
scarcely make a better showing.
But
Each state has to a great extent its own procedure.
it is not too much to say that all of them are behind the
We struck one great stroke in 1848 and have rested
times.
complacently or contented ourselves with patchwork amendment ever since. The leading ideas of the New York Code of
But the work
Civil Procedure marked a long step forward.
was done too hurriedly and the plan of a rigid code, going
A modern practice
into minute detail, was clearly wrong.
act lays down the general principles of practice and leaves
detail to rules of court. The New York Code Commission
If we except
was appointed in 1847 and reported in 1848.
the Connecticut Practice Act of 1878, which shows English
influence, American reform in procedure has stopped subIn England,
stantially whore that commission left it.
beginning with 1826 and ending with 1874, five commissioners
have put forth nine reports upon this subject. 25 as a
consequence we have nothing in America to compare with the
radical treatment of pleading in the English Judicature Act
We still try the record not
and the orders based thereon.
the case
We are still reversing judgments for nonjoinder
and misjoinder.
The English practice of joinder of parties
,
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against whom relief is claimed in the alternative, rendering judgment against any that the proof shows to be liable
and dismissing the rest, makes an American lawyer rub his
We
We are still reversing judgments for variance.
eyes.
of
the
excess
in
still reverse them because the recovery is
26
evidence.
prayer, though substained by the
But the worst feature of American procedure is the lavish
In the ten volumes of the Federal
granting of new trials.
Reporter referred to, there are, on the average, twentyNew
five writs of error in civil cases to the volume.
volume,
a
cases
eight
trials are awarded on the average in
courts
the
state
In the
or nearly twenty-nine percent.
ascertained
as
reviewed,
proportion of new trials to causes
from investigation of the last five columns of each series
of the National Reporter system, runs over forty percent.
In the last three volumes of the New York Reports (180-182)
covering the period from December 6, 1904, to October 24,
Nor is this all.
1905, forty-five new trials are awarded.
personal
for
In one case in my own state^^ an action
of conbreach
for
injuries was tried six times, and one
tractus was tried three times and was four times in the
Supreme Court. When with this we compare the statistics
of the English Court of Appeal, which does not grant to
exceed twelve new trials a year, or new trials in about
three percent of the cases reviewed, it is evident that
our methods of trial and review are out of date.
A comparison of the volume of business disposed of by
English and by American courts will illustrate the waste
and delay caused by archaic judicial organization and obsolete procedure.
In England there are twenty-three
judges of the High Court who dispose on the average of
fifty-six hundred contested cases, and have before them,
in one form or another, some eighty thousand cases each
year.
In Nebraska there are twenty-eight district judges
who have no original probate jurisdiction and no jurisdiction in bankruptcy or admiralty, and they had upon
their dockets last year forty-thrco hundred and twenty
cases, of which they disposed of about seventy percent.
England and Wales with a population in 1900 of 32,000,000,
employs for the same civil litigation ninety-five judges,
that is, thirty-seven in the Supreme Court and House of
Lords and fifty-eight county judges.
Nebraska, with a
population in 1900 of 1,066,000, employs for the same
purpose one hundred twenty-nine.
But these one hundred
and twenty-nine are organized on an antiquated system and
their time is frittered away on mere points of legal
etiquette.
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Finally, under the fourth and last head, causes lying in
the environment of our judicial administration, we may
distinguish six: (l)Popular lack of interest in justice,
which makes jury service a bore and the vindication of
right and law secondary to the trouble and expense involved;
(2) the strain put upon law in that it has today to do the
work of morals also; (3)the effect of transition to a
period of legislation; (4) the putting of our courts into
politics; (5) the making the legal profession into a trade,
which has superseded the relation of attorney and client
by that of employer and employee, and (6) public ignorance
of the real workings of courts due to ignorant ana sensational reports in the press.
Each of these deserves
consideration, but a few points only may be noticed.
Law
is the skeleton of social order.
It must be "clothed upon
by the flesh and blood of morality. "29 The present is a
time of transition in the very foundations of belief and
Absolute theories of morals and supernatural
of conduct.
sanctions have lost their hold. Conscience and individual
responsibility are relaxed.
In other words, the law is
strained to do double duty, and more is expected of it than
in a time when morals as a regulating agency are more
efficacious.
Another strain upon our judicial system results from the crude and unorganized character of American
legislation in a period when the growing point of law has
shifted to legislation. When, in consequence, laws fail to
produce the anticipated effects, judicial administration
shares the blame. Worse than this is the effect of laws
not intended to be enforced.
These parodies, like the
common law branding of felons, in which a piece of bacon
used to be interposed between the branding iron and the
criminal's skin,-^*^ breed disrespect for law.
Putting
courts into politics, and compelling judges to become
politicians, in many jurisdictions has almost destroyed
the traditional respect for the Bench.
Finally, the ignorant and sensational reports of judicial proceedings,
from which alone a great part of the public may judge of
the daily work of the courts completes the impression
that the administration of justice is but a game.
There
are honorable exceptions, but the average press reports
distract attention from the real proceeding to petty tilts
of counsel, encounters with witnesses and sensational byincidents.
In Nebraska, not many years since, the federal
court enjoined the execution of an act to regulate insurance companies. ^1 In press accounts of the proceeding,
the conspiracy clause of the bill was copied iri extenso
under the headline "Conspiracy Charged," and it was made
to appear that the ground of the injunction was a conspiracy between the state officers and some persons unknown. It cannot be expected that the public shall form
,
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any just estimate of our courts of justice from such data.

Reviewing the several causes for dissatisfaction with the
administration of justice which have been touched upon,
it will have been observed that some inhere in all law and
are the penalty we pay for local self-government and independence from bureaucratic control; that some inhere in
the circumstances of an age of transition and arc the penalty
These
we pay for freedom of thought and universal education.
current
But too much of the
will take care of themselves.
dissatisfaction has a just origin in our judicial organThe causes that lie here must be
ization and procedure.
It
heeded.
Our administration of justice is not decadent.
in
known
Political judges were
is simply behind the times.
Master
Lord Kenyon, as
England down to the last century.
of the Rolls, sat in Parliament and took as active a part in
political squabbles in the House of Commons as our state
judges today in party conventions ^2 Dodson and Foggs and
Sergeant Buzzfuzz wrought in an atmosphere of contentious
Bentham tells us that in 1797, out of five
procedure.
hundred and fifty pending writs of error, five hundred and
forty-three were shams of vexatious contrivances for delay. -^-^
Jarndyce and Jarndyce dragged out its weary course in chanWe are simply staionary in
cery only half a century ago.
With law schools that are
that period of legal history.
rivaling the achievements of Bologna and of Bourges to
promote scientific study of the law; with active Bar
Associations in every state to revive professional feeling
and throw off the yoke of commercialism; with the passing
of the doctrine that politics, too, is a mere game to be
played for its own sake, we may look forward confidently
to deliverance from the sporting theory of justice; we
may look forward to a near future when our courts will be
swift and certain agents of justice, whose decisions will
be acquiesced in and respected by all.
.
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PRINCIPLES AND OUTLINES OF A MODERN UNIFIED COURT ORGANIZATION'
By Roscoe Pound

What are the general principles that should govern in the
reorganization which will in reality be an organization of
our courts? The controlling ideas should be unification
flexibility, conservation of judicial power, and responsiUnification is called for in order to concentrate
bility.
the machinery of justice upon its tasks, flexibility in
order to enable it to meet speedily and efficiently the
continually varying demands made upon it, responsibility
in order that some one may always be held, and clearly
stand out as the official to be hold, if the judicial organization is not functioning the most efficiently that the law
Conservation of judicial
and the nature of its tasks permit.
power is a sine qua non of efficiency under the circumstances
There are so many demands pressing upon the
of the time.
government for expenditure of public money that so costly a
mechanism as the system of courts cannot justify needless and
expensive duplications and archaic business methods. Moreover, waste of judicial power impairs the ability of courts
to give to individual cases the thorough-going consideration
Administrative
that every case ought to have at their hands.
organization of the entire system with responsible heads of
each branch, department and division, and responsible superintending control of the whole, is quite as important as the
reform of procedure upon which the profession and the public
I repeat
have concentrated their attention for a generation.
Besides procedural
what I said of procedural reform in 1909.
reform there are a number of "other problems connected with
the administration of justice in America which are equal, or
even possibly of greater importance.
Three of these problems
have a direct and immediate relation to procedural reform,
namely, the organization of courts, and, in consequence,
the personnel, mode of choice and tenure of judges, and the
organization, training and traditions of the bar.
The importance of organization of the courts, of unification of
the judicial system in order to obviate waste of judicial
power, and of organization of the administrative business
of courts, is something we are only beginning to perceive."

*Reprinted from Journal of the American Judicature Society
225-233
23 (1940)
:
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As has been said in other connections, instead of setting
up a new court for every new task we should provide an
organization flexible enough to take care of new tasks when
those to which they were assigned cease to require them.
The principle must be not specialized courts but specialized
judges, dealing with their special subjects when the work of
the courts is such as to permit, but available for other work
when the exigencies of the work of the courts require it. For
two generations, at least, we have not fully utilized the
judges of our courts, although we have often made them work
very hard.
Before adding more judges or more courts, we
should be sure we are making the best and fullest use of
those whom we have.
At the outset a caution is needed.
Experience shows that
even with the best of plans it is important not to go into
much detail in authorizing or requiring certain courts.
Recent constitutional amendments in some states have too much
detail even for statutes. Continual legislative amendment
of the statutes governing the organization and administration
of the courts was the bane of judicial administration of
justice in America in the last century.
Certainly a constitution is not the place for details which, if they work
badly, can only be removed or improved by the slow and sometimes painful process of constitutional amendment.
Authority
to set up a modern organization and responsibility for doing
it and doing it effectively are the main points to be attended
to.

With these general principles, let us turn to the general
plan of organization.
The whole judicial power should be
concentrated in one court, which I would suggest might be
called the Court of Justice of this or that state.
Professor
Walter F. Dodd proposed to call it the General Court of
Justice.
This court should be set up in three chief branches.
To begin at the top, there should be a single ultimate court
of appeal, which might bo given the name which is most generally in use in this country, the supreme court.
Second,
there should be a superior court of general jurisdiction of
first instance for all cases, civil and criminal, above the
grade of small causes and petty offenses and violations of
municipal ordinances.
It should have numerous local offices
where papers may be filed, and rules of court should arrange
that these local offices, being offices for the whole court,
may function for all branches or for one or more, as the
exigencies of business demand.
It is arguable whether this
court should be organized in divisions, one for actions at
law and other matters requiring a jury, or of that type, one
for equity causes, and one for probate, administration.
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guardianship, and the like. My own feeling would be that
this would depend on the traditions of the state, the amount
of business of each sort, and the conditions in localities,
and should be left to rules of court to be determined in
Divorce would be regarded in many
accord with experience.
jurisdictions as so serious a matter that it should be committed to this branch. On the other hand, there might be a
sound reason for committing it to the third branch where a
family court division, in large cities, might be better
adapted to deal with all the incidents of difficulties in
I should prefer to call this branch the
family relations.
superior court ... It is important that this branch be thought
of and treated as one court for the whole state rather than
The term district
a congeries of local separate courts.
court is too suggestive of a type of organization from which
we must seek to get away.
At any rate, however this branch is organized, all the
judges should be judges of the whole court.
If they are
chosen primarily for one or the other branch, as assigned to
this or that division in some appropriate way by the administrative head, yet they should be eligible to sit in any
other branch or division or locality, when called upon to do
so, and it should be the duty of the appropriate administrative head to call upon them to go where work awaits to be
done whenever the general state of business of the whole court
makes that course advisable.
No doubt opinions will differ as to the proposal to include
the tribunals for the disposition of causes of lesser magnitude in a plan for unification of the judicial system.
But no tribunals are more in need of precisely this treatment.
The amount of money involved has a direct relation to
the amount of expense to which the law may reasonably subject
litigants and thus may well determine to which branch of the
court a case should be assigned.
But it does not necessarily
determine the difficulty of the case or the amount of learning and skill and experience which should be applied to
determine it.
Even small causes call for a high type of
judge if they are to be determined justly as well as expeditiously.
A judge dignified with the position and title
of Judge of the Court of Justice of the State, assigned to
the county courts, is none too good for cases which are of
enough importance to the parties to bring to the court and
hence ought to be important to a state seeking to do justice
to all.
It was the original plan of those who drew the
judicature act in England to include the county courts in
their scheme; but this part of the plan was not adopted.
None the less, when one notes the extensive jurisdiction
which is committed to the district courts in Massachusetts
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and very generally to municipal courts, he must feel that the
tribunals which would be included in the third branch have
shown themselves worthy of inclusion.
As I said in the report of the American Bar Association in
1909, these courts have shown (if in view of the English
county courts, it needed showing) that it is perfectly feasible to administer a much higher grade of justice in small
causes than that formerly dispensed by justices of the peace,
without resorting to the more expensive methods of the suThe judges who are assigned to small causes
perior courts.
should be of such caliber that they could be trusted and
would command the respect and confidence of the public, so
that there would be no need of retrial on appeal but review
could be confined to ascertaining that the law was properly
The further we can get
found and interpreted and applied.
idea for small causes
peace
of
the
justice
old
the
away from
the better.

Organization of Supreme Court
As to the first branch, the supreme court, while the head of
the judicial system might well sit there, it should have its
own head, immediately charged with responsibility for its
proper functioning, since the chief justice, as I assume the
head of the whole court will be called, will have much to do
in exercising a superintending control over the entire system.
According to rules of court and under his authority, perhaps
in conference with the heads of the two branches, judges may
be called from the superior court to sit in the supreme court,
It
or vice versa, as the state of the dockets may require.
should be possible for the supreme court to sit in divisions
if necessary to the prompt dispatch of business. When dockets
are swollen, three judges ought to be enough for all but the
most difficult and important cases. Thus there would be more
time for oral argument, which with lawyers of the caliber of
those who alone should appear in the highest court on cases
of any consequence, is of the greatest assistance to the
Also there would be more time and opportunity for
bench.
consultation and consideration of the merits of cases.

Administrative appeals are likely to become a large part of
the work in our courts, if a simple, speedy, expeditious
appellate procedure can be devised which will insure adherence to law and due process of law in hearings and determinations without substituting the discretion of the court for
As this type of work
that of the administrative agency.

-276-

PRINCIPLES AND OUTLINES OF A MODERN UNIFIED COURT ORGANIZATION
increases, it may be advisable to set up a division to deal
with it, and there should be a flexible organization and
rule-making power adequate to find how to meet such situations
as they arise.
The Statistical System

One of the functions of the head of the judicial system,
but not necessarily of the head of the supreme court, should
be to insure and direct the compilation of reliable and intelligently organized statistics of the administration of
justice in the jurisdiction, and embody them in recommendations which with those of the judicial council might well
make an annual report of much value for furthering the work
Cerof the courts both in their own state and in others.
municipal
court
of
Chicago,
earlier
reports
of
the
tainly the
under the leadership of Chief Justice Olson, were of great
use throughout the land in the formative period of such courts
in the first three decades of the present century.
Some of
well
compiled
judicial
councils
have
been
giving
us
and
the
useful statistics.
But there is much to be done in the way
of working out a system of gathering, compiling and reporting them which will insure that they tell what needs to be
told and give an accurate picture both as the basis of
criticism and as the basis of legislation, of rulemaking,
and of administrative regulations.
To be of value they must
of each and every
required
be made upon a system which can be
officers
in the
and
its
clerks
and
administrative
tribunal
a
responsible
unified
judicial
with
Only a
system
state.
head and responsible heads of branches and divisions under
him, can insure that this work is well done, and unless
well done it is not worth doing at all.
The Superior Court
The second branch, the superior court, should be given
complete jurisdiction of first instance, civil and
criminal, the civil jurisdiction, for reasons set forth in
preceding chapters, to include law, equity, and probate.
Certainly there should be no mandatory setting off of
these types of cases to separate divisions.
But the organization of this branch should be so flexible that if
experience showed good reason for setting off some or all
of them in that way, it could be done by rule of court,
or more simply by assigning cases to judges in such a way
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as to effect a practical segregation, which, however, could
be changed or revoked later if experience or changed conditions made such actions advisable.

This branch should be organized under a chief justice and in
some states it might well be advisable to have regional subdivisions, each under a presiding judge, responsible to the
chief justice of the superior court, as he would be responsible to the chief justice of the state.
Rules of court
would determine the times and places of sittings in the
several counties, and all the judges, being judges of the
one court, would be subject to be assigned where the demands
of judicial business might make it advisable.
Rules should
provide for regional or local appellate terms according to
the requirements of the court's business.
Thus there would
be no need of intermediate tribunals of any sort.
As has
been suggested in other connections, the procedure at these
terms could be as simple as at the old hearings in the bank
at Westminster after a trial at circuit.
Three judges
assigned to hold the term would pass on a motion for a new
trial or judgment on or notwithstanding a verdict, or for
modification or setting aside of findings and judgment
accordingly (as at common law upon a special verdict).
If,
as I assume would be true, it proved necessary to limit the
cases which could go thence to the supreme court, rules could
restrict review to those taken by the highest court on
certiorari.
Even then, there need be nothing more in the
nature of a double appeal than there is now in states
where a motion for a new trial in the trial court is a
necessary preliminary to review in the higher court.
But
heard before three judges at an appellate term it would not
be a mere perfunctory step in review but a real hearing of
the questions raised which should enable the case to stop
there unless the points of law were serious enough to warrant
certiorari.

Effective Reviewing
By hearing motions for new trials to set aside findings, or
to render judgment notwithstanding verdicts or findings, or
for modification or setting aside of decrees and orders, at
such appellate terms, with no more formal or technical procedure than is involved in such motions made in a trial court
today, not only would there be a simple and speedy means of
reviewing the great bulk of the litigation in the court of
general jurisdiction of first instance, but the plan would
help rid us of the burdensome multiplication of reports which
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has come with the setting up of intermediate appellate courts.
It is felt that an appellate court, if only as a matter of
dignity, must write opinions, and that its filed opinions
must be published. There is no doubt a real function of an
opinion is a check upon the bench, even if the decision adds
But that purpose and the further purnothing to the law.
court of review, if the case goes to the
advising
the
pose of
would
court,
be served sufficiently by a memorandum
supreme
questions
decided
and the grounds of decision.
the
of

Much time and energy are wasted in writing opinions in cases
which involve no new questions or new phases of old questions.
A brief statement of points and reasons will suffice both as
Some such publicaa check and as an aid to the court above.
tion as the New York Miscellaneous Reports, under a qualified
and responsible reporter, having no interest except to make
the reports useful to the public and the profession, could
select occasional memoranda worth reporting.
It might well
be at times that at county court appellate terms questions
may come up and be decided which will deserve publication
of the memoranda of grounds of decision.
An energetic chief
justice at the head of the judicial system, and energetic
chiefs in the superior court and the county courts, with the
aid of a judicial council, could devise rules to govern these
things and if the courts or the bar, especially an integrated
bar, were given control of reporting, one of the hard problems of the law and of the profession in America might be
solved.
It would seem clear that three judges should be enough to sit
Benches of three have proved satisfactory
at these terms.
appellate
intermediate
courts in many states.
If, howin
ever, it were felt that more should sit, either as a general
practice or in some cases or classes of cases, the matter
should be left open to be settled by rules of court in the
light of experience.

Where, as in some jurisdictions, there are heavy criminal
dockets, rules could set up criminal appellate terms for
felony cases or county court appellate terms for misdemeanors
with a flexible make-up, as in the English court of criminal
appeal.
From these appellate term cases should go directly
to the supreme court by certiorari.
There should be no retrial in the superior court of what has been tried in the
county courts except as rules might provide for removal of
exceptional cases by certiorari.
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The County Court Branch
As to the county court branch, this, too, should be organized
under the headship of a chief justice and perhaps in states
of wide territorial extent, such as California and Texas,
with regional presiding judges under him. Rules could set
up municipal courts in large cities as branches of the county
court, with power by rules to provide for juvenile and family
and domestic relations and small cause courts as divisions,
There should be appellate terms and
as they are needed.
causes could go from these terms to the Supreme Court by
Large metropolitan cities have peculiar needs
certiorari.
which may make such divisional courts advisable.
But while
each municipal court should have an administrative head subject to the superintendence of the chief justice of the county
court, there should be such complete flexibility of organization that judges could be taken from a municipal court to
a rural county court or vice versa, or from these to the
superior court or from the superior court to relieve congestion in the county court, as the state of work in the
It might be that in the
respective courts may require.
municipal court in cities, rules could work out appellate
terms for small causes with a simple inexpensive procedure
so that the public could be persuaded that causes too small
to justify retaining a lawyer were not for that reason neglected, and such terms might even have to be allowed by rule
to review the whole case.

Powers of Chief Justice

Supervision of the judicial-business administration of the
whole court should be committed to the chief justice, who
should be made responsible for effective use of the whole
Under rules of court he should
judicial power of the state.
have authority to make reassignments or temporary assignments
of judges to particular branches or divisions or localities
according to the amount of work to be done, and the judges
Disqualification, disability or illness
at hand to do it.
of particular judges, or vacancies in office could be
He should have authority
speedily provided for in this way.
also, under rules of court, to assign or transfer cases
from one locality or court or division to another for hearing and disposition, as circumstances may require, so that
judicial work may be equalized so far as may be and clogging
up of particular dockets and accumulation of arrears preHe may require assistance in this
vented at the outset.
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work of superintendence of the working of the court as a
As it
whole, and there should be authority to provide it.
has been said, each of the branches, and where conditions
require them, each division or regional organization within
a branch, should have a responsible head, charged with the
Just as the chief justice
duty of immediate superintendence.
should be held to see to it that the energies of the judiciary
are fully and efficiently employed upon its tasks, so these
heads of branches and divisions should each be responsible for
efficient dispatch of the work of his organization. These are
not matters for clerks, although clerks under proper direction
They call for strong men with clear
and control may do much.
responsibility laid upon them to preclude their falling into
prefunctory routine or allowing abuses to grow up through
their inertia.
It is but little less important to organize thoroughly the
incidental non-judicial business of the court and all its

Legislation should not lay down
branches and divisions.
details for this side of the administration of justice. As
is now beginning to be done, competent business direction
should be provided and the clerical and stenographic force
be put under control and supervision of a responsible director.
There very likely may have to be a like officer in
each branch and major division or, if regional organization
But it would be a mistake
becomes necessary, each region.
for legislation to go into much detail upon this subject.
It is enough to settle the general principles and leave
details to rules of court to be drawn up, altered and improved, with the aid of judicial councils, as experience
shows defects and abuses and indicates the best way of dealing with them.
Emancipating the clerical work of the courts from politics
and patronage and putting control of it where it ought to
be, namely, in the courts themselves, must be an important item in any program of improving the administration of
justice.
To specify but one item, the system, or rather
want of system, which prevails generally is a prolific
source of needless expense in the courts.
Control of Clerical Force

Decentralization of courts was carried so far in the last
century that the clerks were made independent functionaries,
not merely beyond effective judicial control, but independent
of any administrative supervision and guided only by legislative provisions and limitations.
No one was charged with
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It
supervision of this part of the work of the courts.
was no one's business to look at it as a whole, seek to find
how to make it more effective and to obviate waste and expense,
There is much unnecessary duplicaand promote improvement.
tion, copying and recopying, and general prolixity of records
In the clerical no less
in the great majority of our courts.
than on the judicial side most of our courts are like Artemus
Ward's proposed military company in which every man was to
The judiciary
be an officer and the superior of every other.
is the only great agency of govt>rnmcnt which is habitually
Even the pettiest
given no control of its clerical force.
agency has much more control than the average state court.
But scientific management is needed in a modern court no
With no one responsible there
less than in a modern factory.
Much that
is no incentive to progress in the clerk's office.
could be done to reduce costs in litigation and the expense
of operating the courts remains undone because it is no
The established instione's business to see it done.
tutions of the past can maintain their claims to appropriations, in the face of this competition, only if they use
to the best advantage the money appropriated to them
Organization of the non-judicial administrative business of
the courts calls for complete and efficient supervision,
under rules of court, which is best to be obtained by unification of the judiciary as a whole, with responsible headship, charged with supervision of the subordinate supervising
and superintending officers.
.

.

.

.

.

Some of the things of which I could make just complaint
twenty-five years ago, in a statement of what would be done
away with by the kind of organization I am urging, have
been remedied in the progress toward unification which has
The bad practice of throwing cases out of
been going on.
court, to be begun over again in case they were brought in
the wrong court, has been generally given up, or at least
much modified.
Yet transfer from one court to another at
the cost of the appellant who has guessed wrong, after
argument very likely, and perhaps construction of an indefinite or ambiguous statute, and it may be a difference
of opinion between the court making the transfer and the
one to which it is made, while an improvement, is not all
There ought to
that may be done in a program of reform.
be no questions of jurisdiction under rigid constitutional
Rules of court may deal with
or statutory provisions.
such situations fully and satisfactorily if they arise between branch and branch of the same court and are subject
to superintending control of one official.
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Principles of Administration
Moreover, enough obvious advantages remain to make full
For one thing, unification would result in a real
measure.
judicial department as a department of government ... In
the states there are courts but there is no true judicial
Again, unification of the judicial system
department
would do away with the waste of judicial power involved in
the organization of separate courts with constitutionally
or legislatively defined jurisdictions and fixed personnel.
Moreover, it would make it the business of a responsible
official to see to it that such waste did not recur and
that judges were at hand whenever and wherever work was at
It would greatly simplify appeals to the
hand to be done.
great saving not only of the time and energy of appellate
courts, but to the saving of time and money of litigants
An appeal could be merely a motion for a new
as well.
trial, or for modification or vacation of the judgment,
before another branch of the one court, and would call for
no greater formality of procedure than any other motion.
It would obviate conflicts between judges and courts of
coordinate jurisdiction such as unhappily have too often
taken place in many localities under a completely decentralized system which depends upon the good taste and sense of
propriety of the individual judges, or appeal after some
final order, when as like as not the mischief has been
It would allow judges
done, to prevent such occurrences.
to become specialists in the disposition of particular
classes of litigation without requiring the setting up for
them of special courts.
.

.

.

In a unified court judges can be assigned permanently to
the v/ork for which they prove most fit without being drawn
permanently from the judicial force so that they cannot be
used elsewhere when needed.
This is likely to be in-

Specialization will probably becreasingly important.
But concurrent
come increasingly desirable in the future.
jurisdictions, jurisdictional lines between courts, with
consequent litigation over the forms and venue at the
expense of the merits, and judges who can do but one thing,
no matter how little of that is to be done nor how much
of something else, are not the way to promote efficient
specialization. As cases of some class become numerous
and require that a specialist pass upon them, judges or
a judge would be designated for that purpose from the
staff of the whole court, and the cases would be assigned
to them in the one court in which all causes would be pending, even if in different branches or divisions, by some
responsible functionary whose duty it would be to see to it
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that the whole judicial power of the state was fully utilized
When judges make assignments among
to the best advantage.
themselves the tendency to perfunctory routine and to follow
the line of least resistance will keep up the practice of
rapid periodical rotation which has been a bad feature of

many courts.

Specialist Judges
Again, from time to time exceptional causes come before the
courts in which it is desirable to assign the best talent
for that sort of case that the staff of the court affords
instead of leaving the case to the chance of what judge
This is eshappens to be at hand at the time and place.
pecially true in certain homicide cases of special difficulty
which do not always arise in places to which the best specialists for the trial of such cases must habitually be assigned.
Power to assign and duty of assigning the most experienced
and skillfull judge for such cases to the trial of the
particular case may save much delay and expense and prevent
miscarriage of justice.
If it be said that there is danger
of abuse of this power of assignment of a particular case,
the answer must be that jockeying to get such cases before
a particular judge in a rapidly rotating bench of judges is
not unknown today, and that the power of assignment will be
exercised by a functionary definitely pointed out as responsible and subject to responsible control by a superior
of conspicuous position.
Divided responsibility is no
responsibility.
Concentration of responsibility in a chief
justice with corresponding power will correct, indeed will
compel correction of, many abuses which have grown up because no one had the responsibility for preventing or removing them.
Unless responsible headship for the whole
judicial system is provided and given power to meet the
exigencies of the responsibility, there is real danger
that an administrative superintending control of the courts
will be set up from without.
This would not merely infringe
the constitutional separation of powers.
It would be a
dangerous subjection of the courts to the executive at a
time when executive hegemony has become a conspicuous feature of our policy.
The Judicial Council

There are two checks which may be relied upon to secure
against abuse of the power which must be accorded the
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responsibile head of a unified court. One is his clearly
defined responsibility both for what he does and lets his
subordinates do and for what he omits to do. The other is
Such councils
the institution of the judicial council
and
are doing
exist now in an increasing number of states
much for the improvement of the administration of justice in
Especially valuable reports have come
all parts of the land.
from them in New York, Michigan, California, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, and Kansas. The history, achievements and
possibilities of judicial cbuncils are not germane to the
It is enough in
subject, however, and need not be pursued.
councils,
these
the present connection to point out that
bench,
the bar,
of
the
commonly made up of representatives
judges
with
the
and representative lay citizens, consulting
their
exercise
of
them
the
in
and advising and assisting
rulemaking power, are certain to prove not only a stimulus
to effective rising by the courts to their responsibilities,
but also an effective and intelligent check upon abuses,
which will be palpable to such men in their close contact
It might be suggested, howwith the work of the judges.
unification
the
of courts there might well
ever, that with
municipal courts, and
for
and
councils
county
come local
large and diversified
an
exceptionally
that in states with
regional judicial
even
be
subordinate
domain there might
will prove most
further
check
which
Moreover, a
councils.
bar.
integrated
seen
the
unified
or
in
effective is to be
could
nothing
organization
lawyers,
of the
With responsible
the
by
immediate
action
go very wrong without producing
profession
.

.

.

.

.

.

Courts Need Power
It should not be forgotten that where not hampered by
legislative prescribing of details of organization and

procedure, our courts have, on the whole, the best conIt was no
structive record of any of our institutions.
judicially
of
body
develop
an
American
a
law,
mean task to
found and judicially declared precepts suitable to America,
out of the old English cases and old English statutes with
the help of such books as Coke's Institutes and the more
orderly but less detailed and thorough-going exposition
The task was well done in about three
by Blackstone.
quarters of a century, so well, indeed, that the newer
states as they became settled and admitted to the Union
No
found their body of law substantially made for them.
other judicial achievement, and no legislative or administrative achievement in the English-speaking world, will
compare with this.
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From the beginning of American law, however, the courts
have been hampered by minute prescribing of detail in
Control of their administrative agencies has
legislation.
from them.
Their organization has been pretaken
away
been
Courts have been set up with
scribed in extreme detail.
rigid but ill-defined jurisdictional lines. Constitutions
and statutes have prescribed successive or double appeals.
In Indiana, the legislature even tried to take away from
the Supreme Court the superintending control over the
After
lower courts conferred upon it by the constitution.
the middle of the last century, the legislature in many
states prescribed the minutiae of legal procedure, so that
as Mr. Hornblower used to say of the New York code of civil
procedure in its heyday, there was a rule for every action
of the judge from the time he entered the court house except
to prescribe the exact peg on which he should hang his hat.
It is enlightening to compare the results in the substantive
law, where the courts had a free hand, with those in procedure and the mechanics of justice where their hands were
tied.
The causes of popular dissatisfaction with the
administration for very much the greater part lie in the
mechanics of applying the substantive law by courts and
judges the use of a mechanism which has been put beyond
judicial control and beyond effective judicial employment
by constitutions and by detailed statutes carrying out
the spirit of constitutional provisions.

—

Unification is Essential
Unification of the courts would go far to enable the judiciary to do adequately much which in desperation of efficient
legal disposition by fettered courts, tied to cumbersome
and technical procedure, we have been committing more and
Ours is
more to administrative boards and commissions.
historically a legal polity and the balance of our institutions will be sadly disturbed if the courts lose their
If they are to keep that place they must be
place in it.
organized to compete effectively with the newer administrative bodies.
We are told in the Federalist that the judiciary is least
able to hold its own in a competition of the three departJudges are inhibited, with respect
ments of government.
to the will to power, by the taught traditions which requires them to refer their action on all occasions to
principles, to hew to precepts established in advance of
action and to find the measure of decision by applying a
Their
traditional technique to predetermined premises.
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quest of ends is restricted by their habitual regard for
The legislature and the executive are aggressive in
means.
The judiciary do little more than obtheir will to power.
struct when the department of government comes into conflict.
There is nothing to be feared from making it efficient.

Unification of the courts will not do everything. There
must be judges equal to their tasks and unafraid to do
them.
The mode of selection and tenure must be such as
But no judges can
to insure such judges as far as may be.
achieve results such as are demanded today if they are held
to the machinery of the last century.
Things are done by
the combined working of men and machinery.
In that combination machinery is no negligible item.
The right men will
do much no matter what machinery is given them to work with.
But our ideal must be the right men with the right machinery.
With the rulemaking power restored to them, with effective
organization, with proper provisions as to selection and
tenure, there is every reason to believe that the work of
American courts in the period of development on which we
have entered will be worthy of the beginning made without
substantive law in the formative era.
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APPENDIX D

JUDICIARY ARTICLE OF THE MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION
OF THE NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE*

INTRODUCTORY COMMENT
The judiciary article reflects, on the basis of additional experience, elaborations or modifications of prinMain
ciples established in earlier editions of the Model
judicial
system,
unified
establishment
of
a
emphasis is on
free from a mass of separately established constitutional
courts of frequently overlapping jurisdiction and free
from constitutionally imposed rigidities and technical procedural difficulties which still characterize court structures.
.

When a great variety of separate courts are established
by the constitution and when the jurisdiction of each is
constitutionally defined, court reform often becomes either
a matter of piecemeal constitutional amendment, or is not
attempted at all because of the difficulties involved in
integrating existing courts into any kind of rational scheme,
or in abolishing courts whose judiciary and other personnel
have obtained a vested interest in their continuation, even
This is esthough they may have outlived their usefulness.
a
provide
courts
the
pecially true in many states in which
system
judicial
major source of political patronage. A
which lacks proper integration and unified administration
is costly to the state because it is uneconomical to run
and to the litigants because of the creation of procedural
difficulties, delay and consequent added legal expenses.
The judiciary article emphasized the unity of the court
system by establishing an integrated system with three levels
The system enof courts of general statewide jurisdiction.
compasses a general court expected to be the trial court, an
appellate court expected to be the court of intermediate
appeal and a supreme court expected to be the court of ultimate state appeal.
Each of these except the supreme court
may be divided into geographical departments, or into functional divisions, i.e., civil, criminal, domestic relations,

National Municipal League, Model State ConstitutiorF
6th ed. rev. 1968 (New York, 1963, 1968), pp. 77-91
Statements on derivation of the provisions have been
omitted.
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To avoid rigidities,
probate, etc., as may be necessary.
the jurisdiction of each is not constitutionally defined but
is left to be fixed by law except that in certain designated
matters of constitutional importance legislative districting
and gubernatorial succession--the supreme court has original
The supreme court also has an express grant
jurisdiction.
of appellate jurisdiction in cases raising constitutional
issues under the state constitution or the Constitution of
Inferior courts of limited jurisdiction
the United States.
may be established by the legislature, but a brake is placed
on the haphazard establishment of a multitude of illcoordinated lower courts by the requirement that all state
The lower
courts must be uniform throughout the state.
courts, particularly when created by the constitution, have
been especially troublesome in the reorganization of judicial
systems.

—

In states with a relatively low volume of appellate business
there may be no need for intermediate appeals, and all
appeals could be taken from the trial court (general court)
In those states all reference
directly to the supreme court.
to the intermediate appellate level could be omitted because
the requirement of "due process" is certainly satisfied by
If the
the opportunity for one appeal from every decision.
interhowever,
volume of appellate work is considerable,
mediate courts of appeal serve to expedite business and may
be used, under appropriate rules of court, to operate as a
sifting device so that only the truly major issues may be
In the absence of a proviappealed to the supreme court.

sion for an intermediate appellate tribunal, with appellate
case loads increasing, some states have occasionally found
it necessary to split the supreme court into two or more
Difficulties with
separate panels to dispose of more cases.
this procedure may begin to arise, however, when conflicts
in decisions require a hearing by the full court to avoid
uncertainty in the law. When the volume of appellate work
warrants the cost, a court of intermediate appeals should be
authorized In the constitution.

The chief judge of the supreme court, as administrative head
of the judicial system, may assign judges freely within each
level of the court system and, for temporary service, he may
In his housekeepassign judges from one level to another.
ing functions he is assisted by an administrative director
whom he appoints with the approval of the supreme court.
Further in aid of a unified administration and to advance
flexibility of the system, the supreme court is granted power
to make rules both to govern the administration of all courts
and to govern practice and procedure in civil and criminal
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These rules are to have the force of law and may be
changed only by a two-thirds vote of all the members of the
legislature.
cases.

The Model takes a firm position for an appointive judiciary
holding office, after an initial term of seven years, during
There is considerable, if not unanilife or good behavior.
mous, agreement that an appointive judiciary is preferable
to an elective one because it enhances judicial independence
and because a judicial candidate cannot and usually does
not run for office in the same manner as candidates for
legislative and executive office. Moreover, the attributes
that make for good judicial qualifications and temperament
are not appropriate subjects for meaningful public debate
The election of
or for a considered vote of the electorate.
considerations
irrelevant
commonly
based
on
judges is thus
such as party label rather than on any considered judgment
This is especially
as to qualifications for judicial office.
judicial office
statewide
candidate
runs
for
case
when
a
the
in a large metropolitan center where he is not likely to be
known by any substantial portion of the members of the bar,
let alone by any substantial portion of the general public.

—

—

Because of the general dissatisfaction with a "straight"
elective system of judicial selection, either partisan or
non-partisan, many attempts have been made to gain the advantages of an appointive system while retaining the form
of an elective one.
This is true in varying degrees of the
Plan,"
the
"Stimson Plan" and the plan in the fifth
"Missouri
edition of the Model State Constitution (1948) which had been
In every one
developed by the American Judicature Society.
has
candidates
judicial
of these plans, the designation of
subsequent
make
the
been formalized in such a way as to
election be it to place a judge on the bench or to determine whether after service of a short initial term he is
to be retained for a longer term--a less important part of
the entire process because it only ratifies some prior
screening of candidates.

—

It does not advance the aims of democratic self-government,
of course, to retain the mere form of judicial election if
the appointive features are the truly significant and determinative ones.
Hence, two alternative provisions are
proposed: The first, patterned on the federal system and
on the systems in Hawaii and New Jersey, providing for
gubernatorial appointment with the advice and consent of
the legislature; and the second, patterned in part on the
Missouri system and on that proposed by the American Bar
Association and the American Judicature Society, providing
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for gubernatorial appointment from a list of names submitted by a separately constituted judicial nominating
committee.

To enhance judicial independence further, office is to be
held during good behavior after reappointment following an
initial term of seven years.
In this respect the Model
follows the New Jersey constitution.
In New Jersey, reappointment for life has been virtually automatic, but the
initial term of seven years does permit the elimination of
inefficient or unsuitable judges whose deficiencies would
not suffice for removal for cause.

Section 6.01.
Judicial Power.
The judicial power of the
state shall be vested in a unified judicial system, which
shall include a supreme court, an appellate court and a
general court, and which shall also include such inferior
courts of limited jurisdiction as may from time to time be
established by law. All courts except the supreme court
may be divided into geographical departments or districts
as provided by law and into functional divisions and subdivisions as provided by law or by judicial rules not inconsistent with law.

Comment
The words "unified judicial system," derived from the
Puerto Rican constitution, have been chosen to express
the intent of the article explicitly.
Other sections carry
out this intent by requiring that the jurisdiction of each
of the courts "shall be uniform in all geographical departments or districts of the same court" (sec. 6.03); in
providing for a single administrative head and organization
for the entire system, and for freedom of assignment of
judges at each level (sec. 6.05); in providing for a consolidated budget (sec. 6.06); and in authorizing the
promulgation of a single set of rules to govern the promulgation of a single set of rules to govern the administration, practice and procedure of the courts (sec. 6.07).

States in which the volume of appellate litigation is comparatively light may wish to eliminate all references, in
this and other sections, to the appellate court.

Although there is ample authority in section 6.01 for the
establishment of inferior courts of limited jurisdiction,
provision should not result in the uncontrolled and random
development of multiple lower courts of diversified
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jurisdiction because section 6.03 imposes a requirement of
uniformity of jurisdiction "in all geographical departments
Thus, the principle of a
or districts of the same court."
unified judicial system has been extended into the lower
In consequence, it is unlikely that more
court structure.
than one, or at the most two, statewide inferior courts of
limited jurisdiction would be created.
The section authorized the division of all courts (other
than the supreme court) into geographical departments or
These geographical divisions of the courts are
districts.
to be made by law and are therefore expected to have some
permanence--though they may, of course, be changed by law
The section also authorizes the
if the need should arise.
division of the courts into "functional divisions and subdivisions" and provides that such functional divisions (i.e.,
civil, criminal, probate, domestic relations, etc.) may be
created "by law or by judicial rules not inconsistent with
This is expected to add a considerable measure of
law. "
flexibility to the system, because it will enable the courts,
by a simple change in the rules, to create, combine or
abolish functional parts of courts so as to adapt the system
promptly to changing needs and to the changing pressure of
the volume of litigation in different areas of the law.
It
should be noted that section 6.03, which requires uniformity
of jurisdiction in all geographical departments of the same
court, does not require uniformity of jurisdiction of the
functional divisions in different geographical departments.
A general court sitting in, and with geographic jurisdiction
over, a heavily populated city or metropolitan department
would be able, therefore, to have a greater number and
greater variety of functional parts than a largely rural
department of the same court, where a relatively low volume
of litigation might make such specialization of function
useless and unnecessary.

Section 6.02.
Supreme Court.
The supreme court shall be
the highest court of the state and shall consist of a
chief judge and
associate judges.

Comment
The section establishing the supreme court as the highest
court of the state deliberately leaves blank the number of
associate judges. The number "four", "six" or "eight"
ought to be inserted, depending on a number of considerations,
The object is to provide a supreme court with an odd number
of judges, five to nine in number, so as to avoid, as far
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as possible, an even division of the court.
As to the precise size, a balance must be struck between the desirable
aims of having a tribunal large enough to assure an adequate
range of views and yet not so large as to interfere with
meaningful and close deliberation. A five-to nine-man
court meets both aims.
The volume of litigation likely to
reach the highest tribunal should also be considered. Usually
one judge is assigned the responsibility of writing the
majority opinion and, unless the number of judges is adequate
to share the burden, each judge will have to carry an excessive
case load, which tends to produce delay, if not deterioration
of the quality of written opinions.
This, in turn, may have
adverse effects on the legal system as a whole because inadequate opinions may fail to supply desired guidance to the
lower courts.

A limiting consideration in setting the size is the expense
of a large tribunal which may well be a factor in smaller
states.
Aside from added judges' salaries, a larger tribunal
can become quite costly if adequate staff services for each
additional judge, such as law clerks and secretaries, and
maintaining appropriate office accommodations are taken into
account.

—

Section 6.03.

Jurisdiction of Courts

MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION
functional divisions may be set by law or by judicial rules
not inconsistent with law, thus allowing diversity as between functional divisions of the same court in different
geographical departments (see, in this connection, pertinent
notes in sec. 6.01
.)
.

.

.

The special position of the supreme court is recognized in
that it is expressly granted appellate jurisdiction in all
cases "arising under this constitution and the Constitution
of the United States," and original jurisdiction in matters
of legislative districting and gubernatorial succession,
subsections 4.04(b) and 5.08(e), which involve issues wherein a single and final adjudication seems best designed to
These
meet the ends of justice without unnecessary delay.
special constitutional reservations of jurisdiction, both
appellate and original, protect the supreme court against
the possibility of legislative interference with the court's
traditional and necessary power of judicial review. Without this special reservation of jurisdiction in constitutional cases, the legislature would be in a position to deny
the supreme court the power to review state law or state
action for compliance with state or federal constitutional
The power of judicial review should be given
requirements.
express recognition in the state constitution not only
because it is a traditional power of the courts but also
because it is the most significant safeguard of American
constitutional government.

Section 6.04. Appointment of Judges; Qualifications;
Tenure; Retirement; Removal.
(a) The governor shall
appoint, with the advice and consent of the legislature,
the chief judges and associate judges of the supreme, appellate and general courts.
The governor shall give ten days'
public notice before sending a judicial nomination to the
legislature or before making an interim appointment when
the legislature is not in session.

ALTERNATIVE:
Subsection 6.04(a). Nomination by
Nominating Commission. The governor shall fill a
vacancy in the offices of the chief judges and
associate judges of the supreme, appellate and
general courts from a list of nominees presented
to him by the appropriate judicial nominating
commission.
If the governor fails to make an
appointment within sixty days from the day the list
is presented, the appointment shall be made by the
chief judge or by the acting chief judge from the
There shall be a judicial nominating
same list.
commission for the supreme court and one commission for the nomination of judges for the
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court sitting in each geographical department or
district of the appellate court. Each judicial
nominating commission shall consist of seven members, one of whom shall be the chief judge of the
supreme court, who shall act as chairman.
The
members of the bar of the state in the geographical area for which the court or the department or
district of the court sits shall elect three of
their number to be members of such a commission,
and the governor shall appoint three citizens,
not members of the bar, from among the residents
of the same geographical area.
The terms of
office and the compensation for members of a
judicial nominating commission shall be as provided by law. No member of a judicial nominating
commission except the chief judge shall hold any
other public office or office in any political party or organization, and no member of such a commission shall be eligible for appointment to a
state judicial office so long as he is a member
of such a commission and for [five] [three] [two]
years thereafter.
No person shall be eligible for judicial office
(b)
in the supreme court, appellate court and general
court unless he has been admitted to practice law
before the supreme court for at least
years.
No person who holds judicial office in the

supreme court, appellate court, or general court
shall hold any other paid office, position of profit or employment under the state, its civil
divisions or the United States. Any judge of the
supreme court, appellate court or general court
who becomes a candidate for an elective office
shall thereby forfeit his judicial office.
(c)
The judges of the supreme court, appellate
court and general court shall hold their offices
for initial terms of seven years and upon reappointment shall hold their offices during good
behavior.
They shall be retired upon attaining
the age of seventy years and may be pensioned
as may be provided by law.
The chief judge of
the supreme court may from time to time appoint
retired judges to such special assignments as
may be provided by the rules of the supreme court.
(d)
The judges of the supreme court, appellate
court and general court shall be subject to
impeachment and any such judge impeached shall
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The
not exercise his office until acquitted.
supreme court may also remove judges of the
appellate and general courts for such cause
and in such manner as may be provided by law.
The legislature shall provide by law for
(e)
the appointment of judges of the inferior courts
and for their qualifications, tenure, retirement
and removal.
The judges of the courts of this state shall
(f)
receive such salaries as may be provided by law,
which shall not be diminished during their term
of office.

Comment
The Model follows a straight appointive system as in the
federal judiciary, Hawaii and New Jersey, at least in courts
The reasons for the reliance on an
of general jurisdiction.
elective judiciary have been stated
rather
than
an
appointive
introduction to this article. The
general
prominently in the
publicity given to judicial appointments by the governor will
It should be
give great assurance of proper selections.
will
appointments
initially
be for seven
that
noted, too,
Thus, after
life.
reappointment
for
followed
by
years, to be
appointjudicial
and
reappointments,
initial appointments
considerable
that
relatively
infrequent
so
ments will become
To allow for public
public attention can be given each.
discussion before a nomination is sent to the legislature
for its consent, ten days' public notice is required.
(a)

The alternative provision also provides for appointment
rather than election but requires the governor to make
appointments from a list of nominees presented to him by
the judicial nominating commission for the particular court.
If the governor fails to make an appointment from the list
submitted within 60 days, the chief judge makes an appointSeparate judicial nominating
ment from the same list.
commissions for the supreme court and for the judges of
each court in each and every geographical department are
provided for. Each judicial nominating commission is to
consist of the chief judge, who is to be its chairman, and
of three attorneys elected by all the members of the bar
of the particular geographic area, and three citizens,
residents of the area, not members of the bar, appointed
Members of judicial nominating
by the governor.
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commissions are to hold no other public office or party office
and are to remain ineligible for judicial office while members in each and every geographical department are provided
for.
Each judicial nominating commission is to consist of
the chief judge, who is to be its chairman, and of three
attorneys elected by all the members of the bar of the particular geographic area, and three citizens, residents of
the area, not members of the bar, appointed by the governor.
Members of judicial nominating commissions are to hold no
other public office or party office and are to remain ineligible for judicial office while members of the commission and for a number of years thereafter.

Alternative proposals for judicial appointment are presented
because of a division of informed opinion. Proponents of
gubernatorial appointment with the advice and consent of the
legislature point to the success of the system in the federal
judiciary and in the states which have adopted it. Critics
of straight gubernatorial appointment concede it has generally
resulted in better choices than have elective systems but
claim party affiliation carries undue weight when left to the
The
governor with the advice and consent of the legislature.
critics further contend that an appointive system could produce better judges if considerations of party affiliation
were ruled out and if factors of experience and aptitude for
The result of
judicial office were the sole considerations.
their criticism is, in the main, embodied in the alternative
provision for gubernatorial appointment from among qualified
Essentially, the
names submitted by a nominating commission.
provision included in the Model is a slight adaptation of
what has become known as the Missouri-ABA Plan of judicial
The plan in its most recent form has been inselection.
corporated in a model judiciary article for state constitution approved by the ABA House of Delegates at its 1962
meeting and reproduced in the Journal of the American
Judicature Society (April 1962), pages 280-282. This plan,
by providing that every judge is "subject to approval or
rejection by the electorate" every ten years, retains some
formal aspects of electing the judiciary while at the same
time making the nominating process the truly significant
The elective feature of the ABA Plan has not been
phase.
adopted here for the reasons referred to earlier.
While it is true that the alternative tends to minimize
considerations of party and while it is true that nominating commissions have an opportunity to investigate judicial
qualifications in a more dispassionate and private manner
than does the legislature, judicial nomination by commission raises a number of other questions.
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First, it should be noted that in a large state with many
geographic divisions of the court system there may be
dozens of nominating commission, with the chief judge of
This may impose a
the supreme court chairman of each.
considerable burden upon him. The very fact of the number
of nominating commissions as well as the fact that they
will normally carry on their deliberations in private
create additional problems. While local nominating commissions may be expected to know judicial candidates from
their localities and while an examination of qualifications
in private may give rise to worthwhile evaluations, the
close local control combined with the secrecy of deliberation and the absence of public involvement may make it
possible for nominations to be controlled by narrow, selfThus, while there can be little doubt
seeking cliques.
that a judicial nominating commission for the supreme court
will function well and honestly because of the great interest
in its work, there may be some doubt as to whether the work
of a judicial nominating commission in naming to judicial
office a judge in a relatively obscure and small geographic
department of the state's judicial system will engender the
same degree of interest to avoid its deliberations from becoming concerned with partisanship of narrow regional or
professional interests rather than with the benefit to the
If an interest in the quality of the
judicial system.
judicial system and its judges is stimulated and maintained,
a governor and a legislature dominated by the governor's
party need not be overwhelming guided by considerations of
party.

Each of the two systems proposed is likely to bring with it
Straight
an improvement compared to an elective judiciary.
of the
consent
gubernatorial appointment with the advice and
Municipal
legislature recommends itself to the National
The alLeague because of the high degree of visibility.
because of
bar
the
of
ternative recommends itself to members
qualifijudicial
of
the more searching and private evaluation
administration,
responsible
possible.
cations it makes
Given
both appointive systems can be expected to improve the
judiciary.
Any number of years of practice of law between five
(b)
and ten presumably would be a reasonable eligibility
requirement.
The provision includes a more or less standard
conflict of employment clause prohibiting judges from holding other paid employment by the state, its divisions or the
United States.
Note that this would not exclude judges from
purely honorific or unpaid positions, such as, for instance,
members of school boards or other similar state or local
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The legislature would, of course, be free to bar
agencies.
judges from holding such unpaid positions.
The subsection
provides that judges who become candidates for elective
office thereby forfeit judicial office in order to avoid even
the appearance of judicial and political conflicts of interest.
This is in line with the more recent state constitutions of
Hawaii, Alaska and New Jersey.

Although judicial life tenure is desirable to foster
(c)
judicial independence, the initial term of seven years provides an opportunity to release judges who could not be dismissed on charges but who, nevertheless, are not thought
worthy of a life term.
It is the normal expectation that
judges who have performed adequately will be reappointed for
a full term. Retirement at age 70 is mandatory and the provision presumes that an adequate system of pensions for the
judges will be established.
Retired judges may be appointed
for special assignments by the chief judge in accordance with
the rules of the supreme court.
The intention of the retirement provision is to provide for
compulsory retirement at a time of reduced capacity but to
make it possible to use good talents and experience for
special and temporary assignments.
(d)
As a double check upon the honesty and efficiency of the
judiciary, two methods for removal of judges are provided
impeachment and removal by the supreme court for cause.
Since the supreme court may remove judges of the appellate
and general court for cause, impeachment would not be normally
used to remove judges of the latter courts.
(In this connection, see Comment to sec. 4.19, Impeachment
.)
.

.

.

(e)
As has been explained, these inferior courts will be
uniform throughout the state.
(f)
Judicial salaries are to be fixed by statute, the only
limitation, which is intended to enhance judicial security
and independence, being the requirement that a judge's salary
may not be diminished during this term of office.

Section
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administrative director to serve at his pleasure and to supervise tho administrative operations of the judicial system.
Comment
A court system which administers justice and renders equitable
decisions may nevertheless be inadequate if inefficient administration leads to confusion and congested court calendars
lead to years of delay.
A court system consists of a great deal more than highly
qualified judges.
It is a large organization that employs
many, sometimes thousands of, persons clerks, bailiffs,
and maintains
stenographers, guards, probation officers, etc.
huge permanent files, systems of accounts for the collection
of fines and fees, and it must provide a vast administrative
machinery to keep court papers flowing in the proper channels.
All this requires administrative oversight and, in an integrated court system, it also requires unified administrative
planning at the top.

—

—

The chief judge of the supreme court, as the highest and most
influential officer of the court system^ logically should be
the responsible administrative head.
While, as in some states,
he may be advised in matters of administration by some judicial council or conference, good administrative practice demands that a single officer have ultimate responsibility.

The chief judge of the supreme court is given the power to
assign judges to serve where the need is greatest.
This
power is essential to equalize workloads and to prevent
calendars from getting years behind in some parts of the state-usually metropolitan centers--while courts in other areas may
The section limits the power of assignment to some
be idle.
extent in that assignment from a lower to a higher court or
from a higher to a lower court may be for temporary service
Thus an appellate court judge may be only temporarily
only.
assigned to serve as a trial court judge and vice versa.
On
each level, however, assignments may be made freely between
geographic departments and between functional divisions.

Administration is a major responsibility and a chief judge
who must also carry a full judicial load cannot discharge
both functions without adequate assistance.
An administrative
director is therefore provided.
The office has proved its
value in a number of states.
The duties of the administrative
director usually will include the formulation of the consolidated
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budget, development of personnel standards and office procedures, collection of statistics and other responsibilities
delegated by the chief judge.

Section

MOOl'L STATE CON.STITU'J' ON
I

tendency of rules to invade the area of substantive law, the
legislature is granted authority to change them by special
majority.
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Section 1.
THE JUDICIAL POWER.
The judicial power of the
State shall be vested exclusively in one Court of Justice
which shall be divided into one Supreme Court, one Court of
Appeals, one Trial Court of General Jurisdiction known as
the District Court, and one Trial Court of Limited Jurisdiction
known as the Magistrates' Court.

Committee Comment
It is contemplated to set up by this section a single unified
judicial system with a single court of original jurisdiction.

This follows the recommendation of advocates of judicial reform from Pound to Vanderbilt.
And this is one of the
recommendations made by the American Bar Association in 1938.
It is a reflection of the unfortunate experiences too many
states have had with multiple courts of original jurisdiction.

Thirteen states with large populations and consequently with
an extremely busy judicial system now provide for an intermediate appellate court.
It is expected that more and more
states will find this kind of a court to be a real aid in
dealing with problems of congestion in the appellate system.
The Model Judicial Article, therefore, provides for such a
court.

The titles of the trial courts may, of course, vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The ones chosen here are
merely for purposes of example.

Section

2.

THE SUPREME COURT.

Par. 1. Composition.
The Supreme Court shall consist of the
Chief Justice of the State and [four] [six] Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court.

Committee Comment
The question of the number of justices is not one which has

Prepared by the American Bar Association, Explanatory
notes prepared by the Committee on a Model Judicial Article,
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an ideal solution and the number may vary from state to
state.
The experience of the United States Supreme Court
would indicate that any number above nine has i)assed the
point of diminishing returns.
On the other hand, the numbcnmust be large enough to divide the tasks sufficiently to
give the justices ample time for reflection and deliberation
in the preparation of opinions.

The Committee is of the view that the number of justices
should be fixed by the Constitution to avoid such suggestions
as that of McReynolds when he was Attorney-General, adopted
by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in his court-packing plan,
to increase the number of justices in order to effect a
change in the substance of the Court's opinion.
The Committee is of the opinion that the Supreme Court should
not sit in divisions, but has not made provisions to prohibit
it.
Such a practice has been utilized by several state jurisdictions.
Its main purpose is, of course, to allow the high
court to increase the number of cases which it can hear in
order to overcome or prevent delay and congestion.
It must
be recognized, however, that decisions by divisions, even if
provided for by the Constitution, will not have the same force
and effect as a decision of the whole Court.
Moreover, sitting
in divisions creates the possibility of minority views on the
Court becoming controlling doctrine because of the accident
of the make-up of a division.
It is the Committee's belief,
therefore, that while divisions could be utilized for clearing
temporary congestion or delay, an intermediate appellate
court and/or a limitation on the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction are more appropriate long-term remedies.
Par.

2.

Jurisdiction.

Original jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court shall have no
original jurisdiction, but it shall have the power to issue
all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.

A.

Committee Comment
It is the view of the Committee that no original jurisdiction
be imposed on the high court.
That court lacks facilities
for the fact finding process inherent in every question of
original jurisdiction.
References to masters and referees,
in the pattern of the United States Supreme Court, do not
seem so adequate or desirable as requiring the case to enter
hi'
judiciiil sy;;Lom by way of the trial court.
I
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Silence on the question of the issuance of writs has generally been interpreted as authorizing the Supreme Court to
It is proposed to eliminate this
issue original writs.
power for the same reasons that call for the elimination of
By way of its appellate jurisdiction,
original jurisdiction.
the high court can review all grants or denials of writs
below and can properly, in the extraordinary cases, remove a
case from the lower court to the high court even before judgment on the petition for the writ has been made by the lower
court.

Appellate jurisdiction.
Appeals from a judgment of the
District Court imposing a sentence of death or life imprisonment, or imprisonment for a term of 25 years or more, shall
In all other cases,
be taken directly to the Supreme Court.
criminal and civil, the Supreme Court shall exercise appellate
jurisdiction under such terms and conditions as it shall specify
in rules, except that such rules shall provide that a defendant
shall have an absolute right to one appeal in all criminal
cases.
On all appeals authorized to be taken to the Supreme
in
criminal cases, that Court shall have the ^ower to
Court
review all questions of law and, to the extent provided by
rule, to review the sentence imposed.
B.

Committee Comment
The only categories of cases in which the Committee felt that
it was necessary to impose compulsory jurisdiction were those
involving the life of the defendant and those involving libMost
erty of the defendant for an extensive period of time.
For
cases.
capital
in
high courts now exercise this power
this purpose the Committee was unable to rationalize a distinction between capital cases and long-term sentences of
imprisonment.
As to all other matters it was believed that the appellate
power should be exercised in accordance with the demands of
the times.
On the question whether this allocation of power
should be in the Court or in the legislature, the Committee
chose the Court for several reasons.
Among others, these
reasons included: (1) the fact that such power in the Court
would enhance the independence of the judiciary; (2) the
fact that it would place the power to meet current problems
in the hands of those most likely to be expert in the subject; (3) the fact that the rule making power was more
flexible than the legislative power in its capacity to meet
the demands of judicial administration.
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The proposal that the appc?llato [lowor in criminal cases include the power to review stMitences is based an IIk> eflicacious use to which that power has been puL by the Couil ol
Recognizing the possibility
Criminal Appeals in England.
of undesirable imposition on the appellate process, the
Committee thought it desirable to leave the Court with the
power to limit the categories of cases in which sentences
would be reviewed.
The Court of Appeals shall
Section 3. THE COURT OF APPEALS.
consist of as many divisions as the Supreme Court shall
determine to be necessary. Each division of the Court of Appeals
shall consist of three judges.
The Court of Appeals shall hav e
no original jurisdiction, except that it may be authorized by
rules of the Supreme Court to review directly decisions of
administrative agencies of the State and it may be authorized
by rules of the Supreme Court to issue all writs necessary
In all
or appropriate in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
other cases, it shall exercise appellate jurisdiction under
such terms and conditions as the Supreme Court shall specify
by rules which shall, however, provide that a defendant shall
have an absolute right to one appeal in all criminal cases
and which may include the authority to review and revise
sentences in criminal cases.

Committee Comment
The necessity for intermediate courts of appeal, already
existent in thirteen states and likely to become necessary
in others, was the reason the Committee felt that provision
The
should be made in the Constitution for their creation.
appeals
court
would
be
to
hear
function
of
such
primary
a
in cases which the Supreme Court should not be expected to
The
handle because of the importance of its business.
jurisdiction of the court of appeals has, therefore, been
framed in the same terms, except for the Supreme Court's
compulsory jurisdiction, as is the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court itself.
The same reasons exist for allotting
the power to the Supreme Court rather than the legislature
to specify the jurisdiction.

Section

4.

THE DISTRICT AND MAGISTRATE'S COURTS.

Par. 1. Composition.
The District Court shall be composed
of such number of divisions and the District and Magistrate's
Courts shall be composed of such number of judges as the
Supreme Court shall determine to be necessary, except that
each district shall be a geographic unit fixed by the
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Every
Supreme Court and shall have at least one judge.
judge of the District and Magistrate's Courts shall be
eligible to sit in every district.

Committee Comment
The number of District Court judges and magistrates and
District Court divisions must be flexible in order to
allow for adjustment to new conditions.
The authorization
to provide for "divisions" was thought desirable in terms
of the need for specialized courts, such as probate and
divorce courts. But it was also thought to be desirable
that these specialized courts be manned by judges whose
functions need not be confined to such courts. Thus, all
branches will be administered as one court with no conflicts of jurisdiction and no waste of judicial manpower.
The Committee believed that the Supreme Court would be the
most expert body to decide how many judges and magistrates
are required in each district.
The authority of a district judge and magistrate to sit in
any district is complementary to the authority of the
Chief Justice to assign judges anywhere in the most efficient
use of judicial manpower.
2.
District Court Jurisdiction. The District Court
shall exercise general jurisdiction in all cases, except
in so far as original jurisdiction may be assigned exclusively to the Magistrate's Court by the Supreme Court
rules.
The District Court may be authorized, by rule of
the Supreme Court, to review directly decisions of State
administrative agencies and decisions of Magistrate's
Courts

Par.

3.
The Magistrate's
Magistrate's Court Jurisdiction.
Court shall be a court of limited jurisdiction and shall
exercise original jurisdiction in such cases as the Supreme
Court shall designate by rule.

Par.

Committee Comment
It was the Committee's view that cases involving minor
matters such as traffic offenses and small claims should be
delegated to magistrate's courts, and that this would be
necessary to avoid an unreasonably large number of district
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judges with general original jurisdiction.
It was also
thought that where the districts covered a large geographic
area or temporary congestion occurred in any district, magistrates might appropriately be used to relieve the district
court of undue burdens.
Because of the need for flexibility
in the use of such courts it was deemed best to leave the
terms and conditions of the magistrate's court jurisdiction
in the control of the Supreme Court by rule.

Section
Par.

1.

5.

SELECTION OF JUSTICES, JUDGES AND MAGISTRATES.

Nomination

ABA MODllL STATE JUDICIAL ARTICLE (1962)

Committee Comment
The requirements of citizenship and membership in the bar are
those which are usually demanded in the States.
The Committee
is of the view that no other qualifications should be specified,
The selection procedure will provide all other necessary safeguards, at the. same time allowing the nominating commission
the broadest opportunity to secure nominees of the highest
calibre.

Section

6.

TENURE OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES.

Term of Office. At the next general election followPar. 1.
ing the expiration of three years from the date of appointment,
and every ton years thereafter, so long as he retains his office,
every justice and judge shall be subject to approval or rejection by the electorate.
In the case of a justice of the Supreme
Court, the electorate of the entire State shall vote on the
question of approval or rejection.
In the case of judges of
the Court of Appeals, and the District Court, the electorate
of the districts or district in which the division of the
Court of Appeals or District Court to which he was appointed
is located shall vote on the question of approval or rejection.

Committee Comment
This provision also follows the American Bar Association plan.
The periods between appointment and election and between
election and re-election have no ideal duration.
They must
be long enough to permit the character of the judge's work
to become known, long enough so that competent persons will
not reject appointment for fear of hasty rejection by the
electorate.
But it must be short enough to remove reasonably
promptly judges who are not performing their functions
adequately.
Par.

2.

Retirement.

ABA MODEL STATE JUDICIAL ARTICLE (1962)
the opinion that the legislature should be Tree to fix
retirement age, so long as it does not reduce it below
sixty-five.

.1

The Committee has reluctantly chosen a fixed retirement age
rather than indefinite tenure because it is of the view that
the interests of sound administration of justice will be
better served by the possibility of retiring competent judges
than by risking the continuance in office of judges with
truly limited capacities.

Retirement for Incapacity. A justice of the Supreme
Par. 3.
Court may be retired after appropriate hearing, upon certification to the governor, by the Judicial Nominating Commission
for the Supreme Court that such justice is so incapacitated
as to be unable to carry on his duties.

Committee Comment
This provision follows the Alaska plan to have an independent
body make the determination whether a high court judge has
The nominating commisbecome incapacitated while in office.
sion seems to be a logical agency to charge with this responsibility.
The difficulties which seem to arise when this power
is put in the hands of fellow judges are avoided by this
process.
4.
Removal. Justices of the Supreme Court shall be
subject to removal by the impeachment process. All other
judges and magistrates shall be subject to retirement for incapacity and to removal for cause by the Supreme Court after
appropriate hearing. No justice, judge, or magistrate shall,
during his term of office, engage in the practice of law.
No justice, judge, or magistrate shall, during his term"~of
office, run for elective office other than the judiciaT
office which~he holds, or directly or indirectly make
any contribution to, or hold any office in, a political party
any political campaign.
or organization, or take part

Par.

m

Committee Comment
The first two sentences of this section derive from the New
The impeachment proJersey and Puerto Rican Constitution.
cess is not utilized with reference to lower court judges,
because it is the Committee's view that the Supreme Court,
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in Its ^5upcrviHory capacity over tlic judicial KysLom, is
better qualified and the more logical body to determine
the issues than is the legislature.

The last two sentences are for the purpose of requiring that
the judge devote his full time to his job as judge and to reSeveral
move all judges from politics to the extent possible.
judge
running
jurisdictions have had the sorry spectacle of a
for the governorship, accepting contributions from lawyers,
while retaining his judicial office.
etc.
,

Certainly this is conduct unbecoming a judicial officer and
hardly compatible with the idea of the safeguarding the
The last clause of
judicial system, from political ravages.
the last sentence is taken from the Missouri Judicial Article
Par.

29 No.

Section

7.

f.

COMPENSATION OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES.

1. Salary.
The salaries of justices, judges, and magistrates shall be fixed by statute, but the salaries of the
justices and judges shall not be less than the highest salary
paid to an officer of the executive branch of the State
government other than the governor.

Par.

Committee Comment
Certainly one of the greatest drawbacks to securing an
adequate judiciary has been the niggardly salaries which most
While the
of the States pay to their judicial officers.
Constitution
of
the
fact
that
Committee was cognizant of the
in
salaries
fix
to
appropriate
place
the State is not the
terms of dollars and cents, it was the hope of the Committee
that the lower limit set forth in this section would afford
some base for more adequate compensation for judges.
Par. 2.
Pensions.
Provision shall be made by the legislature
for the payment of pensions to justices and judges and their
widows.
In the case of justices and judges who have served
ten years or more, and their widows, the pension shall not be less
than fifty percent of the salary received at the time of the
retirement or death of the justice or judge.

Commit

L(H'

Commc^nl:

Again, the Committee understood that the pension program could
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It has endeavored
not be spelled out in the Constitution.
nevertheless to fix a floor on such pensions so that the
requirement of a pension does not become meaningless.

The compensation of
No Reduction of Compensation.
judge or magistrate shall not be reduced during
the term for which he was elected or appointed.

Par.

3.

a justice,

Committee Comment
This is the usual provision for the protection of judicial
independence by removing the legislative power to reduce
Without such a prothe salaries of judges while in office.
vision all attempts to secure tenure of office would be futile,

Section
Par.

1,

8.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE.

ABA MODEL STATE JUDICIAL ARTICLE (1962)
The Chief
the administration of the courts of the State.
Justice shall have the power to assign any judge or magistrate of the State to sit in any court in the State when he
deems such assignment necessary to aid the prompt disposition
of judicial business, but in no event shall the number of judges
and justices exceed the number of justices provided in section
2.
The administrator shall, under the direction of the Chief~
Justice, prepare and submit to the legislature the budget for
the court of justice and perform all other necessary administrative functions relating to the courts.

Committee Comment
The vesting of administrative authority in the Chief Justice
follows the recommendation of the American Bar Association.
The desirability of the concept has been proved by the experience in the New Jersey system which adopted such a method
of administering its courts.

Section

9.

ABA MODEL STATE JUDICIAL ARTICLE (1962)
and most conducive to the effective administration of justice
in the court system.

The last sentence of Section 9 contains language broad enough
to authorize the Supreme Court to deal with either an integrated
or an unintegrated bar of the State in connection with supervision of its members, discipline of its members, and other
regulation or supervision of the bar. The language is broad
enough to permit the Supreme Court to order an integrated state
bar to be organized as was done in Wisconsin.
If it is preferred that an integrated bar be a constitutionally created
corporation, the following sentences may be added to Section 9.
"The State Bar of
is a public
corporation, having, as an agency of the Supreme
Court, perpetual existence and succession.
Membership in it shall be a condition precedent to practicing law in this State.
The Supreme Court by appropriate orders may provide for its organization and its
regulation and supervision."

Section 10.
JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSION. There shall be
a Judicial Nominating Commission for the Supreme Court and
one for each division of the Court of Appeals and the District
Court.
Each Judicial Nominating Commission shall consist o7
seven members, one of whom shall be the Chief Justice of the
State, who shall act as chairman.
The members of the bar of
the State residing in the geographic area for which the court
or division sits shall elect three of their number to serve
as members of said commission, and the governor shall appoint
three citizens, not admitted to practice law before the courts
of the State, from the residents of the geographic area for
The terms of office and
which the court or division sits.
compensation for members of a Judicial Nominating Commission
shall be fixed by the legislature, provided that not more
than one-third of a commission shall be elected in any threeyear period.
No member of a Judicial Nominating Commission
shall hold any other public office or office in a politicaT
party or organization and he shall not be eligible for
appointment to a State judicial office so long as he ^s a
member of a Judicial Nominating Commission and for a perTod
of five years thereafter.

Committee Comment
prof)Ost>d Judicial Nominating Commission also follows the
American Bar AssociaLion plan, which recommended that the list
of nominees be made by an independent agency.
The make-up of
Tlio

-316-

ABA MODEL STATE JUDICIAL ARTICLE (1962)
the Commission could be a combination of a number of
variables.

The Committee feels, however, that no group should have
fixed representation and that all appropriate interests in
the State can be represented through appointments as provided
Provision is made for the participation of
in this section.
non-lawyers in the selection process.
The disqualifications
are self-explanatory.
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Courts subject to plan - appointments to fill
Section 29 (a)
Whenever
a vacancy shall occur in the office of
vacancies
of
any
of
the
following
courts of this state, to wit:
judge
luipreme
court,
the
courts
of appeals, the circuit and
Tlie
probate courts within the city of St. Louis and Jackson county,
and the St. Louis courts of criminal correction, the governor
shall fill such vacancies by appointing one of three persons
possessing the qualifications for such office, who shall be
nominated and whose names shall be submitted to the governor
by a nonpartisan judicial commission established and organized
as hereinafter provided.
.

Section 29 (b)
Adoption of plan in other circuits. At any
general election the qualified voters of any judicial circuit
outside of the city of St. Louis and Jackson county, may
by a majority of those voting on the question elect to have
the judges of the courts of record therein appointed by the
governor in the manner provided for the appointment of judges
to the courts designated in section 29 (a)
The general
assembly may provide the manner in which the question shall
be submitted to the voters.
.

.

Section 29 (c)
(1) Tenure of judges - declarations of
candidacy - forms of judicial ballot - ejection and retention.
Each judge appointed pursuant to the provisions of sections
29 (a) - (g) shall hold office for a term ending December 31st
following the next general election after the expiration of
twelve months in the office. Any judge holding office, or
elected thereto, at the time of the election by which the
provisions of sections 29 (a) - (g) become applicable to
this office, shall, unless removed for cause, remain in office
for the term to which he would have been entitled had the provisions of sections 29 (a) - (g) not become applicable to his
office. Not less than sixty days prior to the holding of the
general election next preceding the expiration of his term
of office, any judge whose office is subject to the provisions of sections 29 (a) - (g) may file in the office of
the secretary of state a declaration of candidacy for
election to succeed himself.
If a declaration is not so
filed by any judge, the vacancy resulting from the expiration
of his term of office shall be filled by appointment as herein provided.
.

Missouri Const. Art.

5,

Sec.

29
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If such a declaration is filed, his name shall be submitted
at said next general election to the voters eligible to vote
within the geographic jurisdictional limit of his court, or
circuit if his office is that of circuit judge, on a separate

judicial ballot, without party designation, reading:
"Shall Judge
(Here the name of the judge shall be inserted)

of the
(Here the title of the court shall be inserted)
Court be retained in office?
Yes
No."
(Scratch one)
If a majority of those voting on the question vote against retaining him in office, upon the expiration of his term of office,
a vacancy shall exist which shall be filled by appointment as
provided in section 29 (a)
otherwise, said judge shall unless
removed for cause, remain in office for the number of years
after December 31st following such election as is provided for
the full term of such office, and at the expiration of each
such term shall be eligible for retention in office by election
in the manner here prescribed.
;

Section 29 (c)
Certification of names upon declarations (2)
law applicable to elections
Whenever a declaration of candidacy
for election to succeed himself is filed by any judge under the
provisions of this section, the secretary of state shall not less
than thirty days before the election certify the name of said judge
and the official title of his office to the clerks of the county
courts, and to the boards of election commissioners in counties or
cities having such boards, or to such other officials as may hereafter be provided by law, of all counties and cities wherein the
question of retention of such judge in office is to be submitted
to the voters, and, until legislation shall be expressly provided
otherwise therefor, the judicial ballots required by this section
shall be prepared, printed, published and distributed, and the
election upon the question of retention of such judge in office
shall be conducted and the votes counted, canvassed, returned,
certified and proclaimed by such public officials in such manner
as is now provided by the statutory law governing voting upon
measures proposed by the initiative.
.

.

.

Section 29 (d)
Nonpartisan judicial commissions - number,
qualification, selection and terms of members - majority rule reimbursement of expenses - rules of supreme court. Nonpartisan
judicial commissions whose duty it shall be to nominate and
submit to the governor names of persons for appointment as
provided by sections 29 (a) - (g) are hereby established and
shall be organized on the following basis:
For vacancies in
.

t.!()

TIIF,

MISSOURI PLAN

(Ml'.IU'l'

SKf.KCT ION

)

*

the office of judge of the supreme court or of any court of
appeals, there shall be one such cominission to be known as
"The Appellate Judicial Cominission"; for vacancies in the
office of judge of any other court of record subject to the
there shall be one such
provisions of section 29 (a) - (g)
Circuit Judicial
commission, to be known as "The
Commission," for each judicial circuit which shall be subject
to the provisions of each judicial circuit which shall be
the
subject to the provisions of section 29 (a) - (g)
appellate judicial commission shall consist of seven members,
one of whom shall be the chief justice of the supreme court,
who shall act as chairman, and the remaining six members
The members of the
shall be chosen in the following manner:
bar of this state residing in each court of appeals district
shall elect one of their number to serve as a member of said
commission, and the governor shall appoint one citizen, not
a member of the bar, from among the residents of each court
of appeals district shall elect one of their number to serve
as a member of said commission, and the governor shall appoint
one citizen, not a member of the bar, from among the residents
of each court of appeals district, to serve as a member of
said commission; each circuit judicial commission shall consist of five members, one of whom shall be the presiding judge
of the court of appeals of the district within which the
judicial circuit of such commission or the major portion of
the population of said circuit is situated, who shall act
as chairman, and the remaining four members shall be chosen
The members of the bar of this state
in the following manner:
residing in the judicial circuit of such commission shall
elect two of their number to serve as members of said commission,
and the governor shall appoint two citizens, not members of
the bar, from among the residents of said judicial circuit,
to serve as members of said commission; the terms of office
of the members of such commission shall be fixed by the supreme
court and may be changed from time to time, but not so as to
shorten or lengthen the term of any member then in office.
No member of any such commission other than the chairman shall
hold any public office, and no member shall hold any official
position in a political party. Every such commission may act
The
only by the concurrence of a majority of its members.
members of such commissions shall receive no salary or other
compensation for their services as such, but they shall receive
their necessary traveling and other expenses incurred while
actually oncjagcd in the discharge of their official duties.
All sucli commissions sliall bo administered, and all elections
provided for under this section shall be held and regulated,
under such rules as the supreme court shall promulgate.
,

,

;

Section 29 (e)
Payment of expenses.
All expenses incurred in
administering sections 29 (a) - (g)
when approved by the
.

,
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supreme court, shall be paid out of the state treasury.
The supreme court shall certify such expense to the state
auditor, who shall draw his warrant therefor payable out of
funds not otherwise appropriated.

Prohibition of political activity by judges.
Section 29 (f
court
of
any
of record in this state, appointed to
No judge
in
office
in the manner prescribed in sections
retained
or
shall directly or indirectly make any contribution
29 (a) - (g)
to or hold any office in a political party or organization, or
take part in any political campaign.
)

.

,

Self-enforcibiljty
All of the provisions
Section 29 (g)
of sections 29 {a) - Tgl shall be self-enforcing except those
as to which action by the general assembly may be required.
.

-322-

APPENDIX G

JUDICIAL SYSTEM PROPOSED BY THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
Lcgislativo Program:
New Proposals For 1972 Report M-67
(Washington.
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 1-23
Source:

,
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ACIR JUDICIAL SYSTEM
JUDICIAL CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLE

A

from the

substantial part of the disorganization in most State-local criminal justice systems stems

confused character of the judicial process. Too often judicial systems suffer from lack of centralized court
administration, wide disparities in the qualifications for and conduct injudicial office, overly

cumbersome

procedures for judicial retirement and discipline and an over reliance on partisan methods of judicial
selection.

of a constitutional and statutory nature. The separation

Judicial reform in these matters needs to be

of powers necessitates the drafting of a model constitutional article that will be the basis for statutory
court reforms. The following draft constitutional article provides the fundamental construcl for
fied court system under the central direction of a

concerning judicial conduct,

(.1)

Supreme Court and

modernized procedures

(

a uni-

)

I

the chief justice, (2) unilonn rules

for judicial relircmciil, removal,

and discipline, and

(4) "merit" selection ol judges.

State judicial constitutional reform has enjoyed considerable support in the past three decades.

ginning with thorough reforms in Missouri in 1945 and
constitutions of Alaska and Hawaii in 1959, a
judicial articles.
(

Among

964), Nebraska

1

(

1

962

model constitutional

Jersey in 1947 and building on the

number of other

1

,

966),
is

New

New Mexico

(

1

966,

1

New York

967),

Be-

model

States have revised their constitutional

such States are CaUfornia (1966), Colorado (1966),

article

Missouri, Nebraska, and

New

(

1

96

Illinois

1

),

(1962), Michigan

and Oklahoma

(

1

967). This

derived from the various provisions of the Alaska, California, Hawaii,

Illinois,

Jersey constitutions as well as the model judicial constitutional articles of the

American Bar Association and the National Municipal League.

Suggested Constitutional Judicial Article

Section

1

I.

The Judicial Power. The judicial power of
which

the state

Supreme Court,

2

system] (one Court of Justice]

3

Court of General Jurisdiction, the geographic divisions of which

4

subdivisions of the Trial Court of General Jurisdiction

5

All

()

divisions

7

several courts shall have original

8

9

courts except the

shall include a

Supreme Court may be divided

known

2.

head of the

|a

[a

unified judicial

Court of Appeals,)

a Trial

be District Courts, (and special

as Courts of Limited Jurisdiction)

rules no( inconsistent with the law.

Tlic

and appellate jurisdiction as provided by law.

Court Administration. The chief justice
judicial

shall

vested in

into geographic districts and into functional

and subdivisions as provided by law or by judicial

Section
tive

,

is

system and

shall appoint,

ol the

Supreme Court

shall

be the execu-

with the approval of the Supreme Court, an

10

administrator and such assistants as the administrator deems necessary to supervise the administration

1

of the courts of the state. The chief justice with the approval of the Supreme Court,

12

judges from one court or division thereof to another) (assign judges to any court

13

to aid in the

14
1*1

may

(assign

in the state] in

order

prompt disposition of judicial business.

Section

.?.

(lalion, piiKljic

Rule Making Power. The Supreme Court
;iiiil

pincodiiic in

all

minis.

These nilcs
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shall

may

adopt rules governing the adminis-

W changed by the legislature by

a

2
1

ACIR JUDICIAL SYSTEM

1

Section

2
3

all

4.

Judicial Rules

of Conduct,

(b)

All

judges shall devote

full

5

the pructice of law or other gainful

6

the United States, this state or

7

contribution to, or hold any office

8

(a)

The Supreme Court

Section

5.

time lo judicial duties. Tlicy

employment. They

its civil

divisions.

in, a political

Commission on Judicial

shall

adopt rules of conduct for

They

shall

shall not,

while

in office,

engage

in

not hold any other public office under

alsi) shall

not directly or indirectly

make any

party or organization.

The

Qualifications.

legislature shall establish a

Commission

on Judicial Qualifications. The Commission may recommend to the Supreme Court the removal,

10

retirement, or discipline of any judge

1

of f>erforming

his judicial duties, or

who

who

the

Commission

finds

is

physically or mentally incapable

has persistently failed to perform his judicial duties or who,se

other conduct has been prejudicial to the administration of justice.

1

Section

13

6.

Judicial

Nominating Comtnissions. The

14

naling commission for the

\5

and

10

Iron) a

I

elected to each house.

judges.

4

9

members

|majority| [two-thirds] vote of the

7

IH

I

shall

Supreme Court and

the Trial Court of General Jurisdiction.
lisl

legislature shall establish a judicial

for each geographic division of (the
All

judges

shall

be appointed

initially

nomi-

Court of Appeals

by the Governor

of nominees submitted by the appropriate judicial nominating commission. Each judge

stand lor relcniion

in otiicc

on

a ballot

which

shall

be retained injudicial oltlcc for the prescribed term.
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OMNIBUS JUDICIAL ACT
This nalion's Skilc-local judicial systems siilTer I'lDni a

and

maladies. Court systems

fiscal

tion, exhibit disparate rules of practice
judicial selection, discipline,

The

result

To
tral

is

number of serious

administrative, structural,

most States arc highly Iragmented, lack central administrative

in

direc-

and procedure, have cumbersome and unprotessional procedures

removal, and retirement, and are often faced with a

critical lack

for

of funding.

too often a disorganized, inefficient |udicial system.

reclily this situation, IS Slates have unified their court systems,

court adnunislialoi, 17 Slates use the Missourr

I'lan for

.?.S

Slates have insliluled a cen-

selection and appoint men

of |udges; IX States

I

use judicial ([ualilications commissions to scrulini/e the perlormance of incumbent judicial personnel; Ibiu

assumed

Slates have

the age of 70.

The omnibus
Title

act.

II

may

luslice

judicial costs

and 22 States provide lor compulsory

reforms have resulted

judicial bill

is

divided into ten

more

in a

titles.

Title

efficienl

I

judicial retirement

and manageable

sets forth the

on or

altei

jiidiciaiy

purpose and ilelinilions of Ihe

delineates the structure of a unified judicial system and provides for the organi/.ation and juris-

diction of the

duel

all

All these Slate

is

supreme court, courl of appeals, and

made executive head of

(rial

courts of geiieia! and hmiteil

the judicial ilcpartmeni,

organize Ihe geographical divisions of Ihe courl ol appeals and Ihe

trial

The

|iiiisdiclioii.

and Ihe supieine courl

oi Ihe legislaluie

courts of general and limited

jurisdiction.

Title III structures the administrative responsibility for court operation. Part

A

creates a three-tiered

hierarchy of judicial administration making departmental justices and chief judges responsible to the chief
justice for the

conduct of court business. Part B provides for professional court administrators

to aid chief judicial personnel in their

management

responsibilities.

The

at all levels

office of the State court adminis-

management responsibilities at the highest judicial level and should be a guiding force in
more uniform court procedures, more flexible assignment of court personnel, and more continuous
scrutiny of the operations of the judicial system as a whole. The appellate and general trial court administrator centralizes

effecting

trators provide similar guidance in other courts.

Title
izes judicial

IV confers upon Ihe chief justice assignment power over judicial personnel and Title
rule-making power

in

the

supreme court and Ihe chief

Title VI specifies the (|Ualificalions lor judicial office anil the melhoil ol judicial selection

of judicial nominating commi.ssioiis that

izes the creation

judicial vacancy.

Title Vll provides for Ihe

shall select

nominees

It

lor appoinlmeiil lo

promulgation of

judicial qualifications

a

canon of judicial

commission

aiillioi-

any

ethics, full-time service forjudges,

to scrutinize the

commission may recommend

lo Ihe

discipline of judges

whose conduct may be deemed

and

performance of incumbent judges.

supreme court the

(i)

involuntary retirement

of judges due to mental or physical disability which hinders their judicial performance or

Title VIII

central-

Proceilures for nonpailisan election ol judges so appointed aie also sel loiih

Ihe institution of a judicial qualifications

The

V

justice.

(ii)

the removal or

prejudicial to the administration of justice.

mandates State assumption of court finances and the institution of centralized budget and

personnel procedures for the judicial system. Title IX makes judicial retirement mandatory at the age of
70.

It

also sets forth, in general terms, other conditions of retirement for judicial

Title

II is

department personnel.

modelled after Connecticut, Idaho, and Vermont laws on judicial organization. Title
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ACIH

is

dciivoil

.IUI)I("IAI,

.'SYSTEM

liom slututcs of the oviT iO Slates that have central court admmistratiirs.

adapted Irom

I'uerti)

Title VI

on "merit" selection oljudges

Title VII

I'ltles

IV and

V

are

Rico and Hawaii law respectively.

on judicial conduct

is

is

adapted Iroin Missouri and Nebraska laws.

designed alter California Supieme Court rules as well as Idaho, Ne-

braska, and Oregon laws on the subject.

Title VIII

is

modelled

after

Colorado law and parts of Title IX

are

adapted from Maine legislation.

Suggested Legislation

TITLE

I

PURPOSE AND DEFINITIONS
Sa/ioii

1

I.

The purpose of

htrposc.

is

to:

create a unified court system, subject to

(i)

and the supreme court,

to nistilute a corps of professional

2

central dnection by the chiel justice

^

com

4

tioii, (ill)

5

uniform rules on judicial conduct and judicial qualifications, (v) to provide

6

judicial personnel,

I

to provide

modeim/.ed procedures of judicial reliremeni and

and

(vi) to

mandate
As used

7

Section!. Definitions.

8

(I) "Judicial department"

9

(2) "Judge"

means

(4) "Director"

12

(5) "Departmental justice"

13

(6) "Administrator"

14

(7)

15

(8) "Nonjudicial personnel"

/

IS

assumption of

all

discipline, (iv) proinulgale

the chief justice of the state

state

government.
officer in the state.

supreme court.

office of the courts.

means the judicial administrative head of

means the general

trial

means

all

a judicial circuit.

court administrator of each judicial district.

means any person admitted

the state bar"

"merit" selection of

in this act:

means the head of the administrative

"Member of

for

court finances.

means any duly appointed or elected presiding judicial

1

till"

state

means the judicial branch of the

(3) "Chief justice"

Id

(ii)

aihniiuslialois to assist the chief |uslice and judicial associates in matters ol court adminislra-

10

I

this act

employees of the

to the practice of law in this stale.

judicial

department

who do

post of judge.
|('')

"Judicial ciicml"

means

a

(Id) "Judicial dislikl" nuMiis

geographical division of the stale
a

geographical division
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iil

comi

ol appeals.]

the stale goiicial

liial

com

I

noi hold

21

.

ACIR JUDICIAL SYSTEM
rnii;
lUDICIAI
Scctinii

1

DII'AKIMINr OkdANI/AI ION AND SIKlKllIKi;

(icitcral I'lun

I.

<>j

Ori^anrzalioit.

ofappeals anil)

2

supreme couil,

^

general

4

lish]

5

justice

6

be coextensive with the boundaries of the state.

court to be

known

1)1'

Section

2.

slalewide general

of

territorial jurisc)iclion

Supreme Court Organization. There

shall

courls

ol

llu-

shall

be the chiel

the judicial depailmenl

in

sli.ill

associate justices.

]

[

Sections. Supreme Court Jurisdiction. The supreme court

have

shall

Appeals to the supreme court from the [court ofappeals] [general

final appellate jurisdic-

court] are a matter of

10

tion.

1

right if a question

1

in

13

appeals] [general

14

tance that the case should be decided by the supreme court except that a defendant shall have an

15

absolute right to one appeal

l()

preme court

17

the extent provided by rule, to review and revise the sentence imposed.

and

18

under the Constitution of the United States or of

as a result of the action of the [court of appeals]

in

[Section

trial

criminal cases.

On

all

criminal cases, that court shall have the

4.

[general

court) certifies that a case decided by

in all

known

20

determine to be necessary] [may be established by law]

21

consist of

22

scribed by [the rules of the supreme court]

23

[Sections. Jurisdiction of the Court

geographical divisions

one chief judge and

]

[

trial

court] or

if

the [court of

appeals aulhori/cd to he lakcii lo ihc su-

as judicial circuits as [the

associate judges.

time

this state arises for the first

(o review

all

questions ollaw and, lo

Organization of the Court of Appeals. The court ofappeals

many

supreme court

shall

Each

judicial circuit

The court

shall sit at the

.

[the chief justice]

shall consist

of as

from time to lime

of the court

shall

times and places pre-

.]

of Appeals. Appeals from

final

judgments of

a general

court are a matter of right to the court ofappeals in the judicial circuit in which the general

24

trial

25

court

26

cases

27

all

2S

trial

involves a question of such impor-

it

power

19

is

;i

be one supreme court which shall be the

highest court of the state and shall consist of a chief justice and

9

idmsinI oI

supreme couii may csiab-

department

judicial

all

s(;i(i' sliiill

and such subdivisions

trial coiiil

The executive head of the

.

supreme court. The

the

a

Ihc

Tla- jiiilicwil tk'p:irlriR'nt ol

as trial courts uf limited jurisdiction as |tlie

|may be established by law|

7
8

trial

|a coiirl

ii

trial

located except in (a) criminal cases directly appealable to the supreme court and (b) criminal

where there has been an acquittal. The court ofappeals

shall exercise appellate jurisdiction in

other cases under such terms and conditions as the supreme court shall spccily by rule.|

Section

6.

General Trial Court Organization. There

29

statewide jurisdiction. The general

M)

supreme court

shall

from time

trial

shall

be one general

court shall consist of as

to lime delerinine lo be neces.sary
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|

jas

trial

court having

geographical divisions as

may

j

(he

be established by law)
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[The boundaries of judicial

1

2

supreme court

3

judge of each

4

adequate

5

in session as

6
7

^

These courts

11

are a part.

-^

14

by

of court business.

Trial

8.

where

in its geographical area

hold continuous sessions or be

trial

trial

court shall have original juris-

and exceptions by the supreme court.

Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, (a) The supreme court

may

authorize

courts of limited jurisdiction as functional subdivisions of the general

tlie es-

court.

trial

be under the general direction of the chief judge of the judicial district of which they

shall

[These courts

shall exercise jurisdiction in

such cases as the supreme court

(These courts shall exercise original jurisdiction

rule.)

shall also designate the chicl

shall

It

The general

Jurisdictionof General Trial Court.

7.

tablishment of

10

I

and

district

often as the chief justice Hnds that the caseload of each district requires.

Section

(b)

each

Hie

judicial circuits in tiie si.iic.|

tlie

The court may hold sessions anywhere

facilities exist for the disposition

diction, subject to appeal

12

be coiiluincd within

shall designate the principal ul'fice in

district court.

Section

8

districts shull

in the case

may

designate

of criminal misdemeanors and

violations of municipal ordinances.]

TITLE

III

COURT ADMINISTRATION
PART A
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATORS
Section

1

be the executive

head of the judicial department and be responsible for the efficient operation thereof, for the expedi-

3

tious dispatch of litigation therein,

4

tice

5

essary for the efficient operation of the courts

may

require reports from

[Section

[appellate and) general

8

Departmental justices

9

their circuits.

Section

I

1 1

I

courts in the state and

all

may

trial

shall

issue rules

The chief jus-

in all courts.

and regulations

as

may

be nec-

and the prompt and proper administration of justice.
shall

appoint from the ranks of

all

court judges a departmental justice for each judicial circuit in the state.

be responsible to the chief justice for the efficient operation of courts

The departmental

justice shall be assisted in his duties

by an appeals court

administrator.)

.'
I

and for the proper conduct of business

Departmental Justices. The chief justice

2.

7

10

I

shall

2

6

I

Chief Justice as Executive Head of Courts. The chief justice

1.

.i.

Kill (lir niii^'.i-s

loi

.11

I'd
I

1

1

I

III-

1

Hvery general

Chief Jiuigcs.
III

by

llir ilisliiil

iiislli r

I
I

III'

>

I

he

I

lie

I

|

trial

court district shall have a chief judge selected

depart inoiitiil justice

|ll(l).'r

s\\M

in

lie icspniisilili'
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I

ho ciiiuil

In

I

III'

in wliiili (lie ilislriil

[(Icpai

I

llli'lllal |lls(li(-|

is

|cliu-l

in

.
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1

juslicel

(i)i

2

his duties

3

justice]

I

he ell icieni operation ol

by a general

4

Section

5

(

(>

IV

lille

111

his district,

liach chief judge shall be ussislcd

court administrator as directed by the |departmental justice]

Administrative Powers oJChicJ Justice.

assign or reassign

)

I

4.

trial

courts

llic

all

in

the slate as described

in

ol iliisacl.

7

(2) exercise powers of general fmanciai nianagemenl as detailed

8

{}) exercise

''

(ciiiel'

The chief justice of the supreme court may:

department personnel to any courl

judicial

iii

all

olhei powers as the supreme couil shall

deem

in lille

VIII of this acl.

necessaiy lo insure the propei

adminislralion of justice.

PART

B

STATE COURT JCOURT OF APPEALS,] AND GENERAL TRIAL
COURT ADMINISTRATORS
Section

1

I.

There

Creation of the Office.

is

hereby established a state office known as the

2

administrative office of the courts.

3

chief justice to serve at his pleasure.

4

necessary for the performance of duties of the office.

Section

5

2.

Qualifications

It

shall

be supervised by a director

The director may appoint

of the

Director,

6

personnel shall have whatever qualifications as

7

provided that no personnel

H

nor hold any other office or employment.

''

l;iw]

.

The

I

Section

11

(

be appointed by the

and other employees

Compensation of Employees. The director and other

may

be prescribed by [law] [the supreme court]

the office shall be engaged directly or indirectly in the practice of law

J.

Powers and Duties. The

The compensation of

the director shall be Jprescribed by

diiector, under the direction ol the chiel justice, shall:

carry on a continuous survey and study of the organization, operation, condition ol busi-

)

and procedure of the

12

ness, practice

13

justice concerning the

14

efficient administration of justice.

15

assistants

shall

director shall fix the compensation of the personnel tinder his supervision.)

10

I

in

who

judicial

department and make recommendations

lo the chief

number of judges, other judicial personnel, and prosecutors required

for the

(2) examine the status of the dockets of all courts so as to determine cases and other judicial

beyond

months and make reports thereon. From such

16

business that have been delayed

17

the director shall indicate

18

mcndations to the chief justice concerning the assignment or reassignment of personnel to courts

19

that are in

20

as to the

which courts

[

]

are in

reports,

need of additional judicial personnel and make recom-

need of such personnel. The director

shall also carry out the directives

assignment or reassignment of personnel
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in

these instances.

of the chief justice

1
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(3) investigate complaints with respect to the operation o\ the courts.

1

(4) examine the statistical systems of the courts and

2
3

system of judicial

4

latiiig

used

in all state courts.

(6) assist

S

bulion thereof.

a.ssigiiiiieiii

preparing assignment calendars of

of icrm parts, judges and justices, and

12

(i)

13

(ii)

(ill)

maintain
prepare

fiscal

llic

all

requisitions for the

chief justice regarding hours of court, the

publication of judicial opinions.

payment of state monies appropriated

for the mainte-

prepare budget estimates of state appropriations necessary for the maintenance and

(iv)

collect slatislical

IS

expenditures of public monies

U)

judicial system;

20

(v)

develop

a

make recommendations with

respect tiicreto;

and other data and make reporls to Ihe chief justice

|,

uniform

both state and

set

local,) for the maiiitenaiice

relating to the

and opeiatioii of

of accounting and budgetary accounts for

all

(vi)

fix the

llxed pursuant to

24

courts in the state

(9)

title

compensation of

all

nonjudicial personnel

whose compensation

not otherwise

is

Vill.

examine the arrangements

for the use

and maintenance of court

facilities

and supervise the

25

purchase, distribution, exchange, and transfer of judicial equipment and supplies thereof.

26

(10) act as secretary to the judicial council and prepare for an annual conference of

judges of

(II) submit an annual report to the chief justice, legislature, and governor of the activities and

accomplishments of the office for the preceding calendar year.

30
31

all

courts of record to discuss recommendations for the improvement of the administration of justice.

28
29

(lie

court system;' and

22

27

distri-

controls and accounts of funds appropriated for the judicial system;

operation of the judicial system and

17

23

(lie

judges and attend to the printing and

nance and operation of the judicial system;

15

21

ail

(8) act as fiscal olTicer of the courts and in so doing:

1

16

in

(7) implement standards and policies set by

^>

14

director shall also collect and analyze statistical and other data re-

to the business of the courts.

7

10

The

uniform

for a

(5) prescribe uniform administrative and business methods, systems, forms, and records to be

5
(i

statistics.

make recommendations

(

ilie

I

2)

chief

attend to other matters consistent with the powers delegated herein as
[iisiice.

Soriu- Nlali-s

.ilsi> li;ivi-

llu-

ilini

l<if sirvi- ;is llic

aiulilDr
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may be

assigned by

21
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[Section

1

Appeals Court Administrator: Creation.

4.

2

circuit, subject to the approval

3

assist

4

the departmental justice

5

personnel as

6

him

of 4lie

administrative duties.

in his

may

and he

chiel" justice, shall

Tlie di'parlmontal justice ol each ludicial

appoint an appeals court administrator to

The appeals court administrator

shall, subject to the

be necessary to enable him to perform the duties of

liis

trict,

subject to the approval of the chief justice, shall appoint a general

8

assist

him

')

and he

10

shall, subject to the

personnel as

may be

Section

1

titm

1

The administrator

office.]

The chief judge of each judicial

7

admuiistrative duties.

trial

him

shall serve at the pleasure olllie

,

general

employ such olhei

court adminislratoi

trial

(administrator] and (their) (his) employees shall have whatever qualilkations

14

pursuant to

1

other office or employment. The compensation of

16

istrator]

17

act.

title

may be

tlie

(appeals court and general

Compliance with Requests for Information.

19

[the attorney general, and

20

director for information and statistical data bearing

21

information as

22

courts.

23

the performance of his duties.

The

(

prescribed

VIII of this act except that they shall not engage in the practice of law nor hold any
trial

(administrator] and [their] [his] employees shall be prescribed pursuant to

7.

judge

[Appeals court and[ General Trial Court Administrator: Qualijications. Coinpensa-

6.

and Employees. The [appeals court administrator and

Section

(.liiel

to perform the duties of his office.

13

18

dis-

court administrator to

approval of the (departmental justice] (chief justice)

necessary to enable

of

approval of the chief justice, employ such other

Sections. General Trial Court Administrator: Creation.

in his

shall serve at the pleasure

all

district attorneys] shall

may be needed

All

court admin-

title

VIII of this

employees of the state court system

promptly comply with the requests of the

on the business of the courts and such other

to carry out the lawful duties of the administrative oftice of the

director shall be assisted by

all

Jappeals court and) general

trial

court administrators

in

TITLi; IV

ASSIGNMENT OF JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL
1

Section

I.

Assignment Powers of Chief Justice. The chief justice
employees of the

department of the

2

of the director,

3

assignments to various parts of the judicial department as the need

4

all

judicial

state

shall supervise,

and

may

with the aid

assign, reassign, or

modify

require.

Section!. Assignment Powers of [ DepartmentalJustices andj Chief Judges, [(a) Subject to the

5

authority of and upon consultation with the chief justice, departmental justices shall have the power

6

to assign or reassign judges to

conduct sessions of the respective courts

•332-

in their judicial circuit as the

2
3
5
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business of those courts

1

>

may

require.

performing these tasks, the departmental justices

In

shall

be

aided by the appeals court administrator.]

power over judges

(b) Cliief judges shall have general supervisory

3

4

subject to the assignment

5

require.

Section

6

power of [departmental

They

in their courts.

justices and] the chief justice as the situation

Compensation for Assignment or Reassignment. Any employee of the

J.

shall

on

7

partment, when reassigned to any court

H

oul additional compensation but shall be reimbursed for

*>

a result ol such reassignment.

in this state

less

all

be

may

judicial de-

than a permanent basis, shall serve with
reasonable expenses actually incurred as

TITLE V

RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Section

1

form

3

revise

4

house of the

5

have the force and effect of law.

rules regulating practices

such rules at

its

2.

in all

All rules

The supreme court

adoplion ol any gencinl lulc or aiiiendnicnl (hereof.

10

criminal and
bar,)

I

which

i.

civil

Section

1

4.

make

uni-

when duly promulgated.

shall

than

less

(

]

procedures rules committee

(,

the

members of which

supreme court and the director

and administration of general

rules of practice

governing the general business of and practice

1

become immediately

in

may

promulga-

prescribe uniform rules

in the state.

Such

rules shall

by the chief justice.

TITLE Vi
JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND SELECTION
S((li,'n

I

.?

litis

slale land

I.

.luiluuil (Jiuilifinitions.

.shall

possess

(lie

All \\n\p-\ in tins slate sliall

lullowiii^ addiluuial (|iialiliealioiis:

-333-

a

be members of the stale

and procedure.

any of the courts

effective as of the date fixed

apply to

may appoint

in the preparation, revision,

General Rules of Court Business. The chief justice

14

shall

shall

days before the

Cnniinal am/ Civil Procedures Rules Committee. The supreme cuurl

shall assist the

tion, publication

1

this act shall,

provide for a public hearing not

H

SciliiiN

shall

Nature of Uniform Rules. Uniform rules of practice and procedures

all

»>

The supreme court

courts of the judicial department and thereafter

and regulations made under

7

courts.

Court.

discretion subject to modification by a [majority] [two-thirds] vote of each

legislature.

Section

Supreme

in

and procedures

2

6

I

Rule Making Powers Vested

1.

he liiensed In piaclice law
|.

in

51
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Sec lion

1

Judicial

2.

supreme court

Nominating Commissions.

Tlie re shall be

one nomliiuliiig cominissioii

lor

court of appeals) and one judicial nominating commission lor each general

2

llie

3

trial

4

judge

5

sons possessing the qualifications for such office

()

submitted to the governor by the appropriate judicial nominating commission established and organ-

7

i/.od as licrcaricr

|;uid

court district. Alter [insert appropriate date] whenever a vacancy shall occur

any court

in

in tliis state,

piovidcd. All

X

lails loi

|4S| days to

'>

|uslice|

lanolliei set

10

siicli

of Ihiee

such vacancy by appointing one of three per-

fill

who

be nominated and whose names

shall

appoinlincnis shall be lor

the appointment,

|il

nominees

(|iialified

Section

shall In-

shall

[

]

Composition of Commissions. Each

3.

members. Members of the

13

nominating commission

14

to confirmation

pcrind nl

a

made

yeai

|

|

|s|

lioni suili nomiiu-cs by

.

I(

llie

be

shall

llie

govoinor

duel

be submillod by the nomiiialing comnnssioii

by the

state bar shall elect

in the judicial district

legislature,

members of

{

]

(

judicial

]

where they

judges, and

[

)

nominating commission

of their number to act

citizens

judges, nor

16

justice shall be an ex officio

17

and court of appeals.] [[Departmental justices] [Chief judges[

18

judicial

19

terms shall be for

20

Section

4.

]

member of

years.

Restrictions

for the judicial districts over

shall

reelection lo a judicial nominating commission.)

2.^

appointed to the commission as judges and ex officio members,

24

a

25

acts of judicial

26

members.

Section

a

member of

nominating commissions

commissions
5.

shall

No member

commission and

that

shall

shall

(The chief

supreme court

jurisdiction.]

All

terms]

on Members. Members of judicial nominating commissions

22

All

appoint, subject

be ex officio members of the

[Insert language to provide for staggered

[Members

the

are neither judges, retired

which they have

hold any other elective or salaried public office.

is

members of

shall

the judicial nominating commission for the

21

judge as long as he

who

as

shall consist of

the state bar to each judicial nominating commission in the state.

nominating commissions
[

The governor

reside.

1

27

of

to the governor).

1

12

make

the governor shall

in the office

shall not

not be eligible lor rcappoinlmcnl or

of the commission, except members
shall

be eligible for appuinlmeni as

for a period of

|

[

years thereafter. All

be made with the concurrence of a majority of

its

operate in accordance with rules promulgated by the supreme court.

Nominating Procedures.

In the event of a judicial vacancy, the

chairman of the

members of the commission and sched-

28

appropriate judicial nominating commission shall notify other

29

ule a public hearing to

30

notice of such hearing to be published by the various

31

judicial

32

vacancy.

i.^

orally or in writing, his views concerning candidales for Ihe judicial vacancy.

be held on qualified nominees for the vacancy. He

shall also

cause appropriate

news media and make known the

interest of the

nominating commission to receive information relating to qualified applicants for the judicial

Any member of

the public shall be entitled to attend the public hearing lo express, either

UA-

Allor

llic

public

2
7
1
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1

liLMriiig,;i iudici;il iioDiiiutiiig

coininission shull

2

uiiy indo|)ciidcii( iiivcsligution

}

dieates lot

4

rence ol a majority ol

5

[11

the

und inquiry

it

liolil

any udditional |confidcnlial| meclings and mukc

nominating commission, upon the concur-

judicial vacancy. Thcrealter, the judicial

tlie

its

members,

shall

determine the qualifications ol can-

dcoiiis necessary to

recommend

three qualified nominees for the judicial vacancy.

comnussion cannot name three qualified nominees within

(>

cancy, the governor, subject to the confirmation of the legislature,

7

the judicial vacancy.]

Section

8

9

torial

Election of Judges,

6.

appointment and every

and the secretary of state no

10

officials

1

the

1

ballot

13

another term. The elections

name of each judge who has

14
15

less

filed

shall

appoint a qualified judge to

desiring to retain his office after initial guberna-

than

]

[

days before the said election. At the election

such a certification

shall

be submitted to the voters, on the

without party designation, on the sole question of whether he

(b)

be conducted

in the

The affirmative votes of a majority of

shall

be retained

in office for

appropriate judicial [circuits or] districts.

qualified voters voting

on the question

shall retain

a judge in office lor the prescribed term.

Id

(c)

Any judge

failing to file a declaration

1

office at the expiration of his term. His

18

and

of candidacy or

vacancy

shall

be

who

fails

reelection shall vacate his

according to procedures of sections 2

filled

5 of this title.

Section

19

Compensation of Commissions. The members of judicial nominating commissions

7.

20

[who

21

members

22

for all reasonable

23

nominating commissions

24

may

va-

years thereafter shall certify his candidacy to the proper election

]

[

Any judge

(a)

months of the judicial

]

|

are public officials] shall receive
shall

Section

be

8.

eligible for a per

salary or other

compensation for

diem compensation of [$50]

expenses incurred
shall

no

in the discharge

be included

of their

in the judicial

Unlawful Influence of Commissions.

.]

All

their service.

[All other

members may be reimbursed

official duties.

The budgets of all

department operating budget.

It shall

be unlawful and a breach of ethics for

25

any judge, public officeholder, lawyer, or any other person or organization to attempt to influence

26

any judicial nominating commission

27

opinions relevant to the judicial qualifications of the proposed nominees, at the times and

28

manner

2''

of Ihe supreme

M)

ciplme or removal as piovided for

set

forth in section 5 of this
coiirl.

in

any manner and on any

title.

basis except

facts
in

and

the

Violation of this section shall be considered as contempt

Violation of (Ins .section by any judge of this state
in (ille

by presenting

VI of

-335-

(his act.

.shall

be grounds for

dis-
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mil

VII

JUDKIAI, CONDUt'l
Section

1

I.

Judicial

Canon of Ethics. After due

notice and hearing, the supreme court shall

2

adopt and put into effect canons of judicial ethics which

3

Any

4

sections 5 through 8 of this

all

judges.

violations of these canons shall be grounds for removal or retirement or discipline as provided in

Section

5

2.

lillc.

hull lime .ludf^cy

(a)

All

judges shall dcvolc

lime to their judicial duties. Dur-

lull

<i

ing Ins (crm o( office a judge shall not practice law noi shall he be

7

person

S

or hold a public ofUce under the United Stales, this State, or any of

')

of office.

10

(b)

1

conduct of

shall j-overn the

in

the practice ot law.

Any judge

provided for

A judge

shall also not

ilie

partner or associate of any

hold any other einploymeiil or posilioii of profit
ils civil

divisions during his term

violating section 2(a) of this title shall be subject to removal or discipline as

in sections 5

through 8 of

this title.

Sections. Grounds for removal and Suspension, (a) Without recourse to the commission on

12

supreme court

suspend any judge from office without salary when he

13

judicial qualifications, the

14

pleads guilty or no contest or

1

under state or federal law or any other crime that involves moral turpitude under the law.

16

conviction

1

suspension. If his conviction becomes final, the supreme court shall remove

18
I''

(b)

found guilty

reversed, suspension terminates

is

All

Section

general

in a

and he

4.

foi in .seclions

Commission on Judicial

hereby established which

of

members of

23

judges, or persons admitted to the practice of law.

24

years.

25

be

26

for the

27

term prescribed by the commission.

29

30
3

shall consist

the stale bar (elected

|

|

by that body[

,

and

(Insert language to provide staggered terms.]

member of the commission,

I

)

5.

retired

formance of

him from

his office.

A

coniinission on judicial qualilicalions

(

(

citi/ens

Members

shall

Whenever

a

may by

from office

his duties

which

shall not

member

|

|

be judges, retired

be appointed for

shall elect

one of

its

members

Grounds for Retirement or Removal. Any judge,
title,

who

,

a

term of

(

[

resigns, dies, o' ceases to

the appointing authority as herein provided shall appoint a successor

unexpired term. The commission

described in this
(

If his

be paid his salary for the period of his

judges (appointed by the chief justice!

22

Section

court of a crime punishable as a felony

ihis title.

Qualifications.

IS

28

shall

through H of

.S

21

a

trial

other proceedings for removal shall be conducted througli Ihe judicial qualifications

comnussioii as provided

20

is

shall

in

to serve as a chairman for the

accordance with the procedures

action of the supreme court be:
for
is,

any physical or mental disabihty seriously interfering with the per-

or

is

likely to

become, of

Mf.

-

a

permanent character.

2
1

ACIR JUniCl/^l,
(2) disciplined or ri;nu)vcd

1

I

I'YSTI'.M

roin ol lice lor action occurring williin

|

)

years belure iho

2

commencement of his

3

sistent failure to

4

commission, or any other conduct deemed prejudicial to the administration of justice or that brings

5

the judicial office into disrepute.

6
7

Secrlon

6.

current term which constitutes willful misconduct

perform

his duties, habitual

Powers of I he Commission,

intemperance, unlawful influence of

(a)

The commission

shall have,

a judicial

nominating

but not be limited to,

hold hearings and subpoena witnesses and exercise requisite process powers;

(

9

(2) to require a judge to submit to physical or mental examination

10

I

)

to

(3) to
investigators

(4)

1

commission;

14

(5) to
its

make independent
employed by

by

qualified medical experts;

by members of the commission, or by

investigations either

special

the commission or by the office of attorney general;

to hold confidential hearings with all parties involved in the proceedings before the

13

15

and per-

the following powers:

8

1

in office, willful

employ

investigators, medical experts

and such other employees as the commission

discretion determines to be necessary to carry out

its

iii

functions and purposes.

(b) All personnel of the judicial department of this state shall cooperate with and give reason-

16

and information to the commission and any authorized representative thereof

17

able assistance

18

connection with any investigations or proceedings within the jurisdiction of the commission.

19

shall

20

orders of the commission throughout the state.

be the duty of any law enforcement officer of this state to serve process and execute

Section

21

7.

Procedures of the Commission, (a) The commission on

22

complaint of any citizen

23

judge

24

the commission.

25

initiate

No

specified

form of complaint

The commission may make such

shall

investigation as

deems necessary

it

27

ing to be held before

2S

recommend

2'>

judge against

30

(c)

may

31

tion

32

finds just

^^

wholly

the complaint

The supreme court

shall

pcrinil (he inlrodiiction

is

order a confidential

discipline, as the case

may

licar-

may

be, ol

liu-

filed.

review the record of the commission proceedings and

of additional evidence.

and propci,aiid may order

reject llie

may

to verify or refute the

concerning the complaint. After confidential hearing, the commission

supreme court the retirement, removal, or

whom

or on the

be required.

substance of the complaint. After such investigation, the commission

to the

lawful

commission or to any member of

26

it

own motion

also

It

proceedings for the retirement, discipline, or removal of any

All citizen complaints shall be directed to the

in the state.

(b)

may

its

all

in

llic

Il

shall

removal, discipliiu-, oi

recommendation. Upon an order
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make

in its discre-

whak'vi-i dolorTniniilions

lolircniciil

of

llic

judge, oi

il

may

for reliremenl, llie |iidge shall llieicby be uMiioJ
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I

Willi

I

s.iilK'

III'

I

.mil

i^'Jils

jililpi's

.'

H'liicliii'iil

.1

salary shall cease liuiii

4
5

111

The

(d)

|>i ivili-)')-'. .i\

)|iiili

I

.111

(e)

No

7

(0

All papers filed

act of the

9

vestigated.

(g)

12

1. II I

ii'liii'il

iciiiiiv.il.

I

111'

pill

'.11.11

lUilf-'i'

1

Ik

1

'.1 1.

1

II

oIIii'i

No members

|iiiivisii>ii

iiniiivi'il

Im

Im

iiieli(;it)U'

I

.

nun

nl

nil

l.iu

Ill

1

1>

.iml

i

|iiJicial uIIki- loi

He

shall

I

l|l^

|

yeais.

|

may become

shall

its

members.

be confidential and the

public record with the consent of the judge being in-

or employees of the commission shall disclose or use any commission

No judge who

is

in

member of the commission

a

any proceedings involving

or of the supreme court shall

his

own

sit

on

the

discipline, removal or retirement.

Sections. Rights of Judicial Defendants in Commission Action, (a) In any proceeding involvhave the right and reasonable opportu-

14

ing a judge's discipline, removal, or retirement, the judge

1

nity to defend himself against complaints

16

counsel, and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

17

subfHjenas for attendance of witnesses to testify or produce books, papers, or other evidentiary

18

matter.

sltall

by the introduction of evidence,

He

shall also

to be represented

by

have ihe right to the issuance of

(b) In any proceedings under this act, the judge under investigation and his counsel shall be

19
given

21

22

ol

or communications in any other than their official duties.

commission or the court

13

20

In

III)'

each order

shall certify

be valid unless concurred in by a majority of

with and proceedings before the commission

record filed by the commission

1

fill

I

1

and the chief justice.

commission

8

files,

III'

director shall be the commission's executive secretary.

the commission to the governor

records,

1

dale ol such oidei. lie shall be

llie

6

10

null'

1

[

(c)

a

days advance notice of such proceedings.

]

A judge

is

recommendation

23

Section

disqualified

to the

from acting

Voluntary Retirement for Disability.

9.

mental or physical disability

25

of his disability; and the commission

26

recommendation.
Section

10.

without

supreme court by the commission

24

27

as a judge,

shall certify to the

may

loss

desiring to retire

and the nature

his request for retirement

order a medical examination and

make

a report

Budget and Compensation of Commission The judicial department

29

sion.

30

pensation.

31

be reimbursed for

32

bors of the commission.

[Other members
all

shall

[who hold other

salaried public office] shall serve

be eligible for a per diem compensation of [$50]

.]

and

shall

responsible for preparing and presenting to Ihe legislature proposed annual budgets for the
the commission

pending

on the grounds of

28

Members of

is

for his removal or retirement.

Any judge

commission

of salary, while there

be

commis-

without com-

Members

reasonable expenses incurred by them in connection with their duties as

-338-
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TITLK

COUKT
SiTlidii

1

2

I'l

RSONNI

Slalc Hcspniisihililv Jor Cniiit

t

VIII

AND

I

I

liiiaiiits.

INANCI S
Altci

liiiscil :ippi(ipii;ilo il;ilc|

(lie

li-^',isl;i

lure shull appropriiile funds lor the expenses ol (he judicial depailiiieiil.

Sec lion

3

2.

Court Personnel and Compensation,

by

(a)

Alter (insert appropriate date] the chiel

courts in the judicial department.

4

justice shall prescribe

5

Such

a plan shall include:

(1

shall

be assigned and

7

positions which shall include education, experience, special skills, and legal knowledge;

K

outline of duties to be performed in each position and class of positions; (iv) the

')

and part-time positions, by position

rule a personnel classification plan for
a basic

(i)

may be

all

compensation plan of pay ranges to which

reassigned;

(ii)

title

qualifications for

and

all

nonjudicial positions and classes of

each court

classification, in

classes of positions

an

(iii)

number of

lulltiiiie

in the state; (v) the proce-

10

dures for and regulations governing the appointment and removal of nonjudicial personnel; (vi) the

I

procedures for and regulations governing the promotion of nonjudicial personnel; and

I

and vacation time and

amount, (erms, and conditions of

1

including annual allowance and accumulation thereof, and hours of

14

employnient.

15

(b)

The chief justice,

compensation and

16

the

1

employment

18

in

promulgating rules as

classification plans, vacation

justice, prepare annually a consolidated operating

21

(he judicial department operating budget.

22

general

trial

(b)

2.1

and

by the administrative office of the courts

20

He

legislative
in the

departments. The chief

implementation of

all

be assisted

courts in the slate to be

in this task

this section.

approval of the chief

shall, subject to the

budget for

shall

account

and sick leave provisions, and other conditions of

Sections. Operating Budgets, (a) The director

19

work and other conditions of

set forth in this section, shall take into

applicable to the employees of the executive

justice shall be aided

the

fringe benefits for court personnel,

1

sick leave

(vii)

by

all

known

as

[appeals cour( and]

court administrators.

The

director shall prepare the consolidated court budget according to procedures prescribed

Budget requests

24

by (he

2.S

and other additional information

2()

the joint budget

27

include his recommendations for court appropriations by [insert appropriate date] and the legislature

28

shall

2')

reconuiiendations and the availability of stale funds.

.'0

|state

budget officer| (and the joint budget committee of the legislature!

(c)

The

as requested shall be transmitted to the [state budget officer|

committee of the

make appropriations

.

legislature)

to courts based

by

[insert appropriate date)

.

The governor

shall

on an evaluation of the budget request, the governor's

dirccliM. subject to the approval of the chici justice, shall prescribe the fliiaiu

-339-
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iiKinagenicnl procedures (o be used in

1

courts ol

ull

tlic

judicial

department. These procedures

kIkiII

(he prepuration of budget re(|uests, (2) the disbursement of ttmds

2

uiclude hul not he linuted to:

.?

appropriated to

4

items us authori/.ed in the judicial department operating budget, and (4) any other matter relating to

5

fiscal

6

tiic

judicial

(

)

I

department, (3) the purchase of lorms, supplies, equipment, and other

administration.

Section

4.

Capital Budgets,

The

(a)

7

prepare a consolidated capital budget for

8

[appeals court and] general
(b)

9

The

trial

director shall, subject to the approval

all

courts in the state.

He

shall

ot"

the chief justice,

be assisted

in this task

by

all

court administrators.

director shall prepare the consolidated capital budget according to procedures pre-

Budget

10

scribed by the [state budget officer] [and the joint budget committee of the legislature]

1

requests and other additional information as requested shall be transmitted to the [state budget offi-

12

cer]

13

recommendations

14

shall

15

tion of the budget request, the governor's

10
17

[and the joint budget committee] by [insert appropriate date]
for court capital expenditures

make appropriations or authorize bond

(c)

The consolidated

by

recommendations and the

capital budget for the judicial

and the

legislature

availability

department

on an

evalua-

of state funds.

shall include

but not be

limited to:

projections of additional court facilities required for each court;

(

19

(2) estimated costs of the additional facilities

21

[insert appropriate date]

shall include his

issues for court capital expenditures based

18

20

The governor

.

.

1

)

and whether these

facilities will

include space to

be used by other state agencies or governmental units of the state; and
(3) a detailed report

on the present court

currently in use and the reasons for their

facilities

22

inadequacy. The capital budget shall also indicate the relative priority of the capital construction

23

needs for each court for the next

24

(d)

The

[

]

years.

director, subject to the approval of the chief justice,

may

enter into leasing agreements

25

with local units of government or other departments of the state government

26

of capital

27

for that portion

facilities is

authorized.

The

leasing

agreement

shall

when joint

construction

provide for the payment of state funds

of the construction costs related to the operation of the courts.

TITLE IX

JUDICIAL RETIREMENT
1

2

Section!. Mandated Retirement.
included

in a

All judges shall retire at the age

retirement plan of the state.
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of seventy. They

shall

be
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1

2

by

liie

2.

Kligihility

for Rcappoininwni.

chief justice as an active retired judge.

and regulations

as other judges.

.>

judicial rules

4

court only at such times as he

5

case shall a judge serve

Section

h

3.

may be

on the bench

All relircd

An
He

judges shull be eligible for reappoinlmeiii

active retired judge shall be subject to the
shall act

only

in

same

such cases and matters and

directed and assigned by the chief judge of his court.

liokl

In

after [eighty] years of age.

Retirement System.^

(a) After |mserl appropriate date] the director, subject to

7

the approval of the supreme court |and the state icllrcmeiit bo;ud| shall pioiiuil(;alc the terms

K

conditions ol ictircmcnt

')

to:

loi |udicial

no

department pcisonncl.

;iiul

Ilicy shall include, but not be limited

10

(I) eligibility for retirement.

1

(2) basis of retirement compensation for the employees of the judicial department and their
survivors,

1

conditions of receiving relircnienl pay as concerns outside employment.

l.»

(.<)

14

(4) conditions for retirement for disability

15

(5)

16

In defining the

1

director shall take into account the retirement plans applicable to

18

legislative

19

any other matter that may be properly related to the determination of retirement pay.
terms and condition of retirement for personnel of the judicial department, the

employees of the executive and

departments.

(b) After (insert effective date of act)

employees of the

20

to be

21

employed by

n

|x;nsion benefits

judicial

employees of

department. These employees

local judicial agencies in

under the

all

local judicial agencies shall

be deemed

shall receive full credit for the

computing the number of years of

.service icc|uircd

time

to receive

|inscrl appropriate slate retirement plan]

TITLE-

X

MISCELLANEOUS
1

Section

I.

I'ffective Date.

2

Section

2.

Severability.

3

Section

.1.

Transition.

.Siiiiir

Sl.ilis

111. IV

XMvli

(Insert effective dale.

(Insert severability clause.

(Insert appropriate transition provisions.)

111 iiiti'i'i.ili'

llii'

iiiilii i.il

pi'iMiiiiu'l rrliiviiuiil sysliiii willi
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OMNIBUS PROSECUTION ACT
The
Slalc

It)

rchilioiisliip

Slalc.

lime, a lew

A lew

)-',ive

bclwccii

(lie iilloriicy

general

local prDscciilliig allorncys vaiies

;iikI

Stales vest euiiiplele pio.semlDtial aiillioiily

him no

aiillioiily wlialsoevei

in

in

llie

alloiney geiieial,

widely from
llie

at

same

criminal cases. Belween (liese exiremes, nuisl Slaies

lange ol relationships, inclniling mnlnally exclnsive areas ol criminal autlunily,

Ik'vc eslahlishecl a

attorney general advice and assistance to local prosecntors, and

control over local proseculnig

iliiect

altoineys hy the attorney geneiai.

Ihe pinposc ol the lollownig pioposed legislation

to strengthen slatewiile cooulmatioii ol

is

prosecutorial activity by providing for general supervision by the attorney general

ol' llio

prosecution

ci)in|)onent of a Stale's criminal justice system. Section 1 contains the necessary delinilions.

shoiilil

It

be recognized that the derinilion ol "local prosecuting attorney" will vary Irom Stale to State,

lermining the proper

titles,

however,

it

should be kept

mind

in

his jurisdiction. Section 3

primary responsibility lor instituting criminal actions within

number of

vides a

actions that the attorney general

on the request of the
cutor

fails

may

de-

in

that the local prosecutor should have

of the

bill

pro-

take vis-a-vis local prosecutors at his discretion;

local prosecuting attorney, the governor, or a

grand jury; or when the local prose-

to apply properly a statewide policy. These actions include consultation, technical assistance,

and intervention. This section also embodies necessary safeguards in connection with the exercise of the
attorney general's authority in criminal investigations. Section 4 authorizes the attorney general to submit periodically to the legislature local prosecution district reorganization plans, and requires local

prosecuting attorneys of multi-county districts to appoint

attorney general to prescribe

minimum

financial aid to offices certified as

at least

meeting these standards

investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses. Section
anil

assistant. Section 5 requires the

to cover pari
(t

of the costs related to the

establishes a State Council of Pro.seculors

provides for interagency cooperation, and Section 7 deals with reporting rec|uirements. Section X

contains procedures lor the removal

Tins draft

and

one

standards for local prosecutors' offices, and authorizes State

New

bill

prosecuting attorneys.

t)f local

draws upon the American Bar Association's "Model Depailmcnt of Justice Act"

"Crmimal Justice Act of 1970."
implement various sections of this act.

Jersey's

required to

In

some

Stales, conslilulional

amendments may be

Suggested Legislation

conform to stale requirements. The following is a
"An act providing for the general supervision by the

/Title should

suggestion:

attorney general of critninal law enforcement throughout the
state. "I

enacted, etc./

I lie it

1

2
?

•I

'i

Section
(1)

economic

J.

The

legislature

hereby finds and declares thai:

increasing rate of crime presents a serious threat to the political,

instiliitioiis

of Ihe slate and helps bung alunil

ai'.cMiies ol I'.oveiiiinent

{!)

The

Findings and I'urpose.

,

a loss

si)cial,

of populai conlulence

ill

and
the

,ind

Iiagmented adnnmstiation

ol

the pioseciilion IiiikIioii has icdnced the cllecliveness ol
political subdivisions,

(>

the crime prevention and control eH\)rts of the state and

7

Ihe consisleni application of criminal law throughout Ihe state.

-342-
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and has hlndeied
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1

1

the purpose of this act to encourage cooperation

among

state

and local prosecuting

general supervision of criminal justice by the attorney general as

2

attorneys and to provide tor

3

chief law officer of the state,

4

nient of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice througlu)ut the state.

5

Sccliou

6

(I)

tlie

Dcfinilions.

2.

order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient cnt'orcc-

in

As used

this act:

in

"Local prosecuting attorney" means

|county or

a

district prosecutor, or a

county

7

allorney, district attorney, stale's attorney, circuit attorney, city attorney, ciirporalion counsel, or

K

solicilorl'

')

It)

I

is

1

having primary responsibility lor instituting criminal actions.

"Law

(2)

employed

full

Sir I inn

I

(a)

13

attorneys and

14

He

15

effective

police officer, sherill, or other individual

a

J.

I'owers

and Duties

may

shall consult

with and advise the several local prosecuting

provide technical assistance in matters relating to the duties of their office.

and uniform enforcement of the criminal laws throughout the

(b)

Any

may

local prosecuting attorney

request in writing the assistance of the attorney

general in the conduct of any investigation, criminal action, or proceeding.

IH

may

I'J

the discharge of his duties.

thereafter take whatever action he

(c)

Whenever

deems necessary

reciuesled in writing

by

The attorney general

to assist the local prosecuting attorney in

by the governor, the attorney general

county or by

cvci icqucsted in wiitiiig

II

the attorney general

23

by

24

purpose of conducting such investigations, criminal actions, or proceedings as

25

for the protection of the rights

a local

26

(d)

a giaiid |ury ol a

intervene

in

prosecuting attorney, and

Whenever

in his

[insert

any investigation, criminal action,

may appear

for the state in

and interests of the

policy or has applied

2^

in

30

general

31

investigations, criminal actions, or proceedings as shall be necessary to

\?

public

I

iiisliluled

shall

be necessary

by so doing, the

prosecuting attorney refu.ses to apply a statewide

28

manner

proceeding

will bo liirtliered

attorney general may, and whenever
in a

ot

any court or tribunal lor the

27

it

and when-

state.

opinion the interests of the state
a U)cal

shall,

other appropriate agencies|.

21

may

view to obtaining

a

stale.

17

20

is

oj the Attorney (lemral.

maintain a general supervision over local prosecuting attorneys with

shall

who

time by the slate or a unit of local government to preserve t)rder and enforce the laws.

The attorney general

12

16

cement officer" means

eiilt))

that distorts

its

purposes, the attorney general

.shall,

intervene

or initiate any investigation, criminal action, or proceeding. In such instances, the attorney

.ti

li

may

appear for the state

iiiioii-sis

in

any court or tribunal for the purpose of conducting such

promote and safeguard the

of the slate ami secure Ihe enforcemeni of the laws of the stale. I'lhe attorney

\l.ilr nIioiiIiI insi-il

llir .i|i|>iii|m l.ilr

(tllr

iil

il\ lot.il

-343-
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1

general

may

2

the state

3

(e)

4

/

any ami

all

no

prosecute the criminal business of the state

shall

Whenever the altotncy general

(0

sccllou. he shall

In-

aullioii/cd to exeici.se

wonUi

pioseculiu^', .illoiiiiy

^)

gatiiin ol alleged crimes, the

and

10

tion

1

criminal cases

12

funds, he

13

powers

oi

.iiid

ici|iimc(I

subsections (b) and (c) ol

peiloini

llie

all

Io pciloiin,

and the representation ol the

in the courts

of

this state.

diilKS

Muhubnf,

llic

luial

llie uivesli-

|uiies, (he piepaia-

state in

all

proceedings

in

Subject to the availability of

appoint temporary assistants, aides, investigators, or other personnel.

The powers and duties conferred upon or required of the attorney general by

(g)

this act

not be construed to supplant or deprive local prosecuting attorneys of any of their authority

14

shall

15

in

16

criminal laws of the state.

respect to criminal prosecutions, or relieve

Local Prosecution

17

Section

IK

districts shall

1')

crimes under state law and handle

20

the

ni

attendance before the ciuninal courts and giand

on appeal or otherwise

may

all

be aulhoii/cd

ollicivk'ise

ot indictments for crimes,

trial

any county or

shall assist, intervene or participate in, or initiate or

conduct any criminal action or piocccding as lierelolore provuk'd
lliis

in

local prosecuting attorney.

S

(b)

4.

appoint

So

as to

at least

warrant

one

them from any of

(a)

Districts,

assistant

at least

|in

their duties to enforce the

Local prosecuting attorneys of multi-county

each county) to coordinate the prosecution ol

stages of felony proceedings.

all

one

full-time local prosecuting attorney

and the supporting

necessary lor elleclive performance ol the prosecution I'unclion, the atlorney general shall

2!

stall

11

submit peiiodically Io (he legislature

li

districts

24

factors.^

25

local prosecuting attorney in representing the interests ol

appeals and applications for post-conviction remedies.)

The attorney general

judicial district having

5
(i

in

any

lor

in his iliscrelit)n act

on the

Section

a

plan revising existing or establishing

basis of popidalion. caseU)ad, judicial district bourularies,

5.

Minimum

Standards; Financial Assistance,

new

local prosecution

and olhei relevant

(a) In order to assure the efficient

minimum

26

operation of offices of local prosecuting attorneys, the attorney general shall prescribe

27

standards with regard to personnel, procedures, and other appropriate matters. Offices of local

28

prosecuting aitorneys shall be given reasonable opportunity to meet such

29

or before (the last

30

bursing officer] those offices of local prosecuting attorneys meeting these standards. The (state

31

disbursing officer]

'III stiniu

St. Ill's.

;i

day of each

.shall

fiscal

year]

,

may

standards.

On

the attorney general shall certify to the [state dis-

make payments, from funds appropriated

toiisliltithiii.il ;iiiicmltnciit

minimum

W
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for that purpose, to the

iii)|ili-im*rit

this siilisci linti
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1

appropriate (units of local goveriiment| to reimburse them for [fifty] percent of the costs incurred

2

during the ensuing

3

offenses conducted by certified offices of local prosecuting attorneys.

4

Section

year for activities related to the investigation and prosecution of criminal

Srarc Council

6.

of Prosecutors and Interagency Cooperation,

5

ponctal shall cslablish a slalo council of proseculors

(>

wliiili shall inccl

/

S

10
I

on

a icgulai

composed of

all

(a)

The attorney

local prosecuting

altomcys,

basis lo develop nuulclnies loi local proscciiliiin altoriieys

lha( local pioscmlioii politics aiul piacliccs lucel slalc iniiiniiuni slaiidauls

and aic

ami assuic
liciin

coiisistciil

lurisdictioii lo luiisdiclum.

I)

I

fiscal

(b)

and as often as may be required,

call

local prosecuting attorneys, the chiefs of police of the several counties

and

Ihe ailDincy general may, from lime

mio conlerencc

llic

to time,

and any other law enforcement officers of the

nuinicipalities,

slate or such

may

advisable, for the purpose of discussing the duties of their respective offices with a view to

12

deem

13

the adequate and uniform enforcement of the criminal laws of this state.

14

of them as he

(c)

All local prosecuting attorneys

and

local police officers shall cooperate with

15

the attorney general in the performance of his duties. All state and local law

16

shall

17

performance of

and aid

enforcement officers

cooperate with and aid the attorney general and the several local prosecuting attorneys

Section

18

Reports,

7.

(a) The alU)rney general shall annually subniil Id

10

logellici Willi suggestions

21

criminal laws ol Ihe

22

reports of the several local prosecuting attorneys.

Each

sl.ile.

llic

govenuii and the

of his office during Ihe preceding caleiidai yeai.

legislature a lepoil selling Inrlh Ihe activilies

(b)

the

their respective duties.

l'»

23

in

and recominendalions

loi

Ihe adequate and iinlloim enforcemeni ol

The allorney general shall include

local prosecuting attorney shall annually

in his

llic

report an abstract of Ihe annual

submit to the attorney general

a

wnlten

[calendar] year, covering such items of information and such

24

report for the last preceding jfiscal]

25

dispositions of complaints, investigations, criminal actions, and proceedings as the attorney general

26

shall prescribe.

27

submit, from time to lime, reports as to any matters pertaining to the duties of their office.

28

(c)

The attorney

general

may

alst)

The attorney general may make

require the several local prosecuting attorneys to

studies

2''

and methods of operation and administration of

30

wilh

31

ihc

32

siilis

a

all

and surveys of the organization, procedures,
law enforcement agencies within the state,

view toward preventing crime, improving the administration of criminal justice, and securing

improved enlorcenieni of the criminal law. Such studies may include the procedures and
ol scnlencing.

whcic senlences

ate

open
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lo discrelion.

re-
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I

Slilldll

S

KillliiVllI i>l

Ididl

l'lii\CtlltlllK :\lli'tlll\'\

.llllllllilll

III

Id

,IIIV

.111(1

u'Miiiv.il liiiiii iilluc. Ilic .illiiiniy ('.ciici.il. .illii

i<'m-I|iI

m;iy iiiilutc pmucihIiiius Ihi

loi.il

.ill

liullliuls IKiW

.'

piiividcil l>v Liw

}

on

4

the stJie by the

5

such investigation as he deems necessary to verity or retute the substance of the coniplaint

6

such investigation, the attorney general

7

gallon and hearing, the attorney general

8

office of

9

general's proceedings and in

10
I

I

I

2

1.^

his

shall

own

(ill

iiiuluiii,

supieme courl. Upon

icccipl o\ j

may
may

iciiidv.iI uI

v;ili(J

its

discretion

local prosecuting attorney or

Section

9.

it

petition the

may

supreme court

ID.

Separability.

I.S

Section

II.

I.'tjeclivc

lor the

shall review the record

>iiii|iI.iiiiI

hi

.iIIdiih-v hi

in.ike

sluill

Allor

removal from

of the attorney

permit the introduction of additional evidence.

reject the petition

hereby repealed.

Section

pniM-iiidnn

i

may

It

order the removal of any

of the attorney general.

All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this

Laws Repealed.

14

v.iIiiI

coinpluiiit, iho iiltmncy gcnci.il

finds just and proper, and

may wholly

;iiiy

.i

order a confidential hearing lo be held. After investi-

any orosecuting attorney. The supreme court

make whatever determination

act are

iIk-

<>I

[Insert separability clause.]

Date.

|

Insert effective date.
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